Talking Sociology with Alain Caillé

Protests and Movements

Media and Digital Capitalism

Theoretical Perspectives

Sociology from the Philippines

COVID-19: Pandemic and Crisis

Open Section

> Gendered Urban Space in Bangladesh
> Labor Internationalism and the Free Circulation of Capital
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The COVID-19 pandemic and crisis dominates the discussions and developments in many countries around the world. The so-called hotspots or the gap between countries of the Global North and South show how social inequalities matter. It is not only healthcare that will be a matter of concern in the next years but also the succeeding economic, social and political developments. In some countries the economic crisis amounts to a deep ongoing social crisis, and/or democracy is put at risk by restrictive politics. With this issue Global Dialogue starts a series on the pandemic and its meaning for the society and for sociology and invites authors from different countries and regions to contribute their insights. To start this series, three authors share their reflections on COVID-19 and its effects.

In our section ‘Talking Sociology’ Sari Hanafi conducts an interview with Alain Caillé, co-founder of the convivialist movement and manifesto. Caillé criticizes the neoliberal standpoint, describes the roots of “Convivialism,” and shows why and how it functions as an “empty signifier” bringing together people who hope and strive to create a “post-neoliberal world.”

In the last years we have been witnessing a lot of protests against anti-democratic tendencies, neoliberal developments, and the effects of market-driven economic and social inequalities. New social movements and protest forms have emerged and challenged the politics of the establishment in many regions of the world. Our first symposium – with contributions by Ngai-Ling Sum, Michalis Lianos, Jorge Rojas Hernández, Gunhild Hansen-Rojas, and Rima Majed – sheds light on the situation in Hong Kong, France, Chile, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The second symposium highlights how media and communication together with the drive for profit shape our society. The articles put together by Marlen van den Ecker and Sebastian Sevignani cover different aspects and effects of the digitalization and marketization of communication – from social media users acting as unpaid laborers and the role of data in capitalist ownership and accumulation to the new digital workers in China and the restructuring of media systems – and show how these processes go hand in hand with the transformation of capitalism in different parts of the world.

The section on ‘Theoretical Perspectives’ also takes up the subject of information and communication technologies. Francis Nyamnjoh reflects on the West and Central African idea of human beings embedded in an ontology of “the incompleteness and compositeness of being human” and shows how this is affected by the use of technologies.

For our section focused on the sociology of a particular country or region Filomin Gutierrez has taken the responsibility to invite colleagues from the Philippines to present important sociological issues and findings. The result is an impressive collection of pieces from urban studies, public sociology and more.

The articles included in our Open Section address important sociological topics such as the gendering of open space, labor internationalism, finance capitalism and the reaction to right-wing populism.

Brigitte Aulenbacher and Klaus Dörre, editors of Global Dialogue

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> Submissions should be sent to globaldialogue.isa@gmail.com.
In the last years, many countries around the world have seen the rise of social movements and mass demonstrations. These protests and movements, which were expressed foremost on the streets, tackled different issues and demands against anti-democratic tendencies, neoliberal developments, and the effects of market-driven economic and social inequalities. This symposium includes four pieces reflecting on the specific forms these social movements and protests took in Lebanon, Iraq, France, Chile, and Hong Kong.

This section provides insights into sociology from the Philippines. Members of the Philippine Sociological Society (PSS) discuss their sociological research focusing on issues such as urbanization and governance, the LGBT movement, violence in the war on drugs, doing public sociology among the poor, and the marginalization of the Mindanao region.

With this issue, Global Dialogue initiates a series on COVID-19 to discuss the meaning and consequences of the pandemic for different countries and regions, for society as a whole, and for sociology. In this section three sociologists present their insights into the challenges and responsibilities sociology has these days.
“Young people are increasingly aware of the imminence of ecological perils but do not clearly perceive that we will not be able to face them without calling into question the hegemony of neoliberalism and without giving new life to the democratic imagination.”

Alain Caillé
SH: Could you introduce the Convivialist Manifesto to our readers?

AC: Before talking about its content, it is worth noting that this Second Convivialist Manifesto is co-signed by nearly 300 intellectuals (economists, philosophers, sociologists, community activists) and artistic personalities from 33 different countries. They form the embryo of a kind of Convivialist International (the name that has been chosen to designate the collective author of the Manifesto). An International, totally informal, with no office, no organization (just some goodwill) and no funding, but which has been active in extending the manifesto well beyond the 300 initial signatories, to other intellectuals, activists, and artists, and, above all, to provoke a decisive shift in world public opinion. For several decades, we have been living under the influence, under the hegemony, as Gramsci would have said, of the neoliberal ideology that prevents us from imagining a world other than our own, entirely submitted to the injunctions of a rentier and speculative capitalism. By its very nature, this generates vertiginous inequalities, which, day after day, empty the democratic ideals of their content. Except in countries that are trying to get rid of their dictators, there is less and less “belief” in these ideals, especially among young people. This is obviously catastrophic. Democracy is now under threat just about everywhere in the world, just as it was in Europe in the 1930s. With it, everything...
that is part of critical thinking, starting with sociology, is in danger of disappearing.

**SH: Why is the neoliberal ideology so powerful?**

**AC:** It is supported, of course, by gigantic material, economic, financial, military, police, media, and sometimes criminal resources. But there is also another factor, less well-perceived but essential, which is the raison d'être of convivialism: to this date, there is no alternative ideology, no more or less coherent set of ideas, concepts, theories, and values in the name of which could gather all those, countless in number, who aspire to something other than a world governed solely by financial and speculative logic. A world, as we know well, that is on the verge of tipping over into irremediable climatic and environmental disasters. In rich countries, young people are increasingly aware of the imminence of these ecological perils, but they do not see, or do not clearly perceive, that we will not be able to face them without calling into question the hegemony of neoliberalism and without, in order to do so, giving new life to the democratic imagination.

In an ideal-typical way, let us say that the neoliberal ideology is organized around the following six propositions: 1) There are no societies, only individuals. 2) Greed is good. 3) The richer a society is, the better it is, because everyone will benefit by a trickle-down effect. 4) The only desirable mode of coordination between human subjects is the free market, including the self-regulated financial and speculative market. 5) There are no limits. More necessarily means better. 6) There is no alternative. What is surprising is that none of these propositions has any real theoretical or empirical consistency. And yet we are not sure what to oppose them.

**SH: How do you explain this?**

**AC:** If we remain impotent in the face of neoliberalism, it is because the great modern political ideologies, of which we are heirs: liberalism, socialism, communism, anarchism (and that we combine them as we wish) are no longer capable of dealing with the problems we have to face today. There are at least three reasons for this: 1) All these ideologies, at least in their main variants, are based on the premise that humans are first and foremost beings of need, and that conflicts between them are caused by material scarcity, leading to the deduction that the first imperative is to produce ever more. 2) This “solution” could make sense as long as nature appeared inexhaustible and infinitely exploitable (as long as we were not under the threat of secular stagnation [a condition when there is negligible growth in a market-based economy] which many economists diagnose). We now know that this is not the case. 3) In perceiving us as needy creatures, these ideologies ignore that the other source of conflict, at least as important as material scarcity, is the desire for recognition.

As a result, they tell us nothing about the possible ways in which different cultures and religions can coexist, either between or within countries – not to mention the relationships between men and women.

The term “convivialism” can therefore be seen at the very least as an empty signifier (the equivalent of mana according to Lévi-Strauss...) symbolizing the hope of a new political ideology in which all those who aspire to build a post-neoliberal world can recognize themselves, each one putting under this term their own aspirations and interests.

**SH: But is the term “convivialism” the best terminological choice to name a new political ideology?**

**AC:** Is it the right word? Is it neoliberalism really the problem? Is it the right word? In English and French, conviviality is the art of eating with friends and having a good time together. The word conviviality therefore has a slightly “nice” connotation, which repels some of our potential supporters. However, we couldn’t think of a better term for a philosophy of living together (of conviviality) that helps us to ask how people can and should cooperate by “opposing without slaughtering each other” (as Marcel Mauss put it). Is it the right problem? Some of the scholars we contacted gave up on signing, saying that the crucial problem today is not the hegemony of neoliberalism but the rise of populism. This latter is indeed a result of neoliberal hegemony, its other side in a way. One only has to reread Karl Polanyi’s *The Great Transformation* to be convinced of this.

**SH: What are the fundamental principles of convivialism?**

**AC:** “Convivialism” is not only an empty signifier, a symbol of hope. For my part, I am glad at the fact that extremely diverse intellectual personalities – of rather liberal or socialist inspiration for some, communist or anarchist for others, not to mention different religious traditions – have been able to agree on five ultimate values or principles, which I cannot detail here: the principles of common nature, common humanity, common sociality, legitimate individuation, and creative opposition (“to cooperate by opposing without slaughtering each other”). These five principles draw a common axiological space that circumscribes the field of possible legitimate political choices. They temper each other. But all of them are subordinated to an imperative that can be said to be categorical: that of the necessary mastery against excessiveness and hubris. Humanity has very little time left to learn how to control its propensity to hubris. Perhaps the priority task of sociology is to help it do so.

**SH: Does your sociology constitute a call to connect sociology with moral philosophy?**

**AC:** Among other things, yes. I can’t read the great classics of sociology, Marx, Tocqueville, Weber, Durkheim, etc.,...
other than as moral and political philosophers, albeit of a rather peculiar kind. Philosophers who, unlike Hobbes or Rousseau (who said: “Let’s set aside all the facts”), are concerned about facts and their historicity. They are also concerned about anthropology. How can we understand our present without seeing what remains in it from past social forms? Hence my interest in Marcel Mauss, who shows us how early societies organized themselves to distribute recognition to their members in proportion to their gifts or their participation in the field of what the phenomenological tradition calls donation. A field of which mana is the best known expression. Without this dimension of moral philosophy, the classics would not speak to us and would no longer interest us. A sociology which would limit itself to wanting to establish facts – an infinite task (which facts? how? why?) – would run dry and would condemn itself to insignificance.

**SH:** Among the moral entrepreneurs are the religious authorities. Do you plan to discuss/collaborate with them?

**AC:** My conviction is that our only chance to avoid the disasters – ecological, economic, financial, social, political and moral – that threaten us, is a global awareness of the magnitude and urgency of the issues at stake. Against the damages generated by the financial and speculative capitalism that is now dominant (you will have noticed that I am not saying anything about capitalism in general...) we must succeed in mobilizing a majority public opinion in as many countries as possible. I am not saying that it will be easy or that we have a great chance of success, but it is obvious that we will not have any without the support of religious authorities. That is why the Second Manifesto quotes fairly long passages from a declaration, Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together, co-signed on February 4, 2019 by Pope Francis, in the name of the Christians, and by the Grand Imam of al-Azhar (Egypt), Ahmad al-Tayyeb, in the name of the Muslims. And I do not see why Protestant, Buddhist, Jewish, etc., moral authorities could not be associated with it. Perhaps we should try to create promptly something like a World Assembly of Common Humanity, comprising representatives of world civil society, of philosophy, of the so-called “exact” sciences, of the human and social sciences, and of the different ethical, spiritual, and religious currents which would recognize themselves in the principles of convivialism. It seems to me that the ISA (International Sociological Association) could play an eminent role here.

**SH:** Has the reflection on this manifesto been verified as to its usefulness/validity for the Global South? Has any research been conducted in these countries?

**AC:** I would answer yes and no. Yes, because a significant number of signatories come from what you call the Global South and because a number of friends from the South have been associated with the convivialism initiative since the first Manifesto (2013). And no, unfortunately, because most of the writing and drafting work was done in the North. An important step now is that of an appropriation and enrichment of the convivialist reflection by the South. Translations are being made into Portuguese and Spanish (in addition to English, German, Italian, and Japanese), and friends are expected to take them to Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, but also, I hope, to India, Africa, etc. A translation into Arabic would be particularly important, for many reasons. But let’s get to the point. I would say that this Second Manifesto lays the foundation for a post-neoliberal consensus on crucial ecological, economic, and political issues. This is already good. But there is still a lot of work to be done to integrate all the debates carried by postcolonial, gender, subaltern, cultural perspectives. This would be a Third Convivialist Manifesto (which too would end up needing renewal), or at least what we could call a Supplement to the Convivialist Manifestoes. And here the contribution of the South will be totally indispensable.

**SH:** Are you optimistic about the spreading of convivialism?

**AC:** It seems to me that the Second Convivialist Manifesto lays the foundation of the political philosophy that we now urgently need. But a political philosophy does not make a policy. In order to go further, it is now necessary for “political entrepreneurs” to take hold of it and to show in each country in concrete terms what almost everybody (ordinary employees, precarious workers, small traders or entrepreneurs, segregated populations, etc.) would gain from convivialism. If, in all these social categories, more people start to think to themselves and to say to each other “I am a convivialist,” then we will have a chance to avoid the disasters that await us.

**SH:** Thanks Alain, I wish you all the best for your Convivialist Manifesto.

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Before the outbreak of Covid-19 and the enactment of restrictions regarding movement and the right of assembly, many countries around the globe saw a rise of social protests manifesting in marches and demonstrations. These protests, which were expressed foremost on the streets, tackled different issues and demands. This symposium includes four pieces reflecting on the specific forms these social movements and protests took in Lebanon, Iraq, France, Chile, and Hong Kong.

The symposium opens with an article by Ngai-Ling Sum, who examines the protests that took place in the streets of Hong Kong in June 2019. Sum interprets the protest from a neo-Foucauldian view and shows how, under illiberal authoritarian conditions, it spiraled into a social movement, how the struggle was expressed through the sovereign’s increasing assertion of its control by using disproportionate police violence, and how the affirmative biopolitics of the front-line insurgents culminated in the protection of life from (near) death.

In November 2018, protests by the Yellow Vests emerged all over France, initiating a new structure and practice of social movement. In his article, Michalis Lianos gives us an insight into this spontaneous and non-partisan form of movement that challenges our sociological understanding of the organization, architecture, and success of collective political action and reflexivity.

After 40 years of neoliberal politics and ongoing protests in Chile, a new emancipatory consciousness developed among Chileans, triggering massive and creative protests in October 2019. Jorge Rojas Hernández and Gunhild Hansen-Rojas describe the country’s social crisis stemming from neoliberalism, the unique historical opportunity Chile is facing, and the social protests that led to the convocation of a referendum on the creation of a new constitution.

We round out this symposium with Rima Majed’s examination of the uprisings that took place in October 2019 in Iraq and Lebanon. Majed analyzes these uprisings in terms of the revolutionary process that arose in the political system known as consociational democracy. In search of a lost “we,” the social actors have to keep their social and political focal point on the demand for socio-economic justice while rejecting the system of sectarian power-sharing.
Hong Kong’s June 2019 protest was triggered by an Extradition Bill which, if passed, would allow the repatriation of Hong Kong citizens/visitors to mainland China for criminal prosecution under its rule by (and not rule of) law system. This ignites local fear of Hong Kong losing its “high degree of autonomy” under the One-Country-Two-Systems framework. The latter was guaranteed by the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and China’s 1990 Basic Law when Hong Kong was returned to mainland China as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) in 1997. Under this framework, Hong Kong is vested with executive and legislative power, an independent judiciary, as well as the right to a Chief Executive appointed by the central government based on elections or consultations held locally.

Since 2003, this fear of losing autonomy has been accelerating with mainland China’s sovereign One-Country life gaining further inroads. Examples include the rolling out of pro-China legislation that ranged from the Article 23 anti-subversion bill in 2003 through to the [Chinese] National Anthem Bill in 2019. These measures were accompanied by the rolling back of Hong Kong’s democratic elements, such as the rejection of direct election for the Chief Executive in 2015 and the disqualification of six pro-democracy legislators from holding office in 2017. Such encroachment by the One-Country life was further accentuated by the fast tracking of the 2019 Extradition Bill. The SAR government, with the support of the Chinese central government, even skipped the usual legislative scrutiny at committee stage and took the bill directly to the pro-China legislature for approval. In face of such urgency, first one, and then two, million people participated in peaceful marches on June 9 and 16 respectively. With delayed official responses and police brutalities, protests endure on a regular basis. The protestors had five demands: withdraw the Extradition Bill; stop describing the demonstrators as “rioters”; issue an amnesty for all arrested protesters; conduct an independent inquiry into police brutality; and grant universal suffrage for the elections of Hong Kong’s Chief
Executive and Legislative Council. The Bill was finally withdrawn on September 4, 2019. However, because of recurrent police brutality and the refusal of the Chief Executive to meet the protestors’ four other demands (see Table 1), resistance spiraled into a social movement.

In analyzing this protest as a social movement, this paper deploys a neo-Foucauldian perspective that focuses on the sovereign biopolitics of life/death. For Foucault, the sovereign sees itself as having the right to rule a territory and engages in the biopolitics of life/death to maintain its own security/safety. The degrees of sovereignty vary in modern societies and they are more visible in illiberal authoritarian contexts than in democratic ones. With the onset of the One-Country life in Hong Kong, the SAR government engages in co-sovereign rule with mainland China’s one-party regime in maintaining Hong Kong’s stability/security. Hong Kong protestors live at the margin of this authoritarian co-rule and have little room for maneuver. Their biopolitics of resistance thus involve frontline insurgents weaponizing their life to (near) death; and background supporters affirming the protection of insurgents’ life from (near) death.

> **Insurgent biopolitics: The weaponization of life to (near) death**

In face of the stepping up of mainland China’s sovereign One-Country life and its triggering of the 2019 protest, the police (and law) play sovereign roles in the biopolitics of: a) debilitating street-level protest life; b) inflicting fear via arrest, prosecution, and trial; and c) causing bodily harm via disproportionate violence. With the Chinese central government condemning protestors as “close to being terrorists,” and the Hong Kong Chief Executive not responding to their five demands (see Table 1), the protest has turned from peaceful to more forceful/violent means (see Table 2). The riot police, with the Chief Executive’s support, have reacted more violently with tear gas, arbitrary/forceful arrests, brutal beatings, chemicalized water cannon, and even guns. They have planted moles and labeled protestors as “cockroaches” who can be erased to maintain security. This has degenerated into the scenario of “violence begets more violence” and protestors have begun to experience personal and public fear/hopelessness.

