

GLOBAL DIALOGUE

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Talking Sociology with
Joan Martínez-Alier

Volodymyr Shelukhin

Moroccan Sociology and
the ISA Forum 2025

Adbelfattah Ezzine
Abdellatif Kidai
Driss El Ghazouani
Kawtar Lebdaoui

Open Science

Fernanda Beigel
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Theoretical
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Open Section

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GD

> Editorial

This year, *Global Dialogue* (GD) is fifteen years old. It all started in a handcrafted way thanks to the extraordinary impetus of Michael Burawoy. In his first editorial in September 2010, Michael wrote: “We want this newsletter to become the center for the exchange of ideas within our global community.” At the end of 2014, after the XVIII ISA World Congress in Japan, *Global Dialogue* ceased to be a newsletter and became a magazine. Gradually, it went from being published in four languages to seventeen, combining online articles with four (and then three) issues per year, and took on an increasingly professional design. Lola Busuttil and August Bagà, who have been involved in the making of GD since the beginning, have great merit in this achievement.

At the end of 2017, Michael Burawoy wrote a short history of *Global Dialogue* in [the GD7.4 Editorial](#), which I highly recommend. From there, [Brigitte Aulenbacher and Klaus Dörre](#) took over this legacy, consolidating GD. In their [five years at the project's helm](#), they diversified the magazine while maintaining its accessible, critical, and pluralistic perspective. Accompanied by Carolina Vestena and Vitória Gonzalez, I assumed the position of editor in 2023, identifying three central challenges: building public and global sociology from the ISA but also beyond the ISA, reorganizing and providing stability to the editorial sections of *Global Dialogue*, and redefining its communication and dissemination strategies.

We have made progress on several axes, but many others remain to tackle. The fifteenth anniversary of *Global Dialogue* and the fifth ISA Forum of Sociology in Rabat will be a good opportunity for this. Throughout this year, some of the key challenges for public and global sociology will be discussed in our pages. We will also open various dialogues with all those interested in contributing to this project. Amid global turmoil, *Global Dialogue* must be able to provide global responses to the crises of our time, building bridges between different realities and academic cultures and proposing intellectual and political alternatives.

This issue opens with an interview by Ukrainian sociologist Volodymyr Shelukhin with Catalan intellectual Joan Martínez-Alier, one of the leading figures in the fields of political and economic ecology. In this conversation, they examine the legacy of Serhii Podolynsky, one of Ukraine’s most prominent nineteenth-century intellectuals, and the ecological turn in social theory.

The first section of this issue presents a broad overview of sociology in Morocco, covering among other topics the institutionalization of sociology in Morocco, the tension between colonial and foreign sociological schools and the emergence of a “Moroccan school of sociology,” as well as some of the most relevant authors and issues in the national debate, and trends in sociological practice. Ahead of the ISA Forum to be held in Rabat next July 6-11, I recommend reading these articles signed by Adbelfattah Ezzine, Abdellatif Kidai, Driss El Ghazouani, and Kawtar Lebdaoui together with the section on Sociology from the Maghreb [published in 2021 in GD11.3](#).

The following section invites us to think about public and global sociology through the lens of open science. Edited by Fernanda Beigel, who served as Chair of the UNESCO Advisory Committee on Open Science, it presents key reflections on the relationship between Open Science and inclusion and interculturality (F. Beigel); the specificity of open science in different cultural contexts (Eujing Shin and Jae-Mahn Shim); the possibilities of decoupling science (Ana María Cetto); the trends of citizen science, open to dialogues with community science, participatory science and public involvement in science (Sarita Albagli); and the relationship between open science, care and epistemic justice (Ismael Ràfols).

In the Theoretical Perspectives section, two of Argentina’s leading contemporary sociologists, Gabriel Kessler and Gabriel Vommaro, seek to answer the question of how to study political polarization by offering an interesting conceptual framework anchored in empirical studies of Latin American reality.

Finally, the Open Section begins with a lucid analysis by Haitian intellectual Jean-Marie Théodat of the logic underlying the current debacle in the Caribbean country. In the following article, Mariana Walter, Yannick Deniau, and Viviana Herrera Vargas map and analyze 25 cases of conflicts related to green extractivism in the Americas. The last two articles on Latin American sociology include Miguel Serna’s account of the state of sociological associations in Latin America and the Declaration approved by the Assembly of the Latin American Sociological Association (ALAS) at its last congress held in November 2024 in the Dominican Republic.

Stay tuned to our next issues for more news. Long live *Global Dialogue*, and thank you all for making it possible! ■

Breno Bringel, editor of *Global Dialogue*

PS: When this issue’s edition was already closed, we received the news of the tragic death of Michael Burawoy. We have lost an outstanding scholar, a global promoter of public sociology, the founder and great enthusiast of *Global Dialogue*, and a fantastic and generous human being. As a tribute to everything he stood for, we will dedicate our next issue to his memory.

> *Global Dialogue* can be found in multiple languages at its [website](#).

> Submissions should be sent to: globaldialogue@isa-sociology.org.

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In the section “Talking Sociology”, Volodymyr Shelukhin talks to **Joan Martínez-Alier** about Serhii Podolynsky and the ecological turn in social theory.



The thematic section “**Moroccan Sociology and the ISA Forum**” covers topics such as the tension between colonial and foreign sociological schools and the emergence of a “Moroccan school of sociology”.



The text of the section on “Theoretical Perspectives” seeks to answer the question of **how to study political polarization**, anchored in empirical studies of Latin American reality.

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“The conceptualization and promotion of Open Science need to be rethought to serve the goal of providing epistemic justice”

Ismael Ràfols

> Podolynsky and the Ecological Turn in Social Theory

An Interview with Joan Martínez-Alier



| Joan Martínez-Alier, 2009. Credit: Wikimedia Commons.

Serhii Podolynsky (1850-91) is one of the most original Ukrainian social scholars of the nineteenth century. His impact has been as influential as it is understudied. Was he first and foremost a revolutionary agitator, a profound researcher, or a madman? Drahomanov collaborated with Podolynsky while simultaneously distancing himself from the emotional anarchist. [Mykhailo Hrushevsky](#) and [Mykyta Shapoval](#) included him among the founders of Ukrainian sociology. His ideas were popu-

larized by the first president of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Volodymyr Vernadsky. They inspired writers and were also crucial for **Joan Martínez-Alier**, a world-renowned Catalan social scholar who is one of the founders of ecological economics and political ecology and whose ideas laid the foundation of the so-called Barcelona School. Prof. Martínez-Alier has been awarded the Balzan prize, one of the most prestigious prizes in the social sciences and humanities in Europe, and the Holberg prize, which is often compared to the Nobel Prize in social sciences. In both the lectures he delivered when receiving these awards, Martínez-Alier mentioned Serhii Podolynsky.

Prof. Martínez-Alier was planning to present a report dedicated to Serhii Podolynsky, but circumstances did not allow that to happen. This interview, conducted by **Volodymyr Shelukhin**, from the Department of Social Structures and Social Relations at Kyiv University (Ukraine), took the place of that report. The interview was prepared within the framework of the Conference "[Potential Classics: Superseded, Forgotten, and Uncovered in the History of Ukrainian Sociology](#)" (June 5-6, 2024) organized by the Ukrainian sociological journal *SVOIE* and the Faculty of Sociology at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (alma mater of Serhii Podolynsky). The conference, which brought together researchers from Ukraine and abroad, was the first of its kind in Ukraine, with a special focus on the history of Ukrainian sociology.

Volodymyr Shelukhin (VS): *Your awareness of Serhii Podolynsky started with a book by [Volodymyr Vernadsky](#), but how did this book come to your attention? It's somewhat unexpected for a social scholar to read a book on geochemistry.*

Joan Martínez-Alier (JMA): Between 1979 and 1982, I published with the Spanish ecological economist José Manuel Naredo (in Spanish, in Catalan, and then in English in *The Journal of Peasant Studies*) an explanation of Podolynsky's agricultural energetics. I made a table summarizing the numbers (kilocalories as inputs and outputs) in Podolynsky's article. I read Vernadsky's *La Géochimie* (1924) later, in 1986, when I was preparing my book *Ecological Economics* (1987). My friend Jacques Grinevald, a French philosopher and epistemologist, ecologist, and historian of science, called my attention to this book by Vernadsky, and to the pages of Vernadsky writing about energy and entropy, and his half page of eulogies for Podolynsky.

VS: *What sources did you use when studying Podolynsky's legacy alongside Vernadsky's book? Podolynsky was largely forgotten in the 1970s, and his most important article was only published in English in 2004.*

JMA: Podolynsky's 1880 article on agricultural energetics was published in Italian, in German, which I can read, and also in Russian in the journal *Slovo*, and probably in Ukrainian, which I cannot read unless I get help. And much later it was translated into English. There are slightly different versions of the same article.

VS: *Were you aware of Roman Serbyn's study on this topic when you began your research on Podolynsky's legacy?*

JMA: Yes, I was aware of [Roman Serbyn](#)'s work. We corresponded many years ago. Podolynsky wrote, of course, about Ukrainian economic history: he belonged to a group of Ukrainian intellectuals opposing Tsarist Russia. In Russia he was close to Piotr Lavrov, who was a "Narodnik": a political tendency favoring the peasantry and against Tsarism. Podolynsky also met Marx in person, briefly. In 1880, he was living in exile in Montpellier. He had studied medicine in Breslau (Wrocław) and in Zurich. It is really a pity that he was ill and died young. He was friendly with the Narodnaya Volya group. But he was, I would say, a Ukrainian nationalist. Ukrainian universities in Kyiv, in Lviv, bear the name of [Mykhailo Drahomanov](#), of [Ivan Franko](#) – these were Podolynsky's friends and sources of inspiration.

VS: *In some sense, Serhii Podolynsky was an unusual thinker for the nineteenth century. His focus on nature and agrarian relations in the age of industrialization, railroads, and steam engines seemed somewhat old-fashioned.*

JMA: Podolynsky had an outstanding education in sciences. This is why he could write his article on agricultural energetics. He followed closely the research on energy, and in his work he quotes [Moleschott](#), [Clausius](#). So, he could calculate the amount of energy from the sun converted into photosynthesis, and how this amount increased (in his view) when the work of humans and animals was applied in agriculture. The surplus increased (the *Mehrarbeit* he wrote in German to Marx in 1880). But a lot of the production was produced naturally, without human work (production in the physical sense, measured in kcal). All this was still rather new in 1880. Podolynsky's articles were published in several languages in Europe, including in the Marxist journal *Die Neue Zeit*, but Marxist authors were not very interested. Marxist authors did not write on agricultural energetics. Some ecologists, much later (David Pimentel and Howard T. Odum in the 1970s) started to write on the ecological energetics of the human economy, and on the EROI of agriculture (the ratio between the energy coming into a field and the energy of the crop). Today this is of interest in ecological economics.

VS: *Some Orthodox Marxist authors have received your interpretation of Podolynsky's legacy and its relation to Marxian views skeptically. Their main argument is that we cannot explain Podolynsky in terms of an ecological turn in the social sciences because he saw nature merely as a complex of resources. He had a consumerist view of nature. How do you respond to this criticism?*

JMA: Marx and Engels in 1880-82 (Marx died in early 1883) read copies of Podolynsky's articles on the energetics of agriculture. They did not think that this was interesting for the study of society and economy. As Engels wrote to Marx, Podolynsky had tried to analyze the economy from a physical point of view, and this was wrong. There are some Marxist scholars who seem to believe that Engels could himself not be wrong. I disagree.

VS: *What contemporary theories in economics, sociology, and related fields might be aligned with Podolynsky's approach?*

JMA: Podolynsky was ahead of his time because he developed a model of biomass production based on realistic figures from the production and the inputs of agriculture, expressed in energy units, i.e. kilocalories per hectare. Kilocalories are relevant on the input side (photosynthesis plus human and animal work, also the seeds, the fertilizer and nowadays the petroleum, etc.) and on the output side. Adult humans eat approximately between 1800 and 2500 kcal per day. As Vernadsky wrote in 1924: "Podolynsky understood the energetics of life and tried to apply his findings to the study of the economy". In other words, he looked at the social metabolism of agriculture, and his model could be applied to the whole economy. He has been recognized as a precursor of agricultural energetics and also

of ecological economics. The field of energy research and social sciences, and also energy research and economic and social history, developed to some extent separately from his insights (because he died relatively young, and also because Marxist scholars knew his work but did not appreciate it because of Engels' negative remarks in his correspondence with Marx, first published in 1919). But he was not forgotten. My 1982 article with Naredo in *The Journal of Peasant Studies* and my 1987 book made him well known to the new school of ecological economists, and also to ecological anthropologists. For instance, Roy Rappaport published in 1968 a book on the agricultural energetics (and also the social system and the religion) of a group of people in New Guinea, the Tsembaga Maring. I read it in 1972, before I knew about Podolynsky's article and Engels' reaction. In fact, I taught about energy and agriculture even before Howard T. Odum and D. Pimentel published their articles and books on this topic after 1971.

My conclusion is that Podolynsky's approach is very relevant for the growing fields of environmental social sciences and environmental history. One must be aware, however, that terms like "agricultural energetics", "social metabolism", "the energetics of life", "the entropy law" and the "economic process" are still almost unknown to mainstream economists and sociologists.

VS: I agree, they are still unknown, but the concept of entropy is used by a limited group of social scholars inspired by synergetics. Were they aware of Podolynsky's ideas?

JMA: I do not know about synergetics. You should read *The Entropy Law and the Economics Process* (1971) by Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen. He mentioned Podolynsky, not in this book but later in his 1986 article, "The Entropy Law and the Economic Process in Retrospect".

By 1986 Georgescu-Roegen, whom I had met in 1979 for some days in Barcelona, had read my work with Naredo on Podolynsky and also knew the first drafts of my 1987 book, *Ecological Economics*. This is where he learnt about Podolynsky. By the way, much of the information on Podolynsky's agricultural energetics, Marx and Engels reactions, and Vernadsky's reception, are explained in my book *Ecological Economics* (1987, new edition: 1990).

VS: Your current research project focuses on ecological conflicts around the globe. The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine also has a tremendous ecological dimension. Although you have not yet studied the Ukrainian context, could you offer some general advice for Ukraine on how to address these new ecological challenges? Is it possible to build a growing economy in harmony with nature and ecological thinking?

JMA: Yes, with the Global Atlas of Environmental Justice ([EJAtlas](#)), which is a collective endeavor, we try to show that there are many local struggles for environmental justice. Economic growth sometimes means the destruction of the environment, such as by pollution. In these movements, the people have similar enemies (for instance, big mining firms). I was recently reading about complaints in Serbia against the Chinese company Zijin for copper mining and smelting in Bor. There are hundreds of similar conflicts. Often, the companies are transnational companies. Also, in Serbia, there was recently a complaint by the common people, the ordinary people, against the company Rio Tinto for lithium mining. Economic growth, in all countries, should not imply the destruction of the environment. The same will apply to Ukraine when peace comes back. ■

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> The Institutionalization of Sociology in Morocco

by **Abdelfattah Ezzine**, President of Espace Médiation (EsMed) and founder and national coordinator of the Instance Marocaine de Sociologie, Morocco



| Credit: Magharebia, on Openverse.

Sociology emerged in the West during the Industrial Revolution as a means of social engineering in response to the imbalances and dysfunctions observed in the social fabric of the countries affected by that revolution. Since then, sociological knowledge has been the subject of debate and reflection concerning its object, methodology, approaches, etc. It evolved from the status of social thought to the status of a science, and in the English-speaking world – especially in the USA – was given the name “sociology,” while the French and other Europeans adopted the term “sociology”: the name that has since stuck.

