Talking Sociology with Michele Ford

Michael Burawoy – Public Sociology

Intersectional Dialogues

Theoretical Perspectives

Perspectives on Ukraine

Open Section

> Why We Need Comparative Intersectional LGBT+ Data
> Recognition, Citation, and Epistemic Injustice
> Profitable Bodies and Care Mobilities in CEE
> Brokered Domestic Work: The Sri Lanka-Saudi Market
In this issue, the section ‘Talking Sociology’ features an interview conducted by Dimitra Laurence Larochelle with the most renowned scientist Michele Ford, who provides insights into her consulting activities for the International Labor Organization (ILO), the challenges for sociological researchers, and the difficulties that can be faced by fighting for labor rights.

Our first symposium refers to Michael Burawoy’s most impressive and inspiring body of work. As past president of the ISA and founder of Global Dialogue, he has initiated and influenced a broad debate on public and global sociology. Sari Hanafi, current president of the ISA, Margaret Abraham, past president of the ISA, and Svetlana Yaroshenko and Elena Zdravomyslova reflect on their collaboration with him and on his recent book Public Sociology: Between Utopia and Anti-Utopia and also shed light on public sociology from different perspectives.

The second symposium, organized by the prominent experts Kathy Davis and Helma Lutz shows how the travelling theory and concept of intersectionality is elaborated, re-worked, and deployed in different contexts. This compilation of articles provides an overview over ways in which intersectionality has been influential and how scholars and activists think about inequality, power, and social change, both locally and globally. Ann Phoenix, Barbara Giovanna Bello, Ethel Tungohan, and Amund Rake Hoffart cover a wide range of topics.

In the theoretical section, Koichi Hasegawa reflects on the Fridays for Future movement from a social movement perspective, focusing on cultural framing, resource mobilization, and the structure of political opportunities, and examining why these campaigns have been so successful and why participation was low and slow in Japan compared to other countries.

Our country focus has been written in the face of the war of aggression against Ukraine as witnessed in the summer 2022. Referring to sociological debates on globalization, Nataliya Chernysh considers the role of sociology in the post-globalization phase with regard to this war. Yurij Pachkovskiy deals with the concrete experience of the invasion, the collective trauma and the consequences to be drawn from the war. Darie Cristea asks about the place of sociology in the face of a “security dilemma” and the rise of anti-system movements and parties.

In the ‘Open Section’ Sait Bayrakdar, Andrew King and Jana Bacevic reflect on the necessary sensitivity for diversity and intersectionality in scientific work, representative studies and surveys as well as epistemic questions, while Petra Ezzeddine, Kristine Krause and Wasana Handapangoda investigate different forms of the contemporary transnational marketization of care.

Five years ago, we started our editorship of Global Dialogue knowing that it would be an honor but also a challenge to succeed to its founder and former editor Michael Burawoy. Now that our editorship is coming to an end it is on the readers of Global Dialogue to judge about the work done over the years. Together with our assistant editors Raphael Deindl, Johanna Grubner, Walid Ibrahim and Christine Schickert, who have done a great job in all this time we are very grateful for their wonderful and inspiring collaboration to: the regional editors and their teams from around the world, who indeed made Global Dialogue global and accessible for broad academic and non-academic audiences; managing editors Lola Busuttil and August Bagà as the creative and organizational backbone of the magazine; associate editors Aparna Sundar and Christopher Evans for their valuable copy-editing; ISA president and secretariat for their continuous support; and all the authors of Global Dialogue for giving insights into the vivid sociology at so many places around the globe. It has been a pleasure to be an active part of this amazing Global Dialogue team and we will miss them all. We are now very happy to welcome as its new editor Breno Bringel, an internationally renowned political sociologist and long-standing active member of the ISA, who will no doubt keep moving Global Dialogue onwards and upwards in the next years.

Brigitte Aulenbacher and Klaus Dörre, editors of Global Dialogue

> Global Dialogue can be found in multiple languages at its website.
> Submissions should be sent to globaldialogue.isa@gmail.com.
In this symposium, the authors explore the work of Global Dialogue’s founder and former ISA President Michael Burawoy, and in particular the question of public sociology.

Researchers from Ukraine and Romania take a look at the current situation in Ukraine and the Russian war of aggression, and what consequences this has for sociology.

The theoretical section reflects from a social movements perspective on the reasons why the Fridays For Future campaigns can be considered the most successful collective action of the recent past.
In sociology, it’s very easy to get really bogged down in micro-level research – and that’s important – but it’s nice to be able to articulate that to bigger questions.”

Michele Ford
Professor Michele Ford is Director of the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre, Australia. Her research focuses on Southeast Asian labor movements, the intersection between national and international trade unions, labor migration, and the engagement of labor in the political sphere. Her work has been supported by a number of Australian Research Council (ARC) grants related to these and other topics. She currently leads ARC Discovery Projects on labor relations in Myanmar’s garment industry and in Indonesia’s commercial fishing industry, and an ARC Linkage Project on trade union responses to gender-based violence in Cambodia’s construction industry. In addition to her academic work, she has been involved in extensive consultancy work for the International Labor Organization (ILO), the international labor movement and the Australian government.

Michele Ford is interviewed by Dimitra Laurence Larochelle, a post-doctoral scholar at the Université Polytechnique Hauts-de-France, France. She is Youth Representative at the United Nations for the ISA (International Sociological Association), a board member of ISA Research Committee on Sociology of Communication, Knowledge and Culture (RC14), Associate Editor of Art Style | Art & Culture International Magazine and a member of the editorial board of the international journal THESIS.

D.L.L.: Could you please tell me about your relation with the International Labor Organization? How long have you cooperated with the ILO and in which ways?

M.F.: I first came into contact with the ILO in Myanmar. In 2013, I was doing some work looking at how industrial relations were emerging after the transition there and, as part of that, I interviewed people working for the ILO. Since I also run the Sydney Southeast Asia Centre, I decided that it would be a useful thing to engage institutionally, and run a workshop for unionists, employers and government officials to give them a sense of what other countries were doing around industrial relations. I pitched that idea to the ILO’s office in Myanmar and they were very happy to collaborate. Something like 70 or 80 people, including the Minister and relevant Directors General attended. It was a really good collaboration. After that, some of those people, who have moved on to other roles within the ILO, asked me to do other things. For example, I worked with a colleague of mine on a background paper on the garment industry in eight countries in Asia, which was supported by the ILO’s regional office.

Then in 2019, I travelled to Geneva for some field work with the global unions. Someone at the ILO had seen a
book that I'd written on global unions and labor migration and asked me to give a presentation and while I was there doing that, I've had some interviews with several people and one of them was the head of the Asia-Pacific desk of the Bureau for Workers’ Activities (ACTRAV). He later commissioned me to conduct research on the workers of the oil palm industry in Indonesia and on digital union strategies in Asia and the Pacific.

The interesting thing is that some of the stuff I published on the ILO has been quite critical, for example on its role in Myanmar but I feel that the people I engage with are actually being quite open to that. I mean, if they were not open, they wouldn't engage with me. The people I engage with in the ILO have respected my role as a critical friend/outside. So, I don’t feel like it's a compromise for me to engage with them. If I did, I wouldn’t do it.

D.L.L.: Could you please tell me how you apply your sociological lens and skills at the ILO? More precisely, could you explain how a sociologist can act within the UN in order to enhance solutions concerning labor-related issues?

M.F.: I think the main thing is bringing an academic lens. We can generate insights that the institution can't necessarily generate by itself. If you look at the way that the ILO works, it commissions a lot of people to do research. I've been given quite a lot of freedom to structure those projects because they're all background research-oriented projects rather than evaluations. I've done a lot of evaluation work for the international union movement, and these have been quite different. In the case of the ILO, there are some questions they want answered, but beyond that they've been very open to allowing me to structure the project and that's where I can bring my academic expertise, right? So, I can decide what kinds of data I need and how it should be collected and how I process it.

When I began, I was concerned that my work might be subject to some censorship, as the ILO has to be sensitive about government perspectives as well as union and employer perspectives — and if there had been, I would have stopped working with them. But I haven’t felt that I've had any restrictions. It’s been a pleasant surprise! Maybe that’s one of the reasons they like to get the outside researchers [laughs] — to introduce different voices into the debate.