The frontline protestors resist by weaponizing their life in response to disproportionate police violence and their fear about the future – their own, and that of Hong Kong. Their refusal to be displaced provides a fertile ground for the growth of a Hong Kong identity. Some insurgents are prepared to sacrifice their lives as they want to defend/rescue Hong Kong’s autonomous life as set out in the Two-Systems. In war-zone type combat with the police, some have even placed their wills (and non-suicide notes) in their rucksacks. Personal reflections include “Give up Life for Hong Kong Society,” “Defend Hong Kong with my Blood,” and “Use Death to Exchange for Freedom.” These ways of weaponizing life in Hong Kong's insurgent biopolitics are passionately framed in terms of hope/fear, shock, anger, tears, blood, and (near) death. Resistance involves the biopolitics of psychological trauma, self-sacrifice, fear of physical injuries, arrest, detention, prosecution, imprisonment, disappearance, and suicides.

> **Affirmative biopolitics: The protection of life from (near) death**

The protestors’ insurgent biopolitics are inviting affirmative efforts to protect life. Protagonists from the previous 2014 Umbrella Movement learnt that leaders could be prosecuted and imprisoned. This experience contributed to the present movement functioning without a formal leader. It adopts a leaderless strategy and deploys the diffuse tactics of “be water” and mutual help. These are facilitated by the use of Internet applications like Telegram and Airdrop to share information and to coordinate actions/decisions amongst themselves.

The movement is cloud-funded and reinforced by mutual-help groups that cross occupational, generational, gender and racial lines. These supporters rally round to protect insurgents’ life from (near) death. An example is the Protect the Children campaign started by a “silver hairs” (senior citizens) group to keep watchful eyes and protect the frontline youngsters. Some choose to stand between riot police and front-liners; whilst others hold out placards with statements such as “Don’t Shoot Our Kids.” These life-

### Table 1: Hong Kong Protestors’ Five Demands, 2019

- Withdraw the Extradition Bill
- Stop describing the demonstrators as “rioters”
- Issue an amnesty for all arrested protesters
- Conduct an independent inquiry into police brutality
- Grant universal suffrage for the elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and the Legislative Council

### Table 2: Peaceful and Forceful Forms of Protest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nature of Protest</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peaceful Means</strong></td>
<td>Demonstrations, human chains, song singing/meetings in public places, making posters/statutes, Lennon Walls/Tunnels, international advocacy, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forceful Means</strong></td>
<td>Spray cans, laser torches, street-level combat, petrol bombs, barricades, private/public abuses, throwing bricks, arson of pro-China commercial outlets, siege of universities, etc.</td>
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</tbody>
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shielding actions are also buttressed by biopolitical supply chains that provide donations, meals, water, face masks (for identity/safety protection), umbrellas, data protection, free transport, medical help, social care, legal advice, and open homes to embrace front-liners.

Other affirmative biopolitics include: a) building a thirty-mile human chain across both sides of Hong Kong Harbour to symbolize the wish for freedom; b) organizing public mourning for the dead to facilitate communal soul-healing and renewal of commitments; c) finalizing and recording new songs such as *Glory to Hong Kong* within five days to boost morale and unite the movement; and d) setting up new trade unions and electoral supports to consolidate the energy of street-level protest. Similar life-enhancing practices can be found (trans-)locally and (trans-)nationally. Hong Kong adherents join hands with the diaspora/supporters to undertake international advocacy and people-to-people diplomacy that target local communities, national legislatures, global media, and international organizations to “Stand with Hong Kong” in this struggle.

> Concluding remarks

This paper adopts a neo-Foucauldian approach to Hong Kong’s 2019-20 protest. Given that it occurs under illiberal authoritarian conditions of the co-sovereign rule between the Hong Kong SAR government and mainland China’s one-party regime, the sovereign biopolitics perspective is important in understanding this protest. It highlights the 2019 conjuncture when the fuller rolling out of the One-Country life in Hong Kong is accompanied by the refusal of some Two-System citizens to surrender their “high degree of autonomy.” This One-Country-Two-System struggle is expressed via the sovereign’s increasing assertion of its control with the use of disproportionate police violence. This is met with protestors’ insurgent biopolitics of life/death that coexists with supporters’ affirmative biopolitical acts in this struggle over Hong Kong’s politics of displacement.

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I would like to thank Brigitte Aulenbacher, Bob Jessop, Virginia Pak, Joe Lee and Lancaster Stands With Hong Kong Group for their support in writing this paper and supply of photographs.
The Yellow Vests came out of the blue. French society was deeply unaware of the potential that such a movement could have. It is well known that established political institutions and the media vilified the movement. It was not surprising since the white lower classes were seen as the inert, obtuse buffer between the segregated racial minorities and the various layers of the middle class. What is surprising is that a spontaneous, non-partisan movement emerged and broke through the established architecture of political stratification in a postindustrial society. This is surely related to the rare conjuncture of a new political party (“La République En Marche”) winning both the presidential and the parliamentary elections in France, and a President who had never been elected to any office before. Hopes of improvement were high and so was the ensuing disappointment.

The movement appeared in the national public sphere on November 17, 2018. Two weeks later it made global headlines. During that time, a spectacular transformation was underway. From the initial spark linked to the tax on fuel, the Yellow Vests rapidly advanced towards questioning the entire political architecture of contemporary societies. They were now demanding the establishment of a citizen-initiated referendum as a tool to give full control to “the people” over important decisions in all areas of governance. At the same time, they asserted that they...
were “the people” and that they were humiliated and supposed to live silently in near-poverty, disregarded by the “elites,” even whilst they incarnated the very heart of French society. That feeling of social legitimacy was particularly reinforced by their self-representation as “apolitical” and “pacifist,” since most of them had never participated in a demonstration before and were indifferent or hostile to political parties. They were accordingly shocked and offended to meet with violent police repression, because they considered themselves as law-abiding citizens exercising for the first time their right to protest.

Besides their significance as a movement of protest, the Yellow Vests have initiated a new stage in the structure and practice of social movements. Their numerous original aspects challenge a series of assumptions on the nature, organization, and success of collective political action. I will briefly touch upon five cascading points to illustrate the sociological interest of these innovations:

1. Rejection of all links to political parties and constituted movements

The most impressive part of this phenomenon is its spontaneity. The Yellow Vests did not come together under a specific political approach or theory. They did not even share a loose political perspective. However, they instinctively felt that all structures of political “formatting” should not be trusted. Anyone holding or seeking power was in their eyes corrupted, corruptible or, at best, interested in advancing primarily his or her own interests, not those of the “people.” This is not to say that they moved towards “populism.” On the contrary, they disallowed not only authoritarianism but even hierarchy within the movement. They almost immediately became a tight community of individuals, a “family” as they often called themselves, of persons who jealously guarded their right to decide separately on each issue when they agreed or disagreed. They spontaneously fled any given sociopolitical framework or platform.

2. Ideological plurality

Social movements are well known for their proneness to ideological homogeneity. While tensions and antagonisms always develop in a movement, it is almost taken for granted that those tensions revolve around the control of a unifying framework of ideology and consequent action. The Yellow Vests are once more a flagrant exception to that law of homogeneity. Not only did they not converge upon a specific political ideology but they managed at the same time to build a pluralist foundation for their demands. That became possible both because they decided to keep party politics away from their movement and because they spontaneously accepted coexistence with each other, while they were often in great disagreement on specific issues. Their explanation was experiential. They were “in the same shit” and what mattered was their objective resemblance and the will to change that condition. Their explanations for that condition may have differed but they always had to do with a system where the powerful did not respect the “people” enough to secure for them a decent life.

3. Neuronal architecture and autonomy

The movement self-organized around partially overlapping groups that emerged either online or spatially. Each participant was involved in discussions, debates, assemblies, and protesting actions either via one or more online groups, or one or more roundabouts. The development of this neuronal structure which covered France entirely (including its remote colonial territories) was a vital trait of the Yellow Vests. Their consciousness of the individual autonomy offered by the Internet was reflected in their choice of the roundabout as the point of community convergence. The conceptual premise in both cases is that autonomous
points of intersection guarantee that only the network as such holds power. There is no governing top and no executing bottom.

4. Direct democracy

Naturally, these characteristics formed a symbolic foundation geared towards a polity where constant and equal participation was seen as a precondition rather than a utopian objective. Impressively, a movement of moderately educated, lower-class, first-time protesters immediately asserted that representative systems of participation and decision are obsolete and dangerous. They used two powerful ways of expressing that assertion. Firstly, they disallowed any representation of the movement by anyone at any level. They only chose roundabout "spokespersons" on a case-by-case basis, despite the immense pressure of all political institutions to have them elect permanent representatives. There was never anyone who could speak in the name of the Yellow Vests and any attempt to do so amounted to betraying the movement. Secondly, they decided that the entire political structure of contemporary societies should change. They demanded the introduction of citizen-initiated referenda in every domain. They would decide, and the "elites" would merely execute their decisions.

5. Tolerance of uncertainty

We are today (February 23, 2020) in the 67th week of the Yellow Vests movement. This is undoubtedly the longest-lasting movement of all-encompassing political protest in recent history. The Yellow Vests never had a specific utopia that they were pursuing and a specific political plan to implement. On the contrary they remained reciprocally open about their pluralist priorities and ideas. That allowed them to attain an unprecedented level of collective reflexivity. They focused on advancing towards overall political change, rather than seizing a share of power in an established system. In doing so, they did not mind the uncertainty of the outcome. As they usually said when I interviewed them, "We must continue. We will see what comes out of this."

Although not as numerous, some Yellow Vest gatherings, marches, and protests continue in various places throughout France. Everyone wonders what the lasting impact of the movement will be. At any rate, one conclusion is safe to draw. The Yellow Vests have proven that a new level of collective political reflexivity is possible. They have established a new link between individual experience, community, and polity as a prefiguration of large-scale direct democracy.

1. This piece is based on extensive empirical research since the beginning of the Yellow Vests movement. For further analysis, see here, here, or here.

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The current social protests in Chile (estallido social) are creatively accompanied by graffiti, murals, music, poetry, songs, meetings, and collective debate. The historically accumulated discontent of Chileans is thus given expression in a new kind of aesthetic. Decades of dissatisfaction, social abuse, discrimination, and social injustice are denounced in slogans like: “Chile has awakened!,” “... until human dignity becomes an everyday habit!,” “Chile will bury neoliberalism!,” “I’ve lost my fear!,” “No more abuse!,” “Away with...”
Social movements are the result: 2006 saw the “penguin protests” – the movement of high-school students demanding a better public education system. An influential and massive student movement with demands for free university education formed in 2011. Both movements resonated broadly with the public. In 2018, the “No+APF” movement against the privatized pension system emerged. Ethnic movements and especially the representatives of the Mapuche communities are demanding their recognition in the constitution, the return of land, and certain autonomy as ethnic minorities. There are also new environmental and protest movements against the construction of megaprojects that result in the loss of ecosystems and habitat. The Hydro-Aysen megaproject in Patagonia became the most important symbol of this movement. In addition, citizen protests against environmental policies are seen in the so-called abandoned areas (zonas de sacrificio) in the municipalities of Quintero, Puchuncaví, and Coronel, which are extremely contaminated by high industrial density and have enormous disease rates. 2019 was also the year of the women’s movement against sexual abuse and for gender equality. These examples show that Chilean society has been gradually shaken up, realizing the dark sides of the celebrated model, and has begun to organize proactively from below.

**A painful awakening**

On October 18, 2019 Chile changed. The pent-up anger has been released in a way that is both massive and creative. Now, after four months of continuous protests, a new republican spirit can be felt, which is irreversible. After 40 years, Chileans are becoming aware of the negative effects of the prevailing mercantilist and unregulated neoliberal model: social inequality, privatization of basic services, pensions, education, health care, and natural resources. The government has responded with police violence. More than 400 people have lost their eyesight due to the use of firearms, women have been raped. Torture and thousands of arbitrary arrests have occurred. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other international organizations have confirmed that human rights are being massively violated and have called on the Chilean government to act proactively.

This awakening of Chilean society is not spontaneous, but the result of a complex process of built-up negative experiences and social dissatisfaction. After 40 years, the neoliberal system is exhausted and has culminated in a crisis, laying bare the irreversible damage from which the country will have a hard time recovering. Through the protests and a new flood of information, a new emancipatory consciousness is developing among Chileans.

**Social and ecological inequalities and social movements**

Social and structural inequalities in Chile grew faster than the promises of the market: low wages, inhumane pensions, privatization of the health and education system and a subsequent hike in fees, the precariousness of work, overpriced and privatized basic services, incredibly high costs of living, and an extreme concentration of wealth. In addition, young people have a difficult time entering the labor market, discrimination against women still exists, and the rights of indigenous peoples are still not being recognized. Little public participation, environmental problems and vulnerability to climate change, as well as water and resource scarcity result in additional problems regarding the provision of basic services.

These policies of privatization and individualization necessarily lead to a loss of meaning as well as uncertainty about the future. Protests and the emergence of new social movements are the result: 2006 saw the “pen-
> A legitimation crisis of the state and political parties

The social crisis revealed the weaknesses of the state created by neoliberalism. Neoliberalism had always called for a minimal state and the privatization and individualization of society. The devastating consequences of this doctrine are felt today. The conservative government of Chile is overwhelmed and reacts with violence, the declaration of a state of emergency, and oppression, without clearly differentiating between the broad democratic peaceful citizen protests and the looting, arson, and destructive violence of small, isolated groups.

In this context, the Centro de Estudios Públicos published the following survey results on Chileans’ confidence in their institutions in December 2019: only 5% trust the government, 3% the parliament, 2% the political parties, and 8% the judiciary. The vast majority of people reject violence as a form of protest as well as police violence. 67% call for a new constitution, 56% believe that this new constitution is an important instrument to solve the current problems. 87% are in favor of leaders who are able to promote social and political dialogue and consensus. According to the respondents, the following three issues need to be urgently addressed by the government: 64% named pensions, 46% health, and 38% education. The survey highlights the legitimacy of democracy as a political system.

> For a new constitution and renewed democracy

On November 15, 2019, the strong and permanent social protests led government and opposition to agree on a referendum on October 25, 2020 on the creation of a new constitution. The representatives who will formulate this new constitution will be elected on April 11, 2021 and must meet three important criteria: a balance between men and women, non-affiliation to political parties, and representation of indigenous minorities.

With this plebiscite and the associated strategies for the future, Chile has a unique historical opportunity to solve existing political and social problems peacefully and democratically with the participation of all social actors. Still, one potential obstacle is the refusal of the conservative sector to support this process with the aim to prevent a new constitution, the modernization of the institutions and the pension, health and education systems, and thus to maintain the existing power and market structures. It is to be hoped that the demands of the citizens’ movements will ultimately be reflected in a peaceful and democratic process and a successful plebiscite with broad participation by all sectors.

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October 2019 witnessed the eruption of unprecedented mass mobilizations in both Iraq and Lebanon. Like wildfire, the protests spread rapidly across both countries and attracted hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of protesters within days. At the core of the demands were questions of unemployment, unfair taxation, widespread corruption, lack of basic services such as water and electricity, and bad governance. While this was not the first time such demands were voiced in the streets, the protests of October 2019 were clearly different in scope and magnitude from any previous movement. In Lebanon, like in Iraq, these uprisings were quickly dubbed “revolutions” – marking a stark rupture with previous waves of mobilization such as the 2011 and 2015 protests in both countries.

While these uprisings might not fall under the traditional social movement literature definition of “revolutions” – since they have not overthrown the regime as a whole – it is important to think in terms of a revolutionary process, rather than of revolutions as events that either succeed or fail. In fact, the October uprisings of Iraq and Lebanon came in the context of over a decade of cyclical mobilization in both countries in which the year 2015 formed an essential turning point with anti-regime mobilizations based on socioeconomic demands, beyond the overemphasized lens of identity politics. Moreover, these revolutionary “social explosions” clearly erupted in the context of a “second wave of Arab uprisings” that had started in late 2018 in Sudan and Algeria and managed to topple two dictators.

However, what makes the Iraqi and Lebanese cases comparable, and different from those of the rest of the Arab region since 2011, is the political system that the protesters in these two countries are trying to topple. While revolutions in the Arab world have all taken place in countries with authoritarian regimes or monarchies, Lebanon and Iraq are the only cases where uprisings erupted in a political system known as consociational democracy – an identity-based (sectarian and ethnic) power-sharing arrangement where the regime does not have one clear “head” to be toppled. This – together with neoliberalism, sectarian clientelism (known as muhasasa), and the legacy of civil wars and violence – made the path of these uprisings more difficult to discern.

> Sectarianism versus nationalism: Missing the point?

Since October 2019, the main squares of Lebanon and Iraq have been filled with protesters waving the national flag and singing the national anthem, a move often adopted by protesters in these countries to express a rejection of...
of sectarian and ethnic divisions, and to highlight “co-existence” and “national unity” despite diversity. However, is nationalism necessarily the opposite of sectarianism?

Decades of literature on sectarianism and nationalism show that these two phenomena are not necessarily opposites, since nationalism has often been deployed with a sectarian connotation. For example, Arab nationalism has often been associated with a Sunni overtone, while Lebanese nationalism has historically been linked with a Christian connotation. However, it is still widespread at the societal level to deploy nationalism as a sign of rejection of sectarianism. The uprisings in both Iraq and Lebanon clearly grappled with the question of sectarianism through the longing for an “imagined nation” as a remedy.