While the process of institutionalization of this science in European and Anglo-Saxon socio-cultural areas has been similar, its emergence and institutionalization have undergone a different process in countries of the Global South (or non-Western countries), and especially in Morocco, which is the focus of this study. The objective here is to enlighten the reader on the trajectory of Moroccan sociology and the challenges that sociologists in Morocco are called upon to take up, with the contribution of other sociologists who believe they live under the “power of knowledge” rather than the “knowledge of power.”

> Institutionalizing sociology in Morocco: the pre-protectorate period

It’s worth recalling that Morocco was home to some of the most significant figures in the advancement of rationalism

(Ibn Rushd/Averroes, 1126-1198) and social thought (Ibn Khaldun 1332-1406) in the Mediterranean region. However, as a “science of society” and scientific knowledge, sociology was introduced into Morocco to serve the purposes of occupation and destructure Moroccan society, while reconstructing it according to an imposed architecture in the name of a mission to civilize a country perceived as backward. Following the negotiations at the Algeciras Conference, Morocco was converted into a French protectorate. This was after having amputated its Saharan territories in favor of Spain at the Berlin Conference (1884-85), where the European colonial powers famously sat around a table and shared out the African continent.

During this period, while wishing to impose its right to occupy Morocco on the other European nations, France dispatched its spies and collaborators across the country to gather information likely to enlighten them on the situation in the country and the composition of Moroccan society. Their aim was to put in place what I call a “theory of domination,” which facilitated the “domination of Morocco” and the establishment of the protectorate. All this work culminated in the founding in 1904 of the “Mission scientifique du Maroc,” which published the *Archives marocaines* (Moroccan Archives) and later the *Revue du monde musulman* (Muslim World Review). In 1914, just after the protectorate status had been forcibly imposed on Morocco and in agreement with the Resident-General, a third publication was undertaken in collaboration with the Department of Indigenous Affairs and the Intelligence Service under the title *Villes et tribus du Maroc* (Cities and Tribes of Morocco).

> **Institutionalizing sociology in Morocco: the protectorate period**

During this period sociology and related social and human disciplines were framed by a political vision of domination. Thus the social sciences constituted knowledge that served the civilizing mission that the occupying states – in this case, France and Spain – had arrogated to themselves and wished to impose on the country.

During the protectorate period (1912-56), few non-French researchers were allowed to research in “French Morocco” whereas the Spanish authorities tolerated the presence of researchers of other nationalities. Moreover, most of those who produced sociological and social knowledge were executives of the “protectorate authority” (civil and military controllers, senior administrative officials, etc.) while only few Moroccans were kept as informers (or even auxiliaries).

An overview of the works from the period reveals a situation where sociology was practiced in Morocco as a tool of penetration and submission, based on gathering information and intelligence to understand the country’s socio-political and economic structures and resources. However, certain nuances between areas of practice can justify the differentiated treatment that I adopt in the following sections.

> **The sociology of “French Morocco”**

French sociology at the time advocated Durkheimism. At the same time, it built its perception of Moroccan reality around a dichotomy, cultivating conflict and antagonism between Moroccan components, with the aim to “divide and rule.” The knowledge generated was mobilized not only during the 27-year pacification period but also right up to independence.

This duality produced monolithic entities that the so-called “academic” literature described as in the table below.

These dichotomies were incorporated into administrative entities. As a result, those in the first column were

conceived as suitable for civilian control while those in the second column were to be managed by military controllers, according to a politico-territorial perspective in which the civilian zone was “useful Morocco” and the other merely “useless Morocco.”

The sociology of “French Morocco” privileged the colonist as the spearhead of this international mandate that France wanted to transform into colonization. The power of the Resident-General did not substitute the power of the Sultan but was superimposed on it and circumvented by vizier decrees. Methodologically speaking, this sociology tried to adopt the research methods and data collection techniques of the time. The main problem lies in the analysis and interpretation. Often, the collection of data and information and interpretation had the society of origin as a reference. This reveals an ethnocentrism both in the development of concepts and in the approaches not only in the field work, but also in the conclusions.

> **“Spanish sociology” in Morocco**

In its zone of influence, Spain behaved in much the same way as France. It relied on information provided by so-called scientific missions and other informants as sources. The underlying idea was to distinguish the socio-political and territorial reality of this zone from its despoiled Moroccan territories: Ceuta, Melilla, the Sahara.

Spanish sociological knowledge was articulated through the notion of “Africanismo,” which refers to Moroccan-Spanish socio-historical “traumas” (Al-Andalus, the Battle of Anwal, and civil wars in particular). This became an ideological and cultural reference against Morocco in many forms. As a result, the social weight of the past between the two countries has prevented “voluntarist objectivism” in the Spanish approach to Morocco, hindered by the so-called “civilizing mission.”

We can conclude that “primary utilitarianism” in Spanish and similar sociological works was not a construct of a field of study or even a specialty; it was a mission tinged with religious humanism.

Dichotomies		Observations
Arab	Berber	The Berber peoples are today known as Amazigh and recognized in the Moroccan constitution of 2011.
<i>Chraâ</i> (Muslim jurisdiction)	Customary law	Customary law is a variant of Muslim jurisdiction. No mention is made of Moroccan Jews, who were once <i>dhimmi</i> (non-Muslims living under the protection of an Islamic state, subject to a special status) and are now recognized as full citizens under the current constitution.
<i>Bled Makhzen</i> (territory under central authority)	<i>Bled Siba</i> (territory insubordinate to the central power)	In Morocco’s history, a distinction must be made between <i>Siba</i> (dissent, revolt or rebellion) and pretension. <i>Siba</i> never questioned the Sultan’s religious status as “Commander of the Faithful,” but was against his political power.

> **Sociology from other countries practiced in Morocco**

Few sociologists from other countries were interested in Morocco, or rather were authorized to conduct fieldwork there, especially after 1912. Most were based in Tangier (declared an International Zone).

The Finn Edvard Westermarck stayed in Morocco from 1898 to 1939. The main reason behind his successful travels was his relationship with his friend Sidi Abdeslam El Bakali (Sheriff of the Jbala region), who provided him with protection on all his journeys. Just as did Carleton Coon, who published *Tribes of the Rif* in 1817, republished in 1966, Westermarck recognized the hospitality, understanding, and high degree of cooperation of the Spaniards and the society he studied.

If I chose these foreigners from different horizons to illustrate participation in this plural, polyglot sociology, it is to show the specificity of the Western-centric vision. That vision meant that anthropology (or even ethnology) was practiced as “exo-sociology,” while sociology, properly speaking, was seen as “endo-anthropology.”

> **The situation of sociology in independent Morocco**

Since the country's independence, sociology has been adopted in Morocco in a paradoxical way. On the one hand, it has been seen by the enlightened elite as a break with Mashreq's cultural tradition and hence a key to modernity aimed at understanding and better diagnosing society's ills so as to overcome them and move towards a better society. On the other hand, it has been seen by those in power as an inconvenient science.

Although Moroccan cooperation with UNESCO gave rise to the Institute of Sociology in 1961, its disbanding in 1970 took place against a backdrop of unfortunate events, the corollary of Morocco's Years of Lead. Once the Institute was closed, sociology was integrated into the Department of Philosophy and Psychology, with a sociology major starting at the postgraduate level. PhD sociology studies are also offered. The curriculum has been Arabized, like all other humanities.

To counter the rise of critical thinking and its left-wing socio-political undertones, Sociology departments were banished in favor of Islamic Studies departments, which were opened in the 11 Faculties of Arts and Humanities that sprang up in the different regions of Morocco.

> **The colonial legacy**

Despite its troubled past, sociology has been accepted as a Moroccan heritage in its own right. Moroccan researchers have appropriated this heritage by subjecting it to a “double critique” (A. Khatibi). They have targeted

both the erroneous theses that support the theory of domination and the methods and techniques used to collect data and information, not to mention the way these are processed and used to support conclusions or constructs that do not reflect societal reality. This debate has not only focused on Moroccan studies but has also delved into the fundamental epistemological and cognitive terrain of the social sciences.

Thus, segregation has had its share of critics (P. Pascon, A. Taoufik, A. Hamoudi, etc.), as have other modes of analysis that have had their heyday. Colonial production, not colonialist production, was integrated into the work of Moroccan researchers. This debate was more dynamic and animated with the French school than with the Spanish legacy, which was under-analyzed (or even ignored), due to Morocco's policy of Francophonization.

> **The arrival of Anglo-Saxon sociology**

Anglo-Saxon sociology made its entry into Morocco with independence. Interest in the country was driven by geostrategic interests. Work on Morocco was particularly plentiful in the USA. So much so that Morocco became a research and immersion laboratory for those wishing to specialize in the Arab world, Islam, cultural diversity and so on (Clifford Geertz and his students are a case in point).

Distinguished Anglo-Saxon scholars were pioneers who then sent their students, and these students, now teachers, were in turn replaced by their students. This has given rise to a body of knowledge that Moroccans could not access due to the limitations of language, dissemination, and, above all, censorship. It was not until recently that graduates of English language and literature became involved in popularizing these works, either through translation or criticism. The same applies to other language and literature departments within the Faculties of Arts and Humanities, with the exception of French language and literature, which have long been involved in this debate. Thanks to bridges created between the various departments and even universities, sociology has been enriched and has become a feeder course for other specialties.

Today, there is an openness to the various foreign production on Morocco, especially since the reestablishment of sociology in the late 1980s, via new departments in all the Faculties of Arts and Humanities. Previously, sociology was only available at the Faculties of Arts and Humanities in Rabat and Fez. More importantly, studying sociology was seen as a left-wing tendency.

> **The emergence of a “Moroccan School of Sociology”: handicaps and assets**

I have used these historical milestones to hastily sketch the context of the emergence of a “Moroccan School of

Sociology” whose output is multilingual, but mainly in Arabic and French. Sociological writing in English and Spanish is now beginning to make inroads, as Moroccan researchers conquer new horizons in their quest for training and employment.

The institutionalization of a Moroccan School of Sociology has been handicapped by the aforementioned socio-political conditions but has also suffered from a poor governance of research in the social sciences and humanities. This is not only due to the compartmentalization from which sociology in particular, and most other specialties, suffered until the late 1990s, but also to the lack of financial resources, which have been insufficient or poorly managed and, generally under-utilized. Moreover, several public funding programs for social and human research have had little real impact on promoting it. Private funding has not kept pace with developments, especially with the deontological and legal vacuum in research activity regarding training, expertise, consulting or research. Even certain partnerships between ministerial entities in specific fields remain unresolved.

Several social science researchers have formed interest groups through associations within or outside universities. They have thus responded to social demand for training, consultancy, and expertise. Students have found this to be an ideal opportunity to improve their skills under the professional guidance of their professors. Examples include the Center for Studies and Research in Social Sciences (CERSS), the Mediation Space (espacemediation.org), and the Regional Observatory of Migration, Spaces and Societies (ORMES), among others.

The latest university reform has seen the creation of several laboratories, but they are handicapped by their bureaucratic structure, cumbersome financial management, and the tensions of “*Homo academicus*.” Despite this, they have been able to enliven university life through their diversified activities and provide a framework for inter-university exchanges at home and abroad.

To compensate for these handicaps, hybrid initiatives have been launched by individual researchers or groups of researchers, in the form of flagship events. These include the National Sociology Day (*Journée nationale de Sociologie*), an annual traveling event organized by the Instance marocaine de Sociologie and the Social Sciences Springtime (*Printemps des Sciences sociales*) organized

by Al Akhawayn University with Mohammed V University in Rabat. These hybrid initiatives have taken the form of para-university and even peri-university work. They have helped open up the university to its social, economic, civil and even political environment and represent spaces for informal exchange and improvement, where different generations of researchers from various backgrounds, as well as young MA and PhD researchers, can meet.

> Prospects and international outlook

Thanks to its multilingual nature, sociology in Morocco has to some extent been sheltered from the trends experienced in other parts of the MENA region, such as Arabization or Islamization.

Since the 1990s, bridges have been built with the various private higher education and training establishments for cross-border university education. This has helped to create stronger cross-fertilization with Anglo-Saxon production while offering sociologists and other social science researchers opportunities to enrich this emerging Moroccan school. This internationalization of academia and research has allowed many sociologists to move to institutions in the Gulf countries, either as immigrants or for occasional stays, and even to be active in networks funded by these countries. These opportunities have helped the Moroccan School of Sociology spread its influence and connect with other countries in the MENA region, offering possibilities beyond institutional mobility.

With the restructuring of sociological practices within the Instance marocaine de Sociologie, heir to the Réseau marocain de Sociologie (Moroccan Sociology Network), and the annual organization of the National Sociology Day, sociology in Morocco is organizing itself while promoting a “Moroccan School of Sociology.” In this way it is contributing to the history of sociology, while striving for an international dialogue referring to the “power of knowledge” rather than the submission of sociology to the sole “knowledge of power.”

Hosting the 5th ISA Forum of Sociology in Rabat (Morocco) from July 6 to 11, 2025 is for us an opportunity to celebrate diversity while respecting deontology so that sociology and the social and human sciences are not affected by utilitarianism or other forms of power and that academic freedom and the independence of the researcher are recognized. ■

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> Revisiting Contemporary Sociology in Morocco

by **Abdellatif Kidai** and **Driss El Ghazouani**, Mohammed V University of Rabat, Morocco



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Several obstacles hinder the production of a comprehensive study of the themes, approaches, and methods of sociological thought in Morocco. The initial impediment has been the dearth of interest among researchers in advancing the discipline and the paucity of documentation about sociological data. These include, but are not limited to, the absence of comprehensive thesis reviews, the scarcity of published book reviews, the lack of thematic bibliographies, and the rarity of colloquium papers. The second obstacle is the national character of postcolonial independent sociology. The formative years of “national sociology” were shaped by the influence of nationalized teaching faculty in the immediate post-independence period and were also affected by political struggles between some nationalists and the monarchy. Consequently, it has often been challenging to differentiate between the roles of the scientist, sociology theorist, and politician in sociological profiles and actors in Morocco. A third obstacle is related to what constitutes

Moroccan sociology and sociologists. The profession of sociologist has not been a prominent topic in broader discussions about culture, intellectuals, and the social sciences and humanities in Moroccan academia.

This article aims to discuss contemporary Moroccan sociology, encompassing its themes, approaches, methods, and current challenges. We begin by examining the evolution of this discipline within the Moroccan academic milieu, delineating the sociological literature that has been produced on society before, during, and after the colonial era. Although the colonial period is seen as a catalyst for the development of sociology in Morocco, a new generation of sociologists has sought to reclaim the discipline, decolonize it, and move beyond the limitations of orientalist discourse. They strive to establish a national sociology oriented towards socio-economic development and create a sociological legacy for future generations. Our second aim is to present the principal themes that inform socio-

logical research in Morocco, the prevailing approaches and methods, and their role in the evolution of this field of inquiry. We conclude by examining some key challenges to be addressed.

> The origins of Moroccan sociology

The sociological studies conducted in Morocco reflected the political debates prevalent in the country during the postcolonial era. A significant proportion of sociologists were influenced by Mohamed Guessous, a leading sociologist who was a member of the socialist party *Union socialiste des forces populaires*. Several strategies were developed to occupy the university space. Political rivalries turned towards sociology in the 1960s and 1970s, resulting in the closure in 1970 of the Institute of Sociology of Rabat, which had become a hub and symbol of critical thinking among university students and academics and was considered too critical and leftist by the state.

In terms of theoretical paradigms, the 1960s and 1970s were characterized by the dominance of Marxist theory. The sociology of the time sought to elucidate the functioning of society from a comprehensive standpoint. Paul Pascon's approach to "Haouz" society, and Moroccan society in general, was characterized by holistic concepts, including social formation, mode of production, composite society, social classes, levels of social reality, and so forth. This holistic view of society was also evident in other sociological studies. Abdelkébir Khatibi produced a text on social hierarchies, while Abdellah Hammoudi employed integrated study and integrated development concepts. However, the influence of this holistic approach was gradually called into question.