D.L.L.: You said before that you give critical feedback and that people within the ILO are very open and that you don’t have any restrictions. However, have you met any other challenges? In general, what are the challenges a sociologist might face when working in international organizations? And if you ever encountered any other challenges, how did you overcome them?

M.F.: To be honest, it is not probably something that any organization would like reading [laughs], but the ILO is very bureaucratic. Because of this, they move very slowly. So, for example, on one recent project, they set up a bunch of interviews for me with unions in the Asia-Pacific. I mean, on the one hand that was very helpful. But it would have been quicker for me to do it myself. The bureaucracy takes a lot of navigating. It’s a big organization so when you work with them, you have to deal with their way of doing things. All the mechanics of getting things done... It is very different, for example, from working with an NGO that has a lot of flexibility and a smaller team, so things can get done fast. But it certainly brings advantages too because research that’s done for the ILO carries a certain cachet. It’s a good CV builder. I’m a full professor, so it doesn’t matter that much for me in academic terms, but in terms of credentialing for other kinds of applied work, it’s very helpful to have worked for the ILO.

I think it would be very different if you weren’t an academic, if you were living in consultancy land. For people in those situations, it could be difficult, because the ILO doesn’t offer very good working conditions for consultants, or pay very well! But as an academic, it’s really nice. We do have the opportunity to influence debate, right? These people are making decisions about the programs that the ILO will carry out. It’s a real privilege to have an opportunity to feed into their decision-making processes. That’s a way of applying our academic and intellectual skills to a real-world problem and you might contribute to a really concrete outcome because this is a body that can influence things.

D.L.L.: What do you think the limits of a sociologist’s engagement within the UN are?

M.F.: I think that organizations in the United Nations system are very big organizations with lots of stakeholders. Everything must be very measured politically because of those stakeholders. Also, the ILO has a relatively small funding base. So, in many ways it has to respond to the agendas of its donors. Sometimes it can really facilitate good work, but sometimes good work has to be abandoned because there’s not ongoing funding or, you know, people’s efforts are pushed in a particular direction because of the nature of the donor agendas. In the case of the ILO, there are a small number of countries that fund most of its activities. So, of course that does shape the agenda. That's not necessarily a negative thing, but it is a limitation to sociologists’ opportunities to have impact.

D.L.L.: Since 2020, we have been facing a global pandemic which inevitably has important consequences on labor and working conditions around the globe. What policies have you promoted to strengthen workers’ rights during the pandemic? Are there any areas that have been overlooked in your opinion?
M.F.: Not so much overlooked, but in terms of some key areas, some of the burning issues at the moment, like the conditions in supply chains. If we look at the garment industry, when COVID hit, there were bottlenecks of logistics and dropping consumer orders. Suddenly factories didn’t have orders anymore. They had to either reduce people’s working hours or get rid of them. In that, brands make a lot of fuss about all the things they do for workers. But then in a time of crisis like COVID, you see how quickly they retreat. A lot of work has been done in the last 20 to 30 years on international labor governance, including through the ILO. But in terms of actually having systems where multinationals who do not do the right thing in terms of labor rights are sanctioned, we’ve got a long way to go.

Obviously, the gig economy is of huge interest to sociologists of work and industrial relations at the moment and in some contexts, it can actually lead to a formalization of work. So, in countries like India and Indonesia, people who were previously informal, now at least have someone they can organize against. But then, on the flip side, of course the platforms are so powerful that it can be a real challenge to maintaining labor rights. It’s encouraging that there are court cases now where delivery drivers’ status as workers is being recognized, but I don’t think the ILO or anyone else really has a good idea yet about how to regulate those forms of emerging forms of work.

Something the ILO has done a lot of work on over the years, which is great, is trying to understand the informal sector work better and this is actually related to the digital platform work. In many ways digital platform work is an intermediate form between formal employment and an informal sector employment. I think that this is an opportunity for us both as sociologists but also as people who want to engage in the real world to try to work out different ways that worker interest can be represented in sectors that aren’t formalized.

I think they’d be my big three. These are not new issues or specifically related to COVID, but COVID has really underlined the problems in those industries. And then more generally, the retreat of the welfare state, and the absence of the welfare state in countries that have never had one in the first place. You know, it’s in times like these where it becomes really clear how deeply that affects individuals. If you’re in Norway or Greece or Congo, life is very different and the impact of something like a pandemic is very different. I think in that way too, it’s a bit of a call to arms to make a case for the reassertion of the welfare state… The pandemic has really emphasized the importance of having a social safety net.

D.L.L.: Do you have any advice for junior sociologists and social scientists who are starting a career in the international field? Do you have any recommendations or information about locating job opportunities?

M.F.: The organizations in the United Nations system are already a big employer in their own rights of junior social scientists, so there are lots of jobs in the system and also in the other kinds of organizations that cluster around the system. In international NGOs and so on, there are also lots of people with PhDs.

If someone’s on an academic path, then I really do think it’s very rewarding to engage with organizations like the ILO. It grounds our research in reality, and takes us out of the micro level. In sociology, it’s very easy to get really bogged down in micro-level research – and that’s important – but it’s nice to be able to articulate that to bigger questions. Looking at how the UN system works helps us generate some of those bigger questions. The answers to those questions may not be the answers that necessarily the system itself wants to hear. But by actually being those engaged but critical voices, I think we have a potential to influence that system itself, but also the groups in society around the world that the system hopes to serve.

In terms of practical stuff, it’s important for junior researchers to get on teams, network within your field, make contact with practitioners, be a good contributor… So that when someone is looking for someone to be involved in the project, they think of you. There’s the networking itself and then there’s proving your worth. Eventually, you become one of the people that people come to.

Direct all correspondence to Michele Ford <michele.ford@sydney.edu.au>
In this piece, we discuss the challenges facing public sociology in today’s Russia. The underlying question we address is: What can we say of professional commitment in a political regime whose name is still to be found? We are currently living the real dystopian nightmare of the “special military operation” – the war in Ukraine – and here we describe its effects on sociology in statu nascendi. We refer to the discussions and research conducted in Russia, to our professional experience, and to Michael Burawoy’s 2021 book *Public Sociology: Between Utopia and Anti-Utopia*, which we have discussed with colleagues, including those mentioned by Burawoy in the preface to his book and researchers who have contributed to the development of Russian public sociology.

> Inspiration from Michael Burawoy

Michael Burawoy identifies several features of sociology in non-democratic regimes. He maintains that in such circumstances sociology functions as “a transmission belt for the ideology of the party-state” and exists mainly in the form of servile policy sociology. Academic freedom is limited and scholars experience rigid control over their professional activities. We consider that such a subordinate orientation to the party-state is an unwanted birthmark of sociology in Russia and adherence to this path is difficult to overcome.

However, the oppositional current of critical professional sociology and its commitment to public openness are also important in the Russian sociological landscape. While empirical sociology has generally existed in the form of directed or guided policy research, there are also sociologists who have been fighting for professional autonomy, for the right to provide independent expertise, and for the possibility of openly discussing issues within the sociological community and with the non-academic public. Russian sociologists have always striven to be public intellectuals. In the Soviet years, the best sociologists sadly complained about the merely ornamental character and the pointlessness of their research. They provided the social diagnosis and gave advice nobody listened to in the authoritarian regime.

Burawoy claims that in order “to flourish, our discipline needs public engagement.” The self-reflection of Russian sociologists confirms this statement. Debating the prospects for Russian sociologists in the 2000s, scholars agreed that “theoretical poverty” and a lack of professionalism are caused by the weakness of civil society, gaps in institutionalization and a lack of autonomy (Romanov & Yarskaya 2008; Sokolov 2009). One part of the professional community expressed hopes that democratization and integration in the global sociological community would help to overcome the limitations of shallow and servile policy sociology. Others emphasized the trend of fragmentation and a lack of professional communication (Lytkina & Yaroshenko 2019).