In Iraq, the movement started in early October following a call for mobilization by a group under the name of Nazel Akhod Haqqi (I am Mobilizing to Take my Right). The main slogans in the squares of Iraq were “the people want to overthrow the regime” echoing the famous chant from 2011, and “we want a homeland.” In demanding a “homeland” or a “country” or “nation,” the protesters were hinting at the desire for a state that is able to serve its citizens and provide a sense of belonging beyond the sectarian and ethnic fragmentation.

In Lebanon, a similar process of re-imagining the “nation” was observed. While the uprising started following a governmental decision to impose new taxes – including a tax on WhatsApp calls – the squares were quickly filled with the national flag, and the Lebanese anthem was repeatedly heard. While the main slogans also included the famous “the people want to overthrow the regime,” a more custom-made slogan was added: “All Means All,” referring to a rejection of the sectarian power-sharing system and denouncing all leaders, regardless of their sectarian belonging. Like in Iraq, the rejection of sectarianism was expressed through a desire to get rid of all sectarian leaders and to build a “country,” a “state,” and a “nation” that protects its citizens and treats them equally and justly.

While many believe that the levels of corruption and inequality in both countries are the result of the sectarian system, this approach overlooks the important role of the economic system (neoliberalism) in creating the crisis that led to these uprisings. A major challenge for the movements in Iraq and Lebanon today is to fight the two pillars of their sectarian-neoliberal regimes simultaneously: keeping the focus on the demand for socio-economic justice and a welfare state, while also rejecting the system of sectarian power-sharing.

> Neoliberalism and discontent: In search of a lost “we”

Neoliberalism flourished in post-war Lebanon (post-1990) and post-invasion Iraq (post-2003). The rolling back of the state and the increase in sectarian clientelism was coupled with a neoliberal political culture that focused first and foremost on individualism. This political culture not only shaped the state and society at large, but was also reflected in the nature of activism and dissent that emerged.

While many activists have been active in social movements and campaigns over the past decades, it is noticeable that some of the biggest and most effective initiatives were largely framed around the individual. For example, one of the main electoral campaigns that grew out of the 2015 mobilizations in Lebanon was Beirut Madinati (Beirut, My City). Instead of emphasizing a collective “our” that rethinks the city as a shared space for all and defies the individualist logic of neoliberalism, the name emphasized an individual relationship with the city. Similarly, in the aftermath of the financial collapse in 2019, activists in the Lebanese uprising sprayed graffiti on the windows of banks saying “Give Me Back My Money” instead of “Give Us Back Our Money.” While the collective anger against the banks was clear, the political culture that shapes activism is still the product of the very system it is fighting against.

Many campaigns have also emphasized a legal and rights-based approach that seems to be detached from the realities of both Lebanon and Iraq. In both countries, the legal and judicial systems are very weak and corrupt, and people have little trust in them. Therefore, the language of “rights” and “obligations” does not occupy a central space in the political imaginaries of people in those countries. However, several prominent political movements and campaigns have centered individual “rights” as the locus of their activism. A few examples include the previously mentioned campaign in Iraq “I am Mobilizing to Take My Right”; or the very active political group in the Lebanese uprising called Li Haqqi (For My Right). This emphasis on individual rights speaks to the longing for a fantasized modern nation-state where state institutions can preserve individual rights equally beyond corruption and sectarian clientelism.

A further consequence of the sectarian-neoliberal system in both Iraq and Lebanon has been the absence of political organizations or unions representing a political alternative that can serve as a scaffold for the uprising’s transition into a new political system. With the recent spread of COVID-19 in both countries, the emergence and organization of a lost “we” is a priority to defeat a system that is clearly unable to protect society, either from economic disasters, or from health pandemics.

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Media and Communication in Digital Capitalism: Critical Perspectives

by Marlen van den Ecker, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena, Germany and Sebastian Sevignani, Friedrich Schiller University of Jena and University of Paderborn, Germany

In digital capitalism users often function as unpaid workers. Photo by Alex Kotliarskyi/unsplash.com.

Contemporary media technology develops and is used for communication within social conditions frequently referred to as “digital capitalism.” Different from the diagnoses of “postindustrial,” “informational,” or even a “global knowledge society,” “digital capitalism” expresses that social change simultaneously shows important continuities in respect to basic social relations of economic exploitation, cultural alienation, and political domination.

Digital capitalism plays out differently across the globe: While on this side of the world digital capitalism fosters the formation of creative and knowledge classes and spurs consumerism, on the other side millions of people earn their living by extracting the required raw materials or assembling components under adverse conditions. But there is also unity in diversity: Users serve as a new exploited class for social media platforms or digital media manufacturers. Surveillance technologies are threatening citizens’ personal rights. Capital-driven interests prevent the grassroots democratic and subversive potentials of self-organised media.

With the increasing relevance of digital media technology, critical media and communication sociology offers insights...
for our understanding of social change at large and even plays a pioneering role for our discipline. It contributes to labour and industrial sociology when it explains new waves of rationalisation, (de-)qualification, and the re-organisation of labouring activity and value chains. It interacts with economic and consumer sociology when it investigates the crucial role of big data, algorithms, targeted advertising, and digital platforms as new marketplaces. It cooperates with cultural and political sociology, coming to terms with the digital culture industries and the current transformation of the public spheres. And it stimulates social theory when it points to the fuzziness of the relation between communication and labour within digital phenomena such as “prosuming.”

The critical insights provided in the articles of this symposium hopefully make way for new initiatives to retrace these issues to their root.

Since existing critical social research seems to have little to say with regard to media and communication, and on the other hand communication research often leaves out problems of exploitation through digital work, Marisol Sandoval and Sebastian Sevignani link communication and labour by thinking through “digital exploitation.” It is often overlooked that the production of the contemporary global media culture relies on communication and cooperation – controlled and managed by Big Tech. As users of social media platforms, we function as unpaid digital workers for these companies, as they feed off people’s data traces.

The Australian scholar Mark Andrejevic also taps into the logic of data-driven business models. His article deals with the escalating tendency of automatically generated data and the role of its capitalist ownership and accumulation. Instead of asking whether automated systems should be employed, Andrejevic questions how they have been designed thus far.

Writing from Hong Kong, Jack Linchuan Qiu discusses the possibility of the formation of a new digital working class. The example of China suggests that governmental surveillance technologies are indeed powerful in exercising social control in terms of spatiality. Qiu however points out that, when focusing on different temporal patterns, the digital working class can unfold their subversive potential when they engage in collective disruptive actions such as work slowdown, sabotage, or strikes. The class struggle of digital workers is about pushing for new ways to gain temporal sovereignty.

Even if commonly framed in this way, our Canadian colleague Tanner Mirrlees doubts that China is a serious rival for the USA. He highlights that the USA not only possesses the greatest economic and military power: its digital technologies and cultural industries also far outstrip their Chinese competitors in terms of size, reach, and profits at the present time.

The final article, provided by our dear colleague Mandy Tröger, teaches us a history lesson on the post-socialist transformations of the media system after German reunification. In the spring of 1990, countless initiatives in the German Democratic Republic towards a free and democratic East German press were quickly overrun by a handful of West German political and economic groups who built market structures in their interest. This serves as a prime example of how, throughout history, media infrastructures with democratic potential have been repeatedly undermined by private economic interests.

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Digital Exploitation: Linking Communication and Labour

by Marisol Sandoval, City, University of London, UK, and Sebastian Sevignani, Paderborn University and University of Jena, Germany

Critical media and communication sociology is facing a theoretical and practical dilemma: While for critical social theory, inspired by Marxian and Marxist thinking, productive activity is key to understanding the momentum of social transformation, communication and media tend to remain marginal issues. Critical communication research, on the other hand, analyses ideologies and media effects but often neglects labour. It seems that Jürgen Habermas’ influential distinction between instrumental and com-
municative action as two separate spheres of social life not only haunts mainstream media sociology and communication studies but also restricts the critical tradition. This has serious limitations for understanding media and communication in the age of digitalisation. We therefore argue for an integrative approach that builds on a critical humanist research tradition. We propose three ways in which communication and labour are practically and theoretically interlinked.

> Working conditions in the media

A first, and perhaps most obvious way of connecting communication and labour is by taking seriously the working conditions that underpin contemporary media culture on a global scale. After critics rightly described work as a blind spot of media and communication research, numerous studies over the past decade have investigated working conditions in a range of media and cultural sector professions including journalism, design, fashion, media, and art. These studies document that, behind the ethics of meritocracy, youthfulness, openness, creativity, autonomy, and self-realization which surrounds these industries, are structural inequalities of race, class, and gender, precarious contracts, unpaid labour, and a culture of long hours, work stress, anxiety, self-blame, competitiveness, and individualism.

Looking further along the supply chains of global cultural production reveals a second, deeper layer of how media culture is structurally linked to physical production. Contemporary media culture would be unthinkable without the labour of thousands of industrial workers assembling computers and electronics products in manufacturing plants around the world. Research into work in electronics manufacturing powerfully shows that modern digital culture is structurally sustained by an industry that perpetuates working conditions that resemble the early days of industrial capitalism. Scandals – such as a series of worker suicides at Apple supplier Foxconn in 2010 – aside, the daily realities of these workers remain largely hidden behind the sleek surfaces of modern gadgets and advertising campaigns that emphasize lightness and innovation. Looking, for example, at journalists, designers, and artists as workers, while also framing electronics manufacturing as both industrial and communicative labour shows that media, art, and communication have never been merely superstructural phenomena but are deeply integrated into capitalist economies and structures of exploitation.

> Communicating to produce

Second, it can be argued that in order to produce, one has to communicate and to cooperate. Every production takes place within communicative and mediated relations of production. Here media and communication sociology interacts with labour sociology and research on how labour is organized and controlled. (New) media and communication technologies, such as email, smartphones, and digital platforms create an always-online culture, contribute to extending the total amount of working hours, and integrate new, often unpaid-online culture. They also intensify labour by making its division and recomposition within the workplace and between corporations more efficient and flexible for the dynamic interests of capital. For certain workforces, media applications such as Slack support a change towards increasingly autonomous, dialogue-oriented, and explorative forms of working that shift traditional management tasks onto the project and knowledge worker. Various forms of algorithmic feedback applications and evaluation tools are then used to make sure that such “autonomous” communicative and cooperative work can still be controlled and directed by those who own the means of communicative production.

> Communication as production

A third option to relate communication and labour is somewhat counter-intuitive: Communication itself can be seen as work and production. This becomes plausible if we imagine communication having the same structure as labour and if we integrate them both into a common framework as objectifying activity. Humans cooperatively use tools and (raw) materials to produce objects and thereby – confronting the sometimes resistant sovereignty of the material world – they develop and refine their subjectivity. This is the starting point of a Marxist anthropology considering humans as active, objectifying, appropriating, and learning social beings. Instead of objectifying one’s capabilities into material objects, communication involves labouring on signs and symbols using the means of communication (Raymond Williams), that is, other signs, symbols, and media, to produce information. The Latin origin of the word information – “in-formare,” meaning to form or impress and to inform somebody – expresses this perfectly. Objectified signs or encoded meanings (from Stuart Hall and British Cultural Studies) have to be appropriated or decoded and this has effects: Instead of structuring the material world, communication structures the communicator’s own psychic regulation and that of other subjects. People can communicate only by labouring on signs and every interaction, be it the most immediate, is in fact mediated by this symbolic-material world.

Think for instance of users lured into the walled gardens of monopolized social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram, Weibo, Snapchat, TikTok, and others. Within the proposed new framework they are actively communicating but also exploited prosumers. Their communicative objectifications continuously leave data traces that are valorised by social media capital within their surveillance-based business models. Without the com-
municative activity of Internet users and the expropriation of their objectifications there would be no commodity to be sold to the advertising industry and no profits for commercial social media. Within this unequal and exploitative social relationship between labour/communication and capital the latter strives to make us use digital media harder and more intensively; it directs and channels our communicative activity towards advertisements and consumerism. User activity is thereby subsumed to capital; (social media) capital is “dead” communicative activity controlled by rich social classes to further exploit others.

However, the profit interests behind social media capital not only exploit communication and reproduce unequal social relations in their own favour; this also spills over to a more general form of digital alienation. In the age of big data and algorithms, which are trained by our communicative activity, it is hard to sustain and even to imagine a form of humane informational self-determination without profoundly challenging the underlying political economy of digital capitalism. The expropriation of communicative objectifications and the alienation of communicative activity have already started to make us objects, not subjects, of the digital age.

By extending the analysis of media culture beyond media content and effects, the humanist integrative approach we are proposing leaves us better positioned to grasp the complexities of communicative capitalism and to critique the uneven distribution of global cultural labour. It also allows us to pay attention to possible moments of solidarity that arise from the common experience of exploitation and alienation under global media capital. Investigating the ways in which communication and labour are shaped by the contradictions of global capitalism and how they might contribute to transforming it remains an ongoing task for a critical sociology of media and communication.

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The notion of “automation” in the abstract, unmoored from social relations, invites fantasies of a material world dedicated to the service of humans: homes that, unbidden, cater to our needs, factories that work for us, spaces that respond to us by opening doors, playing music, even catching us when we fall. Situated within contemporary social relations, however, concrete forms of automation come to look somewhat more dystopian, verging on alienation incarnate. We know that our own activities, filtered through automated systems, shape our information environment – the music that streams across our platforms, the news that cascades through our feeds, the results on our search pages – though we do not know how. We also know that automated systems are, in many cases, evaluating our workplace performance, our creditworthiness, and our life chances.

Automation is coming to play an increasingly important role across societal realms because of the interactive infrastructures we are building for ourselves. These generate so much data, automatically, that the only way to put this data to use is by processing it – also automatically. As digital information comes to reconfigure our world, automation will necessarily accompany it.

So the crucial question faced by those who would study the media is the shape taken by automation as it adjusts...
itself to the priorities of capital. This is the question that needed to be asked about interactivity when once, not so long ago, it was heralded in the abstract as a harbinger of democracy and mass empowerment.

It is the question that we now need to address to the “promise” of automation – which, not coincidentally, has displaced interactivity, a term whose use peaked around the turn of the millennium, but has since gone into decline. The question is not a new one – it is the recurring theme of the critique of political economy, whose persistence shadows that of capitalism. If the fallout of Cambridge Analytica and the recent backlash against “surveillance capitalism” are to have any constructive impact, this will need to take the form of a resuscitated focus on the politico-economic arrangement of power – and, in the media context, of the automated systems that shape our information environment. The question is not whether to automate, but how.

Answering this question requires an engagement with the logic of automation under conditions of capitalist ownership and accumulation. Given the speed with which the technology is developing, one potentially productive approach is to discern the logics shaping the myriad ways in which automation will be used to consolidate power and enhance control. The advantage of such an approach is that it traces connections across recent developments and identifies future trends and tendencies. The goal, of course, is to anticipate rather than react: to imagine the possibility of shaping the technologies according to shared priorities rather than surrendering control to the next generation of Zuckerbergs and Bezoses.

We might start by identifying three interlocking tendencies of automation under current conditions and considering their implications: preemption, framelessness, and operationalism.

Preemption refers to the management of risk and opportunity based on the predictive promise of automated data collection and mining. This logic is an increasingly familiar one: Amazon envisions the possibility of sending us products before we know we want them (preempting desire); predictive policing imagines the possibility of thwarting crime at its moment of emergence. New automated security systems promise that they can detect a punch the moment it is launched, but before it lands. The millisecond between these two moments marks the interval of automated preemption: the moment when the system might someday respond before the punch can land.

Preemption, in all these contexts, relies upon sensorization and automated data collection. To know the desire of the consumer and the intent of the criminal before they themselves know means learning as much as possible about them via embedded sensors and comprehensive data collection. Preemption is thus inseparable from ubiquitous, full-spectrum monitoring: collecting everything and holding on to it forever.

Framelessness describes at once the (impossible) attempt to redouble the world in digital form (that is, to leave nothing out, nothing beyond the frame) and the perpetual repurposing of data. We find our conventional frameworks of data relevance disrupted when we are told that the Web browser used to fill out a job application is a better predictor of future job performance than anything entered into the form, or that our handwriting or the number of calls we make to our mothers might bear on our creditworthiness. Narrative explanations fall by the wayside in such contexts, because they attempt to reimpose a frame by describing why a particular variable might be relevant. But they trail behind the correlational machine, which imagines it can dispense with them entirely. As Chris Anderson put it in his obituary for the explanation: “Out with every theory of human behavior, from linguistics to sociology. Forget taxonomy, ontology, and psychology. Who knows why people do what they do? The point is they do it, and we can track and measure it with unprecedented fidelity. With enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.”

Following the work of Harun Farocki on “operative” images, we might describe this as “operationalism”: information that no longer needs to be interpreted because it acts. That is, it results in an outcome without the need for interpretation: whoever uses the right browser or proper capitalization gets the job or the loan. Whoever fits the pattern is arrested, promoted, or targeted.

These logics – of preemption, framelessness, and operationalism – apply across the spectrum of automated processes from targeted ads to signature drone strikes – from selling to killing. They identify the location of power in the hands of those with access to the data and the processing power. Automatic data collection requires automated processing and facilitates automated response. At the same time, such logics mark a site of resistance: the challenge posed by our irreducible finitude. The goal of power is to obscure the fact that the ambition of framelessness is both grand and impossible – which means, that we can neither perfect preemption nor dispense with explanation. ■

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Temporality and the Making of the Chinese Digital Working Class

by Jack Linchuan Qiu, The Chinese University of Hong Kong

With the help of digital media platforms, location-based services, and artificial intelligence (AI), the Chinese government has dramatically strengthened social control over the spatial movement of its people and the evolving geography of its cities and countryside. This article, however, contends that if we shift attention from spatiality to temporality while examining the making and unmaking of China’s digital working class (DWC), we can see that Beijing is losing control. Class is understood here in both Marxist and Weberian senses, which roughly correspond to “times of revolution” and “times of consumption,” respectively.