> Late-twentieth-century boom and the urban turn

Abdelrahman Rachik argues that the early 1990s saw a notable surge in sociological research on women, family, youth, and socialization in Morocco. This phenomenon emerged concurrently with a heightened discourse on women's values, movements, and broader human rights concerns. The surge in research activity in these areas during this period included contributions from Moroccan researchers such as Fatima Mernisi, Aïcha Belarbi, Ghetha Al-Khayyat, Fatma Al-Zahra Azroel, Rabia al-Nasiri, Rahma Bourqia and Mohammed Talal.

Similarly, Rachik indicates that research into Moroccan urban-related topics represents another concern for Moroccan sociologists. The dominant themes in urban sociology are linked to housing (shantytowns and slums), urbanization, urban policy, real estate, and transport. In this context, the work of Françoise Buchanin, Mohammed Nasiri, Abdel Ghani Abu Hani, Mohammed Benatu, Abdelrahman Rachik, Abdullah Lahzam and Aziz al-Iraqi can be cited as illustra-

tive examples. [According to Rachik](#), most of these research projects have been conducted in French.

> Taking up contemporary issues

Furthermore, numerous social scientists, spearheaded by Mokhtar al-Harras, Rahma Bourqia, Driss Bensaïd, Ahmed Cherrak, and Abderrahim al-Atri, research the sociology of culture, the sociology of values, rural sociology, and the sociology of the family. Most of these researchers have made a notable contribution to the emergence of a new generation of Moroccan sociologists over the past two decades. The majority of these researchers conduct their research in Arabic.

Contemporary issues about religion, women, youth, and immigration are addressed by a new generation of Moroccan sociologists who use English in their research. Fadma Ait Mous, who studies collective identities and social movements, gender relations and women's conditions, socio-political transformations, and youth and migration, is notable among these scholars. The case of Hicham Ait Mansour, who studies poverty, also illustrates Moroccan scholars' openness to different languages and cultures. This indicates that studying Moroccan society is relevant to the global community and can reflect universal phenomena and changes. The contributions of sociological studies conducted in different languages within the Moroccan context to producing theories, paradigms, and approaches based on concrete findings are significant.

> The limitations of doctoral theses

The broader domain of sociological studies in Morocco includes doctoral dissertations. These may focus on fifteen areas of research: family, organizations, space, integration and social relations, precarity and poverty, youth, education, social networks, mobility and social change, work, religion, urbanization, social history, health, and the rural world. The sociology of work, social change, development, and culture are the focus of most doctoral dissertations. However, these theses have not contributed to advancing sociological theories by introducing novel approaches or concepts. This perpetuates the methodological deficit and hinders the establishment of sociology as a separate field of research. Since they are not published, the findings of most PhD dissertations are not integrated into subsequent broader critical discussions.

> Redefining sociological practices for long-term research

Despite the evident relevance of sociology to public authorities and the expectation that sociologists will contribute to the analysis of significant changes affecting Moroccan society, their involvement remains limited. This is evidenced by a [bibliometric study of all social science](#)

research published between 1960 and 2006, and is due to many factors. These include limited funding, a lack of a legal framework to motivate researchers, and a lack of a specialized sociology journal. Without a public policy for scientific research, practices are essentially based on individual initiatives or individual networks, and research takes place outside the university institution. Current research into development issues (poverty, marginalization, exclusion, health, and the environment) is more responsive to political and social demands than to long-term research projects.

Sociology’s main challenge is to reconstruct itself on new foundations that will provide a new impetus for higher education and scientific production. The practice of sociology must be defined with greater precision in terms of its research orientations, within both the national and international context. In light of impending reforms, should the trend be to intensify research structures, there is a risk that these structures may become devoid of substance without a clear definition of the research objects and a commitment to scientific rigor. It is, therefore, imperative to facilitate communication between sociologists, ensure the circulation of information, and coordinate and evaluate studies to plan the discipline’s scientific future.

> **The policy of Arabization**

A further significant challenge pertains to the linguistic issue in Morocco. Currently, sociology is taught in Arabic in all sociology departments, except in Casablanca. The process of Arabization in sociology, which can be traced back to the early 1970s, represents a broader political perspective that has implications for all social science disciplines. From this perspective, the Arabization of the human sciences can be understood as a reference to the cultural dimension of societies in the Arab–Muslim world. In the 1980s, the debate among Arab sociologists was polarized around the question of the specificity of their societies. This debate pitted those who considered that the sociology of the Arab world should contribute to a “universal” science against those for whom the human and social sciences could not claim universality. This situation has resulted in a schism in the Maghreb, particularly in Algeria and Tunisia, between Arabic-speaking


and French-speaking sociologists, who pursue disparate research agendas and address distinct subject matters.

The first generation of Moroccan sociologists received their training in the Western sociological tradition, were influenced by the scientific paradigms developed in Europe, and were keen to engage in the theoretical and methodological debates of the international community. However, it is essential to acknowledge that the situation of the younger generations is a cause for concern. The Arabization policy in Morocco has not yielded the desired results. As posited by experts in the field of language studies in the Maghreb, this failure may be attributed to the initial objective of enabling Maghrebi children to become proficient in the written language of their culture, namely classical Arabic, while simultaneously acquiring proficiency in a foreign language. Nevertheless, the majority have not yet achieved either of these objectives.

As a consequence of deficiencies in language policies, these younger generations are regrettably insulated from the accumulated knowledge within their respective disciplines and from a transnational scientific field to which French-speaking Morocco had full access. Concurrently, they are re-examining methodologies that, while not inherently traditional, exhibit [a certain degree of detachment from the prevailing trends in the social sciences](#). This discrepancy between the new generation and the sources of sociological knowledge could challenge the future of sociological practices in Morocco and integration into the scientific debates of the international community.

> **The challenges facing doctoral students in sociology**

Sociology in Morocco encompasses a wide range of domains that study human behavior, society, and culture. However, teaching this science in Morocco has gone through a series of stages in which politics played a crucial role, given that most of those who specialized in this field belonged to the political left. As in many other countries, doctoral sociology students in Moroccan universities face several challenges that can affect their academic and research progress (see Figure 1).



| Figure 1.



Our survey data show that sociology doctoral students face many challenges during their training. The language barrier is seen as one of the most critical challenges at 91%, followed by the quality of supervision at 85%, bureaucracy and administrative hurdles at 67%, research infrastructures at 57%, limited funding at 38%, and finally, limited interdisciplinary opportunities at 27%.

Language barriers and the quality of supervision are significant challenges that doctoral students in Morocco or any other country may face. In Morocco, doctoral programs are typically conducted in French or Arabic. The language barrier can be a significant obstacle for many students, especially those who have previously studied in another language or have limited proficiency in these languages. This can affect their ability to comprehend course materials, write research papers, and effectively communicate with their peers and supervisors.

Students pursuing research in niche areas might struggle to find a suitable supervisor. The quality of doctoral supervision can vary widely: some students may receive excellent guidance, while others may face issues such as a lack of timely feedback, limited interaction with their supervisors, or misalignment of research interests which can affect the progress and quality of their research.

The perceptions of doctoral students training in sociology within Moroccan universities can vary depending on various factors, including the quality of faculty, curriculum, teaching experiences, and employability (see Figure 2).

Our survey data indicate negative perceptions regarding doctoral program enrollment among sociology students. Some 55% affirm that the coursework and curricula are weak, while some 45% believe that the employability and career prospects are weak. Additionally, close to 40% consider the teaching experience very weak, and a further 43% find it weak. On the other hand, 35% of the respondents consider the quality of the faculty to be relatively good, while 25% view it as weak.

In general, most students are dissatisfied with doctoral training in sociology despite the efforts made by the state in this regard. The new reform adopted by the ministry through the preparation of a new charter for these is expected to enhance these programs in a way that serves the interests of the students and the university as a whole.

> **Final notes**

As previously stated, Moroccan sociology has undergone substantial transformations and faced many challenges. A linguistic divide exists between sociologists writing in Arabic and those writing in French, which has resulted in a contentious field of study. A new generation of sociologists is emerging who are receptive to the use of English and endeavor to transcend the existing dichotomy between themes and interests. ■

> **Final notes**

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


Figure 2.

> Sociology in Morocco and General Sociology

by **Kawtar Lebdaoui**, Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Morocco



| Credit: Suzy Hazelwood, 2017, on Pexels.

One of the challenges facing post-colonial Morocco was the decolonization of sociology and how to rid it of ethnocentric ideology. The aim of this article is to retrace the identity of sociology in Morocco in relation to the colonial period and general sociology, and to question the challenge of the de-Westernization of sociology in Morocco.

Taking stock of the decisive turning points in the history of sociology in Morocco leading towards the construction of the sociological self enables us to analyze the dynamics of conjunction and disjunction between the evolution of sociology in Morocco and sociology in general.

> Sociology in Morocco rethought and decolonized

The rise of sociology and anthropology in the Western world was key to colonialist movements, providing them with a political strategy through which to control Indigenous resistance. Scientific knowledge is a non-military force; it is less costly and ensures greater control over the colonized. So, while sociology aims to change the world, it is also guided by underlying ideological tensions.

Historically and politically, Morocco is closely linked to colonialism, along three differentiated periods: pre-colonial Morocco, colonized Morocco after 1912, and Morocco since independence in 1956. For this reason, the characterization of pre-independence sociology in Morocco as ideological and colonial requires great epistemological caution, and enables us to account for the emergence of the sociological identity of Moroccan society as a decolonized entity.

The colonial sociological literature on Morocco is extensive. Officials made an invaluable contribution with monographs and in-depth field surveys. That research was institutionalized by the “Mission scientifique”, the “Section sociologique des Affaires indigènes” and then the “Institut des Hautes Études Marocaines”, producing a corpus of “reference” for later generations of sociologists, who did indeed return to it in an epistemologically critical way, with the aim of creating a national sociology emancipated from colonial ideology.

Haunted by the desire to free itself from its colonial past, sociology has turned towards empirical and methodological refinement. [The emblematic sociological figure of Paul Pascon](#) is proof of this. To understand and transform society, he opted for action research, demonstrating a conceptual creativity that put the sociology of Moroccan society in disjunction with Marxism that had far-reaching echoes during the 1970s. Through the notion of “composite society”, Pascon demonstrated how several modes of production (tribalism, capitalism, etc.) can coexist without the demarcation lines between them being necessarily definitive.

The emerging sociology was defined by public action and funding from international organizations. As a result, it was generally dominated by rural and women’s studies. While the founding fathers opted for a holistic perspective embodied in Marxism, the later generation of researchers tended towards more sector-based research.

Decolonized sociology emerged with pioneers who built a line of escape from colonial knowledge and its ideologies. In its search for its identity, the challenge was to rethink

the “social we” (*nous social*) and rebuild niches of knowledge about Moroccan society.

> The scientific appropriation of the “social we”

The mission of the pioneers of sociology in independent Morocco was to catalyze the transformation of the world for the benefit of the working classes. They campaigned for a sociology that distanced itself from colonialism and was politically operative on behalf of the exploited.

While national sociology was concerned with social demand, anthropology remained faithful to its quest to understand society. Post-independence anthropological literature has been devoted to revising its colonial counterpart. It set out to access new spheres of religious and political research, and did so with a view to scientifically appropriating the “social we”.

Critical examination and decolonization do not mean wiping the slate clean of the legacy of colonial literature. Although Eurocentric, that literature provides invaluable empirical archives on people, social relationships, tribal dynamics, political power and so on.

On another level of the scientific construction of anthropology in Morocco, awareness of the epistemological gap between the Western, but also colonial, anthropologist and the local anthropologist does not mean that the latter is necessarily more familiar with Moroccan culture.

Of course, the sense of strangeness in the two cases is not the same. In the case of the Western or colonial anthropologist, the gap is ontological, due to an obsession with colonial ideology and the imaginary of the colonized as “savage”, “primitive”, “underdeveloped”, etc. In contrast, for the local researcher, the gap is epistemological and emerges from the desire to produce local scientific knowledge that is valid for transforming society.

In order to escape from *doxa* and immediate evidence, the local anthropologist and sociologist adopt Alfred Schütz’s “[strangeness of the familiar](#)”. This reflexivity concerning the relationships of the local and the colonial anthropologist to the community that is the object of their research would produce a positive epistemological otherness vis-à-vis colonial literature. As a result, the boundaries between the two literatures remain porous for as long as the re-construction of a scientific sociology of Moroccan society continues to probe this dialectical relationship between colonial and decolonized.

> For a sociology with a de-Westernized perspective

Despite its epistemological break with colonial thought, while maintaining a positive otherness towards it, national

sociology is not in disjunction with general sociology. Like the latter, Moroccan sociology has remained a nomothetic science of the social, capable of generalizing concepts and establishing laws about social life. But in what sense can it only be emancipated through the production of de-Westernized knowledge?

The transition from coloniality to decolonization was aided by the mobilization of the sociological paradigm of “transforming the world” in favor of citizens and the anthropological paradigm of “looking from the inside.” The construction of the “*social nous* conceived by ourselves” and the consequent emancipation of the sociology of Moroccan society were not achieved without methodological and theoretical innovation nor without profound ontological and epistemological reflexivity.

Yet the epistemological discourse of the de-Westernization of knowledge calls into question the relationship between local sociology and general sociology, which, to the extent that it is Western, represents hegemony of the global over the local.

Indeed, the challenge of de-Westernization means that sociology in Morocco, as in other countries of the Global South, must adopt a non-Western, anti-hegemonic perspective. De-Westernizing sociology means ceasing not just to be colonized but to be dominated and inferior.

The multiplicity of the social can only lead to the emergence of new, credible local knowledge as an alternative to the dominant “global” variety. As long as the empirical terrain in Morocco is fertile, the construction of a local sociology that takes account of its historical, political and socio-cultural singularities can help it escape alienation and produce a local cognitive space that places it at odds with Western hegemony. This does not mean isolation, but rather the elaboration of an inter-cognition between “local” and “global”, and the establishment of a sociology capable of energizing a new relationship between the two scales.

In conclusion, the birth of sociology not only dates to its founding fathers and early pioneers; it is constantly regenerated and reinvented to bring it into line with the evolution of societies, but also with relevant epistemological debates, particularly those in the Global South. The sociology of Moroccan society therefore needs to form its own identity, deterritorializing concepts and theories, appropriating paradigms, and establishing a transnational sociological niche capable of contributing to the universal and inter-civilizational creative accumulation of knowledge. ■

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> The Contested Field of Openness and Inclusion

by **Fernanda Beigel**, CONICET and Centro de Estudios de Circulación del Conocimiento, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Argentina



| Credit: Jacek Kita, 2018, on iStock.

During 2020 and 2021, I had the honor to serve as chair of the [UNESCO Advisory Committee](#) that prepared the Recommendation on Open Science draft project, approved at the 41st UNESCO Conference in November 2021. The discussions with the 30 experts who were part of the committee, representing different regions of the world, soon showed us the complexity of the idea of openness in the context of the world's economic, technological, academic, and social inequities. The challenges of scientific openness change significantly from Global North to Global South, given the asymmetrical development of digital infrastructure, but also from West to East, within each region, and even within a country and its internal structural heterogeneity.

The most developed dimension of Open Science by the time of the preparation of the Recommendation was open access to scientific publications. Public concern for this issue seemed boosted by the COVID-19 pandemic. As noted by several studies that consider the 20-year balance since the Budapest Open Access Initiative ([BOAI](#)), open access was born as a noble intention but evolved as a flawed reality. Vested interests within the academic publishing sector, particularly publishers of highly esteemed journals (e.g., impact factors above 10–20), had a great incentive to change their funding to a hybrid model since their subscriptions – although costly – are still coming in, and their manuscript submissions continue apace, far above their publication

capacity. A dynamic drift of scholarly journals born in Open Access or mega-journals demanding increasingly high payments for article processing charges (APC) overshadowed the achievements of the Open Access movement.