> Achievements of public sociology in the 21st century

In post-Soviet times, the visibility of sociology in the public realm has grown. Public sociology claims have always resonated with the popular idea of our profession. New generations of Russian sociologists believe that to carry out sociological research is to engage with citizens; they conduct research targeting grassroots initiatives and NGOs. Thus, the idea of organic public sociology has gained support within the professional Russian community.

But for the most part, what we still see are the effects of traditional public sociology: public lectures, interviews, expert evaluations, popularization of research data; all these activities now count in professional ratings. Public engagement brings material and symbolic benefits to institutions and individuals. Over the last few decades, Russian sociologists have learned how to communicate with the media.
difficulties for public sociology. For a while now, there has been a political split that has become an important feature of the sociological field in Russia. Until recently, representatives of different camps each found their own means of publicity. For critical public sociologists, there has been a reliable niche comprised of different agencies that were prepared to work with them, including *The Echo of Moscow* radio channel, *The Novaya Gazette* newspaper, and several online resources.

However, with the tightening of authoritarian rule, the public realm has gradually shrunk. Critical journalism and research, represented by both individuals and institutions, have been forced out of the official public realm. They have either been labeled as “foreign agents,” have undergone ideological transformations through self-censorship, or have simply been liquidated.

> Repressive legislation, disempowerment of civil society, and suffocation of public sociology

Before the ill-fated day of February 24, 2022, when the “special military operation” in Ukraine was launched by the Russian state authorities, the autocracy successfully disempowered Russian civil society, limiting the ability of the popular classes to influence state policy. Recent persecution was made legally possible by a set of repressive laws passed by the Russian legislature after mass protests against electoral fraud in 2011-12. More specifically, the “Gay propaganda” legislation (2013) restricts the freedom of speech and criminalizes the LGBTQI+ community. It has contributed to the straightjacketing of gender studies in Russia. “The Law on Foreign Agents” (2012) has functioned as a garrote causing the asphyxia of civil society and the restriction of professional activities of non-state institutions engaged in organic public sociology projects. This law initially targeted NGOs involved in political activities and receiving international grants. Nowadays, policy and public advocacy research has become the object of such qualifications. Human rights organizations and non-governmental research institutions such as Memorial, the Levada Center, the Center for Independent Social Research, and gender studies centers were the first targets listed as foreign agents (FA). The costs of this “toxic” status are often insurmountable barriers for social research, which result in the narrowing down of international cooperation, as well as financial austerity and bureaucratic expenses (Skibo 2020).

The enforcement of the repressive laws has likewise stifled Russian civil society. Its voices have become weakened as if trying to escape from suffocating throats. Active citizens, civic initiatives and NGOs fear persecution. Public fear as well as actual repression have produced breathing difficulties for public sociology.

Most NGOs have sought to avoid stigmatizing status and have chosen the strategy of self-liquidation. (Many gender studies centers have closed.) A few “FA” NGOs have continued their activities, carrying out a self-imposed experiment in survival. Self-censorship has become another popular strategy for researchers and journalists who are trying to continue “business as usual” under stifling conditions. While the official media channels have restricted contacts with FA, social media have started to constitute an alternative public realm for open discussions and open breathing.

However, this was only the initial phase of the “special operation” against that part of Russian civil society that still remained unsilenced. The two years of the COVID-19 pandemic have helped the autocracy to prohibit public events, crush protests, and shift public attention from international affairs to health threats and personal life.

> The dystopia of the special military operation and the asphyxia of public sociology

After the start of the war in Ukraine the situation has worsened drastically. A new series of repressive laws has closed down public discussion and criminalized protests. The 2022 amendments to the FA Law extend the range of targets and pretexts for persecution. The new statuses of “undesirable organization” and “unfriendly country” smash efforts towards international academic cooperation. In this context, adepts of public sociology are easily categorized as foreign agents and forced to join the ranks of the persecuted. This can even happen to those researchers and institutions who try to demonstrate their apolitical standpoint and their belief in academic neutrality.

In this atmosphere, the old political divide between servile and critical sociologists has been revived. After the start of the war, social scientists have expressed their positions in open letters of support and protest. Many protesters have had to opt for internal or external exile (hopefully, temporarily).

In March 2022, the media circulated a Rectors’ Union letter of support with 180 signatures. This political gesture seemed to guarantee those universities and their staff a certain degree of security, but made these institutions targets of the cancel culture in the international academic community. Simultaneously, protest letters were signed, individual researchers and independent institutions posted protest statements on their social media sites (Telegram, Facebook, and Instagram channels). The protest letters emphasized the devastating consequences of the war for Russian society and academia (Dubrovsky & Meyer 2022). Soon after the start of the war, Instagram and Facebook were blocked in Russia, and non-restricted social media access became available only through the use of a VPN.

However, most sociologists avoid making any open statements on the invasion. Abstainers explain their choice by...
considerations of “professional neutrality.” They believe in
the neutral rationality of a scholar who should keep cool,
provide expertise, and not mess with political issues. This
seemingly logical argument is fueled by strong feelings of
fear that penetrate the public space.

The atmosphere of public fear has a disempowering and
suffocating effect on public sociology. However, certain so-
ciological issues are insistently discussed in both official
and alternative public realms.

> Criticism of opinion surveys

There is one important topic that has a direct link to
traditional public sociology. Oppositional sociologists criti-
cize the methodology of opinion surveys in repressive re-
gimes and during military conflict. They claim that the
figures reflecting support for the military operation should
not be perceived as an expression of genuine attitudes.
Public fear distorts people’s answers; traditional public
sociology has become a matter for political manipulation,
and its results are mobilized in defense of the war and
economic sanctions (Yudin 2022). Such criticism enjoys
a consensus among oppositional public intellectuals,
while those who express loyalty take opinion poll data at
face value.

> Strategies of sociologists

When academic freedoms are cut back and public so-
ciologists suffer from asphyxia, what are the strategies that
sociologists can adopt? The majority of academics con-
tinue their traditional business as usual – they do not see
any alternative to their work situation. Often they believe
that there is still space to perform professional duties and
to “keep calm and carry on.” Our colleagues emphasize
their educational responsibilities, the importance of help-
ing students to overcome their feelings of embarrassment
and disenchantment. Many think that it is time for ethnog-
raphy and to inspire field research and diaries in different
settings of crushing life-worlds. Others turn to the analysis
of totalitarianism and dystopias in the classics, which they
believe could help to analyze major shifts in the current
social reality.

We see that many students and scholars feel “help-
less disenchantment” with our discipline. They have real-
ized how dangerous it is to be engaged in public sociology,
how huge the costs may be that result from the combina-
tion of professional work and civic engagement. Fear, as
well as a lack of hope about the prospects of continuing
professional work in Russia, cause alienation and (hope-
fully, temporary) relocation of scholars at risk. There is not
enough air for public sociology, its prospects are radically
reduced, and protest sociologists are trying to organize an
alternative open public space on social media platforms
where they can speak openly.

> An alternative public realm

d as a real utopian hope

Protest critical sociologists are trying to make their voices
heard in Russia and globally. Their strategy is to continue
professional work and to raise their voices in the alternative
public sphere made available by new information technolo-
gies. Protest journalists work across borders in the online
space that grew during COVID-19; they run online public
discussions on burning topics concerning life in Russia.
Telegram and Facebook channels have created a public
sphere for those who protest against the military opera-
 tion. However, these activities have limited audiences and
create an information bubble.

In this alternative public sphere, social scientists discuss
foreign affairs as public intellectuals, as well as delving
into more abstract conceptualizations of neo-totalitarian-
ism, dictatorship autocracy, colonialism and empire. They
are trying to find a proper signifier for the Russian regime.
Many feel their responsibility for what happens. They ask
themselves: What did we miss? How could we have pre-
vented the war? Why did we fail in our forecasts?

> Conclusion

The repression of the public sphere means that public
sociology suffers from traumatic asphyxia: a serious patho-
logical condition when a living body can neither breathe nor
move due to a lack of access to oxygen. This condition is
life-threatening. In the context of the Russian authoritarian
regime, possibilities for public sociology have become very
limited because of public fear and actual repression. Tradi-
tional public sociology suffers under strong censorship and
opinion survey results are used as political instruments.
But public sociology continues to exist across borders and
in the alternative public realm of social media.