Revolution and consumption are two opposing modes of temporality: the former being disruptive, collective, anti-capitalist, forward-looking, heroic, and hyper-historical – which I term “spiky time,” borrowing from Richard Florida’s “The World is Spiky”; the latter being continuous, individualistic, neoliberal, presentist, profane, and ahistorical – which is called “flat time,” following Thomas Friedman’s “The World is Flat” thesis.

I choose to focus on China’s working-class population because, compared to other social groups, they tend to live in more plural temporalities. They thus provide a more comprehensive museum of temporal orders that coexist while having internal conflicts, allowing for a dynamic examination of the interplay between spiky time and flat time.

Spiky time and flat time form the two poles of a magnet-ic field imbued with various temporalities that belong, in Raymond William’s framework, to the residual, the dominant, and the emergent. While flat time is the dominant among most workers in their increasingly digitized everyday life, spiky time in its more or less fragmentary moments lurks among the residual and/or emerges as forces of change, piercing holes in the smooth surface of flat time, aka “timeless time” à la Manuel Castells. While spiky time assists collective struggle and the making of the DWC into a class for itself, flat time hampers class formation by encouraging workers to live in atomized conditions, dream other people’s dreams, and forget that their identities may lead to something unique: working-class solidarity.

The spiky and the flat are also similar. In China, they both run against the temporal linearity that characterizes past regimes, be they Confucian (valuing regress), Buddhist (circular reincarnations), or Modernist (progressive but predicta-
ble). While flat time is neither regressive nor progressive nor circular, spiky time is defined by its jagged edge that results from the collision between progress and regress, created through what Stuart Hall calls “politics without guarantees.”

Both spiky time and flat time are powerful because of their synchronicity. Think about the nationwide truck driver strikes against Yunmanman (China’s long-distance truck transportation platform) in 2018, similar to struggles against Uber in western cities but in this case, at the national level; or the annual e-commerce carnival “Singles Day” every November 11, when Chinese consumers of various social classes indulge in a spectacular online shopping spree. Workers can live in flat time 360 days of the year but spend the remaining five days in spiky time usually due to structural causes triggering agentic action.

The key vector that distinguishes the above-mentioned senses of time – spiky or flat, Confucian or Buddhist or Modernist – is what Judy Wajcman refers to as “temporal sovereignty,” i.e., who holds the ultimate power to define temporality. What is the basic unit of time? How do the units relate to each other? What is the meaningful temporal totality?

Whereas traditional senses of time such as the Confucian presume transcendental sovereigns, Modernist temporality is expressed in the Chinese context through statism, be it state-socialist or state-capitalist. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the most obvious Modernist temporal sovereign. Yet both spiky time and flat time defy the state-led temporal regime, creating a vacuum to be filled by non-state actors: corporations for flat time, and activists for spiky time.

Temporality, of course, never static, especially in China today characterized by secularization, individualization, and increasing mobility. While there is a certain novelty brought by smartphones and Internet cafés, there is in fact more historical continuity than rupture, considering the collective experiences of the Chinese working class from the beginning of the twentieth century.

Usually workers have to go with the flow of whatever time the bosses impose on them – the industrial time of their factory; the flat time of the company that operates their social media. But once in a while, when there is a work injury, when collective grievance arises against management abuse, when the coronavirus outbreak pauses the economy, the existential threats facing the DWC engender an alternative sense of time for which none other than workers themselves become the temporal sovereign. Work slowdown. Stoppage. Sabotage. Wildcat strikes. The class struggle in this digital era is about establishing alternative regimes of worker-owned time: spiky time.

The rise of flat time is a global phenomenon. Al-powered content farms churn out fake news, viral-market nation- alistic memes, creating what Adam Greenfield terms the “posthuman everyday.” Flat time is twofold: For consumers, it’s supposed to be “natural,” dictated by the laws of data science and Wall Street. For IT companies, the same time, once captured, is privately owned by the corporations, which manipulate and monetize the time as raw materials for capital accumulation.

But there is something peculiar when the global trend takes root in China: the unexpected retreat of the state. China is among the world’s most powerful state machineries in nationalizing time through not only schools and mass media but also regular political mobilizations during and after the Maoist era. Since Deng Xiaoping’s marketization reform in 1992, the CCP remains central to spatial planning through mega-infrastructures that have started to reach across Eurasia, Africa, and the Americas. However, under Xi Jinping, the authorities have curiously failed to keep their grip on temporality.

The party-state did try. But despite the state’s endeavors, the ultimate power to manipulate temporality has decidedly shifted from public authorities to private corporations. For workers, no government-led campaign has come in any way close to the shopping festival “Singles Day.” Statist time persists in a nearly-residual status. Every day on prime-time TV, the ritualistic display of Xi Jinping, the God-like figure, has become surreally trivial – a single shot of crowds clapping hands at Xi can last several minutes – indicating Modernist statist time has been hollowed out, subsumed by flat time.

For Chinese workers, 2004 marked the return of revolutionary time in the era of the Internet. Three struggles, in the provinces of Shaanxi, Sichuan, and Guangdong, breached the line of information control set by local authorities using online forums and weblogs. Since then, it has become commonplace for digital media-equipped worker-rebels to claim successes, partial or full, over their bosses and authoritarian censors, as seen for instance, during the 2010 Honda Locks strike, the 2014 Yue Yuan shoe factory strike, and the 2018 Jasic struggle.

Let me conclude with a reference to Giorgio Agamben’s “messianic time” vs “chronological time,” his pair of temporalities that parallel the juxtaposition between spiky and flat time. He wrote: “messianic time is not exterior to chronological time: it is, so to say, a portion (una porzione) of chronological time, a portion that undergoes a process of contraction which transforms it entirely.” For China’s DWC, the messianic time is already occurring. With the wide spread of digital media and the predominance of flat time, the genesis of revolutionary time is often invisible to the eye. But the spiky is folded inside the flat. It is precisely at such moments of oblivion when revolutions happen, anytime.

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A US-China Rivalry? The Digital Technology and Cultural Industries

by Tanner Mirrlees, Ontario Tech University, Canada

Has the economic and cultural dominance of the United States come to an end? 
Source: Wikimedia Creative Commons.

From the end of the Cold War up until the US-led global War on Terror hit the wall of the Great Recession, the US was the globe’s largest empire, and one with no rival. But nowadays, US President Donald Trump, US foreign policy strategists, and even publics polled by the Pew Research Center see China as a threat to the US’s grip on global order. News headlines such as “U.S. Versus China: A New Era of Great Power Competition, but Without Boundaries” (New York Times) and “As US-China rivalry heats up, the days of not choosing sides may soon be over for Southeast Asia” (South China Morning Post) frame the US and China as “rivals.” But are they? The US Empire has long been buttressed by three pillars of structural power: global economic might, military supremacy, and technological and cultural popularity. While China’s economy and military are rapidly growing, and Chinese “soft power” campaigns are taking off, China is not yet a genuine rival. In 2019, the US Empire endured and outmatched China economically and militarily, and especially in terms of its digital technology and cultural industries.

According to the Forbes Global 2000 list of the world’s largest public companies, the US headquarters 575 of these, whereas China is home to 309. Of the top 20 largest global companies, ten are American and five are Chinese. The dollar, not the renminbi, is the world’s reserve and most used currency, and the US nominal GDP is around $19.39 trillion, significantly larger than China’s $12.24 trillion. The US $684.6 billion defense budget towers over China’s $185 billion outlay, and the riches of this war chest flow into the coffers of Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and General Dynamics, the world’s biggest arms producers and exporters. From the Daegu Air Base in South Korea to the Spangdahlem Air Base in Germany, hundreds of US military bases crisscross many countries; recently, they have expanded in the Indo-Pacific region to physically surround and contain China. By comparison, China’s global military footprint is minuscule, with just one foreign base in Djibouti, at a great distance from the US.

Augmenting the US’s global economic and military power are the digital technology and cultural industries, whose size, reach, profits, and power are much greater than China’s. Consider the following: 65 of the world’s 154 largest global technology companies are American while 20 are Chinese. Eight of the top ten are American (Apple, Google, Amazon, Microsoft, Facebook, IBM, Intel, Oracle).
Microsoft, Alphabet-Google, Intel, IBM, Facebook, Cisco Systems, and Oracle) and only one is Chinese (Tencent Holdings). The two largest telecommunications companies in the world are the US-based AT&T and Verizon. The third largest is China Mobile. Silicon Valley is also home to over 14 of the 20 most visited websites, including the search engine monopoly Google, the social networking superpower Facebook, the video sharing platform YouTube, as well as digital microblogging (Twitter), encyclopedia (Wikipedia), entertainment streaming (Netflix), email (Outlook and Yahoo), photo sharing (Instagram), discussion forums (Reddit), and smut (Pornhub and Xvideos). China’s Internet firms are growing, but they own just two of the world’s most visited sites (Baidu and qq.com).

Hollywood’s “big five” studios – Walt Disney Studios and 20th Century Studios (owned by Walt Disney Company), Warner Bros. (owned by AT&T-WarnerMedia), Universal Pictures (owned by Comcast-NBCUniversal), and Paramount Pictures (owned by ViacomCBS) – not Chinese studios, rule the global box office. In 2019, Hollywood’s total box office closed out at $42.5 billion, an all-time high: The North American box office returned $11.4 billion and the international box office took in $31.1 billion. China’s government protects and promotes the growth of a nationally prosperous entertainment industry, and most of the top films and TV shows in China are “made in China.” China is not the victim of US cultural imperialism, but the cultural trade relationship between China and the US is imbalanced, weighted in the latter’s favor. Hollywood films annually make big bucks at the Chinese box office while Chinese films are infrequently screened in US theatres and not the source of comparable returns. 2019’s top grossing film – Avengers: Endgame – set over 30 box office records in China while China’s major blockbuster – The Wandering Earth – set none in the US. Simply put, China’s global entertainment is no match for Hollywood’s cross-border profit and cultural appeal.

Each year, Silicon Valley and Hollywood add billions to US GDP. Also, digital media platforms meet capitalism’s need to create consumers and cajole them to keep buying commodities. Google is the largest digital ad seller in the world, accounting for 31.1% of worldwide ad spending, or $103.73 billion. Facebook is next, with $67.37 billion in net ad revenues, followed by China-based Alibaba, at $29.20 billion, and then by Amazon, with roughly $14.1 billion. Hollywood films and TV shows serve capitalism’s advertising exigencies as well. They are, first and foremost, experiential and cultural commodities, produced by studios to be sold to distributors, and distributed to be sold to exhibitors in all kinds of screening and streaming exhibition markets. Anywhere from $20 to $150 million is spent by Hollywood to market each of its works. But global advertisers also pay Hollywood to place branded commodities into its storytelling. With $288 million in promotional tie-ins, Spider-Man: Far From Home set a record for branded entertainment: watch Spider Man battle Mysterio, and enjoy Audi, Pepsi, and United Airlines! Season three of Stranger Things incorporated about $15 million worth of product placement, compliments of Coca-Cola, Burger King, and KFC synergies.

The US digital technology and cultural industries are driven by capitalist logics, but their operations also interlink with US geopolitical ambitions. The US Department of State pushes cultural and digital free trade and stringent intellectual property policies to bolster Silicon Valley and Hollywood profit-making in every country they touch. The US national security agency (NSA) leverages Big Tech’s model of “surveillance capitalism” to produce and then monitor global populations as data profiles, and does predictive analytics of the threat they pose to America. To buttress US “soft power,” the US Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs conducts pro-America campaigns across all media, old and new. The US Department of Defense operationalizes the Internet and social media platforms as “weapons” and “battle-spaces” for “cyberwarfare,” and contracts firms such as Amazon, Google, and Microsoft to undertake militarized research and development on the Internet of Things and artificial intelligence (AI). All branches of the US security state are embedded in the cultural industries, and they routinely assist Hollywood’s production of security-themed TV shows and movies. The CIA helped produce The Americans, a Cold War TV drama; a former agent, Joe Weisberg, was one of its creators. The Department of Defense has co-created with Hollywood numerous “militainment products” such as Tom Gun: Maverick, Captain Marvel, and Transformers.

The twentieth and twenty-first century convergences between the capitalist logics of the US digital technology and cultural industries and the geopolitical actions of the US security state are examined in greater detail in my book Hearts and Mines: The US Empire’s Culture Industry (2016) and co-edited volume, Media Imperialism: Continuity and Change (2019). In brief, US state agencies and the digital technology and cultural industries are building, protecting, and promoting a global system of integrated ally states pressed by Silicon Valley and Hollywood profit-making, superintended by the US military-security regime, and pervaded by American popular culture and platforms. China is expanding its soft power resources and cyber-war arsenal, and engaging in cultural influence campaigns. But China is not yet a match for the US Empire.

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The West German union magazine Publizistik & Kunst called it “the gold rush,” while the newspaper die tageszeitung was reminded of “the early days of capitalism.” Both referred to the development of the press market in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the spring of 1990. West German political and economic groups were building market structures in their own interest, hampering a profound democratic media reform.

Only five months earlier, in November 1989, hundreds of thousands of East Germans had gone to the streets protesting state repression, demanding free and democratic media. These protests brought down the Berlin Wall and set off a wave of progressive reforms also in the media. Eventually, on October 3, 1990, the GDR joined the Federal Republic, reuniting Germany. While much has been written about the unification, the interim period has fallen out of history. This article shows that the German press market was effectively united by May 1990.

> Reform

The initial media reform goal in November 1989 was to break the information monopoly of the Socialist Unity Party (SED). The SED held about 70% of the total newspaper production of the GDR. As early as December 1989, the GDR Council of Ministers ratified a resolution that supported opposition groups by guaranteeing them equal access to the media. Shortly after, on February 5, 1990, the Act on Freedom of Opinion, Information, and Media prohibited censorship and declared that the press was free from political and economic monopolization, and thus, an open platform for public debate. Every person and legal entity in the GDR had the right to publish, print, and distribute media.

This was followed by an explosion of newspaper start-ups: sixteen newspapers were founded in February 1990 alone; by July 1990, it was about 100. In a country with only seventeen million people, this start-up wave stood for structural reform and democratic participation. Meanwhile, established newspapers claimed political independence and underwent internal reforms; debates on what makes a press truly free were being held in newsrooms, newspapers, and letters to the editor.

At the same time, several institutions were founded solely to reform the GDR media. For instance, the non-partisan grassroots Media Control Council (MKR) and the Ministry of Media Policy (MfM) were already founded by April 1990. Their aim, according to Media Minister Gottfried Müller in May 1990, was to ensure a “cultiv-
vated transition to media freedom,” to not “simply adopt or imitate Western models and concepts.” The goal was to find new models for a free press.

> Market takeover

Concurrently with these political reform initiatives, West German media corporations had begun to explore the East German market. As early as December 1989, publishers distributed their publications in the GDR. Sporadic exports soon turned systematic. By mid-February, the West German Ministry of the Interior (BMI) admitted there was already a need for regulation: taxes were not paid, prices not fixed. The BMI, however, “explicitly endorsed” these “activities of publishers in legal gray areas.” It aimed thereby at securing the flow of information to influence the first free GDR-election in March 1990, heavily financed by West German partisan interests. This laid the political foundation for a press transition shaped by West German market interests.

On March 5, 1990, the major publishing houses Springer, Burda, Bauer und Gruner + Jahr (G + J) started systematic imports. They single-handedly installed their own proprietary system. Dividing the GDR into four zones of distribution, they jointly distributed mainly their own publications, flooding the East German market. Illegal according to federal law, it caused consternation among all GDR political and civic bodies. Since this scheme began only two weeks before the election, the GDR government was unable to act. Attempts at regulation were rejected or ignored.

Shortly after the election, these publishers aimed at gaining a competitive advantage over one another by the use of predatory pricing. The goal of this money-losing business was to win future readers. This excluded small West German publishers who could not afford such prices, and put additional pressures on East German newspapers: outdated printing facilities, paper scarcity, and unreliable distribution infrastructures made it difficult to compete. Moreover, on April 1, 1990, the GDR ended press subsi-

dies. Most newspapers doubled or tripled their prices and quickly turned to advertising, which made necessary West German expertise. This – in addition to needed capital investments – created early dependencies for East German newspapers.

> Two countries, one market

By April 1990, all East German newspapers stood in joint venture negotiations with West German publishers aiming for a competitive advantage in the East. Prime objects were the fourteen former SED regional newspapers, quasi-monopolies in their respective regions. Officially, these newspapers signed agreements of intent. In reality, however, West German publishers put in place business relations that ranged from the acquisition of advertisers, to the printing of newspapers, and included equity investments. It was only in April 1991, however, that these joint ventures were turned into legal contracts by the trust agency (Treuhandanstalt, THA) of the German government. The THA handed unaltered, former state press monopolies to major West German publishers that soon further consolidated the market.

> Death of a dream

The result was press concentration: Of the 120 newspapers that had been founded in 1990, two years later, only about 65 newspapers from about 50 publishers were left. By November 1992, the number had fallen to 50 newspapers from 35 publishers. To historian Konrad Dussel, this was a consequence of the federal government’s decision “against any experiment.” What it meant was the death of the democratic dream of 1989. Experiences, ideas, and initiatives of how to rethink a free press based on GDR experiences were overrun. This makes the transition period a lost window of opportunity and German unification a mere expansion of the Western political-economic order. A sovereign East German press never developed.