In this context, one of the main concerns of all the experts who share this rich intellectual debate is how to expand scientific openness while fostering diversity and interculturality. I will introduce the conceptual discussion I recently presented at the STI Conference in Berlin as the framework for a series of mappings I made to calibrate how much we are advancing towards inclusive, open science or whether exclusion is winning the game.

> The tensions between inclusive openness and exclusive closedness

There are different paths towards open science, coexisting conflictingly at the global scale, and the tension between them is not only determined by the degrees of openness/closedness but is also related to the poles of inclusiveness/exclusiveness. Figure 1 shows different combinations in this space of conflict that are organized resembling the way Bourdieu describes the properties of a given field. We can see the features of openness to the right; and to the left, the characteristics of closedness. However, combined with the vertical axis and reading more practically from the center, where the axes cross each other, we see four quad-

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rants. The upper quadrants feature exclusiveness, driven by commercial actors or by the traditional asymmetries of the global academic system. In the lower quadrants, on the contrary, high degrees of inclusiveness circulate, but with different limitations to openness, due to sovereignty issues or the protection required by subaltern groups.

The axes of inclusiveness and openness



Figure 1.

Analyzed by quadrants, the space is organized according to opposite poles; firstly, featuring the exclusive–closedness headed by the big commercial publishers that dominate in the constellation consisting of the Scopus-Clarivate publishing platforms. The increasing concentration of scholarly services and the fact that they still control a considerable part of the credibility of the academic community makes this sector dominant in terms of global value for research assessment. Consequently, the structural bias of these global databases deepens the exclusion of a great part of the scientific results published outside high-impact journals, in languages other than English and pushing aside bibliodiversity. Contrary to inclusiveness, these commercial publishers need to offer exclusive goods and services that can guarantee access to the global value of excellence, which is (by definition) scarce and exceptional. The upper right quadrant is organized according to the main conditions for openness, such as interoperability and the other FAIR principles (findability, accessibility, and reusability). But it leads to severe exclusion within the framework of the “gold” business model where open access journals transfer the costs of publishing to individual authors that are affiliated to institutions that cannot afford Read & Publish agreements.

The field of inclusiveness and openness




Figure 2.

Represented in the right lower quadrant in Figures 1 and 2, inclusive openness is opposed to exclusive closedness. The main drivers of this path in Open Access have been regional publishing platforms and portals such as Latindex, SciELO, Redalyc, Biblat, and AJOL, which have established conditions for quality journals in multiple languages. Given that the established hierarchies in the academic world assign little value to these journals, inclusive open science can be less visible and feature as regional circulation. However, it embodies a critical effort to preserve interculturality and foster the human right to science.

In the left lower quadrant, we see inclusive closedness: a pole featuring a restricted circulation of knowledge, which is mostly locally valued. Here, we may see scientific output disseminated in non-indexed journals, numerous initiatives for the management of scientific information and digital platforms created without permanent identifiers, and many other similar experiences. During the discussions held in the UNESCO Advisory Committee for Open Science, the risks of openness were discussed with regard to the need to protect subaltern communities, indigenous knowledge, or scientific information subject to extraction under unequal power relations: *open all that is possible and close only what is necessary* was the basis of the debate. However, this was critical not only to protect but also to respect the rights of indigenous groups to the autonomous government of their native knowledge. [The CARE principles](#) were born amid this tension and today represent one of the main sets of guidelines for a transition to inclusive openness: Collective benefit, Authority to control, Responsibility, and Ethics.

Closedness can result from the need to protect subaltern groups or potentially extractive scientific information and can be used by state governments to defend digital sovereignty. From a democratic perspective, governments may need to protect citizens’ personal data and businesses’ economic interests in an information economy. In an authoritarian regime, in contrast, this concept has been embraced to limit academic freedom and exert social control over citizens.

As we can see, the tensions present in developing inclusive open science do not only revolve around national open science policies, unequal material resources, or commercial interests. Data governance plays a key role in contested global projects regarding the integration of digital platforms. Deep debates surround the benefits or disadvantages of centralized open infrastructures, while a more inclusive and democratic route seems to emerge from the idea of federated infrastructures.

> The stakeholders in the dynamics of inclusiveness and exclusiveness

Any path to inclusive openness has to surmount two structural obstacles, one dependent on material resources

and the other on the symbolic capital at stake in scientific practice. The first obstacle consists of the global inequalities forged by the digital divide and the risks of extraction that openness creates for non-hegemonic research communities lacking the indispensable infrastructures for visibility and recognition. The second emerges from the increasing struggles between commercialization and de-commercialization of scholarly publishing and scientific information. These conflicts go beyond the tension of the “diamond” versus the “gold” route, given that recognition and differentiation among scientists were built under an excellence regime designed by commercial publishers. Accordingly, the feasibility of a real change is ultimately linked to addressing asymmetries with multi-causal factors.

Latin America represents an alternative open-access publishing circuit, with diamond journals that are community-managed and driven by the principle of science as a common good. However, the “mainstream” circuit still holds most of the belief of internationalized researchers in the performative effects of high-impact journals, which prevents them from changing their paths of circulation at the risk of losing recognition. SciELO, Redalyc and Latindex have made enormous efforts to increase their visibility and impact, and governmental agencies and public institutions sustain this regional circuit. However, the academic evaluation defined by these same organizations depreciates these journals, resulting in a form of alienation that still remains unresolved.

Inclusiveness faces strong forces of exclusiveness driven by oligopoly commercial stakeholders that seek to concentrate profitable goods and centralize infrastructures under closed ecosystems. Figure 3 shows some examples of such companies in the upper left quadrant. Meanwhile, in the right upper quadrant, fully open infrastructures that comply with the FAIR principles, such as OpenAlex, guarantee visibility but are limited in terms of inclusiveness by the availability of persistent identifiers (PIDs) such as DOI, ORCID, or others.

In the lower quadrants of this contested field, we can see a reinforcement of the idea that inclusiveness is highly linked to multilingualism and the interculturality of science. However, some inclusive publishing platforms have limitations regarding the availability of metadata at the level of the documents indexed in their services, and the lack of PIDs also diminishes the visibility of this quality indexed production. Autonomous governance may clash with unrestricted

openness as we move to full compliance with the CARE principles, high inclusiveness of subaltern groups, and the protection of indigenous knowledge. Digital sovereignty may, for its part, imply certain degrees of closedness.

Positioning of commercial stakeholders and practices within the contested field



Figure 3.


The right lower quadrant agglutinates the best examples of inclusive openness. Latin American publishing platforms and repositories are relevant stakeholders on the path toward an equitable research system. Their main strength resides in governments’ public investment in infrastructure under a general agreement on the definition of science as a common good. It is a heterogeneous region with diverse scientific policies and governance approaches to scientific information systems that coexist in a noncommercial publishing ecosystem. The relevant experience in federated infrastructures such as LA Referencia and its local technology gives the region a critical role in a just transition to inclusive open science.

These conceptual and practical tensions exist while a severe change is occurring behind the expansion of mega-journals and the pledge for fast-track peer review that blur the original interaction between a given scholarly community and the specific audience of a journal. The homogenization and automatization of editorial management displace editors from leading academic decisions. A potential crisis of legitimacy seems to emerge from the pervasive effects of commercial open access, leaving us facing a potential opportunity. I believe a radical change is only possible through a deep critique of the concept of “excellence” within contextualized and “situated” reforms in research assessment systems. Indeed, to seek inclusive openness entails new definitions of research quality, framed by the multilingual horizon of science as an intercultural common good. ■

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> The Dialectics of Open Science: Three Years since the UNESCO Recommendation

by **Eunjung Shin**, Science and Technology Policy Institute (STEPI), South Korea, and **Jae-Mahn Shim**, Korea University, South Korea



| Credit: UNESCO, 2022.

> “Open science” and the Mertonian ideal

The mid-twentieth-century sociologist Robert Merton, who can be said to have set out what is now termed “open science” through his norms for ideal science practices and communication, prescribed that science should be universal in what it reveals (objectivity) and constructs (free access). Via this Mertonian norm of universalism, the science community is encouraged to pursue universal knowledge by openly discussing and verifying facts discovered collectively, regardless of individual scientists’ identities, regional differences, and socio-political conditions. The practical norms of open science that have been imagined, contested, and observed in the world science community for decades since Merton’s conceptual inception of it, seem to diverge considerably from his prescriptive norms.

Researchers have experienced [ever-intensifying commercialization and peer competition in the science community](#) over recent decades. This trend eventually motivated indi-

vidual researchers to keep their ideas and findings within closed circles instead of sharing them with their peers in the wider community. Meanwhile and in contrast, advances in digital technologies and Internet access have enabled scientific publications and research materials to be publicly released and become accessible to relevant stakeholders in a more timely and efficient manner. Thus encircled by a double movement, as suggested by [Karl Polanyi](#), individual scientists and local, national, and regional science communities have been witnessing heterogeneous sets of practical open science norms. While the ideal of open science that Merton initiated remains intact, the reality of open science is not only historically but necessarily a multivocal, dialectic process of contestation and construction loaded with divergent ideas and practices.

Responding to these multi-layered dialectics of open science, UNESCO mobilized its convening power, initiated global dialogues among its 193 members, and finally issued the [Recommendation on Open Science in 2021](#). The Recommendation rightly supports universalism and local/

regional diversities as a much-needed effort. On the one hand, it reaffirms global recognition of open science and its universal values which have enabled science. It calls for collective global endeavors to revitalize open science within and beyond scientific communities. On the other hand, UNESCO's Recommendation sheds light on the inevitable diversities when implementing open science and advocates multicultural and multilingual knowledge systems. It is one thing for the global community to maintain a commitment to Mertonian universalism. It is another to acknowledge and champion the importance of diversity and the value of localities worldwide when it comes to advancing universalism.

> Developments in South Korea

Three years have passed since the adoption of the UNESCO Recommendation. Over this period, we can identify the following actions aimed at elaborating on the specificities of open science in South Korea (officially the Republic of Korea). Unlike countries that have established an integrated national open science policy or plan, South Korea currently does not have a comprehensive framework covering all aspects of open science practices. Nonetheless, at least four distinctive movements have occurred in the last ten years, along with the global open science agenda-setting process.

First, government funding agencies have promoted public policy measures to enhance access to and utilization of publicly funded research outputs. This is based on the simple logic that the public should benefit from public investment. In particular, the outbreak of COVID-19 accelerated the public sector's proactive efforts to share research data to combat public health emergencies and safeguard public goods. Even though unconditional COVID-19 data sharing is no longer in practice, public access policies applied to publicly funded research outputs remain in effect.

Second, research data management and sharing have been facilitated by the growth of data-driven research or AI (artificial intelligence)-assisted research. Private companies, the Korean government, and public agencies have invested in data and resources for AI technologies. Generic data platforms that provide services for all scientific disciplines have appeared in both the public and private sectors. In addition, field-specific data centers (in bioresearch, materials science, ecology, geoscience, high-energy physics, public health research, etc.) and institutional repositories have increased in number and developed discipline-specific or institution-centered rules and standards.

Third, academic institutions and libraries have continuously adapted to the evolving global landscape of open-access publishing. As more researchers across the world as well

as in South Korea publish their papers via international open-access journals, greater pressure is being placed on domestic libraries to adapt. They are being asked to reconsider existing models of international journal subscription and explore alternative ways (e.g., transformative agreements) to balance current subscription costs with open-access publishing fees. "Predatory" journals and conferences – dominated unequivocally by commercial interests – have become another challenge to advancing open-access publishing. The academic publishing industry is undeniably undergoing transitions, prompting academic communities to readjust. Yet, available information and potential risks associated with these transitions vary across academic disciplines, sectors, and regions, engendering divergent publishing behaviors.

Fourth, citizen scientists, local communities, and laypeople have become integral participants in the scientific process. Their engagement and contribution are particularly prominent in ecology, astronomy, and public health research. New perspectives and interests introduced by emerging science actors lead to novel trajectories of knowledge development. At the same time, these trajectories inevitably result in tensions amid heterogeneities. A tendency to preserve endogenous knowledge embedded in local contexts is being challenged by calls to codify and disseminate this knowledge out of local contexts to broader audiences. Similarly, the established norm to protect the unique identities of those surveyed is being countered by demands for exceptions to be made for research purposes.

> The dialectics of open science

For anything to be real and existent, the [phenomenological wisdom in the sociology of knowledge](#) advises that it should have an ideal representation and be constructed in dialectics of concrete types and heterogeneities that are often disconnected. In the same spirit, this article briefly considers several distinct developments in the Korean dialectics of open science. As they stand, each is a disconnected movement confined within specific contexts. Only historical observers will be able to see what they become over the coming years. Depending on the path they follow, the prototypical ideal of open science by [Robert Merton](#) will become concretized and real. Along the whole route, we can be assured that open science is coming to us in all these details. We only encourage people to pay closer attention to current and future developments in countries like South Korea. UNESCO's upcoming national reporting processes, scheduled for 2025, will be a valuable platform to deliver lively dialectics of open science from each country. On top of that, it will take in-depth social science studies of those dialectics to fully appreciate the emerging global dialectics of open science and reveal the specific tasks we are facing. ■

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> Decommercializing Science: a Utopia?

by **Ana María Cetto**, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico



Credit: photomontage based on images from Freepik.

As noted by Mirowski and Sent, the “[commercialization of science](#)” is a heterogeneous phenomenon that defies simple definition, which makes many contemporary discussions of it unsatisfying. This unfortunate state of affairs is due primarily to the definition of science itself, which ranges from science as an established body of knowledge or science as an institution, to science as a process or science as the product of that process. Therefore, the question posed by the title of this article has many dimensions and lends itself to a multifaceted approach. The approach presented here, which is inevitably partial and incomplete, focuses on commercialization as a common thread.

> A historical glimpse

Historical records show that trade was an important driving force in knowledge production, use, and dissemination even before science was conceived or named as such. In particular, the development of science as a European construct benefited greatly from knowledge from distant territories, either through navigation, colonization, or conquest. Once decontextualized, this knowledge became part of the scientific corpus and, more importantly, a source of economic gain. The trade in spices, medicinal plants, and other natural products from the tropical South has contributed significantly to Europe’s economic power over the centuries.

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Historical records also show that knowledge has been produced and shared worldwide over the centuries. One illustrative example is the knowledge network relationships established by the Jewish Portuguese physician Garcia da Orta, who became famous for his extensive work on the medical use of Asian fruits and herbs, first published in Goa in 1563. Indeed, the connections Garcia da Orta made with Indian, Arab, Persian, and Turkish court physicians and with travelers who sailed to China, Indonesia, and along the East African coast were a great source of information. But Garcia da Orta was also a man of business, promoting the sale of medicinal plants and precious stones and their export to Europe. The [59 chapters of his complex and voluminous work](#) were translated and circulated in abridged form in Europe, focusing on the selection of the most useful species for medicinal and commercial purposes. Not surprisingly, since the nineteenth century, he has been portrayed as a “great man of science” and a “pioneer of tropical medicine.”

The circulation of knowledge from the Global South to the Global North has not stopped since the voyages of discovery and conquest of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This has also led to commercialization of the products of such knowledge, detached from their original roots.

> The creation of the funding machine

The historical asymmetries in the circulation of knowledge are still with us. In the age of globalization, we all, in the Global North and the Global South, contribute in varying degrees to science as we know it today: a politically and economically legitimized body of knowledge nourished by a growing international community of established practitioners. But asymmetries persist: contributions to science from the Global South have a low commercial value and are of little interest to the market. On the one hand, the products of our science are rarely used in applications of economic value in our own countries; on the other, they are largely ignored by practitioners in the Global North.