The dystopian nightmare that we are living in helps us
understand that the sociological tradition we belong to is
built on moral commitment, on democratic values that we
share steadfastly with others: freedom, reason, equality,
solidarity. In the current situation, we have to accumulate
professional knowledge which will be available to the pub-
lic in the future. The present circumstances force Russian
sociologists to raise questions about their ambitions and
the foundations of their work, and to reflect once more on
the strong link between their profession and moral com-
mitment – a reflection which could be avoided before, un-
der the auspices of neutrality. ■

Direct all correspondence to:
Svetlana Yaroshenko <svetlayaroshenko@gmail.com>
Elena Zdravomyslova <zdrav3@yandex.ru>
Michael Burawoy is not simply a social theorist who feeds sociology with many theoretical insights into labor sociology and political economy, he actually reshapes the practice of sociology across the world. When I started reading Public Sociology: Between Utopia and Anti-Utopia, I could not put it down until I had read the last page. Read as a novel, the book turns the last half century of Burawoy’s trajectory into an object of analysis, while putting forward his arguments in favor of public sociology. By bringing Erik Olin Wright’s project into line with his public sociology, Burawoy sees this sociology as moral or normative science standing for certain values that might be realized (the utopian side) and how their realization is obstructed (the anti-utopian side).

Burawoy theorizes public sociology by making it organic and generative of a real utopia that is committed to civil sociology. I cannot but agree with him, but here, in this brief article, I want to push not only for cutting-edge criticism of the oppressors but to envisage the possibility of dialoguing with them. My justifications for what I call “dialogical sociology” come from my area of academic intervention and location. My subfields in sociology (knowledge, culture, religion, and politics) are quite different from Burawoy’s labor and (critical) Marxist fields. He antagonizes neoliberal capitalists and actors in third-wave marketization. I grew up and still live in the Middle East: a region afflicted with long-standing brutalizing authoritarian and colonial regimes where torture, political kidnapping, assassination, and dispossession are very common. How would one deal with a situation where the authoritarian regimes have created cultural hegemony and ideologically brainwashed a large section of the people into believing in the virtue of authoritarianism to bring stability? How would one deal with the Arab–Israeli conflict when some Israelis, siblings of Holocaust survivors, become colonial settlers who confiscate the land of Palestinians? Can we have historical, restorative justice without the broader pluralistic mechanisms of transitional justice?

Because of his sensitivity to dominated people and their suffering, Michael Burawoy has often insisted that the task of sociology is to stand with civil society against both state and market domination. This is absolutely crucial, but I would add to this task another two.

The first is to extend the sociological mission beyond civil society, to the civil sphere in the sense this is given by Jeffrey Alexander. Alexander reminds us that civil society is only one sphere among others within a broader social system, into which the family, religious groups, scientific and corporate associations, and geographically bounded regional communities should be incorporated, as they all produce goods and organize their social relations according to different ideals and constraints. This extension of our mission is very important if we are to keep seeing ourselves as guardians of this civil sphere and of liberal democratic ideals.

The second task is to mediate with different noncivil spheres: to engage in dialogue with them. We need to listen attentively to those who refuse to embrace, partially or totally, the ideals we aim to further. To his credit, Burawoy feels the importance of this when he praises Arlie Russell Hochschild’s Strangers in their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right and how she jumps the “empathy wall” with Tea Party supporters in Louisiana. They turned into Trump supporters, expressing their discontent vis-a-vis globalization and their vision of social inequalities. Before judging them, let us listen, for example, to those who fear Syrian and African migrants coming to Europe. With our normative methods, presuppositions, and explicit commitments, I would like here to emphasize our capacity to dialogue and mediate with noncivil spheres. Against a radical critical social theory, I call for a situated critical one. One that, while criticizing power, is also able simultaneously to open up dialogue with the very forces it critiques. This is a way for sociology, while it espouses the comprehensive/classical liberal project, to accommodate (an enhanced and amended version of) Rawls’s political liberalism; i.e. to work out the pluralism (pluralistic conceptions of the good) in our society that combines all sorts of diversity with social cohesion (a unified conception of justice) within society.
“Public sociology is not simply about rational claims or normative argumentations debated in the public sphere, it is also about understanding the emotions and the moral enervation of the other”

More broadly, to me – and I am sure Burawoy would join me on this – the issue of public sociology is not simply about rational claims, or about normative argumentations debated in the public sphere, it is also about emotion: how to understand the emotions of the other, moral sensitivity, the moral enervation of the other, sometimes making them blind to social suffering. This dialogical sociology is sensitive not only to how people ethically justify their actions, but also to how sociologists could take this suffering seriously and approach it, to put it in the words of Silvia Cataldi, as a hermeneutics of presence.

As for talk of morals, in the Arab region, where we have immense religiosity, religion is one of the sources of morality. This is the massive elephant in the room that is deliberately or unconsciously unseen in sociology literature, except when related to political violence. This is not only the case in the Arab world, the Middle East, Israel; religion is also becoming more and more important in Latin America (e.g., the new Pentecostalism in Brazil) and beyond. So, I think that as sociologists we need to be modest and to think about how to acknowledge that there are different elite formations in our society, which include religious people who have been ignored or despised for so long, dubbed as backward and reactionary by anti-clericalist social scientists.

Finally, Burawoy’s autobiography/deep analytical book straightforwardly states that one of the tasks for sociology today is to advance utopian visions; not an easy task in times when the idea of socialism has been discredited. For Burawoy, people become sociologists “not to become rich but to make a better world, [...] more equal, more free, more cooperative” (p. 2). Burawoy has not only made the world better by his thought, but also through his practice: being so generous when taking care of his students and the broader scientific community. I owe him a lot as he has held my hand while my sociology has shifted not from professional and policy sociology to public sociology, but from a sociology that is mapped out by local and regional problems to a sociology that embraces global issues. Moreover, he encouraged me to stand for election onto the ISA executive committee, as vice-president for national associations and as President of this association.

Direct all correspondence to Sari Hanafi <sh41@aub.edu.lb>
A cross the world, sociologists, social scientists, researcher–activists, feminists, and people of color have had a long history of linking research and action, and of engaging with publics. This includes addressing issues of inequality, apartheid, exploitation, oppression, alienation, wars, racism, colonialism, capitalism, democracy, gender-based violence, and movements for social justice and social change.

In the United States, the history of sociological engagement with publics has often been erased or relegated to the margins in the sociological canon. While the classical theorists Marx, Weber, and Durkheim were rightfully a part of the Western pantheon, pioneering sociologists, social researchers, and activists – notably W.E.B. Du Bois, Harriet Martineau, Jane Addams, Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells-Barnett, and Marianne Weber – remained relatively invisible until quite recently. Historically, the pillars of power and privilege, systems of knowledge production, distribution, and consumption have played a pivotal role in creating and contouring the canon in ways that suited sociology’s central theoretical and methodological professional domain which was predominantly Western, White, and male. The result has been the exclusion/minimization of the theoretical knowledge and methodological contributions of important sociologists engaged with publics, doing sociology, and working outside the canon.

In 2004, Michael Burawoy, through his American Sociological Association (ASA) presidential address (re)popularized the term public sociology in the US. Delineating the types of sociological knowledge (public, professional, policy, and critical) and defining public sociology as an impetus for doing sociologies which promote and protect all social relations that make people human, he invigorated discussions and debates on the purpose of the discipline. For me, a feminist action researcher, a sociologist at the margins, actively engaged since the 1990s in shifting domestic violence from being a private problem to a public issue, the 2004 annual meeting was one of the most sociologically engaging and publicly inclusive conferences that the ASA had put together. Although acutely aware of the profound contributions of American sociologists to sociological engagement with publics, as well as those of associations such as the Society for the Study of Social Problems and Sociologists for Women in Society, Burawoy’s presentation
and call to public sociology resonated! It challenged the professional myopia and called into question sociology’s knowledge: for whom and for what?