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I grew up in West and Central Africa where we believe, organize, and conduct our lives around the idea that everything in the world and in life is incomplete: nature is incomplete, the supernatural is incomplete, humans are incomplete, and so are human action and human achievements. We believe that the sooner one recognizes and provides for incompleteness as the normal way of being, the better we are for it. We also believe that because of their incompleteness, people are not singular and unified in their form and content,
even as their appearance might suggest that they are. And neither are things. Fluidity, compositeness of being, and the capacity to be present in simultaneous multiplicities in whole or in fragments are core characteristics of reality and an ontology of incompleteness. Furthermore, West and Central Africa is a region where interconnections and interdependencies are recognized and celebrated, and used as the dominant and desired template for organizing relationships among humans, and between humans and the natural and supernatural worlds.

> On incompleteness

It is in recognition of incompleteness that humans in West and Central Africa are eager to seek ways of enhancing themselves through relationships with other humans, and use their creativity and imagination to acquire magical objects that can extend them in these relationships, as well as in interactions, with the whims and caprices of natural and supernatural forces or agents. Such magical objects, which in the language of modernity are referred to as technologies, are more commonly known in West and Central Africa under local names that I have roughly translated as *juju*. The cosmologies and ontologies that lend themselves to such beliefs and practices have in the past been, and still largely continue to be, mischaracterized and disparaged by modern-day students and observers of Africa and even by some Africans, as witchcraft, sorcery, paganism, superstition, and primitivism. Paradoxically, not even the currency of new information and communication technologies (ICTs) championed by the digital revolution is seen as a redeeming factor for such cosmologies and ontologies, beliefs and logics of practice by those who insist on seeing modernization and development as a zero-sum pursuit.

Yet, ambitions of dominance and superiority through conquest and refusal to acknowledge debt and indebtedness aside, it becomes evident that the future belongs with such disregarded popular beliefs and practices informed by the reality of incompleteness. If ordinary humans in the state of nature are incomplete, all efforts at seeking to enhance themselves through relationships with fellow humans and through borrowings and technologies, far from making them complete, points them to the humility of being composite and to the acknowledgement of their indebtedness to others – humans, nature, and the supernatural. Incompleteness is an enduring condition, in that the quest for extensions in order to repair one’s state of incompleteness only makes one realize one’s incompleteness, when confronted with all manner of extensions that one has not mastered. Moreover, extensions tend to work only partly and for some of the time, and some of them actually undermine the degree of completion one thought one had achieved. The fact that completeness is an illusion that can only unleash sterile ambitions of conquest and zero-sum games of superiority, is an invitation to explore, contemplate, and provide for a world of open-endedness, interconnectedness, fluidities, and conviviality; a world in which no one has the monopoly of power or powerlessness, a world in which humans and things complement each other.

An emphasis on interconnections and interdependencies invites us to embrace incompleteness as a normal state of being and becoming, by systematically disabusing ourselves of zero-sum aspirations to superiority.

> Digital technologies as *juju*

As one of Chinua Achebe’s proverbs from his book *Arrow of God* on invisible power goes, “When we see a little bird dancing in the middle of the pathway we must know that its drummer is in the near-by bush.” To be able to claim god-like attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, humans must seek to enhance their ordinary selves with extraordinary activators – *juju*. Hence, the widespread belief in West and Central Africa that, ordinary though we are as humans, our ability to be omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent can be significantly enhanced by *juju* (which includes but is not confined to charms, spells, concoctions, potions, etc.). Such *juju* is usually specially prepared by clairvoyant or spiritual experts who are known in different contexts by different names.

Thus, I liken ICTs or digital technologies to what we in West and Central Africa have the habit of referring to as *juju*. I invite you as scholars of the digital humanities to see in the region’s belief in incompleteness and the compositeness of being human, as well as in the capacity to be present everywhere at the same time, an indication that we have much to learn from the past about how best to understand and harness current purportedly innovative advances in ICTs. The idea of digital technologies making it possible for humans and things to be present even in their absence and absent even in their presence is not that dissimilar to the belief in what is often labelled and dismissed as witchcraft and magic. This belief lends itself to a world of infinite possibilities – a world of presence in simultaneous multiplicities and eternal powers to redefine reality. The popular world of West and Central Africa – a world of flexibility, fluidity, and incompleteness that was dismissed by colonial powers and continues to be disparaged by modernizers – is one in which time and space are not allowed to stand in the way of the truth and its nuanced complexities. It is a world that we have come to understand a great deal better only more recently with the advent of new ICTs such as the internet, the cell phone, and the smartphone, along with their “magic” and “witchcraft” of instant availability and reachability, as well as their propensity to facilitate narcissism, self-indulgence, and the keeping-up of appearances. Rather than thinking in dichotomies, the West and Central African tradition of self-extension through creative imagination assumes an ontology of interconnections that may be a fruitful approach for theorizing the intersections between humans and ICTs.
I see *juju* as a technology of self-activation and self-extension – something that enables us to rise beyond our ordinariness of being, by giving us potency to achieve things that we otherwise would fail short of achieving were we to rely only on our natural capacities or strengths. It is true that our bodies, if well cultivated, could become phenomenal *juju*, enabling us to achieve extraordinary feats. But even such technically trained, programmed, or disciplined bodies are likely to encounter challenges that require added potency. In other words, while our bodies have the potential to be our first *juju*, they eventually require additional *juju* for us to be efficacious in our actions.

The fact that *juju* often rely on a complicated network of interconnections to function properly is an added and humbling complication and a deterrence to any propensity for hubris. Equipping or extending oneself with purportedly more scientific and technical *jujus* such as computers (desktops or laptops), cell phones (basic or smart), and other mobile devices (tablet, iPad) is still no guarantee that these will not fail just when one needs them the most.

It is perhaps for this reason that the *juju* men and women of West and Central Africa do not shy away from the use of modern/scientific technologies (smartphones, tablets, iPad, etc.) alongside what some prefer to call their “African electronics.” They use these blends of traditional and modern *juju* for self-activation and extension, and to enable them to meet and attend to clients in multiple locations outside their villages, in towns and even in other continents.

Reliance on *jujus*, charms, spells, and clairvoyance might seem primitive and irrational, but these are part of the potency repertoire from which we draw agency in view of the fact of our incompleteness. In this regard, as argued above, *jujus* are not much different from the supposedly more scientific, rational, and modern technologies of self-extension with which we are familiar (photos, computers, internet, cell phones, smart phones, mass media, social media, books, electricity, washing machines, artificial intelligence, nuclear weapons, etc.). A simple Google search for words such as *marabout* in France, Canada, or Belgium, for instance, would take you not only to websites and contact details of marabouts in Senegal, Mali, or Niger, but to their offices, agents, phone numbers, and schedules abroad. In Cameroon, for example, it is not uncommon to find diviners summoning diasporic Cameroonian on computers, smartphones, and tablets to appear and answer to the afflictions and predicaments of concerned relations left behind.

> **Juju: A necessary evil?**

We are witnessing the phenomenal, growing, and disturbing powers of software designers in the age of digital technologies and the surging potency of algorithms. It is no longer beyond imagination for hackers to remotely install spyware in our smartphones that enables them to access all our content, including encrypted messages, and allows them to remotely control the microphone and camera without our knowledge. Such spyware makers are not dissimilar to a spirit medium in the bushes of West and Central Africa drumming their clients and protégés into intoxicating frenzies of fearless overindulgence in full view of others.

Just as life is full of hierarchies informed and sustained by inequalities, so too are there inequalities and hierarchies among *juju*. The more powerful one’s *juju*, the better one’s chances of being, seeing, doing, feeling, and smelling things, tangible and intangible, as well as of influencing and controlling other people, things, events, and phenomena. A *juju* can be used either alone or in combination with others, in order to maximize their potency. With a good *juju* (take the case of drones), one does not need to be physically present to be efficacious with those one is seeking to influence for good or bad, in love or in hate. Nothing brings this home better than the capabilities of a well-resourced (with applications and contacts) smartphone – one of the most sensational *juju* in vogue – with access to Wi-Fi, a hotspot, or Bluetooth, in the age of social media, supra connectivity, and the growing imperative for conviviality.

Yet, despite their contradictions and manipulability, life would be very ordinary, predictably standardized, and routinized without the exciting sense of adventure and ambition that the ever unfolding creative effervescence in *juju* brings. The very idea of creative innovation would be dead, as individuals and societies would lose the ability to improvise and reinvent themselves. This highlights the importance of *juju* in society and social relationships. Individuals and collectivities use *juju* to influence, persuade, and control situations and others, and to overcome and complicate adversities in ways that would otherwise not be possible without their repertoire of *juju*.

The ubiquity of *juju* should be associated with the idea that power, far from concentrated in the hands of a few, is actually something that comes and goes, often without warning. However powerful a person is, he or she is always seeking to enhance themselves with extended body parts and extra senses on the one hand, and *juju* (technics and technologies) on the other. This should sensitize us to the need to cultivate and champion a disposition to take the outside in and the inside out.

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Doing Sociology in the Philippines

by Filomin C. Gutierrez, University of the Philippines, Philippines and member of ISA Research Committees on Sociology of Deviance (RC29), and Women, Gender and Society (RC32)

This volume of Global Dialogue presents reflections of members of the Philippine Sociological Society (PSS) on various issues such as urbanization and governance, the LGBT movement, violence in the war on drugs, doing public sociology among the poor, and the marginalization of the Mindanao region. Coming from three distinct regions or groups of islands of the country, Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao, they discuss their respective research interests and reflect on the challenges Filipino sociologists face today.

Louie Benedict Ignacio tackles the issues of urbanization in the Philippines by pointing to the dynamics of metropolitanization of Metro Manila, an urban sprawl of multiple cities that form the National Capital Region. The rise of gated communities evolved from providing economic security to ensuring physical security for its privileged residents as urban poverty increased and slums proliferated. Ignacio presents the crises of urbanization as attended not only by shared problems of resource and transport management, but also by social segmentation and issues of governance.

John Andrew Evangelista takes up how the queer lens makes sense of the ideological differences behind the groups in the LGBTQ movement in the Philippines. Diverse ideological logics presented various claims, which ranged from those advocating anti-discrimination laws and calls to transform the current economic system to those keen on the partying aspects of the Pride parade. He argues that the spaces of contradiction and conflict in constructing the history of the LGBTQ movement show that the differences in the sections of the movement are historical products rather than opposing interests.

Gutierrez presents the violence in the war on drugs, which killed thousands of “drug personalities” in the Philippines, as attended by dissonant narratives. The Filipino public’s support of the anti-drugs campaign contradicts complaints of human rights violation and narratives by arrested drug suspects of police violence, but confirms the latter’s own view of the campaign as a solution to the drug problem. As the topic opens to diverse narratives depending on one’s focus, social researchers must look beyond the debate between penal populism – an approach that advocates punitive measures against criminality based on public sentiments – and penal elitism – a view that privileges scientific or expert opinion on crime and regards public sentiments as simplistic.

The piece by Phoebe Zoe Maria Sanchez critiques the authoritarian populist regime of President Rodrigo Duterte as an extension of the failure of the People Power revolution in 1986 to achieve democratic transitions, and one which has only renewed, if not worsened, the fascistic features of the state displayed during the Marcos dictatorship. Sanchez argues that public sociology can gain from supporting organizations of the poor and unlocking their cultures of silence to strengthen their participation in civil society and impact state policy.

Finally, Mario Aguja writes about the marginalization of Mindanao in the Philippine South against the hegemony of Metro Manila in the North as the de facto center of economic, political, military, and cultural power. He problematizes this center-periphery relation to cover the practice of sociology itself. While issues from Mindanao, such as the Muslim-Christian conflict, extreme poverty rates, and violent extremism, are compelling topics for sociological analysis, Philippine sociology’s discourse was limited to topics that were of interest to the center. To reverse this bias, the PSS recently made a decisive pivot to Mindanao by bringing annual conferences to the region and placed Mindanaoan sociologists at the forefront of the national conversation.

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Urban Studies in the Philippines: Sociology as an Anchor

by Louie Benedict R. Ignacio, University of Santo Tomas, Philippines and member of ISA Research Committees on Sociology of Education (RC04) and Regional and Urban Development (RC21)

Urban studies in the Philippines, and urban sociology in particular, saw a rapid growth from the 1980s onwards when the capital city of Manila and its surrounding cities started to expand economically and politically. Prior to the structuring of communities and the advancement of technology, the areas now sprawling with high-rise buildings, gated communities, and busy streets used to be covered by green fields and connecting water and river systems. But as population in these areas increased, the needs of the communities also evolved, to the extent that their development could no longer be sustained by their own resources. These changes saw the need for a more complex governance of the residents’ economic, political, and social lives.

They also led to a varied discussion of city life. Different aspects of city life, including that of housing and the built environment, the segmentation of residents based on economic status, criminality, and governance all called for a specialized lens in understanding the city.

Politically, to address these concerns, the state devolved some of its functions to various local government units like the administration of local affairs. In the Philippines, this process of decentralization was granted by the Local Government Code of 1991. Under Article 24 of the Code, the state devolved its functions to the local government units so that each unit became responsible for a minimum set of services and facilities to be provided in accordance with

Metro Manila, where informal settlers are a normal sight, is one of the metropolitan areas with the densest population in the world. Photo by Rhon Paolo C. Velarde.
established national policies, guidelines, and standards. According to Article 25 of the Code, local government units should provide basic services such as adequate communication and transportation facilities, support services and facilities for education, police and fire protection, and community development.

In the Philippines, the concept of metropolitanization – metropolitan areas and metropolitan governance – was first conceived in the early 1970s to coordinate the metropolitan services to the newly integrated three cities and thirteen municipalities within the vicinity of Metro Manila. The first metropolitan governing body in the Philippines was established in 1975 by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 824: the Metro Manila Commission, serving from 1975 to 1986. Its functions were to coordinate services such as traffic and transport management, squatter control, and the preservation of a clean and green environment. In 1995, by virtue of Republic Act No. 7924, the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) was created, which involves the functions of planning, supervision, coordination, regulation, and integration of seventeen cities and municipalities in terms of providing basic services. The basic services that the MMDA provides include: traffic decongestion and transportation efficiency; work management; pollution monitoring; flood and sewage management; urban renewal, zoning and land use planning, health and sanitation; and public safety, which includes rescue operations.

If the twentieth century was characterized by the domination of urbanization, this has given way in the twenty-first century to metropolitanization as the latest comprehensive approach to urban governance and management. Urbanization came along with a rise in urban poverty due to limited income and employment opportunities in the cities, as urban populations continued to grow naturally and through migration from the countryside. This as well gave rise to the proliferation of slums in the cities. Lack of potable water supply and sanitation and waste disposal were also problems generated by rapid urbanization, resulting in environment degradation. Inadequate infrastructure and transport facilities in cities led to a state of gridlock that restricted economic growth. In turn, all these urban problems led to the breakdown in the social fabric of the cities since the late 1970s, which reached a peak in the early 1990s since the restoration of democracy in the Philippines, and has consequences up to the present.

My research has tried to look into this vast realm of urban studies, particularly in Metro Manila. I first focused on how an inter-city, national agency like the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority addresses the urban problem of traffic management, arguing that political dynamics between local government unit officials and national agency officials played a significant role in solving such a complex issue. I continued by focusing on how a gated community in the urban area of Metro Manila emerged, particularly looking into how the function of gated communities evolved from being a form of economic security, to being a form of physical security, and further to being both. Most recently, I looked into the dynamics of the delivery of security in an urban setting, given that gated communities, being privately owned entities governed by private homeowners associations, provide their residents a higher level of security than the local government provides the general public. This phenomenon, seen through neoliberalism and the New Public Management approach, results in undermining the legitimacy of the local government units by monopolizing the source of services while enticing more and more urban dwellers from a higher class to patronize this residential set-up.

Given the continuous growth of the population in Metro Manila – with a steady increase of 1.7% annually, similar to other megalopolises around the world – it is all the more important that the perspectives used in understanding urban areas be more diverse. Urban studies in the Philippines have been compartmentalized into different fields like health, urban planning and design, politics and governance, discrepancy between socio-economic groups, and even risks and disasters. For Metro Manila, with its population of 12.8 million people and one of the highest population densities in the world, sociology can provide an overarching framework to understand the relationship between individuals and their environment. Sociology can provide an anchor to connect concerns and possible solutions provided by evidence-based research and immersion in the city.
Navigating Conflicts through a Queer Lens

by John Andrew G. Evangelista, University of the Philippines Diliman, Philippines, and member of ISA Research Committee on Women, Gender, and Society (RC32)

When it first emerged as a framework through which society could be examined, queer theory directed our vision towards the understanding, if not the glorification, of the oppositional. To engage the orthodoxy of patriarchy and heteronormativity, it excavated events, moments, identities, and cultures that defy the rigid binaries of gender and sexuality. It searched for logics that subvert existing hierarchies. Within this frame, to be queer is to be suspicious of anything that resembles normality.

Anthropologist Martin Manalansan engaged this conception of queerness by grounding it in messiness. The task is not to merely celebrate subversive acts and thoughts. Instead, the mission is to illustrate the various ways deviance intersects and collides with the normal. Queerness, then, could be understood as those messy spaces where seemingly conflicting logics encounter each other. This provides a viable framework to make sense of the social and historical conditions within which actors confront and negotiate seemingly contradictory meanings, interpretations, and even ideologies.

In his book *Global Divas* (2003), Manalansan told a compelling story about a Filipino gay man living in New York who appeared to have created a spatial division within his apartment. On one side, there was an altar with Catholic religious symbols while on the other, there were pictures of naked men. The religious legacy of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines travelled to a city providing relative freedom for LGBTQ people. This case demonstrated queerness not only by mapping the messy encounter between gayness and religion. It also brought to light how social and historical conditions contribute in setting up such mess.

Caught up in the middle

Like the messy apartment mentioned above, researchers of queerness often find themselves in spaces of contradictions and conflicts. Often, they feel like being caught up in the middle of opposing interpretations. In my own work on the history of the LGBTQ movement in the Philippines, I found myself standing in the middle of different ideological tensions between activists. It is no secret that social movements are never monochromatic. Carrying various ideologies, activists often read and construct claims in diverse ways. It is these kinds of tensions that researchers of queerness like me encounter as we make sense of LGBTQ movements.