In short, our science is largely subservient to a system with the power, money, and means to decide which science “matters”: a system deeply influenced by post-World War II industrial management principles inspired by Taylorist efficiency models. The commodification of science products, scientific publishing, and its main “currency”, the impact factor, are natural consequences of the industrialization of the scientific enterprise.

Let us recall that the commercial publishing model emerged when private companies took over the journal-based publications of the learned societies, which were still the leading publishers in the first half of the last century. Those societies handed over the editorial and administrative management to commercial publishers, occasionally receiving in return remuneration to support the societies’

activities. Publishers saw the market value of this opportunity for a profitable business model, a “perpetual funding machine” in the words of Robert Maxwell, and came up with an ambitious arrangement. Accordingly, scientists would do all the substantive work, not just producing the content – the raw material – but also serving as editors and reviewing other authors’ manuscripts. More recently, this was extended to all the typing and formatting of the manuscripts, which had to be delivered “camera-ready” before the Internet era, are now delivered “upload-ready” to the journal platform. What more could the publishing industry ask for?

> A glimpse of the present

There was indeed more to come. The commercialization of research production has been accompanied by the creation of bibliometric and scientometric services and their promotion as indicators of “good performance” (of both individuals and institutions). This has contributed to the continuous expansion of scientific activity since the end of the Second World War.

However, this expansion, driven by business and focused on productivity, has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in the quality and relevance of science; some analysts even speak of the stagnation of science. This is particularly true of the fundamental frontier research that underpins applications within and beyond science, as well as modern technologies. Moreover, the market created by bibliometric incentives, combined with the adoption of the Open Access “gold” model, has allowed a handful of large companies to form a transnational oligopoly responsible for around 75% of published papers. These companies now enter into commercial agreements at the institutional or national level, at prices that are increasing year by year beyond the rate of inflation and the budgetary possibilities of academic institutions. This results in a significant drain on public finances.

It is important to understand that the emergence of these large for-profit publishing corporations is not a *failure* of the hegemonic system of science, but an alternative that the system itself has strengthened to maintain its hegemonic status. If we are looking for someone to blame, we should focus on the market-dominated system that has penetrated and subverted nearly all areas of human activity, especially human creation. How else can we understand that, in art, a young US-Chinese entrepreneur pays 6.2 million US dollars for an “artwork” consisting of a banana fixed to the wall, only to eat it at a press conference to “make history”?

> Knowledge as a public good

In their analysis of the new characteristics of capitalism, Hardt and Negri show how the commons – that which be-

longs to humanity as a whole – have been enclosed by the market and financial systems. The commons are the air, water, the fruits of the earth, and all that nature provides us with; but also the results of social production, such as knowledge, languages, and information. As these latter resources are socially produced, they belong to all of us; and yet, due to their commodification, the vast majority of the population cannot access them.

Scientific knowledge is a public good insofar as greater access does not diminish its value for anyone; on the contrary, it enriches us. In principle, it is to be of high quality and trustworthy in order to generate broad public support for scientific activity and its products – although, in practice, we are far from this ideal.

When discussing the management of the commons, Elinor Ostrom does not differentiate between natural and immaterial resources, such as knowledge. In both cases, she argues that the capacity of individuals to manage resources varies depending on the possibilities and willingness of the community to govern itself by adopting a set of agreements and rules of the game.

> **Decommercializing science publishing to retain ownership and control dissemination**

Following Ostrom's arguments, academic communities must be willing to manage themselves; specifically, to re-

gain control over the publication of knowledge products. In this respect, Latin America is setting a good example for the world since most of our scientific journals are published by academic not-for-profit institutions. What is needed is for public policies to correct the contradictory practice of favoring commercial publications and to prevent our scientific knowledge-producing communities, financed with nations' public resources, from continuing to respond at the beck and call of the publishing oligopoly.

Publication free of charge for both authors and readers has been the dominant practice in Latin America since before the term "diamond" Open Access was introduced in the Global North and adopted in the Global South. It ensures that the academy retains ownership of the knowledge it generates and takes control of its dissemination, establishing the channels and ways of making it accessible.

Decommercializing science may be a tall order as it will require, among other things, a significant shift in mindsets regarding the social value and purpose of science. Decommercializing the publishing enterprise, which is part of the problem, is more realistic, although it requires concerted action by policymakers and the scientific community. Some institutions are taking initial steps in the right direction by canceling subscriptions to giant for-profit publishers or changing their academic evaluation criteria. But this is only the beginning. ■

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> Citizen Science and a New Rights Agenda

by **Sarita Albagli**, Brazilian Institute of Information in Science and Technology (IBICT) and Institute of Citizen Science, Brazil



Credit: TL Furrer, 2017, on iStock.

Citizen science has expanded in the last two decades, gaining visibility in the public policies of different countries and agendas of international organizations. It dialogues with other activities and approaches, such as community science, participatory science, and public engagement in science. Citizen science encompasses various conceptions, practices, methodologies, and topics. It is a polysemic term that allows for different interpretations and definitions depending on who mobilizes it and their motivations, objectives, perspectives, and backgrounds. Therefore, it has a situated character depending on local contexts and conditions. It can start either as a scientific project seeking social contributions or as a group or community initiative that may seek support or certification from scientific teams.

> The pragmatic and democratic perspectives

It is worth asking from the outset: “Citizen science: for what, for whom, and, above all, under what conditions?”

We can observe two major perspectives of citizen science projects, which are not necessarily opposed: they can be complementary.

On the one hand, from a more pragmatic point of view, citizen science is motivated by mobilizing non-scientists to collect and eventually analyze data to reduce costs and improve the speed and scope of research results. Science increasingly demands large volumes of heterogeneous and territorially dispersed data, which implies that relying solely on scientific teams may not be sufficient in many cases.

On the other hand, citizen science has been called upon to give visibility and recognition to the knowledge and perspectives of different social groups to bring new insights into science and make novel contributions to problem-solving and social innovation. This version expresses a more democratic perspective of citizen science, which requires respecting the slow pace of listening and giving porosity to the dialogue between different types of knowl-
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edge. It involves a bottom-up and participatory approach as well as co-production methodologies.

> Institutionalization and diversity

One challenge is to ensure the long-term sustainability of citizen science projects, considering the plurality of points of view. On the one hand, this requires that citizen science be acknowledged and rewarded by research evaluation and funding systems. On the other, it is necessary to avoid institutional models that create rigid criteria for what defines a project as citizen science and can inhibit its diversity, openness, and innovativeness. We need to allow for an understanding of this approach to science as a concept and process that are under construction and constantly changing.

Different types of initiatives do not necessarily call themselves citizen science, but they can be understood as part of this field. In Latin America, there is vast accumulated experience in participatory approaches and methodologies in research and education. This is attested to by the pioneering work of the Colombian sociologist Orlando Fals Borda and the Brazilian educator Paulo Freire.

In Brazil, citizen science initiatives have been attracting increasing attention since the end of the first decade of this century. In 2021, the Brazilian Citizen Science Network (RBCC) was created, and today, it brings together more than 400 participants. In April 2022, the [citizen science platform Cívica](#) was launched by the Brazilian Institute of Information in Science and Technology (IBICT). Cívica has registered more than 200 citizen science initiatives and projects in Latin America, more than half of which are in Brazil. There are citizen science initiatives that attract people interested in science as a hobby or leisure activity on topics such as bird watching (see [Wikiaves](#)); communities affected by socio-environmental disasters that produce data with the support of university teams that help them fight for their rights (see “[Que Lama é Essa](#)”: What mud is this?); projects that mobilize citizen science in actions for environmental protection (see [Blue Change Initiative](#)) and to protect the quality of marine and coastal environments, among many other examples.

> Citizen science as open science

Citizen science is currently part of the open science movement. What is at stake is not merely the quantitative dimension of openness, focused on access, but its qualitative aspect – the kind of knowledge we want to produce, which means openness to a diversity of points of view. This implies that its practices and methods go beyond open access and open data principles and protocols. Considering the unequal positions and hierarchies among the heterogeneity of actors who participate in these initiatives is important. Therefore, open data requires more than FAIR principles, that is, that data be findable, accessible, interoperable, and reusable. It

also involves attention to the CARE principles proposed by Indigenous peoples: collective benefit, authority to control, responsibility, and ethics. It is necessary to adopt, whenever relevant, protocols for prior, free, and informed consent, means for the return of research results to the participants, and tools for the fair and equitable sharing of benefits.

Open infrastructures are also crucial, considering citizen science projects’ growing use of digital tools, such as mobile phone applications, recording, measuring, sensing devices, and digital platforms. While these devices enable increased production and data recording in a decentralized manner, they also pose risks of data extraction and exploitation. This is part of the emerging Platform Economy – or rather Platform Capitalism – threatening data sovereignty, that is, our ability and autonomy to make decisions about the production and use of our data. Such platforms usually have user-friendly interfaces but little transparency about their operating and profitability strategies. The growing use of artificial intelligence creates opportunities but also risks. At the same time, digital exclusion persists, affecting several regions and social groups who remain without adequate access to the Internet and become vulnerable to big tech companies.

These aspects and their respective safeguards must be considered in citizen science projects.

> Citizen science in conflictive arenas

It has been argued that we need citizen science to contribute towards tackling the current planetary socio-environmental crisis. However, building a “common future” is not necessarily consensual or peaceful. The causes and consequences of the crisis are unevenly distributed across countries, regions, and social segments. Tackling them often involves divergent and conflicting positions regarding worldviews and development styles. There are disputes, sometimes violent, between environmental protection and nature exploitation forces, particularly in scenarios of high social inequality and political vulnerability. To what extent does the pressure for alternative development styles lead science to be permeable to other values and practices or even motivate paradigmatic shifts in science power structures?

Many point out that Western scientific paradigms have promoted invisibility and created obstacles to developing and recognizing other and more diverse scientific trajectories and types of knowledge that could allow for paths leading to more sustainable development. In this context, a set of counter-hegemonic views concerning knowledge and science has emerged, expressing, in Michel Foucault’s words, a true “insurrection of subjugated knowledges.” They originate from various lines of thought stemming from inspiring social movements – from environmentalism to feminist and queer theories, anti-racist, postcolonial, decolonial, and subaltern studies, the pedagogy of the op-

pressed, the ecology of knowledge, and the epistemologies of the Global South.

Those who propound such lines of thought have sought to make visible the worldviews and epistemic frameworks of traditional and indigenous peoples, groups at risk and vulnerable populations, socially stigmatized groups, lay expertise or experiential knowledge and peripheral science. The goal is to value their role in confronting the present planetary crisis. They propose promoting what they consider to be cognitive justice, paradigm shifts, and border thinking, among other terms.

> **A dialogical relationship between science and society to counter disinformation**

In these scenarios, the role of citizen science is not limited to filling data gaps to monitor the achievement of sustainable development goals. Citizen science has been led to dialogue with those lines of thought and action, promoting interaction between different onto-epistemic bases – different ways of living and ways of knowing – and making visible knowledge practices with a more balanced connection with the sustainability of

life. Citizen science has also been a means for scientific and environmental education, contributing to a more dialogical relationship between science and society. This has gained importance due to disinformation and campaigns discrediting science, such as climate denial and anti-vaccine campaigns, with the spread of fake news and fake science.

Citizen science can be an opportunity to strengthen citizenship, especially for those otherwise excluded from it. The notion of citizenship is reinterpreted, giving centrality to more horizontal relationships between the different actors and spaces of knowledge. Citizen science may offer tools to support data and cognitive activism to expand social influence on territorial management and public policies. This means including a new rights agenda, especially the “right to research”.

This is a crucial issue if we want to promote broad dialogue within and beyond science. Such conversations indicate development from ethics of coexistence between different epistemological matrices towards a perspective of polyphony, of communication in its original etymological sense of “becoming common.” ■

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> Rethinking Open Science: Towards Care for Equity and Inclusion

by **Ismael Ràfols**, UNESCO Chair in Diversity and Inclusion in Global Science, Leiden University, The Netherlands, INGENIO, University of Basque Country (CSIC-UPV), and Universitat Politècnica de València, Spain



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> Growing pains: more Open Science is exacerbating its contradictions

Open Science (OS) represents a new mode of doing science based on cooperative work and new ways of sharing knowledge, often through digital technologies or other collaborative tools. Also, as expressed in a UNESCO Recommendation in 2021, there is hope that OS will “serve to widen access to scientific knowledge for the benefit of science

and society and [...] promote opportunities for innovation and participation in the creation of scientific knowledge and the sharing of its benefits” ([UNESCO, 2023](#)).

Given these potential benefits, activities such as open-access publications, data sharing, and citizen science have been promoted and have gained ground, particularly over the last decade. However, recent analyses of OS have found some worrying trends: yes, OS is spreading, but it is doing so in a way that questions expectations

that it may lead to more equity and enhance the societal impact of science.

Overall, one gets the impression that something has gone wrong with the current modes of developing OS: on the one hand, [current Open Science is leading to more inequity](#) and on the other, [the societal impact of the current ways of doing Open Science is unclear or limited](#).

First, on inequity, researchers in rich universities and countries (as is my case) now have the privilege of being relatively more visible than colleagues in poor-resource contexts, because our institutions can pay (often expensive) fees to publish via Open Access. While this makes some knowledge accessible, it goes against the basic principle that scientific contributions should be judged and made visible according to their scholarly merit, not because of the wealth of the authors. Therefore, many stakeholders believe that the pay-to-publish model (what used to be called “gold” or hybrid OS) is corrupting the research system. This model also undermines publishers with “diamond” Open Access (free to publish and read), [particularly in regions like Latin America and Eastern Europe](#). As a result, [even in Western Europe the tide is shifting from pay-to-publish to institutional support to diamond Open Access journals](#).

Second, [according to a recent review](#), so far there is little understanding of the societal benefits of OS. However, current evidence does suggest that citizen science and other participatory approaches, such as interactions with policymakers and stakeholders, are the main ways research contributes via social arenas. In other words, social impact seldom happens via papers or data, but mainly through social interactions that mediate the “transfer” of knowledge back and forth between societal actors and researchers. These findings question the current focus on investment in technological platforms of many OS policies.

Following these insights, I will argue that the conceptualization and promotion of OS need to be rethought to serve the goal of providing epistemic justice.

> **Open Science as a transformation, but in which direction?**

As we have seen, two main drivers exist for the development of OS. First, the digitalization of information has brought about new methods for producing, communicating, and storing scientific knowledge. Second, the expectation that these new methods would facilitate science–society interactions has been associated with critiques of the social impact of science and the hope of making research more responsive to societal needs, demands, and aspirations.

[Very different agendas for OS implementation have been developed](#) depending on why we pursue OS and what we

believe OS can accomplish. Some of the visions focus more on efficiency gains within the research system, others on the development of platform technologies, on widening access to information, or are concerned primarily with participation. While, in principle, these visions were expected to run in parallel and complement each other, implementation has brought out tensions and contradictory dynamics.

[If we understand OS as transformation of the research system](#), each vision of OS pushes research in a direction incompatible with other visions. For example, the development of OS in terms of information platforms very often enters into tension with OS as inclusion and participation, since some sections of the global population do not enjoy a context or have the capacities that allow them to participate via these platforms. Or, for example, more Open Access via a pay-to-publish model is antagonistic to OS in terms of equity (because researchers in low-resource contexts cannot pay) and integrity (because the rigor of the review systems of [some pay-to-publish journals, such as Frontiers or MDPI, is questionable](#)).

In summary, there is not one OS future to be reached but disparate potential futures that would lead to certain types of OS but not others. The question to be asked is thus *not about the extent of progress towards more OS* but about *what types of OS are developed and adopted, by whom, and with what consequences*.