For Burawoy, sociology is a catalyst for social change. At its core, this is a deeply humanistic sociology that seeks to contribute meaningfully to a better world where there will be less socially produced suffering. This in turn entails a sociology that grapples with the real-world problems of social exclusion, vast inequalities of wealth and opportunity, commodification, and a market-centric world. Sociology’s major mission is to proactively join the battle to protect society from the ravages wreaked by market fundamentalism. Burawoy seeks a public sociology paradigm that builds alliances with and enlists the support of civil organizations and social movements, while also emphasizing students as an important public. Sociology cannot be restricted to activist, pragmatic impulses alone, but must be equally concerned with values to better comprehend the human, social world. Sociology must put at the forefront of its analysis not only instrumental knowledge of means but also “reflexive knowledge” about ends. Public sociology should contribute to a public dialogue about values and goals as well as the possibility of their realization. It entails the “organic interdependence” in which the flourishing of each type of knowledge – public, professional, policy, and critical – depends on the flourishing of all.

Burawoy’s essays written between 2004 and 2014 present the development of his work as a movement from public sociology to global sociology. Together, these provide the trajectory that started by naming and challenging the hegemony of professional sociology in the US and moved on to a more critical understanding and engagement with the global challenges posed by an unequal world. Advocating for a global sociology with strong underpinnings in the local and national systems of knowledge, Burawoy is acutely conscious of the hegemonic hold of the Global North on knowledge production, warning against the positivist dream of unification of the social sciences because that would inevitably be controlled by the powerful, thereby running the risk of the West “advancing the interests of a new imperialism.” Instead, he expounds an alternative project that envisages stitching together national sociologies into regional associations which then lead to dialogue and the ultimate synthesis of global sociologies. Global Dialogue, his International Sociological Association project, was one avenue for international sociological dialogue and debate across the globe on a spectrum of contemporary issues.

On reading Burawoy’s recent book Public Sociology: Between Utopia and Anti-Utopia, published almost two decades after his 2004 ASA presidential address and nearly a decade after his 2014 ISA presidential address, what comes to mind is how he continues to be persistent, passionate, and persuasive about the pitfalls and promise of sociology. C.W. Mills’ view that sociology lies at the intersection of biography and history comes to the fore; but also, albeit unintendedly, so does the importance of the feminist phrase that the “personal is political.” More explicit is the commitment to and critique of Marxism and the highlighting of the profound sociological contributions of W.E.B. Du Bois in connecting sociology and social transformation. Burawoy carefully connects and intersects his own experiences with his analysis of public, professional, policy, and critical sociology. Intertwining biography with history, his sociological sojourns across the world show that lived experiences are an integral part of the sociological imagination. This memoir follows his explicit, nuanced, and personal journey as a sociologist, student, researcher, teacher, administrator, friend, collaborator, activist, and professional association leader continuously committed to reflecting and (re)situating sociology to meet the disciplinary and societal challenges of our time. It is here that he interrogates, extrapolates, and expounds the risks and relevance of sociology.

Today, as we confront the impact of a global pandemic, the rise of authoritarianism, the growth of religious fundamentalism, and the explosion of fake news, social media, and consumption of mega misinformation by manipulable publics often aligned against the common good, we are once again compelled to consider what it will take to fulfill the promise of sociology. Perhaps hope lies in a new generation of sociologists and activists, examining history, advancing the science of sociology through rigorous theory, a commitment to teaching, and research, to address persistent and emerging inequalities. We know that problematizing and explanations are not enough. We need to question, envision, propose, pursue, and manage ways to reverse inequalities. We need to steadfastly stick to the promise of sociology to build a better, just, and equal world.

Direct all correspondence to Margaret Abraham
<Margaret.Abraham@Hofstra.edu>
Thinking Locally and Globally about Intersectionality

by Kathy Davis, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Helma Lutz, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

The term intersectionality addresses the intersections and entanglement of social structures and identities. Coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, it uses the metaphor of a crossroads: a highly frequented place where individuals of different genders, sexualities, social classes, or racialized identities are constantly in danger of being run over. This metaphor has been successfully employed in analysis and debate concerning social inequalities because of its capacity to depict the intersections of different forms of social positionings and discrimination. By replacing the “add-on” approach to categories of difference in power relations (gender and class and “race”), intersectionality established a new agenda: it captures both the structural consequences and the processual dynamics of interactions between three or more axes of power and subordination.

Crenshaw’s idea of intersections between systems of oppression found global resonance during the UN World Conference against Racism in Durban in 2001. Today, the concept of intersectionality has long left the fields in which it originated: gender studies, critical race studies and law. It is now used in sociology and social work, health studies, education, social geography, anthropology, psychology, political science, literature studies, and even architecture. In gender studies, intersectionality became a keyword for course offerings in graduate and undergraduate programs. Conferences, special issues of academic journals, and book publications devoted to intersectionality abound. One can now speak of the field of “intersectionality studies.”

As it traveled from the US to Europe, the notion of intersectionality was taken up in many parts of the world. During these travels, the concept has been changed and adapted to local conditions and historical contexts. In Europe, for example, ethnicity and religion became relevant categories for analyzing discrimination within migrant populations; while in India, “caste” was included as a category that is essential for understanding social inequalities. More recently, generational differences have emerged in how intersectionality is conceptualized – or should be. Recent movements like Black Lives Matter have influenced debates on race and struggles against racism, fueling innovative work in the field of intersectionality.

Understanding these developments requires us to look at the history of intersectionality through the lens of the present. What is it that brings critical scholars and activists back to intersectionality again and again? What is it about the concept of intersectionality that enables it to constantly reinvent itself? And finally: How is intersectionality elaborated, re-worked, and deployed for different purposes and different terrains?
These questions are central to the Routledge Handbook of Intersectionality Studies, which we are now editing and will be published in 2023. The Handbook covers a wide range of topics within the field of intersectionality studies from international and interdisciplinary contributors. For this issue of Global Dialogue we have asked several authors to provide a shortened version of their chapters. The result is a preview of some of the ways intersectionality has been employed to understand social, cultural, and geopolitical inequalities. Ann Phoenix begins the conversation by considering the ways the histories of slavery and colonialism haunt the present, showing why they need to be part of how we think about intersectionality globally. Barbara Giovanna Bello continues with an intersectional look at two of the most important social movements of the present – Black Lives Matter and #MeToo – which began in the United States, but have since become global. Ethel Tungohan shows how intersectionality is essential for understanding the recent migrant care workers’ movement in Canada where it was clearly necessary for different social movements to join forces in order to undermine oppression. Turning to the debates which have emerged within the field of intersectional studies, Amund Rake Hoffart takes a critical look at the search for a pure intersectional metaphor which will eliminate all the problems with the concept, arguing instead for the “need for messiness” in research on intersectional inequalities and configurations of power. Finally, taking up the international call for a methodology for intersectional research, we (Kathy Davis and Helma Lutz) show how the deceptively simple procedure of “asking the other question” can help us analyze the strategies people use to resist or accommodate power in their everyday lives.

Taken as a whole, this dialogue shows some of the ways intersectionality has been influential in how scholars and activists alike can think about inequality, power, and social transformation, both locally and globally.

Direct all correspondence to:
Helma Lutz <lutz@soz.uni-frankfurt.de>
Kathy Davis <k.e.davis@vu.nl>
Few people now dispute the idea that intersectionality is central to understanding social relations, everyday social practices, and how society functions. Its concern with the ways in which everybody is simultaneously placed in multiple social categories such as gender, sexuality, social class, and racialization provides a heuristic for analyzing inequalities, power relations, and the complexity of social positioning. It shows how any social category is decentered by its intersections with other social categories and by their dynamism, relationality, and historical location.

Sociologists are increasingly engaging with historical understandings of how slavery and colonialism have constituted the global history of the present. Yet, while theorizing that intersectionality is historically located enables an understanding of the potentially contradictory processes that underpin social divisions, inclusions, and exclusions, much...
less is known about the ways in which histories are part of intersectionality. This article argues that the ways in which histories haunt the present are important for theories of intersectionality.