My involvement in Philippine LGBTQ organizing both as a researcher and an activist familiarized myself with the tensions among various segments of the movement. While some foregrounded the need for laws, others associated gender and sexual liberation with the socialist transition. Others recognized homophobia and misogyny as the products of individual consciousness, which prompted them to argue for gender responsive education. Finally, a segment of the movement also recognized the intersections of issues. Thus, they avoided arguments that center on one cause and one solution.

These tensions could be understood within the queer lens. The existence of various ideologies within the move-
ment quintessentially characterizes the movement as messy, as diverse ideological logics encounter each other. This is particularly observable during Pride marches in Metro Manila. Marchers carry various claims formed within specific ideologies. While some are calling for the passing of specific anti-discrimination laws, others also foreground the need for a transformation of the current economic system. Others even bring calls to end labor contractualization (short-term employment practice) while corporate contingents are visibly partying and dancing.

One can make sense of such tensions and messes by understanding the social and historical conditions within which the movement emerged. LGBTQ organizations started to form a few years after the fall of the Marcos dictatorial regime in 1986 that resulted from massive and sustained protests. No longer preoccupied with the ultimate goal of toppling the dictatorial regime, activists started to venture into various advocacies. The institution of the 1987 Constitution centered on protecting civil rights hastened the formation of legal organizations working on a wide array of issues, including sexual and gender justice, among others.

Along with this opportunity to organize was an ideological split in the Philippine Left. On the one hand, a segment maintained that feudalism remained the force fueling oppression. On the other hand, some groups deviated from such a reading as they recognized political openings and took advantage of them to fight for a progressive agenda. Organizations that refused to look at issues from a purely class analysis also emerged. Situated in various segments of the Philippine Left, LGBTQ activists were socialized in different political persuasions, which hastened the ideological variety within the movement.

> The currency of queerness

Amid these contending voices, queer theory could help in facilitating conversations within a movement polarized by ideologies. The tendency of some LGBTQ organizations is to refuse conversations with other organizations especially when they do not align with their respective persuasions. These attitudes and behaviors stem largely from the logic that ideological differences are essential, natural, and given. Some even expressed to me that attempts at bridging will more often than not fail since ideologies are so entrenched that they will always preclude positive perceptions about particular groups.

I find the queer lens to be a viable frame of thinking in this context. Instead of looking at political persuasions as naturally contradictory, I interpret their differences as historical products. The currency of this queer thinking lies in its capacity to develop empathy towards activists carrying different ideologies. To heed the call for queerness is to be tactical in the course of actions. We need to shift from understanding ideological contradictions as given to looking at them as products of specific histories. Only then can we deploy one ideology that works for the moment while not being stifled from utilizing another, should the need arise.

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When Rodrigo Duterte assumed the presidency in the Philippines in July 2016, a war on drugs was immediately cascaded into Philippine communities. This campaign saw members of the Philippine National Police coaxing drug users to voluntarily surrender and pledge to cease the habit, with over a million “drug personalities” surrendering just six months into Duterte’s administration. The anti-drug campaign was popularly known as Oplan Tokhang, a portmanteau term for toktok and hangyo, which means “to knock” and “to plead,” respectively, in the Cebuano language. Since 2016, tokhang has become a euphemism for extra-judicial killing (EJK) by either the authorities or anti-drug vigilantes.

The rising death toll of the drug war drew criticism from human rights groups. Official sources reported that as of July 2019, some 5,375 drug personalities have been killed in police operations. Human rights groups estimate that the overall death toll, which includes EJKs, has reached beyond 25,000. The International Criminal Court (ICC) started investigating Duterte for crimes against humanity in February 2018. Public opinion surveys by the Social Weather Stations (SWS) in late 2019 indicated that 75% of Filipinos believe that many human rights abuses took place as a result of Oplan Tokhang.

The war on drugs generated enormous interest among Filipino social science researchers, most of whom are sensitized to the human rights perspective. Conflicting death toll estimates, along with contrasting assessments of the extent and severity of the drug problem, matched the debates surrounding the morals and politics of the anti-illegal drug campaign between the authorities, human rights groups, and experts, including social researchers.

Narratives of suffering from those arrested and widows of those who were killed compose the backdrop of a new, violent Philippine reality. This reality is attended by the paradox of hyper-stigmatization of drug use by the current political and criminal justice regime vis-à-vis the “normalized proliferation” of drugs, articulated by the term talamak (chronic), commonly used by arrested persons, media, and much of the public.

In my own studies, I struggled to make sense of the dissonant narratives of suspected drug offenders, specifically involving the stimulant methamphetamine (locally known as shabu). I interviewed 27 men in jail, most of whom are working-class individuals in their early and middle-to-late adulthood arrested in the first year of Oplan Tokhang on drug-related charges. They claimed that they had been wrongly arrested, that police officers planted evidence, and that they were mistreated or tortured to confess their guilt. They described their plight as walang kaibahan-laban (defenseless) against the police who forcefully descended into their dwellings. Despite their tragic personal plight, many of them still support Duterte’s anti-drug campaign because it represents a decisive action against a worsening drug situation that had long been ignored.

Clearly, the “drug offenders” are very much a part of the “penal populist” public that generated support for Duterte’s presidency in 2016. A moral panic about the rising number of drug addicts and unsafe neighborhoods propped up the resurgence of penal populism, a term proposed by John Pratt as an approach that adopts more punitive measures against criminality based on public sentiments rather than on empirical evidence or expert opinions. This can be observed in public opinion polls released by SWS at the end of 2019 indicating that Duterte enjoyed a net satisfaction rating of 72% from Filipinos, and his war on drugs a net satisfaction rating of 70%.

Prior to Duterte’s presidency, studies by Gideon Lasco showed that the youths of a Philippine port community used shabu as pampagilas (performance enhancer) for their work in the informal sector (e.g., vendors, porters, sex workers). Similarly, participants in my study also confessed to using shabu to regain strength from tiredness, stay awake, and take up jobs that are either hard to come by or require long unpredictable hours (e.g., truck and jeepney drivers, construction workers). They refused to be called “addicts” because, in their belief, they can stop anytime they wish, and they don’t let it become a habitual vice. That they purchase it using their own wages and not with funds derived from theft, robbery, or any other crime confers shabu the legitimacy of a consumer commodity in the open market. The scope of analysis of its use, therefore, needs to go beyond notions of leisure or retreatism and subcultural theories of addiction, and toward its function as a mainstream means to cope with the stresses of poverty and economic precarity.

by Filomin C. Gutierrez, University of the Philippines, Philippines and member of ISA Research Committees on Sociology of Deviance (RC29), and Women, Gender and Society (RC32)
Despite the participants’ defense of their drug use, the denouement of my conversations with them was their recognition that shabu is a “destroyer of families,” “a source of criminality,” “ultimately evil,” and “a national problem,” which must be eradicated. One key aspect of their narrative is that the misinformed police made a mistake in capturing them instead of targeting those who are truly guilty: addicts who commit heinous crimes to support their vice, money-hungry traffickers who exploit them, and corrupt policemen who extort money from the addicts and peddlers.

My preliminary interviews with police officers on Oplan Tokhang also suggest an experience misunderstood by human rights groups and misrepresented by the media. They spoke of their conviction in carrying out the mandate and ideals of protecting the country and its citizens from a drug menace “that does not seem to end.” While they recognize that drugs do fill a vacuum created by poverty and that drug lords economically exploit an addicted and impoverished population, they also regard drug personalities as combatants, armed with weapons, who are ready to retaliate. More importantly, they reflexively look back on Oplan Tokhang as a campaign that has exposed the “true depth of the drug problem,” and how it has “gravely corrupted the police ranks.” If a deep story – an approach used by Arlie Hochschild to capture the experience of right-wing American Republicans – can be told from the narratives of “drug offenders,” it might render a starkly different account of Philippine reality assembled from the narratives of the police.

Social science research on the Philippine war on drugs can indeed contribute to providing evidence-based policies, whether these involve the methodological expertise of quantifying addiction levels, reconceptualizing drug use typologies, or interpreting public opinion on criminality. The challenge for sociology is that it must heed caution about frameworks that offer binaries that reduce the drug question in the Philippines to a battle between the good guys versus bad guys, the addicts versus those who are not, and the good cops versus bad cops. More importantly, sociologists researching the war on drugs must be wary of privileging penal elitism, a term which Victor Shammas uses to refer to an overvaluation of scientific or expert opinion and dismissal of a public regarded as emotional, irrational, or simplistic. Such self-reflexivity then calls for sociologists to be comfortable with contesting narratives within groups of social actors and between the supposed camps of the political and moral spectrum that makes up the public.

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Piles of dead bodies have mounted under the current Duterte regime (Rappler, December 2018). More concretely, this regime has embarked on an impressive political settlement scheme with a network of feudal political families and compradors in public office backing him up as a bold mouthpiece, along with the Philippine police and military state bureaucracy. This is shown in how Duterte mustered an enormous majority of the members of the Philippine House of Representatives and ousted a Chief Justice in 2018. Scholars dub this “authoritarian populism” given that, partly, it was said to be interspersed with popular and developmentally progressive programs, despite its open call for “murder” as a strategy in its anti-crime policies. But the regime enthrones a kind of political dynamics that is an outright and naked form of authoritarianism. It has recently increased police, military, and para-military interdiction in Philippine communities as it entrenches dirty politics through election fraud, graft, and corruption and engages in a drastic rampage of killings with baiting à la McCarthy as justification to murder social activists, religious persons, human rights advocates, lawyers, teachers, university professors, peasants, youths and others.

A substantial practice in Philippine sociology since the first dictatorship of the Marcos regime is the employment of public sociology as a necessary response to the perceived invisibility of sociology to the Philippine public. This derives from the viewpoint that Philippine society is confronted with a crisis of permanent dictatorship, from the Marcos to the Duterte regime. It brings to the fore questions about the nature of the first so-called EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 that toppled the Marcos dictatorship and whether it had truly paved the way for a democratic transition to take place. Unfortunately, it now seems a foregone conclusion that the first EDSA People Power Revolution was short of the tools for genuine democratization given the establishment of a fascistic order 33 years later. This suggests a crisis of permanent authoritarianism,
challenging Filipino Cebuano Sociology to rethink whether the years following EDSA 1 were truly years of honoring a full democratic transition, or years of girding for the form of dictatorship revived today. For how else could the previous authoritarian practice become alive in its current form and with even more lethal effect? For, compared to Marcos’ killings at a little over 3,000, the volume of deaths in recent times has been an average of 33 persons murdered daily, that is, over 30,000 in the first three years of the Duterte administration (Rappler, December 2018).

Public sociology as practiced in the University of the Philippines Cebu links: a) Professional Sociology, b) Critical Sociology, and c) Sociology of Public Policy. This resonates with Burawoy’s (2004) public sociology that stood on the four divisions of sociological labor, namely: a) professional sociology, b) critical sociology, c) public sociology (the multiple publics), and d) policy sociology. Professional sociology provides mechanisms for the craft of sociology in proper research design and employment of the appropriate methods and techniques, i.e., case studies, sociographies, ethnographies, participant-observation, basic mass integration, etc. This enables sociologists and students alike to test their theses and engage in conversations concerning social and public policies, social institutions, cultures, groups, organizations, and processes of interaction among people working together. In the same manner, it invites social scientists to reimagine social problems beyond social constructionism, extending Filipino public conversation to the streets, and providing mechanisms to record and publish patterns of public interest articulation. This is standing on the indigenous or local political practice of governance, where critical sociology enables the understanding of the struggle for power between and among groups engaged in conflict over certain limited resources. Critical Sociology weighs structures – whether dominant or dominated, who controls and who is being controlled. Its end point is the creation of a Filipino critical mass that can be mobilized into actual public demonstrations organized to create a social movement. This social movement in turn becomes the necessary prime mover to the final link which is assessing and evaluating the content and context of public policies in the form of policy sociology.

The intricate weaving of the aforementioned links makes the concrete amalgam of techniques that enables public sociology to work as a scientific field. Public sociology takes place when dynamics of democratization are enabled for marginalized sectors to have access to resources and play an important role in civil society and within the state. It first takes the form of an academic exercise in sociological imagination, as a point of conversation among students and professors. Then it extends beyond the four walls of the classroom, to serve as a social tool and enabling mechanism to unlock cultures of silence among oppressed communities via extensive discussions, theorizing, and social engineering by supporting organizations among poor, deprived, oppressed, and violated individuals and communities. A sociologist’s ability to muster a sheer force or volume of people is a means to unmask the ways the state has straightforwardly and violently served as an instrument for the protection and preservation of ruling class interests.

Most especially in the Philippines today, public sociologists have to be emboldened as harbingers of the process of democratization because the Philippines is confronted with an entrenched level of democratic deficit and absence of the rule of law. This time, like in the Marcos era, the Philippines needs civil society formations that are self-organized, voluntary, self-generating, genuinely autonomous from the state, and able to articulate the public interest, bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules. Hence, public sociology’s end point may be called the sociology of public demonstration. This sociology of public demonstration consists of proofs, persuasion tools, transactional and coordination mechanisms, cognitive and rational apparatuses in the form of collective erudite communicators on issues or advocacies, and/or mobilization and competition social apparatuses in the form of a mass of people, or vote banks. This sociology of public demonstration measures how efficient and effective is the public sociology that is being engaged. And the public in demonstrations is a cue for public policy instrumentation as it provides a venue for assessing and accounting for the effectiveness or failure of a government’s public policy.

A major end of public sociology is summing up and theorizing the relationship between the government and the governed (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007; The American Sociologist, 2005). From a Global South perspective, comes actual governing in the framework of a native logic or of community collective sharing and relationship in solidarity. This framework is then incorporated in the means-making, regulating, tax-generating and mass-communicating of government institutions subject to actual public scrutiny of civil society and its public demonstration.

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The islands of Mindanao, often referred to as the Southern Philippines, suffered the most from marginalization in a national history replete with narratives of marginalization. Mindanao, formerly under the Sultanates of Maguindanao and Sulu, had developed a centralized system of governance and advanced civilization more than the rest of the country prior to the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521. The Sultanates fought the Spanish colonizers for 300 years in the bitter “Moro Wars” and were not colonized. Mindanao suddenly became part of the Philippines when the Americans signed the Treaty of Paris with Spain in 1898, and was “legally colonized” since then. However, it was the US as an imperial power that started the devastating colonizing work of Mindanao resulting in its economic, political, and cultural marginalization. Such historical injustices committed against the people of Mindanao have been linked with the bitter struggle of separatist Moro groups and account for the terrible state of well-being in the Southern Philippines. The injustices committed against the peoples of Mindanao remain a subject of transitional justice until today.

The rise of Manila (later Metro Manila) in the North as the de facto center of economic, political, military, and cultural
power for both colonial and domestic regimes perpetuated an unjust center-periphery relation in the country. The quest for peace in the South and the decentralization of government towards more autonomous economic and political empowerment remains elusive. While abundant in natural resources, Mindanao has high poverty rates and is plagued with separatism with undercurrents of Muslim-Christian conflict. The recent peace brought about by the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) of 2014, between the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the threat of violent extremism still looming, adds to the marginalized periphery status of Mindanao in the Philippine nation as an important subject and object of sociological inquiry.

> The centrist narrative of the Philippine Sociological Society

The national narrative of center-periphery relations affects different spheres of endeavor in the country, including academic, scientific, and professional narratives. The Philippine Sociological Society (PSS) is an exemplar of such a narrative. The development of sociology in the Philippines was primarily a center-metropolitan initiative. Its membership and leadership have been dominated by sociologists from the center. Its publication, The Philippine Sociological Review, featured mostly authors from the center on topics of interest to the center. Its conferences were held mostly in the center. Lately, however, this trend is changing.

The PSS was organized mostly by people from the center who had sociology programs in their universities. The list of the Charter members and their institutional affiliations is reflective of this. When PSS was organized in 1952, its charter members were affiliated with the following institutions, all located in Metropolitan Manila, to wit: De la Salle University, Phil. Women’s University, Phil. Rural Christian Fellowship, University of the East, College of Holy Spirit, Union Theological Seminary, and from the University of the Philippines.

As a consequence, the leadership of the PSS was directed from the metropole. Of its 69 years of existence, the presidency of the organization was held by Metropolitan Manila 54 times, the rest of Luzon seven times, and Mindanao eight times. The Visayas islands still have to capture the leadership of the organization. The University of the Philippines and the Ateneo de Manila competed with each other in providing leadership to the organization for 43 years, while Mindanao has been at the helm of its leadership for only eight years, or 10.29%. The last time it held the position was in the 1980s. It was only again in 2019 and 2020 that it had the opportunity to provide leadership, and bring a strong Mindanao perspective in the sociological discourse in the country.

> A changing mandate

Starting in the 2000s, the PSS has undertaken many initiatives in Mindanao. This is in response to the call of the times, but also because Mindanaoans finally became part of the leadership. It became an opportunity for the PSS not only to bring its membership to Mindanao but also to familiarize its membership with the Mindanao discourses as part of the national narrative. Despite security concerns, the 2014 PSS conference was successfully held in General Santos City, the southernmost city of Mindanao, with its theme “Crisis, Resiliency, Community: Sociology in the Age of Disasters.” Not yet content, and in a way as part of the organization’s “transitional justice,” the 2015 Conference with its theme “Sociology of Peace and Conflict: Context and Challenges” was again held in Mindanao, in Iligan City in the northern part of Mindanao. The theme was in line with taking stock of the promise of the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF as well as the tragedy of the Mamasapano incident where 44 members of the Special Action Force of the Philippine police were killed. With the populist rise to power of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016, the first Philippine president from Mindanao, the PSS held its conference in his city, Davao City, with the theme “Imagined Democracies: Transformation of Power and Knowledge in Philippine Society.” The 2017 and 2018 Conferences were held in the Visayas Islands only to return in 2019 to Mindanao, in Bukidnon province, with the theme “Engaged Citizenship and Identities.”