[Philip Mirowski, a political economist of science](#), has warned that mainstream OS, associated with information infrastructure, is closely associated with “platform capitalism” (cf. the “surveillance capitalism” of Shoshana Zuboff) and involves dangers similar to those of social media such as Google and Facebook: control of public research information at different stages of the research process (from lab notes to publications to evaluation analytics) by oligopolistic companies such as Elsevier, Clarivate or Springer-Nature with the power to shape collective behavior and visions of science. Those companies, often with the support of US and European policies (e.g., the early Plan S), are not only extracting wealth from the Global South, but are in a position to [produce representations of science that may reinforce Global North hegemonies](#) in terms of making its main scientific issues, disciplines, languages, values, and cultural perspectives more visible.

Nevertheless, in parallel and friction with these platforms, collective initiatives are being developed both in the Global South and the Global North that offer alternatives for diverse and inclusive OS trajectories; for example, [La Referencia](#), [Participatory Research in Asia](#), [the Public Knowledge Project](#), or the [Barcelona Declaration](#). The question remains as to which are more aligned with epistemic justice within the alternative OS futures.

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> Open Science by whom? Open Science for whom?

The 2021 UNESCO Recommendation on OS has been crucial in redefining OS by establishing equity and collective benefits as key values of the directions to be pursued. Building on the principle in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that: “Everyone has the right freely to participate [...] and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits”, the Recommendation sees science as a global public good, and the “openness” in OS, as the means by which to make knowledge genuinely public and global.

However, [as argued by Michel Callon](#), science is not a conventional public good because substantive investment in capacities is required to participate not only in its production but also in its reproduction, maintenance, and use. Any citizen can potentially breathe clean air (a public good) with no special effort and without even necessarily being aware of it. However, to participate in producing and using scientific knowledge, previous knowledge, and complementary resources and capabilities are indispensable.

For example, concerning expertise: we may have access to scientific publications on cancer. Even so, in the event of a diagnosis, only experts can use those scientific papers to decide on the appropriate therapies. The rest of us need to rely on reports aimed at a general audience; therefore, [these materials \(rather than scientific papers\) are key for knowledge sharing](#).

Concerning resources, researchers in middle–low-income countries might be assumed to have access to websites with scientific data. In practice, however, they often cannot use them because data analysis requires some infrastructure or specific personnel that they cannot afford; in the worst scenarios, they may have [expensive, poor, or blocked \(due to sanctions\) internet connections](#).

In short, scientific information accessible online often cannot be mobilized for good purposes, particularly in the Global South. Making scientific products (articles, data, software, etc.) openly accessible can benefit organizations and companies that have strong capabilities and resources. Even so, targeted efforts of “transfer” and adaptation

are needed for this knowledge to reach and benefit most populations in the world. Just making knowledge electronically accessible favors mainly those who already have access and does not foster participation or sharing in the benefits of science for much of the world population. This is why the direction that OS is taking by focusing on free access to scientific products is not leading to more equity and epistemic justice.

> Contextualizing openness: from ‘access to outputs’ to ‘connections’

Despite all this, alternative forms of doing OS can lead to equity and impact. The [Open and Collaborative Science in Development Network \(OCSDNet\)](#), led by Leslie Chan, made the case that [openness needs to be contextualized](#). It is only in a specific context that researchers and stakeholders can develop the specific forms of participation and communication that render scientific knowledge valuable to specific social groups, e.g., marginalized social communities.

This contextualization cannot be achieved simply by focusing on making research products digitally accessible. Instead, as [Sabina Leonelli has argued in a recent book](#), the focus should be on knowledge exchange processes between researchers and social communities. These processes will often benefit from open access to digital products. Nonetheless, the particular forms and platforms used will vary depending on the participants in a given knowledge exchange process.

The movement for Open Science has offered the promise of epistemic justice. Many activists think that private actors, [mainly oligopolistic publishers, have hijacked current developments](#), but perhaps so too have large research infrastructures in powerful disciplines (e.g., genomics and high energy physics). To regain its emancipatory power and care for equity and inclusion, OS needs to redefine itself, not in terms of products and technological platforms (so many of which are owned by industry or “big science”), but in the very processes of knowledge exchange in more humble settings across a much more comprehensive range of human communities. ■

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> Polarization and Political Conflict: Insights from Latin America

by **Gabriel Kessler**, Conicet-UNLP/UNSAM, Argentina, and **Gabriel Vommaro**, Conicet-UNSAM, Argentina

| Credit: Matheus Ribs, [@o.ribs](#), 2021



Latin America has been experiencing a period of growing discontent and social and political conflict since 2019, aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, as discussed by [Gabriela Benza](#) and [Gabriel Kessler](#). The leftist forces that had fanned the winds of change at the beginning of the twenty-first century became the “establishment” to be challenged. At the same time, the emergence of right-wing opposition presaged a political turnaround; but this shift did not occur. Political discontent has grown in Latin America since the end of the commodity boom and has deepened with the pandemic. Expressions of this include massive protests, changes in electoral behavior, negative attitudes

toward democracy, and the emergence of radical right-wing proposals.

Against this background, there are two questions we wish to address. How is conflict organized in different countries? What are the consequences and challenges of these conflicts for democracy in the region? To answer these and other questions, the Polarization, Democracy, and Rights in Latin America ([POLDER](#)) project, funded by the Ford Foundation, conducted comprehensive comparative research in five countries (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, and Mexico) between 2021 and 2023, using mixed methods.

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Based on our research, we argue that, after the end of the commodity boom, social conflict in Latin America can be framed under three types of scenarios: **ideological polarization with affective components, polarization around an emerging leader, and generalized discontent**. These three types are dynamic and do not follow a pre-established sequence, as shown in Figure 1.

Scenarios of discontent in contemporary Latin America




Figure 1.

> Analyzing three cases: Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico

Among the countries studied within POLDER, Argentina and Brazil are cases of ideological polarization, as is Uruguay. There is generalized discontent in Colombia, as there is, with nuances, in Peru and Ecuador. The cases of polarization around a leader are those of Mexico under Andrés Manuel López Obrador and El Salvador under Nayib Bukele. We will consider three cases to illustrate these scenarios.

In Brazil, polarization began in the first decade of this century with a “left turn” built around a solid socio-political coalition comprising an alliance between the Worker’s Party (PT in Portuguese), unions, and social movements. The PT governments, as [Singer](#) argues, laid out redistributive policies together with progressive cultural, gender, and human rights policies. [Samuels and Zucco](#) show that when Bolsonaro emerged on the electoral scene, he managed to represent a dispersed and heterogeneous electorate that was brought together both by their rejection of the PT and, as also proposed by [Santos and Tanscheit](#) and [Rennó](#), by their disagreement with a mainstream right wing that did not fully represent cultural and economic unrest against Lula and his party.

In Colombia, [Botero, Losada and Wills-Otero](#) demonstrated that Álvaro Uribe emerged in 2002 as an authoritarian alternative to traditional party candidates (despite being a Liberal Party leader). Within the frame of “democratic security,” he built a successful party brand based on hard-line policies on domestic armed conflict. The 2016 refer-

endum on the peace accords was characterized by a high degree of electoral polarization and by a strategic joining of those opposed to the accords and religious conservatives. However, the non-partisan nature of the vote hindered the consolidation of socio-political coalitions likely to frame different agendas for voters. In 2018, a leftist electoral option at the national level reached the second round of the presidential elections. In 2022, this force brought its leader, Gustavo Petro, to power.

After more than 70 years of predominance of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (“Institutional Revolutionary Party”, known as the PRI), Mexico entered the twenty-first century undergoing a process of democratic opening up. A competitive system with three main electoral forces emerged: the PRI, which maintained its strength as a catch-all party with diffuse ideological components; the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN: “National Action Party”), a conservative party; and the Partido Revolucionario Democrático (PRD: “Revolutionary Democratic Party”), a center-left party. During the 2006 presidential elections, the PRD became absorbed within a new movement, this time with a solid re-foundational tone: the Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional (Morena: “National Regeneration Movement”) took in a good part of the PRD’s leaders and its rank and file. Morena’s leader, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (also known as AMLO), became president in 2018 with a discourse against the political establishment and its “privileges.” In 2024, Claudia Scheinbaum, of the same party, was elected with a high percentage of votes.

> National scenarios and discontent at the societal level

How do different national scenarios influence the structuring of discontent at the societal level? In our argument, in line with [Ken Roberts’](#) discussion of the post-neoliberal political scenario in Latin America, we see the agents of representation as providing the frameworks within which society organizes discontent. For example, in the case of Brazil, [Kessler, Miskolci and Vommaro](#) show that PT voters have progressive positions on cultural and economic issues. Bolsonaro voters are more conservative along both dimensions. In scenarios of generalized discontent towards political elites, parties organize the electoral scene but are weak agents of representation and, therefore, do not organize the conflict at the societal level. This is the case in Colombia, where [Kessler et al.](#) show that electoral preference and ideological positions are weakly correlated. When a polarized scenario centers on a leader, this polarization operates at the electoral level but does not organize preferences and demands within society’s principal agendas. As in Colombia, electoral preference and ideological positions are weakly correlated in Mexico.

The three scenarios we have defined also have implications for different dimensions of structuring conflict. The

first obvious impact is on the politicization of agendas at the societal level. There is a correlation between a high level of polarization and a greater interest in politics. Opinions are clearly in line with votes. These ideas are related to the frameworks offered by socio-political coalitions. Brazil has more arguments and language about rights and less based on individual criteria. In both Mexico and Brazil, there is more interest in politics and more consumption of political information. On the other hand, Colombia is the least politicized case, with greater weight given to religious frameworks and less consumption of political information.

Second, there are implications for the ideological alignment of discontent. High levels of alignment imply that the frameworks organizing positions on agendas follow the left–right division (with its national particularities), generally associated with the main competing socio-political coalitions. In Brazil, where there is ideological polarization, an ideological boundary between voters of the two competing options can be identified. In Colombia, generalized discontent prevails. The lack of opportunities and the negative view of elites generate the perception of an uneven playing field: everything is set up by the elites only for their own benefit. This idea of an uneven playing field generates apathy and anger. In Mexico, the critical factor is moral and calls into question the protagonists of Mexico’s recent history, particularly concerning corruption and privileges.

The degree and content of affective polarization also vary in the three scenarios. Brazil exhibits the highest levels of moral disqualification of the adversary with ideological polarization. Thus, affective polarization feeds back into ideological alignments instead of supplanting them. A clear

contrast can be observed in Colombia, where the negative view of the other only emerges among small, hard-core groups of voters. In Mexico, meanwhile, ideological alignment is also diffuse. Still, the figure of AMLO could either give rise to an ideological reordering of society or become a less durable experience of populist interpellation.

> Conceptualization of scenarios and polarized situations

The dynamic character of our conceptualization of scenarios has implications for polarized situations. Polarization is known to have unequal effects on democratic vitality. It organizes discontent and creates high levels of politicization, but it also generates a great deal of animosity at the societal level.

Scenarios of polarization around an emerging leader can provide room for the growth of authoritarian orientations. This has not been the case in Mexico, where the presidency of Claudia Scheinbaum seems to augur a deepening of democracy. However, other cases of emerging leaders promising to transform long-standing discontent into hope for change may be worrying signs of illiberal democracies, as can be seen with Bukele in El Salvador, or a turn to the far right with an uncertain future, typified by Milei in Argentina.


Finally, cases of generalized discontent seem most common in Latin America. The dissatisfaction with democracy, the low level of participation in elections, and the difficulty for society to transform its dissatisfaction into transformative action point to a scenario of high political volatility with no clear horizon for change. ■

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> Haiti: The Twilight of a State

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Credit: USMC, 1922, by Richard from USA, on Openverse.

According to the usual logic, terror is an instrument of oppression used by authoritarian powers to subjugate the population and reinforce their hold on public opinion. In Haiti today, terror is not used to consolidate power, but is a consequence of the absence of power. The loss of the monopoly of legitimate violence has led to a dispersal into the hands of venal individuals of the regal function of ensuring the security of citizens. At the same time, the oppressed strata of society, who have long suffered from social and cultural exclusion and an unequal distribution of wealth, are faced with a sense of disenchantment that has given rise to antisocial and violent movements: gangs. Their firepower is such that the state is unable to defeat them.

> Assassination, impunity, and fear

On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in the presence of his wife and children. According to witnesses, the victim was tortured before being shot dead with an automatic weapon: twelve bullets for one man. It could be the title of a B movie. Adding to this outburst of violence is the appalling ease with which the killers were able to escape with no bother at all. It was only when they returned to their bases that the perpetrators were apprehended. Clearly, they felt so confident of their impunity that they did not hide or even conceal their weapons. How did they manage to enter the presidential residence

without encountering the slightest obstacle? This question is just as important as the motive behind the crime. The assassins were able to enter and leave the President's residence without causing any alarm or reaction from the agents responsible for the head of state's security. The execution was a mafia-style operation, which also acted as a warning for witnesses to keep a low profile.

> Questionable elections, constant clashes, and the breakdown of law and order

At the time of his assassination, President Moïse was already an unloved figure. Elected in 2016, he took office after an electoral process marked by numerous irregularities, forcing the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) to go back to the drawing board twice. The CEP, which was accused of corruption and massive misappropriation of public funds under the Petrocaribe program, continues to influence government decisions, and is seen as a stand-in for the presidency. Sporadic demonstrations have taken place to demand accountability in the use of public funds allocated for rebuilding the capital after the earthquake of January 12, 2010, which caused material losses with a value estimated at over \$9 billion and left more than 250,000 people dead or missing.

The demonstrations generally start out from the capital's poor neighborhoods and spread to the affluent districts of Pétion-Ville, where the people with money and power reside. Although at first they are peaceful, the protests often degenerate into ransacking of stores, looting of warehouses and acts of vandalism often targeting street vendors.

Between 2016 and 2018, Port-au-Prince experienced clashes between demonstrators and police, during which exchanges of gunfire left many anonymous victims dead. Meanwhile, the murdering of opponents does not result in arrests or any form of trial of the perpetrators. The head of state, himself a proponent of strong-arm tactics to get rid of his opponents, would eventually perish by the sword that he had used to suppress demonstrators in the streets. Power that relies solely on the services of outside infiltrators and obeys no democratic mandate to maintain public order, is doomed to disappear. The use of militias and criminal gangs to maintain law and order reflects a drift towards a mafia style of governance that has gradually led

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to drug smugglers taking the lead in operations designed to demonstrate the authority of the state.

> Riots, gangs, and murder on demand

To ensure the safety of government personnel and secure the most important routes around the country and points of entry (ports, airports and border crossings), the use of private service providers has served as a Trojan horse for arms dealers, who have been able to move in all the more easily since the Haitian army was disbanded in 1995. In March 2018, a massacre took place in La Saline, one of the capital's most deprived neighborhoods and the starting point for many anti-government protests. More than 80 people were murdered by gang leader Jimmy Chérizier's henchmen. Some were butchered and grilled, retrospectively justifying the nickname of "Barbecue" that Chérizier had been given back when his mother sold grilled sausages on the city's sidewalks. To date, no arrests have been made, nor has there been any public inquiry, while the victims' relatives keep silent, for fear of reprisals.

In July 2018, protests intensified, and the government was faced with riots and barricaded streets. Despite the general discrediting of the state and the week-long blockade of the capital's main roads, the government managed to hold on to power, but at the cost of a bloody crackdown orchestrated by the gangs. In poor neighborhoods, macabre scenes proliferated. Civilians found themselves at the mercy of armed gangs who murdered, raped and set fire to dwellings without any intervention from the police. Between 2018 and 2021, opponents of the government were systematically murdered, with no consequences for the perpetrators. Monferrier Dorval was assassinated on August 28, 2020, and Antoinette Duclair on June 29, 2021. The former was a lawyer and President of the Port-au-Prince Bar Association who was an expert constitutionalist and contested the legitimacy of the President's proposal to amend the constitution by referendum. The latter was a journalist who was critical of the government. Both were assassinated in circumstances that remain unclear but suggest that it was by order of the Palace.