> **Historical hauntings**

The ways in which historical hauntings inflect contemporary social relations and erupt psychosocially in unanticipated ways became evident in 2020 via the global protests against racism and oppressive racist histories following the video-recorded murder of George Floyd by a policeman in the USA. This revitalized, and broadened support for, the Black Lives Matter movement. The fact that racist histories of colonialism and enslavement haunt many societies was demonstrated by reactions to George Floyd’s murder (one of numerous murders of a Black person by White police), which focused on centuries of racist oppression and spontaneously targeted symbols of that oppressive history, including statues of enslavers and colonialists. Histories that appeared long-buried, unconscious, or unthought, came to haunt the contemporary social landscape. These resurfaced histories resulted in campaigns to produce sociostructural change and an outpouring of personal testimonies.

The notion of historical haunting is clearly not new. It has long been explored in novels and academic work dealing with, for example, the ways in which the traumas of the Holocaust and slavery are part of transgenerational communication and disrupt the lives of the descendants of those who suffered them, generally without being identified as doing so. The reactions to George Floyd’s murder illuminate the ways in which collective histories are also individual, and elements from the past return or persist in the present. More than this, collective histories are central to how we imagine the future and the possible futures that are brought into being.

From an intersectional perspective, the theorizing of hauntology deepens possibilities for analyzing social categories. It does so by raising questions about how personal and national histories are interlinked and sedimented within all social categories, producing divisions and commonalities between people. Such temporal understandings of, for example, what it means to be a Black, working-class woman in Minority World countries require the bringing together of transgenerational and national histories that avoid implicitly essentialist social categories. Equally, it encourages a focus on how those same histories are also inextricably part of the lives of White, middle-class men in those same countries.

An intersectional focus on hauntology can help researchers to ask more illuminating questions about social issues. Through the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, it soon became painfully clear that gender, nation, migration status, socioeconomic status, disabilities, age, housing, and occupation all intersect to produce unequal rates of morbidity and mortality. It was striking, however, that many explanations were sought in terms of, for example, living conditions, in ways that individualized these differences and highlighted cultural differences. While it is crucial to establish which factors are associated with mortality rates, it is equally important to recognize that the associations found depend on what is investigated, which in turn depends on preexisting understandings. Asking questions about the histories that produced particular positionings and practices, and the socioemotional context in which they are expressed, is more likely to produce analysis that sustains claims for social justice and meaningful interventions. Those questions are also more likely to take seri-
ously the ways in which the intersections of particular social positions exacerbate inequities that already exist in Minority World societies.

**> Haunting intersectional futures**

The intersectional haunting of the present is temporal, not only because it shows how the past is part of the present, but because of how it spurs future action. This is true whether the past erupts into the present, as with the resurgence of Black Lives Matter, or whether it remains a melancholic and unnamed presence. In both cases, the haunting produces troubled subject positions that require the production of new stories and hence new visions of the future. Events that become historically significant therefore affect everyday practices and permeate social relations, constraining or facilitating possible futures. The eruptions produced when hauntings emerge into consciousness impel future action and claims for more desirable futures. Intersectionality helps to explain how people in a certain social category may have different reactions, hopes, and visions when haunting histories become conscious.

In recent years, various countries have seen new gendered/racialized narratives produced in reaction to murders of different women or of Black people, giving rise, for example, to the popularizing of #SayHerName in the US in recognition of the fact that while the murders of some Black men by police become notorious, the murders of Black women and children by police frequently receive no publicity. It is not, therefore, possible to understand the impact of histories on any one person without knowing the constellation of relations and effects that have been passed down through the generations and sedimented within everyday practices, simultaneously reproducing, for example, racism and sexism. The understanding of which categories are being evoked in any social situation, and the relevance of social locations, emotional attachments, positionings, and power relations, are not necessarily self-evident. This means that it cannot be assumed that social categories are only relevant when they are focused on or visibly in operation. It also means that histories as legitimated by nation states are not sufficient for the understanding of intersectional hauntings, since there is much that is hidden in and from such histories. Silent histories permeate societies, haunting the present through exclusionary/inclusionary everyday intersectional social relations.
> Intersectional Perspectives on Social Movements

by Barbara Giovanna Bello, University of Milan, Italy, and Board member of ISA Research Committee on the Sociology of Law (RC12)

The #Black Lives Matter (BLM) and #MeToo movements have become globally viral since 2013 and 2017, respectively. Due to the amplifying effect of social media, they have catalyzed international attention to the persistent and systemic violence confronting women and Black people in the US and beyond.

> Origins

BLM was co-founded by Alicia Garza, Patrisse Cullors, and Opal Tometi in 2013 in response to the acquittal of Trayvon Martin’s murderer, and is considered the first Internet-based movement of its kind. Its leadership has been Black, female and queer ever since. The #MeToo movement has a different history: founded by Black activist Tarana Burke in 2006 with the aim of healing trauma of sexual violence against women, young people, queers, trans people, and those from Black communities with disability, its fast online journey started when, during the Harvey Weinstein scandal in 2017, celebrity Alyssa Milano – unaware at the time of the earlier grassroots MeToo movement – called upon women worldwide to share their experiences of sexual abuse by using the #metoo hashtag.

> The “both/and” perspective

One may ask why two movements initiated by Black women, intentionally intersectional since their inception, face challenges when it comes to making the “both/and” perspective work effectively. We see Black male activists progressively represent themselves as advocates for their community and as the primary target of racist violence by law enforcement officers; meanwhile, White women’s re-

Credit: Raphael Deindl.
quests to compete in the labor market, without the threat of sexual abuse, seem to dominate the scene; but Black women’s voices and experiences are increasingly absent. In what follows, I summarize some possible explanations for their invisibility and reflect on how an intersectional approach could hopefully contribute to remedying it.

> **Unequal questions of social justice**

Firstly, at the structural level, the different status enjoyed by gender and race as stand-alone categories needs closer analysis, since it affects their mutual interplay and that with other categories in hierarchical power relations. In fact, the BLM movement primarily calls upon Black people to address White supremacy and the reproduction of violence along the line of race. The conservative counterclaims, like the “All Lives Matter” and “Blue Lives Matter” groupings, particularly minimize Black women’s and most disadvantaged Black people’s demand for dignity. In its turn, #MeToo addresses virtually all women (more than half of the world population): it seeks to dismantle patriarchy, but it expresses this more clearly around access to the “room” of power without the threat of sexual violence, a place that is even harder for Black women to access. All in all, both movements raise questions of social justice, but they do so differently.

> **The self-perpetuation of privilege**

Secondly, the US and international mainstream media have played a role in furthering Black women’s invisibility. News and images of brutal killings of Black men and their last words – “I can’t breathe” – still thunder loudly in our ears and souls, but those of murdered Black women are absent. Similarly, sexual abuse denounced by White women – celebrities or not – have overshadowed that reported by “other” women. In this context, “class” matters in both movements. The prism of class–race–gender helps reveal mutually constructing systems of privilege that are crystallized in the media system – where White people, including women, are in a better position to attract attention – and reproduced through information.

These first two observations possibly explain the wider support received by #MeToo and the downplaying of Black and minority women’s experiences, while suggesting possibilities of how to subvert power relations and include “all” voices.

> **Why we need intersectionality**

Thirdly, it may be suggested that the murder and sexual abuse of Black women are still perceived as too specific to represent “universally” all women’s and Black people’s sufferings. So, an intersectional approach has the potential to transform the public discourse still based on the assumption that racist and sexist violence are what happens, respectively, to Black men and White women. Fourthly, intersectionality helps explain how social constructions fuel the domination/subordination of bodies, which are de-humanized in the BLM cases and exploited in the case of #MeToo. Portrayals of Black women as aggressive Sapphires, or holding “superhuman” strength, or as hypersexualized Jezebels assumed to be available may instrumentally serve to justify the abuse of state force against them or non-consensual sex, and to question their credibility. This surfaced in the Weinstein case too: out of many denouncements, he specifically discredited Black Kenyan-Mexican actress Lupita Nyong’o. At the same time, the representation of Black men as “rapists” of White women often led to unfounded incriminations and legitimized their lynching in the past, possibly explaining the reluctance of some of them to support the #MeToo motto, “Just believe women,” which may also impact their solidarity with Black women.