The Mindanao conferences provided an opportunity for institutions of higher learning in Mindanao offering sociology degrees to serve as host, and project themselves as part of the national narrative of training new sociologists. The Mindanao State University (MSU)-General Santos City served as host of the 2014 conference, followed by the MSU-Iligan Institute of Technology in 2015, and the Ateneo de Davao University in 2016. It was the Central Mindanao University (CMU) and the Bukidnon State University that hosted the 2019 PSS Conference. It also became an opportunity for Mindanaoans doing sociology to avail of the platform to present their research output, develop camaraderie, and become part of the transformation of the PSS toward a genuinely national sociology.

Today, there is greater awareness among Filipino sociologists about Mindanao – about its people, places, cultural richness, and discourses. Mindanao has started to break the metropolitan hegemony and mainstreamed itself as “the other Philippines,” worthy of critical sociological discourses and leadership. With the backbreaking work in Mindanao in recent years, the Philippine Sociological Society has immensely contributed in making Philippine sociology a truly national sociology.
Global Sociology in the Pandemic

by Geoffrey Pleyers, Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, ISA Vice-President for Research, past president of ISA Research Committee on Social Classes and Social Movement (RC47), and member of ISA Research Committees on Sociology of Religion (RC22), Sociology of Youth (RC34), and Social Movement, Collective Action and Social Change (RC48)

The coronavirus has brought science back to the center of public space, even in countries where populist leaders used to delegitimize it. Epidemiologists, medical doctors, and biologists bring us hard facts: the pandemic progresses every day and it is far worse than a “strong flu.” Social scientists have come up with facts that are as hard and unquestionable: while the virus itself may infect any of us, we are deeply unequal when confronted with it. Public health policies and social inequalities matter at least as much as the way our bodies react to it when it comes to the virus’ deadly consequences. Social scientists have shown that the COVID-19 pandemic is not only a sanitary crisis. It is also a social, ecological, and political crisis.

The pandemic has caused a “deglobalization” trend. States have closed their borders. Travels have sharply decreased. Major international events – such as the ISA Forum – have been cancelled or postponed. National governments’ priority is to secure access to healthcare equipment and basic supplies to “their own people.” The social sciences have often followed this path and focused on the national scale. Scholars and experts have conducted national statistical studies, analyzed the differentiated impact of the virus across class and race in their country, monitored their government’s responses to the crisis, and contributed to the national public debate.

This comeback of methodological nationalism is a paradox, as the COVID-19 pandemic is a deeply global phenomenon. It does not stop at closed borders and reveals how deeply interdependent we have become. International collaboration is crucial in dealing with the pandemic. It is certainly true in the fields of medicine and natural sciences to reach a better understanding of the virus itself, improve medical treatments, and come up with a vaccine. International collaboration is equally crucial in the social sciences. We need to learn from other countries and other world regions’ experience of the pandemic. Such a global perspective should not yield to “methodological globalism” and be limited to macro-analyses. To be useful at the time of the pandemic, we have to foster global dialogue among social scientists from different regions, fully embedded in a reality that is at the same time local, national, regional, and global.

While often sidelined by policy makers, the social sciences’ contributions in dealing with the coronavirus pandemic have been as important as, and in many ways complementary to, those of the hard sciences. These contributions have mostly focused on four sets of debates.
COVID-19: PANDEMIC AND CRISIS

1. The pandemic as a social crisis

Social scientists have revealed that, while the virus may infect each and every human being, the pandemic affects us differently and the way the virus is treated is closely connected to social factors. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbates social inequalities and reveals the social structures, notably in terms of class, race, and gender. An intersectional approach is crucial to understand how the crisis is experienced and why the way we face it is deeply unequal and unfair. In countries or slums without a solid welfare system, the sanitary crisis quickly transforms into a humanitarian crisis, with deadly consequences as national and international humanitarian organizations have not been able to operate as usual.

2. COVID-19 governance

A second set of contributions analyzes the way policy makers and political regimes deal with the outbreak. Nation-states have imposed themselves as the main actors in charge of dealing with the pandemic. International institutions have vanished in the global crisis, including the UN and the European Union. The pandemic has revealed the strengths and limitations of national political systems. The lack of efficiency of a national government or reiterated discourses by a state leader mocking the pandemic and delaying lockdown measures have resulted in hundreds of additional deaths. Confronted with the pandemic, each government has set its own necropolitics. Most have failed to provide basic protections against the virus spreading to their healthcare workers. Through their policies, governments give less opportunity for some people to cope with the virus than others, while people who die in elder care homes do not appear in most countries’ public statistics.

The pandemic and the lockdown have transformed the relation between citizens and government. Citizens turn to national governments for protection, care, and guidelines against the pandemic. Many of them accept stronger social control by the state and new surveillance technologies and facial recognition as the price to pay for getting the pandemic under control.

3. How society reacts

A third set of contributions analyzes the way individuals and civil society handle the crisis. Sociologists explore the deep impacts of the lockdown on people’s lives, subjectivity, and social relations. Intergenerational relations have taken new shapes and meanings. Digital technologies have taken on a major role in maintaining social relations. Social distancing measures have put solidarity at risk and often shrunk the limits of the community within which it takes place. While new networks of solidarity have emerged in neighborhoods and cities, we also witness the limitation of solidarity to closed national communities or to families.

4. Will a new world arise out of the crisis?

The fourth set of analyses deals with the longer-term impact of the pandemic. As a global crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic has opened horizons of possibilities and may be an opportunity to reshape the world in a different way. Many social scientists stress the need for a world more sensitive to human beings, care, and social inequalities, and with stronger public healthcare systems. However, the crisis may also pave the way for other societal models. So far, increased competition has prevailed over new solidarities in the management of the crisis. Massive economic help packages have focused on rescuing national corporations rather than on strengthening public healthcare services. The pandemic may also pave the way for a new authoritarian era, with biopolitics grounded in new technologies.

The way humanity will overcome the COVID-19 pandemic will depend on medicine and sciences, notably to find a vaccine. It will also rely on the way society, policy makers, and citizens deal with this crisis and sow the seeds of the world that will come out of it.

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COVID-19: PANDEMIC AND CRISIS

> COVID-19: First Lessons from the Current Pandemic

by Klaus Dörre, University of Jena, Germany

In April 2020, while I am writing this, the economy is heading towards a recession. Nobody can make an exact prediction about developments in the coming months, as it is uncertain how long the pandemic will last. But it is probably not too far-fetched to anticipate a deep slump in the economy. The only question is how deep the slump will be.

> Economic developments and the impacts on labor

In the best-case scenario, the shutdown in most countries will end after one month. Even then, Germany, for example, would have to reckon with falls in growth like those seen during the 2007-9 crisis. According to the ifo Institute for Economic Research, a three-month shutdown could lead to a slump in growth of up to 20%, with up to 5.5 million people in short-time work (what is called Kurzarbeit in German, as employees in Germany are not laid off during a recession but their working hours can be reduced down to 0 while the government pays for some of their lost income). But the many small and micro-enterprises will not be able to survive for long without direct financial assistance. This is a particular problem for areas with a small-scale economy. For a world champion in exports like Germany, it’s uncertain whether there will be a rapid growth spurt after the end of the pandemic. That depends on how quickly other countries, such as China and Germany’s European neighbors, recover. The German federal government’s actions are contradictory: it ought to be interested in rapid aid within the EU, but it is blocking euro bonds as a means of crisis management.

There is much to worry about. Nothing about this crisis is good. It is threatening thousands with death, will cause millions to lose their jobs, and is temporarily depriving billions of people of important basic rights. The longer this pandemic lasts, the more serious its destructive effects on culture, society, and the economy will be. Therefore, the following must apply to large and small companies: no redundancies, but preferably subsidized temporary layoffs. In general, safeguarding employment will be important. In Germany there are tried and tested measures in the form of long-term short-time work.
Production processes depend on cooperation, which includes contact between people; social contacts at work are important for a lot of people. Even a physically demanding, monotonous activity is easier to tolerate when the chemistry between the workers is good. That has now disappeared. “Keep your distance!” basically means a radical de-socialization or even de-communitarization.

On the other hand, in the jobs currently considered to be systemically relevant in hospitals, supermarkets, nursing homes, agriculture, etc., physical contact can hardly be completely avoided. One can follow rules and protect shop assistants with sheets of Plexiglas, for instance, but for everyone who is not working from home, the risk to their health is disproportionately greater. This is one of the reasons why bus drivers, checkout staff, care workers, and nurses are now receiving more appreciation from customers and the general public. One can only hope that this will continue and will in future also be reflected in better pay, more staff, and better working conditions in these areas. In any case, the states that will come through the crisis best are those with a robust health system and a crisis-proof welfare state. This also makes it clear which countries on the European continent will be worst affected by the consequences of this crisis – those in the south and south-east. The high mortality rates of those infected with the coronavirus in Spain and Italy are also linked to the cuts in the health sector forced on them by the European austerity policy.

> A weakening of democracy?

The USA is currently the center of the global pandemic. The radical right is naturally attempting to take advantage of the situation. All sorts of conspiracy theories are being spread online. Those who believe them risk not only their own health, but also that of other people. But people will see that wherever right-wing populists such as Trump or right-wing radicals such as Bolsonaro are in power, crisis management is failing completely. I believe, therefore, that the crisis will lead to a huge defeat for right-wing populists and radicals.

Instead, there is a different concern when it comes to democratic processes: Climate change could entail a number of external shocks, which also require large-scale crisis management. We must therefore be careful that the state of emergency does not become the norm. Democracy needs public discussion, debate, demonstrations, and strikes. These fundamental rights must be safeguarded in perpetuity – in spite of crises.

> Necessary changes

After corona, the world – and the world of work – will be different. Dogmas of economic policy that have been considered incontrovertible in recent decades have now been swept away: debt ceiling – passé! The “black zero” of a balanced government budget – that was yesterday: public debt is all the rage. This paradigm shift will continue after the pandemic. It was overdue and the corona crisis has only accelerated it. People will also wonder how to interpret the fact that for the second time in ten years, the capitalist market economy has had to be rescued by methods that belong to the non-market economy. It will not be possible to dismiss such events as a “black swan” in future. It will also be easier for all of us to decide what we really need. Even I can live perfectly well without Bundesliga football. But we couldn’t live without bakers, farmers, medical assistants, lorry drivers, and helpful neighbors. This shows that we all need a well-functioning social infrastructure. This must become a well-funded public asset. If you compare the monthly income of professional footballer Jadon Sancho with that of a geriatric nurse, it is immediately clear that something is not right in our society. Social services must be socially upgraded – financially, but also within the recognition pyramid.

Regarding the challenges of climate change, the crisis is degrowth by disaster. As in 2009, climate-damaging emissions and perhaps also the consumption of resources will decrease. Because of the crisis, Germany may even achieve its climate targets after all. However, this has absolutely nothing to do with the revolution in sustainability that we so urgently need. We can see now very clearly that the state is assertive in times of crisis. It can restrict freedoms that we exercise at the expense of others, through mandatory rules, for the benefit of all! But as mentioned above, it is always crucial that state action be subject to democratic decision-making. Freedom has a binding social dimension and this also applies to entrepreneurial freedoms. In the future, these freedoms must be strictly linked to sustainability goals. The one thing that is better than not driving an SUV is not producing it! And better than not exporting military equipment is not manufacturing it in the first place. The examples make it clear: after the crisis, we need a fundamental debate about our economic order – and this debate must not be conducted exclusively by economists and career politicians.
The surreal atmosphere of the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed fault lines in trust among human beings, among countries, and between citizens and governments; it is pushing us to raise big questions about ourselves, our social relationships, and life generally. This crisis is not just limited to public and environmental health or the economy; what we are witnessing is a moment of truth regarding the crisis of late modernity and its capitalist system on a broad, overarching scale. We will not be able to simply revert to “business as usual” after we get through this crisis, and the social sciences should strive to both analyze and actively engage in addressing these new realities.

What will sociology be in the post-Corona world? I would like to place emphasis on three tasks for sociology: to build multi-level focuses that branch from community to humanity; to take an active approach in fighting against the diseases of the Anthropocene and the Capitalocene; and, finally, to set a better agenda for recognition and moral obligation.

Multi-level focuses, from community to humanity

First, the situation in light of the coronavirus has very clearly revealed how truly interconnected the world is, transforming the image of a global village from a metaphor to a reality. But we still need to generate more global solidarity and more humanistic globalization. To do so successfully requires a multi-scale conceptualization. Gilles Deleuze argued that the Left (including most social scientists) perceives the world in terms of relationships that begin from the most distant, and move inward. Social inequality, for instance, has been understood as a large, global phenomenon of exploitation that can be traced inward, through imperialism and colonialism. Because of this, most social scientists call to deal with the structures of imperialism and colonialism in order to properly address the suffering of the affected (abstract) social classes.

Contrary to this are some identity politics movements (i.e., some Islamic movements, and far right-wing and conservative movements) which view relationships as beginning from a close point, and moving to the most distant. They believe in community work, and in family and neighborhood relationships. For instance, Trump supporters believe in his capacity to address the social inequalities faced by forgotten communities of rural white Americans. And faith-based organizations in Lebanon are currently the most proactive NGOs dealing with families who have lost their jobs during the lockdown. In the case of the other identity politics movements (focused around ethnicity, gender, sexuality, etc.), their struggle may vary considerably depending on the context but is often anchored in community struggle, armed with the universalist human rights doctrine. Yet, for Richard Rorty, while advancing a cultural agenda of pluralism, this “cultural Left’s” struggle for social class justice is sometimes very minimal (as the case of the US).
I see post-Corona sociology as one capable of reinventing how sociology has traditionally commanded its focus (from the outward-in, or from the inward-out) towards creating methods that use multi-scale focuses: re-thinking the importance of the family, community, and of the ethics of love, hospitality, and caring, and then scaling up to the level of the nation-state and humanity as a whole.

> Struggling against the Anthropocene/Capitalocene

COVID-19 is a disease not only of globalization but also of the Anthropocene. The creed of human consumerism is depleting resources that our planet Earth cannot renew, and this virus is but one (albeit significant) episode of such consumerism. As we know, this virus was transmitted from non-domesticated animals (like civets, pangolins, and bats) to human beings through the consumption of these animals. Are they really so tasty? Bourdieu would consider this as a sign of distinction, pointing to the significant amount of unnecessary and luxurious objects that we, the middle and lower-middle class, consume. Here, for many Lebanese, a vacation becomes synonymous with traveling abroad.

This voracious consumerism is induced by what the French sociologist Rigas Arvanitis called the mythological access to happiness, which ultimately serves as an effective accelerator for more health troubles, epidemics, deaths, and disasters. Examining these multi-scale relationships cannot be done without reconnection of the economic to the social, and connecting these to the political, and to the cultural. We need to revive Karl Polanyi’s concept of social embeddedness. Polanyi introduced three forms of integrating society to economy: exchange, redistribution, and reciprocity. Our social sciences thus should rethink these three terms seriously, as the market (place of exchange) needs to be moralized, which includes establishing firm societal control against all forms of speculation. Redistribution cannot be done without significant measures to prevent the concentration of wealth in a minority of companies in each sector, without establishing heavy taxation on high levels of capital and wealth, and without moving to a slow-growth economy and its corollaries (including the need for cheap and low-carbon public transportation, seeing public services as investments rather than liabilities, and increasing the security of labor markets). I will leave the question of reciprocity for the next section of this article.

We are aware that the struggle for the environment is inseparable from our choice of political economy, and from the nature of our desired economic system – and these connections between human beings and nature have never been as immediately or intimately connected as they are now. There is an acute crisis of rapid growth that was expressed very clearly by former President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, when he said: “[t]here are no such things as limits to growth, because there are no limits to the human capacity for intelligence, imagination and wonder.” In a previous issue of Global Dialogue James Galbraith and Klaus Dörre suggested that there are indeed limits to growth and delineated a consciously slow-growing new economy that incorporates the biophysical foundations of economics into its functioning mechanisms.

> A politics of recognition and moral obligation

Now I will come to the question of reciprocity in Polanyi’s social embeddedness. Polanyi defined it as the mutual exchange of goods or services as part of long-term relationships, where reciprocity, moral obligation, and concern are added to contractual relations. Reciprocity requires a politics of recognition between groups and/or networks who accept the identity of the others, which works in line with the paradigm of pluralism and multiculturalism. Functioning reciprocity is dependent on the strength or weakness of the moral obligations in social relations. Strong social relations may be seen in the solidarity networks posited by Mark Granovetter, who argues that sometimes strong network relationships are gift-based relationships. Related to, and expanding on this, is the view of Alain Caillé who pushes an anti-utilitarian hypothesis, where the desire of human beings to be valued as givers means that our relationships are not based on interest alone, but in pleasure, moral duty, and spontaneity.

Post-Corona sociology will only be meaningful if it is armed with a utopia that, even if it is not fully realizable, will direct our actions. There is no ethical life without utopia, and the difference between clerical preaching and a sociologist’s utopia is that the latter does not necessarily denounce the anti-utopian vision of others, and may even seek to work with those who believe in it. Such sociology thus should appreciate and further the Maussian gift relationship and the moral obligation connecting the social sciences to moral philosophy.