This is the backdrop against which President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated. Ariel Henry, as Prime Minister, took the reins but his power was immediately challenged by supporters of his predecessor who had been dismissed just two days before the murder. From July 2021 until his downfall in February 2024, Henry's government watched helplessly as 80% of the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area was taken over by armed gangs in a criminal alliance called "Viv Ansanm" with a firepower totaling over 600,000 combat weapons. Jimmy Chérizier, who rules this cartel of mobsters with an iron fist, launched his first attacks against the central government in January 2024. To justify his actions, the gang leader adopts pseudo-revolutionary language. While wreaking havoc in the capital's poorest neighborhoods (Bel Air, Delmas, Grand Ravine, etc.), the bandits claim to be defenders of the oppressed.

> The rise of the warlords and the Presidential Transitional Council

Faced with the authoritarian drift of an ineffective and corrupt government, a section of the opposition chose February 2024 to call for the Prime Minister's resignation. When heavy-handed police intervention failed to discourage the demonstrators, private militias were brought in to assist the forces of order. The government uses militiamen as auxiliaries who follow no code of conduct, much less any code of honor. The militias commit massacres in poor neighborhoods and drive the desperate inhabitants out of the areas under their control. Now acting as soldiers with no masters, former gang leaders have turned into warlords, laying down their own law in the outskirts of the city. The names of Izo, Lanmò Sanjou, Tilapli, Chen Mechan and Barbecue have become as familiar as those of key government ministers. Meanwhile, the government is gradually losing control of the gangs it has helped to establish.

The gangs stormed symbolic centers of power, giving rise to fears that Barbecue might take over the national palace. The destabilization of the state was such that armed bandits prevented the Prime Minister from returning to Haiti after travelling abroad, and he was forced to resign. His defeat, besides offering an opportunity to remove incompetence, reflected the collapse of the authority of the state. This explains why Barbecue, in his public statements, is now demanding direct participation in power within the framework of the Presidential Transitional Council set up on April 30, 2024. His pseudo-revolutionary rhetoric resonates with some young people who have become disoriented by the drift of political power towards criminality.

> A nation adrift

The degree of disillusionment is commensurate with the scale of inequality and the difficulty in finding a solution to extreme wealth disparities. Some 20% of Haiti's population concentrates 65% of national wealth, while the poorest 20% share only 1%. It is as if the time for revolution had come, but the majority refused to join the movement, leaving a minority of zealots to express their rejection of an unequal and cynical system with both words and fire. The working masses from the suburbs, too preoccupied with their day-to-day survival, have no time for demonstrations. As for the middle class, wiped out by exile (with 85% of those holding a Master's degree or higher degree living outside the country), it has not joined the protests either, for fear of the violence perpetrated by an infuriated mob.

From its position of systemic precariousness at the top of a social pyramid dangerously swollen at its base, the oligarchy is increasingly confused with an underworld with which it associates in order to continue to exist. Many businessmen and politicians (including senators and deputies) are involved in trafficking of all kinds. Whether on the land border with the

Dominican Republic, the sea border with Jamaica, or the air border with the continental Caribbean states (Florida, Colombia, Panama), Haiti is at the center of a network linked to the illicit arms and drug economy. This network has ended up taking root in the political, economic and social fabric of Haiti, to the point where it has infested the public arena.

> Comings and goings, and remaining outside

The Armed Forces of Haiti were disbanded by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide on his return from exile in 1994. After a decade marked by an increase in violence, the country enjoyed a relative period of calm between 2004 and 2017, thanks to the presence of a UN mission. MINUSTAH, with over 10,000 soldiers and police officers, contributed to pacifying the capital's most troubled districts, but at an often-bloody cost. The "pacification" carried out by the Brazilian military police in particular has left its mark on memories and walls. The National Police, which could count on only 10,000 serving officers in 2018, is said to be down to just 7,000 due to defections of personnel attracted by the facilities temporarily offered by the US government for visa-free emigration to the United States.

There are reportedly several hundred gangs in the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area. In February 2024, they federated under the banner of Viv Ansanm, headed by Jimmy Chérizier (aka Barbecue), and as I have said, stormed the seats of power. After attacking the national penitentiary, freeing several thousand inmates, including criminals serving long prison sentences, they went on to attack schools, police stations, churches, libraries and temples. They literally came to a halt at the palace steps, as the Champ de Mars, the heart of power in the capital, became a battlefield, literally and figuratively.

The "outer country" (that is, the provinces) is relatively untouched by gang violence. Unlike the capital, where it's easier to go unnoticed, in the provinces, neighborhood vigilance remains a barrier to the expression of certain antisocial tendencies and crime finds a hostile breeding ground as community solidarity still works against intruders.

Shanty neighborhoods have become lawless areas, where racketeering, theft and rape have become the rule. The urban exodus has emptied these neighborhoods of their inhabitants, who seek refuge in the provinces.

The more affluent neighborhoods have not been affected, but the wealthy remain on the alert: they are the target of hostage takers who lie in wait for them along the main roads.

In this context, no country seems willing to provide assistance to Haiti, for fear of being dragged into the spiral of

violence that seems to be sweeping the country away. The Dominicans, who are most directly threatened, are building more than 160 kilometers of wall on a border just over 370 km long. The Cubans are out of the picture, because of the US embargo imposed on their country since 1962. The United States – the only country in a position to significantly influence the situation – is doing nothing to stem the arms trafficking reaching the country from Florida. As I have said, there are reportedly over 600,000 combat weapons in circulation in Haiti. The US opted instead to call on Kenya to lead the peace mission, which the UN can no longer take on due to the lack of Security Council consensus.

In the face of globalized crime, Haiti stands on the front line of democratization. The country is left alone to deal with mafia-like networks and criminal associations, which have strong footholds in Florida, South America and on the island of Hispaniola. They also have the capacity to mobilize financial and human resources that the state lacks.

> Disenchanted solitude

Underlying the sporadic unrest that marked the end of Jovenel Moïse's term of office is the profound exasperation of a population mired in structural misery. More than a third of the population lives below the poverty line. Remittances from the diaspora, amounting to \$4 billion a year, provide for the most basic food needs, but the country does not produce enough goods or services to do without official development assistance, which accounts for a third of the government's budget. The state survives thanks to this double infusion of migrant remittances and budgetary aid from friendly countries, but at a time when international donors have other priorities to push, its lot does not look bright. Increased inflation in the period 2010-2020, and the resulting erosion of purchasing power for the poorest, have thrown the most vulnerable onto the streets. Young people from the underprivileged neighborhoods of Cité Soleil, Canaan, Pernier and Carrefour, lacking education and prospects for the future, have fallen prey to radicalized politicians who use them as human shields in the most violent demonstrations, and to gangs who recruit them to commit the most brutal acts of violence.

In the dialectics of class struggle, the marginalized have, on a territorial level, won the battle. Thugs, who already controlled the poorest neighborhoods of the capital, have extended their hold over the city center and the main traffic routes to the provinces, covering more than 85% of the Port-au-Prince Metropolitan Area. The collapse of the state is the result of this criminal logic. Taken to extremes, terror as practiced and staged on social networks by the gangs has led to a collapse of the rule of law in Haiti. ■

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> Mapping Conflicts Related to ‘Green’ Extraction in the Americas

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In a [recent publication](#) we examined a mapping process that was co-produced by researchers from the Global Atlas of Environmental Justice (EJAtlas), Mining Watch Canada, affected communities and social organizations, to document how the extraction of metals and minerals deemed critical for green growth and the associated energy and digital transition is expanding and generating impacts and resistance in the Americas. The paper examines some of the mechanisms and discourses shaping the politics of the expansion of “green” extraction frontiers and explores how such processes are bringing tension to both globalization and de-globalization (“onshoring” or “reshoring”) dynamics.

We documented 25 large-scale mining conflicts related to lithium, copper and graphite extraction in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Panama, Mexico, the US and Canada: nine countries spanning the Americas. More than 30 organizations and a dozen researchers contributed to that collaborative effort. Participants brought different knowledge, experiences and skills to co-produce the case stories and develop a featured map within the Global Atlas of Environmental Justice.



> An extractivist transition

In 2020, the World Bank estimated that over the next 30 years, it would be necessary to extract 3 billion tons of minerals and metals to drive the global energy transition and avoid a rise in global temperature of over 2°C. The demand for metals and minerals such as copper, graphite, nickel, zinc, chromium, manganese, lithium, cobalt or rare earths is currently booming in order to supply the development of technologies and infrastructures such as power grids, electric vehicles, solar and wind energies, batteries, etc. Hegemonic energy and digital transition scenarios are marked by the urgency to extract an unprecedented volume of highly diverse metals and minerals.

The urgency exhibited by governments and private-sector actors to secure a wide range of metals and minerals as well as their supply chains is accelerating the continuous expansion of extraction frontiers, exacerbating extractive pressures and fueling resistance in the Global South as well as fostering extraction conflicts in industrialized economies. Extractive tensions are particularly relevant in the Americas: continents that contain, as documented by the US Geological Survey, a significant share of known global reserves of copper, lithium, rare earths, nickel and graphite. Together, these two continents already extract large shares of copper and lithium, among other materials deemed critical. For some decades now, Latin America has been the destination of about a third of worldwide mining investments.

> The Decarbonization Consensus

It is the mainstream global energy transition pathways leading to decarbonization and energy security that are driving this new global commodities boom. Breno Bringel and Maristella Svampa propose the concept of “[decarbonization consensus](#)” to frame the emerging capitalist

Source: Prepared by Y. Deniau.

Note: The figure shows the 25 cases documented and the commodities involved. The grey dots represent other resistance movements related with transition metals and minerals mapped in the EJAtlas that were not part of this mapping effort.



Credit: Matheus Ribs, [@o.ribs](#), 2021

agreement to transition from fossil fuels to a reduced carbon emission economy based on lower-carbon technologies. The consensus, they argue, is based on the discourse that in order to address global warming and the climate crisis, a transition based on the electrification of production and consumption together with digitalization is needed. Nevertheless, instead of addressing the climate and socio-ecological crisis, this consensus seems to contribute to it, increasing socio-ecological inequalities, fueling the exploitation of common resources and perpetuating the commodification of nature. In fact, as pointed out by different activists and scholars (such as Lang, Hamouchène, Sandwell, Bringel and Svampa), this process is exacerbating energy colonialism and opening a new phase of environmental dispossession in the Global South.

The concept of “green extractivism” was proposed to frame the paradox whereby an environmentally destructive form of extraction and accumulation loaded with colonial legacies is promoted as the solution to the ecological and climate crisis (see Voskoboynik and Andreucci, or Zografos and Robins). There is increasing evidence of the impacts of extractive activities related to the energy and digital transition on Indigenous Peoples and their territories, biodiversity and deforestation risks, and human rights violations worldwide.

> Shifting geopolitics and (de)globalization

When considering the current expansion of “green” extractive frontiers – to supply green growth agendas and their transitions – interrelated processes can be seen to converge. The COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have led to increased concerns about the need to secure control over supply chains for critical materials and energy provision. Moreover, COVID-19 has also contributed to a serious recession and public debt, in particular in the Global South, where extractivist policies have been reinforced. In fact, social organizations have denounced the fact that COVID-19 was instrumentalized by governments and companies to advance extractive activities, putting the health of communities at risk and accelerating the approval of contested projects without adequate participation or consultation and without the possibility of effective public protest.

Different assessments of dependencies and vulnerabilities regarding critical materials and supply chains conducted by the European Union, Canada and the US point to the challenges of an unprecedented increase in the demand for metals and minerals, as well as global competition to secure the same pool of resources. Such assessments also signal the heavy dependence on third countries to access certain materials (China, in particular). Different

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domestic and international strategies are being fostered to secure the supply chains of critical materials. Moreover, governments and international institutions highlight that mines are not being developed fast enough to respond to the unprecedented increase in the forecast demand for critical materials; as a response, fast-track permitting and review processes are being promoted.

With the aim of securing critical supply chains, a series of international instruments are being developed by different countries. Unprecedented amounts in critical metal and mineral mining are being invested worldwide, including in Latin America, under China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). EU international instruments include strategic partnerships concerning raw materials, free trade agreements with special energy and raw materials chapters, or the Global Gateway. Such agreements are currently being developed with Chile, Argentina, Mexico and Canada, among other countries.

In these ways, countries are competing to control a broad range of materials to respond to supply chain vulnerabilities, geopolitical tensions, and energy and economic security aspirations, including military goals. This competition is leading to increased protectionism and resource nationalism. Moreover, the urgency to secure supply chains is accelerating the expansion of extraction (and processing) activities at both old and new sites, outside and inside industrialized economies. Mining is being revived in countries that had displaced these activities. However, the associated impacts and resistance are exacerbating tensions on both globalization (e.g., increasing supply chain disruption and contention) and deglobalization (onshoring) dynamics, thus highlighting the limits to current growth and consumption trends, as well as the potential limits of a new phase of globalization.

> Mapping the discourses and mechanisms of "green" extraction frontier expansion

The mapping process we are concerned with here documented some of the mechanisms that are shaping the expansion of "green" extractive frontiers. In the cases considered, governments, development institutions and corporations refer to the pursuit of critical material extraction projects as positive and urgent local, national (development, green transition or security) and global (climate and human salvation, mitigation or sustainability) goals. Such discourses also frame resistance to mining as selfish, irresponsible or ignorant.

However, counter-discourses also confront and subvert mainstream discourses, challenging unequal power relations and socio-environmental injustices. Socio-environmental movements and Indigenous communities claim that their territories are being turned into sacrifice zones, increasing social and health vulnerabilities and impacts on sensitive

and poorly known ecosystems, water sources and cultural heritage sites. While criminalization and violence against local protestors is recurrent in the Global South, allegations of inadequate and poor decision-making and participatory procedures occur across the Americas. In Canada and the US, fast-tracked permitting processes foster unrest.

While it is not a representative sample, 20 of the 25 mining conflicts mapped affect Indigenous Peoples. This includes four of the six cases documented in Canada and the US, which are mostly new projects. Indigenous Peoples denounce the colonial patterns that are shaping the expansion of "green" extraction frontiers, sacrificing bodies and territories while putting the natural and cultural heritage of humanity at risk, instead of saving it.

Many documented cases illustrate an expansion of extractive frontiers and socio-ecological tensions across the Americas. Numerous territories, already subjected to prolonged and intense socio-environmental pressures, are experiencing an intensification of impacts and conflicts, deepening the unjust distribution of burdens. In Andalgalá (Argentina), the Algarrobo Assembly opposes the development of the Agua Rica and La Alumbrera (MARA) copper and molybdenum project. Communities are primarily concerned about impacts on water sources and glacial and periglacial environments. These concerns stem from negative experiences with the Alumbrera mine, which operated for twenty years, causing environmental degradation, water contamination and the reduction of agricultural lands. The Alumbrera project aims to process resources from Agua Rica, located 35 kilometers away. However, the region already faces critical water shortages, leading to repeated declarations of water, environmental and agricultural emergencies. The Algarrobo Assembly denounces that the company would consume 300 million liters of water per day: over six times the amount used by the 12,600 local inhabitants. The twenty-year-old resistance movement has faced violence and criminalization. In Canada, communities opposing the North American Lithium (NAL) project cite official evidence of existing impacts and inadequate hydrogeological studies. In Chumbivilcas (Peru), Indigenous communities report serious environmental and water impacts from La Constancia copper mine. Similarly, in Chile, groups including Indigenous Peoples denounce La Escondida mine for causing continuous, permanent, cumulative and irreparable damage to the Punta Negra salt flat's underground aquifer.