> **Moving forward**

Lastly, as a heuristic device, intersectionality focuses on the implications of the interaction between power structures, but political decisions determine whom to support and how, as Keisha Lindsay underlines. In both movements, many supporters are still engaged in a single axis struggle, while their founders and other activists are frantically seeking to make the still invisible people visible: their initiatives deserve greater media and online attention worldwide. Hence, the #SayHerName project was launched in December 2014 by the African American Policy Forum (AAPF) and the Center for Intersectionality and Social Policy Studies (CISPS) to tackle violence by the police against Black women (including trans and gender non-conforming women); the original #MeToo and the #UsToo movements seek to tackle sexual abuse against women of color, unskilled workers, and LGBTQI+ people.

As a way forward, I suggest that the characteristics of the Internet could be better used to raise the “intersectionality question” globally. In fact, if the transnationality and amplification of Web communication have allowed emphasis to be placed on White women and Black men, they have also made it blatantly evident that “someone” was missing in the narration, and have paved the way for prompt reactions about “who” was not there and “why,” providing room to discuss current gaps. In this “virtual” space, BLM and #MeToo could maximize their offline and online “intersectional” agendas by building coalitions. If we recall the American lawyer and activist Mari Matsuda: “we cannot, at this point in history, engage fruitfully […] without engaging in coalition, without coming out of separate places to meet one another across all the positions of privilege and subordination that we hold in relation to one another.”

Direct all correspondence to Barbara Giovanna Bello <barbara.bello@unimi.it>
In April 2018, former Liberal Party immigration minister Ahmed Hussen announced that the Canadian Live-In Caregiver Program would no longer accept applications for permanent residency from 2020. This announcement dismayed organizations constituted by Canada’s migrant care workers’ movement. The migrants’ movement in Toronto, which consists of different actors from various social locations and diverse organizations with sharply differing normative goals and agendas, sprang into action.

How to achieve permanent residency for all migrant care workers

Meetings were hastily organized at the Workers Action Centre in Toronto, attended by different migrant organizations. After agreeing that caregivers should continue to be able to receive permanent residency in Canada, the movement splintered, with divisions emerging along the lines of how to achieve the demand for permanent residency for all migrant care workers. There were also issues regarding which agendas to prioritize, and the following questions emerged:

Who is speaking for whom? What is truly at stake in this campaign? Should our collective energies be geared towards legal reform or should we also consider the structural inequities that compel migrant care workers to leave their families behind and come to Canada to work?

Proposals withdrawn

These questions were left unanswered and indeed remain a focal point of tension. Nevertheless, caregiver organizations succeeded in voicing their opposition to the proposed changes, ensuring that their perspectives became part of the ongoing dialogue that was taking place. Through media releases and protest, they made it clear that care work is a valuable part of Canadian society and that migrant care workers, most of whom are racialized, working-class women from Global South countries, are an indispensable part of the workforce. As a result of their activism, the Liberal government withdrew its proposal and created new pathways for migrant care workers to attain Canadian citizenship. While the resulting pathways were a far cry from the automatic right that caregivers previously had to apply for Canadian citizenship under the now-defunct Live-in Caregiver Program, routes to permanent residency were nevertheless retained and caregiver coalitions were relieved that they had held at bay the threats to remove citizenship rights altogether.

Intersectional Solidarities and the Migrant Care Workers

by Ethel Tungohan, York University, Canada

The intersectional lens

When reflecting on these discussions four years later, in 2022, it occurs to me that applying an intersectional lens when examining migrant care workers’ movements specifically, and social movements in general, brings to the fore the oftentimes tricky dilemmas that actors in such movements face.

First, intersectionality allows us to truly appreciate the challenges that the migrant care workers’ movement faces when projecting a unified platform considering the multiple and overlapping social locations its members occupy. Tensions persist when identifying which activists can truly be the voice of the movement, given that members who face the most intersectional disadvantages are those who are the least likely to have the capacity to speak. Yet it is their needs that are arguably the most urgent. Hence, this intersectional approach reveals the difficulties in creating a movement that captures its members’ needs, especially the needs of those who are facing the most challenges.

Second, an intersectional lens also reveals how migrant care workers’ movements benefit from being intersectional in their approach. Migrant care workers’ organizations that define themselves as intersectional seek coalitions with different movements with diverse membership bases. They often form alliances with the labor movement and feminist movement. Acting in the interests of migrant
care workers in Canada who find their citizenship applications rejected because they or their families have disabilities, these organizations have also sought coalitions with disability justice movements. The opportunity to work with these various movements enables migrant care workers’ concerns to gain more widespread traction. As Fernando Tormos-Aponte and I write in an upcoming piece, the ability to carve out intersectional solidarity allows different communities to see their fates as interlinked. The progressive organizations that are part of the migrant care workers’ movement – alongside other social movements – find that collectively, they can work together to undermine oppression by joining forces in key campaigns and influencing public discourse.

> Abolition versus reform

It is, of course, on the question of normative agendas that different actors from a movement come into conflict. Here, an intersectional lens again proves illuminating. Some migrant care workers’ organizations believe, in harmony with the Combahee River Collective’s intersectional vision, that movements should ultimately move towards abolishing the interlocking power structures of capitalism, imperialism, and patriarchy. Yet other organizations consider that their efforts are best channeled towards seeking policy changes. In my forthcoming book, Care Activism: Migrant Domestic Workers, Movement-Building and Communities of Care, I categorize these divisions as based on abolition versus reform: some organizations see movement success as fostering an abolitionist vision and others see success as grounded in policy changes.

> The effects of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has upended many of these ideological divisions, making intersectional analysis even more salient. While I still think that different organizations’ normative visions ultimately rest on ideology, analyzing these movements using intersectionality allows us to better appreciate the fluidity of the approaches adopted by migrant care workers’ movements. Intersectionality, with its emphasis on a multi-dimensional analysis of power that identifies shifts in processes, systems, and structures that scale down and affect experiences lived by individuals, shows how COVID-19 was cataclysmic for migrant care workers: the ensuing shifts in state policies and workplace conditions were devastating.

The pandemic was a watershed for the migrant care workers’ movement in Canada, revealing the urgency of activism within the movement. Many of the same organizations that adopted conflicting stances in 2018 came together during the pandemic to call for improved policies in support of migrant care workers with the aim of ushering in more long-lasting structural changes that would lead to care taking center stage as a fundamental societal value. The pandemic has also led actors within the migrant care workers’ movement to consider anew the importance of forming alliances with indigenous movements, with Black Lives Matter, and with other progressive social movements. Seeing their fate as irrevocably united with other minoritized communities has led to a deeper appreciation of the necessity for intersectional solidarity.
Language, in both its everyday and academic forms, is loaded with metaphor. If you start looking for metaphors in a text, they are likely to spring up like mushrooms. Metaphors make use of tropes: expressions that shift the familiar meaning of words so that they depict something else. Metaphors such as a broken heart, a bad apple, one’s moral compass, late bloomers and double-edged swords make use of well-known objects from mundane settings and transfer them into new, sometimes surprising, ones. Locating the wealth of metaphors in our everyday and academic language illustrates why they are something we “live by,” as it was put in the classic work on metaphor by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson from 1980. Far from being a peripheral phenomenon of language, something extraordinary that belongs to the realms of poetry and rhetoric, metaphors deeply influence our everyday thinking and actions.

> Crenshaw’s traffic intersection

Kimberlé Crenshaw’s 1989 essay “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” elaborated the concept of intersectionality through
the metaphor of a traffic intersection. By visualizing Black women's experience of discrimination as the experience of being run over by traffic from multiple directions, Crenshaw provided particularly evocative imagery to accompany her analysis of legal cases in the USA, where Black women were falling through the cracks in the US anti-discrimination doctrines. Although the traffic intersection has since been taken up as intersectionality's central image, it has also received its share of criticism. Most objections center on the additive dimensions of the image of the traffic intersection: it portrays social categories – like gender, race, class and sexuality – as separate and independent, making it possible to add them to each other. It seems hard to deny that the image of the traffic intersection is additive in the sense that it separates independent roads that lead into and out of the intersection. In the three decades that have passed since the publication of Crenshaw's essay, an abundance of – more and less eccentric – alternative metaphors have been proposed. This, then, has also become one of the important ways in which intersectionality travels: the idea has journeyed far and wide by continuously being given new interpretations and elaborations through metaphor and analogy.