This global crisis may have prompted fresh strategies to reinforce exploitation, dispossession, and neoliberal capitalism, and increased the reach of our greed and selfishness, but it has also given us an opportunity to explore and provide new ways of understanding and reclaiming our social justice and humanity.
Gendered Urban Space in Bangladesh

by Lutfun Nahar Lata, The University of Queensland, Australia and member of ISA Research Committee on Urban and Regional Development (RC21)

The fastest growing megacities in the world are failing to provide support for livelihoods for the urban poor. Consequently, informality, which refers to activities that largely remain unrecognized by “formal” regimes and includes both housing and livelihood practices, is a large part of the economies of the Southern cities. Poor people depend on the informal sector for earnings, often with ambiguous legal status. The informal economy provides 60 to 80% of urban jobs and up to 90% of new jobs in many cities. Dhaka, a Southern megacity, is no exception. Except for those engaged in the garment sector and other low-paid jobs, the majority of slum residents in Dhaka do not have access to formal economic opportunities. Existing research shows that most government planning and development strategies in Dhaka have focused more on infrastructure and real estate development to cater to formal economies and elite housing needs, and less on addressing the housing and employment needs of the urban poor. Hence the informal sector has become the most important livelihood option for the poor. However, informal traders experience many challenges in using public space in Dhaka for livelihoods.

Among the numerous barriers imposed by informality on income earning opportunities are the barriers to accessing public space to conduct businesses, including in locations close to the dwellings and settlements of the poor. A number of studies around the world have explored the importance of public space for vending activities and revealed that access to public space for livelihoods is very important for the urban poor in the Global South. Yet, in most cities of the Global South, urban planning and governance practices have not left any space for the growing number of urban poor. In addition, due to continuous population growth, originating mostly from rural-urban migration, and the demand for land for real estate development, pressure on land is very high.
result, access to public space is one of the main challenges for future livelihood research in megacities.

Urban space is socially constructed: different actors have different interests, needs, and desires and differential power to dominate space. As the appropriation of public spaces for selling products is formally illegal in Dhaka, the urban poor are regularly evicted from public spaces, in violation of livelihood security and their right to the city. Another persistent problem is the gendered use of space. The discourse on space and gender has changed considerably since the 1970s, with the breaking down of the old construct of public man and private woman, due to women’s frequent access to and use of urban public space. Nevertheless, access to public space for earning an income is still an issue for women. Access to public space for women depends on social norms, values, religious practices, and socially as well as culturally determined gendered vocations. Poor women’s participation in Dhaka’s informal economy is important to the survival of poor households living in the slums, as a single income is normally not sufficient to maintain the family. Yet, poor women’s access to public space is often constrained, as dominant gender ideologies still see women’s place as being at home.

Although most studies on South Asian cities reveal poor women’s engagement in home-based work, a few studies have explored women’s use of public space for livelihoods. I conducted an ethnographic study in Sattola slum in Dhaka to explore the gendered aspects of the appropriation of urban public space for livelihoods. I carried out fieldwork for four months from November 2015 to February 2016 and interviewed 94 informal workers (18 women and 76 men). My findings illustrate how women bear the triple burden of social stigma, religious barriers, and patriarchy in accessing public space to earn an income.

My research found that most women in Sattola were not engaged in any income-earning activities; these are discouraged by the religious norms of purdah — a Muslim custom that restricts women’s movements, clothing choices, and work activities. Engagement in outdoor income-earning activities is also regarded as a sign of extreme poverty. As a result, only 3% of rural women work in wage employment in comparison to 24% of rural men; and women’s participation in the paid, non-agricultural sector is 18%. This is because women’s paid labor is not valued as much as their reproductive roles in caregiving and other domestic duties. Women, even elderly women, who had broken these gendered boundaries and gone beyond their homes to earn an income faced sexual and verbal harassment and other types of harassment and maltreatment. Men spoke ill of their character for breaking social norms. Most participants, who were engaged in informal trades, had experienced this even though they sold goods and vegetables sitting near their homes on a daily basis. For example, one of my research participants said, “As I am a woman who is doing business, many people speak ill. Still after that I have to run this shop to educate my children.” Another participant said, “When I sell tea, some men irritate me. They sometimes touch my body to harass me.” Some women simply ignored other people’s opinions as they were too poor and vulnerable to pay heed to them. As a boiled egg seller said, “Different people have a different mentality and I don’t care about that.” Very often poor women operated businesses on the streets because they had no other alternatives to earn a livelihood. For example, Moyna’s husband was sick and unable to do any work, and her son was a drug addict and did not live with them, so she had to operate the business. When the officials of Bangladesh Medical Research Council (BMRC) evicted them from the adjacent sidewalk of BMRC, she started selling on the main street of Sattola slum in Dhaka.

My study further found that many women face extreme sexual harassment by men. If women circulate in a particular space to sell goods or food, sometimes men treat them as “sex workers.” As a result, most female participants who operated businesses outside the slum were accompanied by their older brothers, neighbors, husbands, or children. For example, when Tahera began a flower business, her Noakhali neighbor would accompany her so that she did not experience verbal and sexual harassment by other men. It is often argued that women’s employment and earnings would empower them. Yet this seems to be a myth for the poorest women of Dhaka where their (physical) security depends on having a male companion.

The government of Bangladesh is proud of its achievement in ranking 47th among 144 countries in the 2017 Global Gender Gap Report. Yet, the government has mostly focused on improving the lives and livelihoods of rural poor women and has taken steps to provide income-generating training to rural and small-town women. To date, the government and NGOs emphasize women’s “strategic gender interests,” which arise from women’s identification of their subordinate position to men. The government and NGOs also have been working to assist women’s participation in work, providing them with small loans to fulfill their “practical gender interests.” “Practical gender interests” emerge as a response to an immediate perceived need felt by women within a specific context according to their socially accepted roles in society, rather than generating a long-term strategic goal such as women’s emancipation. However, it is necessary to improve urban women’s working conditions and provide other facilities, such as day care centers, that might enable women’s labor force participation. More importantly, the government needs to take steps to ensure women’s physical security and to undertake initiatives to build a safe city first. If the government and NGOs fail to ensure women’s physical security in public spaces, all of their efforts — all the rules and regulations that the government has introduced for women’s empowerment so far — will fail to yield meaningful outcomes.

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In the summer of 2016, the US multinational Dura Automotive – a global supplier of automotive components operating in several countries – committed to deliver components to Chrysler, Audi, and BMW. Orders were on the rise and Dura was at risk of paying high fines if workers did not accept weekend overtime to fulfill orders. The German workers at Dura Plettenberg decided that they would only do so if Dura accepted a collective agreement with IG Metall, the German metal workers’ union; the plant was threatened with relocation from Germany to Portugal and other countries, and a reduction from 1,000 to 700 jobs. Dura’s managers reacted with a radical form of dumping – they asked 260 Portuguese workers from Dura Carregado to go to Germany to work in July 2016. The trip was initially prevented by local pressure: German workers threatened to close down the factory. But in October 2016, after several negotiations, about 300 Portuguese workers arrived in Germany to produce the orders on Saturday and Sunday for almost 2 months.

Many workers received them with protests. IG Metall had in the meantime brought the case to court. The court declared an unprecedented sentence: the operation was legal because during the week Dura in Germany was German, and during the weekend it was Portuguese! In an interview, a Portuguese worker said that when they arrived the ambience was “tense” and the machines had been partially sabotaged by local workers.

In a commodified society – where the labor force itself is a commodity – workers compete not only within a sector, but also in the national and international labor market to sell their labor power. Labor migration is linked to an objective factor; the value of the wage and the right to have a job. The absence of strong political parties representing international working-class interests has left this issue hostage to two variants of nationalist policies: one racist/prohibitionist trend (far right) and one promoting the free movement of the labor force (liberal, conservative, and social democratic parties), sometimes including some social rights (in the case of social democratic parties). Today there is no internationalist radical politics with real influence on this issue in European societies. The migratory policies of European states have responded primarily to the imperatives of management of the labor force, and not fundamentally to humanitarian or multicultural considerations. Without effective ties of solidarity between those who earn more in favor of those who earn less, racism and xenophobia will have social grounds to grow.

Globalization has created competition among workers by lowering wages worldwide, but it may also have created the conditions for its opposite: internationalism. If a group of workers in Dura Carregado can break a strike in Ger-

> Labor migration at the core of European labor restructuring

Photo by Nick Bastian/flickr.com. Some rights reserved.
many, dockers across Europe can, at minimum cost, strike for the dockers in Portugal, helping them to win the battle.

> Backing up a strike across borders

The International Dockers Union (IDF), now with 140,000 members, was founded 20 years ago in Liverpool, England. On September 29, 1995, 500 dockers on permanent contracts from Liverpool refused to cross a picket line of about 50 precarious workers. Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (MDHC) fired them all, starting a dispute that would achieve global reach between 1995 and 1998.

The Liverpool dispute can be considered the first internationalist movement of workers in Europe against neoliberalism – and such struggles have been rare. It was also a conflict that would unite precarious and flexible workers with protected workers in the same struggle through collective action that mobilized active solidarity between the two groups. The same strategy and principle would lead to the fact that in 2013 the list headed by António Mariano, the Portuguese docker who participated most actively in the support movement for Liverpool, won the election for the union leadership in Lisbon. From the beginning, the International Dockers Union has been characterized by genuine gestures of international solidarity that go beyond diplomatic words – all too common in other confederations – with international or regional active solidarity strikes, common strategies in meetings, and local and global assemblies.

Between 2013 and 2016, the union developed a series of strikes and struggles that led to the secure employment of formerly precarious workers in the Port of Lisbon, contrary to the law that had liberalized the contracting out of ports at the request of the Troika (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) during the Portuguese financial crisis.

On August 1, 2012, the Portuguese government approved a new labor code that repudiated the Collective Labor Agreement and put in place: a proposal for new industrial relations; ending the limit on the hiring of casual workers; canceling the most qualified categories of workers; increasing working hours and reducing the wage rate from 1,700 euros to around 550 euros; and dismissals. The union leadership responded with a clear strategy: they subsidized the dismissed precarious workers through the strike fund of the fixed workers, and aimed to convince the dockers in Lisbon port – the promise that the 47 precarious workers would be reinstated, some under better conditions than before. This strike of international solidarity and the Ryanair strike across Europe in June 2018 have been, as far as we know, the only international strikes demonstrating Europe-wide solidarity after the 2008 crisis. In other cases the nationalist approaches of the unions in their countries prevailed.

In my view, what was decisive in the defeat at Dura and the success of the Lisbon dockers is the evolution of trade unions and their political and trade union leadership. But this conclusion is not self-explanatory. The question is: what historical conditions have created an internationalist program in one place and a nationalist ideology in another? To answer this, we will need a case-by-case analysis of each particular factor.

> Solidarity: Not just words

Globalization has created a worldwide production model – we have never been so dependent on one another. In the nineteenth century, if a factory went on strike and the boss wanted to stop it, he paid his own police – some local mercenaries. But in the nineteenth century not only repressed was local; so was the daily production: raw materials, workers, parts, maintenance, all was within the same factory or close by. This is not the case anymore. A container carrier can be built in South Korea, with steel from Spain, engines of Finnish origin, inks produced in Germany, and designed at US universities.

The dockers realized in time that the precariousness of the young casual workers would be a short-term time bomb for themselves and became aware of their strength. Because complex societies run in a chain model, to stop this chain for a certain time blocks all the production at great cost. Thus, the entire country can be stopped and all the production can be rocked to its core. It is not only transport workers who have this potential power. The same goes for doctors, teachers, administrative officials, and magistrates.

The increasing terrain for workers’ self-determination all over the world has something to do with recognizing differential necessities and possibilities amongst the “social movement as a whole.” The analysis of the dynamics of capitalist accumulation and the strategic use of borders in the world market should lead us to a truly internationalist methodology. Such an internationalist perspective needs to be constructed on the basis of labor organizing, independently of capital. *Verba non sufficient ubi opus est factum.* Words are not enough; concrete acts must follow.

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In his 2017 book *On Extremism and Democracy in Europe* Cas Mudde argues that the main struggle of populist radical right parties is to increase the saliency of “their” issues, such as corruption, immigration, and security. Far-right populism, by denying the existence of distinct interests in a population, and by imposing a monolithic and essentialist notion of “people” against a corrupt “elite,” leads to a Manichean and polarized view of political culture. It also mobilizes the electorate against the political elite by blaming it for not stopping external “threats,” represented by the “other,” the “stranger,” the “black,” the “gypsy,” or the “immigrant.” In the context of a declining industrial labor force, the recognition deficit experienced by sections of the working class no longer able to claim economically distinctive interests may give rise to resentful subjectivities. As Klaus Dörre (2019) has noted, this class-specific experience may become “material for the formation of a right-wing populist block.”

While Portugal was until now considered a rare case in Europe since it had no fascist parties or movements, this may be changing. I point to three important sociological dimensions that may explain the nature of this change: the history of a long dictatorship; the radicalized democratic revolution in April 1974; and the consequent restructuring of the class framework along with a persistence of social inequalities.

## Historical background

Under the integralist conservatism of the “Estado Novo” regime, officially instituted in 1933 but whose genesis dates back to the military coup of 1926, the grassroots working-class movement triggered by the fall of the monarchical regime in 1910 was the main target of attack. Under cover of the Catholic Church, which sought revenge for the attack on its old privileges by republicans, socialists, and anarchists throughout the 1920s, Salazar’s moralistic conception kept the country educationally, culturally, economically, and industrially backward, mainly penalizing the popular classes and persecuting, arresting, and torturing the opposition for over four decades. Despite the repressive apparatus and censorship, however, in the early seventies some strike actions emerged and clandestine union structures were consolidated, largely under the influence of the Portuguese Communist Party and some progressive sectors linked to the Church. The Colonial War in Africa,
and the students’ protests in Lisbon, Coimbra, and Porto in the 1960s, touched by the winds coming from abroad, increased discontent (especially among the youth, the first victims of the war), which helped to spread the spark of hope for democracy within the country.

The military coup of April 25, 1974 by a group of captains who refused to continue the war and fought for a democratic and more developed country was crucial, but it was the next phase of popular mobilization (strikes and occupations, ideological debates, and deep political cleavages) that became the great “school” for democracy. This school of democratic and civic formation, however, was full of contrasts, illusions, and open conflicts in which “socialism” was at the center of dispute and the rejection of “fascism” was the main unifying factor. Anti-fascist unity did not prevent the structural hatred between communists and socialists, a hatred that lasted until 2015, and only ended with the advent of the alliance labelled as *geringonça* (contraction).

> The erosion of democracy

With 46 years of democracy and 35 years after joining the EU (in 1986), the country has shown significant social and institutional progress. In the political field, governments have always been supported by parliamentary majorities that oscillated between center-right (PSD and CDS) and center-left (PS) parties, with the parliamentary right being represented essentially by the CDS (Social and Democratic Centre, inspired by Christian democracy). Its electoral expression reached 16% in 1976 (under the moderate leader Freitas do Amaral, founder of the party, who in his last years approached the Socialist Party), but it has been losing weight, and stands today at 4.25%.

The most radical discourse, with references to Salazarism and xenophobic practices, was until recently restricted to very small groups: PNR (National Renewal Party), founded in 2000 (merging small radical groups), which never went beyond 0.2%, and was even taken to court on grounds of violence, xenophobia, and illegal possession of weapons; and New Social Order, founded in 2014, and led by Mário Machado, a PNR dissident previously convicted for xenophobic violence. In August 2019, a meeting previously announced as “the biggest nationalist event in Portugal,” brought together a few dozen people, including representatives of European neo-fascist parties. This meeting was the object of a counter-demonstration with hundreds of activists at the doors of the hotel where it was taking place.

As we know, the EU’s political programs, despite their positive impacts in Portugal, have surrendered over time to a more general orientation toward neoliberal capitalism and monetary union. This has created profound disturbances in the country’s economy. With the recent crisis, social inequalities have increased and, with them, precariousness, poverty, and persistence of general wage stagnation (the average salary in 2018 was at the level of 2008). As the expectations of the middle class and large segments of the workforce fell, Portuguese society was overtaken by resignation and silent resentment, gradually beginning to be disconnected from political action and associations. This can be seen in the rising levels of electoral abstention in parliamentary elections, from 8.3% in 1976 to 51.4% in 2019. Insecurity, vulnerability, and fear led to a predisposition for reverence for social power and opportunistic leaders, the most fertile ground for the flourishing of right-wing populism.

> The populist threat

Portuguese democratic life is therefore not immune to the populist narrative. The media coverage of politics, sensational tabloid journalism, and the growing popularity of television figures (some due to their systematic presence in entertainment and/or football discussion programs, for example) have already brought political dividends to some of these protagonists. President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is a good example – who had a weekly TV show for more than ten years, and gained widespread popularity across the entire country. One of the most controversial protagonists of extreme right-wing populism today, André Ventura, has emerged precisely from the heart of the hegemonic political spectrum (former member of the PSD, the Social Democratic Party, affiliated to the Liberals in the European Parliament). He gained visibility when, as candidate of that party for a municipality on the outskirts of Lisbon, he proposed to fight the Roma community with police violence and even promised to sterilize Roma women, claiming that the community is essentially violent, survives on illicit activities, and benefits from social policies at the expense of public resources. Subsequently he left the PSD, and in the last elections he founded a new party named “Chega” (“Enough,” legalized in 2019), that ran for parliament; he was elected as single deputy, obtaining 1.3% of the votes. Ventura’s party also counts on the support of old cadres and ideologues known for their connection with violent neo-fascist forces and groups nostalgic for Salazar.

The nationalist, xenophobic, and anti-immigrant discourse has become radicalized and the radical and moralistic language against the state has repeatedly disrespected the democratic rules and dignity of Parliament. “Chega” promotes verbal guerrilla battles and a stance of constant victimization against the political elite. In addition to the increase in media coverage made possible by its presence in Parliament, the latest opinion polls already point to voting intentions of 6% (Expresso/SIC poll, February 14, 2020). There are indeed worrying signs indicating that Portugal should cease to be considered an exception with regard to the presence of neo-fascist parties.

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