Groups resisting lithium extraction argue that environmental assessments and decision-making procedures inadequately account for the cumulative impacts of various mining projects. In Argentina, the Fundación Yuchan developed a map showing multiple lithium brine projects in the Hombre Muerto salt flat. This map aimed to shift the focus from individual projects to a territorial approach, highlighting aggregated pressures on water systems – an aspect

they claim is absent in formal assessments. This broader perspective was crucial in obtaining a court ruling to halt new lithium mining licenses in March 2024. Communities argued that despite evidence of ongoing impacts on water availability, where rivers and ecosystems dry up, animals migrate or die, and livelihoods are disrupted, permits for new and expanded lithium mines continued to be granted.

The co-produced mapping that inspired this paper aims to shift analysis away from scalar lenses, examining the local and continental expansion of extraction frontiers, together with local and aggregated impacts, implications and resulting resistance.

> Final remarks

Ecological degradation has awakened widespread attention, yet the importance of grassroots social resistance to the expansion of “green” extraction should not be underestimated. Experts argue that as we approach scenarios of critical mineral and metal scarcity, environmental, social and governance factors are likely to pose the primary risk to metal and mineral supply chains in coming decades, surpassing direct reserve depletion. Indeed, while local communities and socio-environmental organizations resist the expansion of extraction frontiers globally, governments and financial institutions increasingly worry about the challenges that socio-environmental impacts and resistance to mining pose to green growth and transition agendas.

Conflicts are delaying and halting extractive projects worldwide, leading to significant cost increases, including lost productivity due to delays, that can range from thousands to millions of dollars. Massive social mobilizations have forced the cancellation of mining projects in several countries, including Spain, Serbia, Panama, and Argentina. The political stakes are also high: in 2023, allegations of corruption in lithium mining development in Portugal led to the Prime Minister’s resignation.

Furthermore, while this paper has focused on extraction, tensions are emerging across entire supply chains, including processing, transportation, disposal/recycling and low-carbon energy generation (e.g., solar and wind power) and infrastructure. The unprecedented material extraction and consumption pressures driven by green growth scenarios are pushing “green” extractive frontiers (and supply chains) into uncharted territory. This includes a new scale and acceleration of extraction, uncertainty regarding impacts, and exploration of new frontiers such as deep seas or space, both in the Global South and within industrialized economies. As we have seen, this process is deepening ecological crises and encouraging resistance, curbing expansion in some areas and shaping the politics of “green” extraction expansion. This resistance is creating tension in globalization and reshoring dynamics, highlighting not only the limits of growth and consumption, but also the potential constraints on a new phase of globalization. ■

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> Brief Cartography of Latin American Sociological Associations

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In recent decades, sociology as a profession has expanded in terms of the numbers and quality of graduates in various fields and roles in society. The expansion of the social question in the face of recurrent economic crises or the persistence of structural inequalities that have fragmented the social fabric, together with the emergence of new social actors, have led to new demands for social research. This article addresses the development of sociology from the academic to the professional field in Latin America through a comparative analysis of sociological associations in the region, their characteristics, and evolution.

> A shaky beginning

The institutionalization of Latin American sociology proved to be difficult and was marked by various tensions. These included reservations concerning the promotion of social research, the need for academic autonomy, public commitment, and the internationalization of scientific life.

Academic development initiatives date back to the mid-twentieth century, marked by winding paths with various institutional obstacles, diverse rhythms, advances, and setbacks. Latin American sociologists began their practice in a traditional university framework dominated by a foundational matrix of universities oriented to the formation of classical liberal professions. Brazil exhibited a different trajectory, with later university development that was accelerated by the adoption of the North American model, with Institutes of Philosophy and Human Sciences and departments for research development. Across the continent, sociologists developed an academic practice whose goal was not exclusively the teaching and training of professionals but the practice of social research according to the criteria of the scientific method.

The development of sociology as a scientific discipline was closely linked to a university model of the Latin American reformist tradition characterized by political commitment and the defense of university autonomy in relation to governments. Thus, the historical legacy of the social sciences and their context combined rigorous social research with an activist tradition of resistance to the established social order, particularly in the face of the persistent authoritarian political regimes and interventions that plagued the region.

Since the recent cycle of democratization, the processes of academic institutionalization and professionalization of sociology have been reconverting its legacy and practice in the face of growing internal and external social demands.

> A locally rooted profession that experienced rapid internationalization

The formation of sociological communities took place along a double axis: local rooting of the production of sociological knowledge, in dialogue with Latin American and international academic spaces. The early insertion of sociology into circuits of internationalization was evident via simultaneous entry into the International Sociological Association (ISA) and the Latin American Sociological Association (ALAS) in 1950. This was followed by the Latin American Association of Rural Sociology in 1969 and the Latin American Association of Labor Studies in 1993; and, with a sub-regional profile, the Central American Sociological Association in 1974. At the same time, the internationalization of sociology was in permanent dialogue with other social sciences, expressed via active participation in regional networks such as ECLAC (1948), FLACSO (1957) and CLACSO (1967).

There were multiple indicators of the progressive formation of academic communities of sociology (research centers, universities, careers, specialized publications, etc.). Still, at the same time, this was made possible and enhanced by a community of actors, professors, intellectuals and sociology professionals who exercised their profession in various fields, built networks and associations, and gathered at public events to present themselves as a category and professional group to society.

A ritual sense of collective belonging to the profession is the celebration of an official commemorative date of the sociologist. In Chile, this is the national day of the sociologist on November 24, commemorating the creation of the College of Sociologists in 1982. In Colombia, December 10 recalls the creation of the first chair of sociology in the country in 1882. In Panama, the date celebrated is December 12, to honor the sociologist and writer Raúl Leis Romero, while in Peru it is December 9, recalling the first chair of sociology at the Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos in 1896. Finally, in Venezuela, February 11

recalls the founding of the first College of Sociologists and Anthropologists.

> **Sociological associations: main objectives and development**

In order to present a general overview, a classification of sociological associations in Latin America has been drawn up according to: a) priority objective of action, oriented to the academic or professional field, b) age and longevity, and c) territorial scope (see Table 1).

Combined analysis of the nature of the association (academic or professional) and time variables (age and longevity) reveals interesting empirical observations. The development of the associations over the long term shows a slow and uneven implementation, although with a progressive growth in the number of associations and of countries with associations.

Comparative longitudinal analysis made it possible to establish three historical periods with specific profiles, in line with the analysis presented in the previous sections. There was a foundational period of Latin American sociology between the 1930s and 1970s, characterized by the development of associations from the academic field, networks and expressions at national and regional level. This was followed by a cycle of expansion of associations with a more professional profile, in the 1980s and 1990s, during which there was a shift from academia to extra-university fields in the practice of the sociological profession. This period was accompanied by growth in the number of graduates and non-academic spheres of practice of the profession. Finally, we can identify a period that spans the first two decades of the twenty-first century, characterized by the diversification and institutional consolidation of the training of sociologists (undergraduate and specialized postgraduate) and institutions and associations becoming rooted at the territorial level. This period saw progressive and parallel growth of academic and professional associations in many countries.

> **Networks, international solidarity and the emergence of colleges and professional associations**

Diverse associations contributed to the collective production of multiple forms of solidarity and the development of networks. This provided a sense of belonging and endogenous identity for the professional category in different ways, such as the establishment of membership in a group or the organization of social meetings at sociology events and congresses, among others. There were also mobilizations, advocacy and public commitment to social causes and the defense of vulnerable social groups together with practices oriented towards international solidarity, especially in Latin American networks.

The emergence of colleges and associations with a professional or guild profile aimed at defending, promoting and strengthening the professional field of sociology has been a more recent development. These are linked to the public legitimization of sociological knowledge and its profession, as well as to the advancement of legal and normative regulations in the practice of the profession. Such regulations are heterogeneous and partial, from non-existent specific legislation for the profession – in most cases – to strictly regulated professional colleges, both at national and sub-national levels, in several countries (such as Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Uruguay).

> **Current risks and challenges**

The development of academia, associations and the craft of sociology has by no means been the result of a linear evolution or progress but has faced multiple obstacles and challenges. On the one hand, conservative sectors in Latin America distrust the social sciences and sociology in particular, with sociologists being perceived as a threat to the social order. On the other hand, new social demands for scientific and professional knowledge can result in risks that undermine substantial aspects of the practice of the sociological profession.

Added to this are the transformations in the world of professions. These include the multiplication and relative devaluation of university credentials and degrees and the processes of flexibilization and precariousness of professional labor markets. Moreover, the irruption of teleworking, which has consequences in terms of the distribution of care and gender inequalities, has been particularly visible in the social sciences. Due to the growing productivity demands of cognitive capitalism, there are also risks of substituting a critical profile and analytical reflection by an overvaluation of soft skills and the technical management of data from the market.

The challenge for the sociological profession is to adapt to the demands of the new dynamics of social knowledge without losing its sense of critique and social commitment. This means taking up the historical legacy of Latin American sociology's activism, of commitment to profound changes in the social order, and to the culture of anti-authoritarian resistance. In an epochal change, it requires the role of intellectual critique of power structures and public denunciation of the social inequalities that pervade the region. Furthermore, it is necessary to recover the sociological critical look at society to make problems and social actors that have been marginalized visible, to uncover the social mechanisms that make the reproduction of institutions of power and inequalities possible, and to question, through critical reflection, the simplification and naturalization of common sense in the explanation of recurrent social issues on the public agenda (such as violence and its uses).

Field	Years	National Associations	Regional Associations
Academic	1930-59	Brazilian Society of Sociology	Economic Commission for Latin America Asociación Latinoamericana de Sociología Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Latin American Sociological Association Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences
Academic	1960-79	Colombian Sociology Association	Latin American Council of Social Sciences Central American Sociological Association Latin American Association of Rural Sociology
Professional	1980-89	Council of Professionals in Sociology (City of Buenos Aires) Association of Sociologists of the Province of Buenos Aires College of Sociologists of San Juan College of Sociologists of Chile College of Sociologists of Peru	
Professional	1990-99	Panamanian Association of Sociologists National College of Sociologists and Sociologists College of Sociology and Social Sciences of Panama College of Sociologists of Uruguay	Latin American Association of Labor Studies
Professional	2000-09	Association of Sociologists of the Republic of Argentina Association of professionals of the Province of Mendoza Network of Sociology of Chilean Universities	
Professional	2010-09	Argentine Sociological Association Sociologists Association of Santiago del Estero Sociologists' of the State of Sao Union Sociologists' of the State of Rio de Janeiro National of Sociologists Federation Colombian Association of Sociology (<i>refoundation</i>) College of Professionals in Sociology of Costa Rica Salvadoran Association of Sociologists and Social Science Professionals Honduran Association of Sociology Paraguayan Sociology Association Sociologists and Anthropologists of Paria College (Venezuela)	

Table 1

Note: Some countries do not have national academic associations of sociology but do have long-standing university sociology centers (institutes, departments, colleges, etc.) that are internationally recognized within scholarly circles, the most precise case being Mexico. Some countries have both national associations and university centers of reference, such as Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Uruguay.

In short, it is necessary to resort to the “sociological imagination” as an essential professional resource. Beyond legacies, conditioning, and challenges, its associations and its craft are probably sociology’s greatest strengths as society changes. ■

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> The Sociology of Latin America and the Caribbean

in Times of Crisis and Uncertainty

by **ALAS** (Latin American Sociological Association)



Credit: Latin American Sociological Association (ALAS).

The critical social thought that has sustained ALAS as an intellectual movement linked to its time since 1950 is endorsed in our congresses. The Congress in the Dominican Republic is the culmination of two years of preparation that give continuity to this effort to give a historical and civilizational sense to sociology, social sciences, arts, and humanities. Our Afro-Abya Yala America is Caribbean and Latin American; our intercultural links nourish the diversity of gender, ethnicities, regions, and countries and update the challenges for our autonomous integration, critical of the coloniality of power, emancipatory and open to alternatives founders of other forms of coexistence, which are contrary to all forms of exclusion, inequality or discrimination.

The polycrisis as a global, systemic, multidimensional phenomenon that crosses all geopolitical scales is the result of a crisis of the world order based on Western rules. Along with that, we are witnessing the emergency of a new multipolarism in which the Caribbean and Latin America can build South-South relations based on Active Non-Alignment and the struggle for a New Economic, political, cultural, social Order.

This context exacerbates social inequality and the brutal concentration of income and accelerates unprecedented impoverishment processes. We are suffering from deindustrialization, extractivism, the precariousness of employment in the so-called informal economy, and factors that trigger complex processes of accumulation by dispossession, which strongly affect Indigenous peoples and Afro-descendants.

Violence is the face of death, the violation of human rights, the forced disappearance of hundreds of thousands of people, and the forced internal and international displacement of millions of migrants. Added to this picture is the weakening of the State propitiated by economic policies, with its necropolitical counterpart driven by organized crime and the empire of the powerful. Likewise, the conservative customs that reiterate social exclusions, intolerance and discrimination, androcentric power, and the stigmatization of the dispossessed and the youth, which produces a fragmented society, are reiterated.

Our continent experiences a socio-environmental crisis of biodiversity and interculturality. This crisis generates a fierce struggle over the goods of nature, its privatization, and the dominance of strategies of exploitation and exclusion. In the face of this, we recognize the capacity of socio-environmentalist movements that deploy eco-social and intercultural strategies from the Global South.

In recent decades, feminist collective action has contributed to decisive changes in gender relations in Latin America and the Caribbean by expanding and consolidat-

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ing sexual and reproductive rights, emerging demands for a society of care, and institutional changes that favor it.

Since 2019, social outbursts (*estallidos sociales*) have opened up new imaginaries and expectations for change and alternative transformations, whose scope and new scenarios critical social thought should draw on, particularly in the context of the offensive of the ultra-right. The recent election results in the United States and several Latin American countries have gained popular support and deepened well-founded fears about the impact in Latin America and the Caribbean of the disruptive role of white supremacist, patriarchal, racist nationalism that exacerbates the persecution of migrants, generates a devastating economic war on the region, enhances the power of the military-industrial complex, and dynamites the capacity for state regulation and for any possible multilateral action to address the severe polycrisis in all spheres of life.

ALAS International Congress in the Caribbean is concerned about the destruction of social struggles' achievements, which substantially expanded society's democratization. It stands against hate speech, the naturalization of violence in armed conflicts, the disqualification and disregard of public rights, including freedom of expression, the criminalization of public protest, and the ultimate expansion of individualism.

It also supports the various demands of public education, particularly the defense of social sciences, sociology, and all community and ancestral knowledge.

We stand for a critical and cosmopolitan global sociology capable of reactivating the concepts and reflections of so many generations of sociologists who give an account of the sociological imagination. We are committed to utopias and in solidarity with the emancipation of citizens and people.

Likewise, the new sciences, scientific revolutions, artificial intelligence, and digital technologies should be incorporated in a way that is not alienating, not bound to consumerism, sensitive to nature, and that enhances democratic coexistence.

Latin America and the Caribbean are bearers of identities and inclusive senses of belonging that point towards peaceful coexistence for the good life of their peoples and nationalities; their vocation is radically pacifist, in opposition to the genocide of the Palestinian people by the Israeli government, and promotes peace with justice and dignity in all armed conflicts from which humanity suffers, in Ukraine as well as in North Africa and South Asia.

ALAS, as a key actor in the academic and social expression of unity in diversity in the face of the above-mentioned planetary crises and uncertainties, is committed to gathering its historical heritage within the framework of critical thinking to nurture creativity and promote the production of transformative sociological knowledge, expanding and deepening with its praxis the universal right to social and cognitive justice. ■

Declaration of the General Assembly of ALAS at the XXXIV Latin American Congress of Sociology, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, November 7, 2024.

