The Impact of Populist Governance on Civil Society Advocacy

The rise to power of right-wing populist parties in liberal democracies has sparked intense debates about the state and future of democracy. Sweden is a clear example of a country with stable democratic institutions, a vibrant civil society, and a high degree of trust in public institutions that has seen a right-wing populist party, the Sweden Democrats, increase its electoral success election after election. Following the 2022 elections, Sweden Democrats gained direct access to state policies by supporting a centre-right government led by a liberal-conservative party.

Drawing on considerable experience of civil society studies at the School of Social Work at Lund University, and funded by the Swedish Research Council, we started a research project in 2024 titled “Civil Society and Populism: How the rise to power of populist parties affects state–civil society relations”. The project employs a comparative approach, focusing on two countries: Sweden and Italy. The latter is an interesting example of a liberal democracy with a long history of right-wing populist parties influencing government policies. In this brief article we present the project’s research agenda and insights from a case study recently published in the International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society.

The centrality of advocacy in liberal democracies

One of the main functions of civil society organisations (CSOs) in liberal democracy is advocacy. For some organisations, this means advocating for their members’ rights or interests, such as those of women, people with disabilities, or other minority groups. Other organisations pursue more general interests without a strict representative role, such as those focused on sustainability, peace, or human rights. This advocacy role is a hallmark of liberal democracy and presupposes access to free public debate and policy-making processes. CSOs can, therefore, be viewed as intermediaries between the state machinery and citizens.

Such an advocacy role is potentially in tension, or even in conflict, with how many right-wing populist parties conceive of their position in society and the political system. These parties tend to emphasise the direct connection between the leader and the people, rejecting the idea of intermediaries like CSOs, which can be viewed as part of a corrupt elite. Furthermore, many CSOs with a central position in access to public policy-making over the last few decades originated in social movements that push for humanitarianism, solidarity, the rights of minority groups, and against discrimination. These values clash with the nationalistic, nativist and value-conservative view of many right-wing populist parties.

Advocacy and four types of CSO responses

Our study explores how operationally effective CSOs in Italy and Sweden responded to their governments’ budgetary legislation in 2024. Budgetary legislation is a crucial part of governance, allocating resources for various policies, including funding for CSOs. It can become an essential instrument for populist governance, understood as the exercise of power by populist parties. We study effective CSOs because, having a central position in policy-making and possessing considerable resources, they can be greatly affected by changes brought about by populist governance measures, not least in terms of their capacity to act if their funding were cut. They would also be, from their operationally effective position, able to criticise the government’s provisions, although at the risk of losing their privileged position.

To understand different advocacy strategies, we develop a model of CSO responses to policy changes based on two dimensions: 1) level of criticism, from acceptance to rejection; and 2) extent of criticism, from policy-oriented to system-oriented. These two dimensions intersect, forming four different response options, as shown in the model that follows.

 The model allows responses to be characterised according to these dimensions. Policy-oriented acceptance (lower left) would be pursued by CSOs that largely accept the political status quo but may criticise specific policy details. System-oriented acceptance (lower right) would instead be used by CSOs that accept the broader political framework but advocate significant systemic reforms.

Regarding the more conflicting reactions, policy-oriented rejection (upper left) would be adopted by CSOs that reject specific policies or initiatives of populist governments without challenging the entire system. Finally, system-oriented rejection (upper right) would apply to CSOs that fundamentally oppose populist governance and advocate transformative change.

Different CSOs respond differently

In our study, we find instances of all four types of response, which indicate that CSOs can react quite differently to the changes brought about by populist governance, depending on their position in the organisational field. Some policy areas might be more or less exposed to reforms that CSOs perceive as unfavourable, affecting the members’ perception of their impact on the CSO or the interests they represent. Compared to CSOs active in specific policy areas, some, aiming to represent the entire civil society sector, may adopt a more conflicting approach or a more prudent approach, possibly depending on the level of consensus among their members. Based on their ideology and mission, some might also feel more threatened by what they perceive as a nationalist–conservative agenda. This can, for instance, apply to organisations linked to workers’ or migrants’ movements.

These results suggest that different CSOs will respond to populist governance differently, based on their perception of the effects of the reforms, their policy area of interest, their ideology and value base, and their position within the civil society sector hierarchy.

Context matters for CSO responses

One of the central values of comparative studies is based on the assumption that context matters for the outcomes we are interested in. Italy and Sweden offer two very different contexts within the framework of stable liberal democracies in Europe. Italian civil society is traditionally primarily oriented towards service provision, while Swedish civil society is oriented towards expressive functions and advocacy. State funding of civil society in Italy is generally more indirect, through regional and local authorities, while in Sweden, it is more direct and administered by state agencies. The types of populist parties, historical trajectories and access to power also differ between the two countries.

Despite finding important differences between Italian and Swedish CSO responses to budgetary legislation, we also observe a substantial variation in CSO responses at the individual country level. In both countries, we observe examples of responses related to three of the four response types. When examining the CSO responses and comparing the two countries, we find, however, that Swedish CSOs tend to be more oriented towards rejecting populist governance and offering a more systemic critique. With the reservation that our case study is based on a small number of CSOs (11 for each country), these results suggest that the national context does indeed matter concerning how CSOs react to populist governance.

One possible explanation for the differences could be an ongoing normalisation of populist governance in Italy, a country where CSOs have been dealing with these policies for a longer time. Such a mechanism of normalisation may not yet have had an impact on CSOs in Sweden. An orientation of the civil society sector in Italy towards provision of services may also make CSOs less likely to criticise the government than a more advocacy-oriented sector would be, such as the one in Sweden. Examining public institutions, we might also consider that in a country where the state directly controls civil society funding, as is the case in Sweden, populist governance aimed at obstructing oppositional CSOs has a more direct effect on them, which reasonably sparks a stronger reaction.

Can CSOs serve as a counterweight to populist governance?

The answer to this question is not easy. It is essential to note that liberal governments have implemented restrictive measures against CSOs in well-functioning liberal democracies with no direct link to populist parties. It is hence not surprising that many CSOs in different contexts perceive a shrinking of civic space. The increasingly limited room for manoeuvre is accompanied by restrictive policies targeting many groups and issues with which operationally effective CSOs work. The extent to which CSOs can uphold a position as being effective while also assuming a critical position towards public policy has been a central topic in civil society studies. The issue becomes topical in times of populist governance, which may lead to democratic backsliding and a shift towards more autocratic rule. Furthermore, CSOs may become less likely to pursue a critical advocacy function due to the normalisation of populist governance and right-wing discourse. Further studies are needed to explore the structural and organisational preconditions for the activities of CSOs in times of populist governance, as well as in other national contexts.

Roberto Scaramuzzino, Lund University, Sweden <roberto.scaramuzzino@soch.lu.se> and Cecilia Santilli, Lund University, Sweden