> **There's more than one way to skin a cat!**

Interestingly, some alternative metaphors for intersectionality are more abstract than the traffic intersection they are intended to replace, for instance, axes, interferences, configurations, assemblages, fractals, interstices, vectors, topographies, and disorderly spaces of emergence. For those looking for metaphors in more tangible arenas, the sphere of cooking and baking is evidently an inspiring one, as intersectionality has been likened to sugar, cookies, a layer cake, the swirls in a marble cake, batter, and a stew. There is one aspect of cooking and eating that has had an especially alluring effect on scholars in search of better intersectionality metaphors: the way ingredients mix, intermingle, and flow into each other; parts becoming wholes, wholes becoming parts; different ingredients blending, spilling over, and being chewed up together. One example among the mountain of food metaphors is Shannon Sullivan’s stew, presented in her 2001 book *Living Across and Through Skins*. In contrast to a fondue, where ingredients melt together and disintegrate, the vegetables in Sullivan’s stew retain their "identity" in the pot, but at the same time they are transformed by interacting with other vegetables. Thinking of a stew as a metaphor for intersectional social relations and identities, the vegetables in the pot illuminate the dynamic and mutually shaping relationship between different parts of one's social identity, such as categories of race, gender, class, sexuality, age, dis/ability, and so on.

> **The messy mountainous intersection**

Other scholars have continued to work with the traffic imagery of roadways and crossroads. In her 2011 essay “Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender,” Ann Garry sketches the step-by-step addition of more elements to the traffic intersection: elements that build upon, but at the same time complicate, Crenshaw’s original metaphor. To make it more fluid and better able to capture a thorough blending of oppressive systems, Garry adds more streets, more cars, and a roundabout. Nevertheless, these added elements still cannot redeem the restrictive horizontality of the image of the traffic intersection. To do so, we must venture beyond the flat structure of the roundabout. What is needed is an element of verticality to convey how structures of privilege and oppression work together and relate to each other. At this point, Garry turns to mountains and then also introduces running liquids to accompany the image of the mountain. Again, the motivation is to ensure that the imagery remains fluid, not solid and discrete. Garry’s remake results in something like the following: liquids run from mountains to an intersection with a roundabout in its center and where many streets and cars meet. If this image appears messy, Garry assures us that this kind of messiness is exactly what we need in our metaphors to help us understand the complexity of intersectionality.

> **There is no pure messiness**

What drives this search for alternative metaphors for intersectionality? The quest for new and improved metaphors seems to be fueled by the widespread dissatisfaction with intersectionality’s central image. The traffic intersection metaphor simply does not meet the requirements: it is too reliant on additivity of separate streams to suffice. That is to say that the “right” metaphor for intersectionality must also be one that is unsullied by additivity. At this point, I am reminded of Garry’s insistence on the need for messiness in our intersectionality metaphors. However, the quest for the right metaphor for intersectionality appears, paradoxically, to aspire towards a pure version of the impure; that is, it is an attempt to carve out a metaphor that is free from additive pollution. Aspiring towards such ideals of purity seems, to me, to be the very opposite of messiness, and something that might actually hamper our intellectual and metaphorical imagination. Would not taking “the need for messiness” in our metaphors seriously, instead require us to acknowledge the additive dimensions of our thinking, and see them as a potential resource rather than an embarrassment? ■

Direct all correspondence to Amund Rake Hoffart &lt;a.r.hoffart@stk.uio.no&gt;
> Intersectionality as Critical Method

by Kathy Davis, Free University Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Helma Lutz, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany

While many scholars in the field of gender studies are convinced that intersectionality is an essential part of good feminist theory, it is not always clear how intersectionality should be adopted in the context of research. In practice, intersectionality raises many questions, for example: What categories should be included in an intersectional analysis? Should researchers always stick to the “big three” of gender, race, and class, or should they cast a wider net? Some scholars have asked whether categories should be used at all, as they may be misleading and fail to capture the broad diversity of experiences and identities.

> How to apply intersectionality

The US legal scholar Mari Matsuda came up with a simple procedure for intersectional analysis which she called “asking the other question”: “When I see something that looks racist, I ask, ‘Where is the patriarchy in this?’ When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, ‘Where is the heterosexism in this?’ When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, ‘Where are the class interests in this?’” This procedure turns out to be a surprisingly simple, but definitely useful way to begin analyzing the ways intersectional power works in people’s life stories and how these intersections can be both enabling and constraining.

> How freedom can be seen to depend on integrating struggles

As an example, we applied this method to the life history of Mamphela Ramphele, a famous South African medical doctor, writer, and anti-apartheid activist. She was imprisoned and her work banned for many years, but she went on to become the first Black woman to head a South African university, a managing director of the World Bank, and a presidential candidate of the Democratic Alliance in the general elections of 2014. We used three ways of “asking the other question”: a) to situate ourselves as researchers prior to the analysis; b) to discover blind spots that emerged during the analysis; c) to complicate thinking about power relations.

a) Following Donna Haraway’s famous argument that (feminist) researchers need to admit that the knowledge...
they are producing is always situated, partial, and reflexive, we recognized that as White, feminist, European/US researchers with an anti-racist agenda, our desire to analyze Ramphele’s biography was not an innocent endeavor. Being critical of the neglect of race and racism in feminist scholarship, we hoped that Ramphele’s life history would allow us to implement our project, namely, to demonstrate that it is impossible to talk about gender without talking about race. We were initially surprised at her seeming reluctance to situate herself as a Black African in the context of apartheid or to talk about her own experiences with racism. She even seemed to distance herself from race and racism by drawing upon her privileged position or the ways that she was extraordinary or different. Even more remarkable was the fact that throughout the interview she seemed more comfortable positioning herself as a woman. It was her repeated emphasis on gender that stopped us in our tracks and made us realize that we needed to go back to the drawing board.

b) By again “asking the other question,” we considered more closely some of those moments when Ramphele insisted that gender inequality and sexism were the driving forces behind her development. In contrast to our assumption that racism would be the most salient feature of her life under apartheid, Ramphele continued to reference patriarchal gender relations in order to make sense of her life. Her narrative strategy was instrumental in establishing her special position, something she could more easily accomplish via her gender identity in racially bifurcated South Africa. She did not position herself as a Black woman or as a South African, but rather as a daughter and a sister who had to fight against the men and male-dominated institutions which prevented her from doing what she wanted to do. In this way, she established herself as distinctive: different from her family, friends, colleagues, and comrades.

c) By “asking the other question,” we were able to understand Ramphele’s determination to present herself as an independent-minded woman. Her deep desire to overcome the normative constraints of a woman’s role in society became the grounds for her success as a self-made scholar, an activist, a professional, and a single mother. She focused on the activities that she had accomplished under her own steam (and not, for example, as the lover of the famous Black Power activist Steve Biko) and emphasized repeatedly that it was not only race, the apartheid state, or the Black Consciousness Movement that mattered to how she saw her identity. She demonstrated how different aspects and social positionings in her life became salient at specific moments, depending on the context in which she found herself. Take, for example, her rebellion against the ANC’s prioritizing of the struggle against racism over feminism:

“You can’t have divided freedom. I asked, How am I going to define myself as a free person if I become free as a black person and remain trapped as a woman? There is no way in which my body can be divided between the woman in me and the black person in me. And if you’re going to address my freedom, it’s got to be integrated.”

In this beautiful example of intersectional thinking, she brings gender and race together, making it clear that for her, freedom depends upon both struggles being integrated.

> How everyday strategies allow us to resist or accommodate power

The method of “asking the other question” enables us to make intersectional sense of Ramphele’s biography by allowing us to critically interrogate our own assumptions and social location, to recognize how our blind spots impede our analysis of the interview, and ultimately to uncover how the interviewee herself provided a complex reconstruction of her life, using an intersectional understanding of gender, race, and other social difference to create a narrative that made sense for her. The use of intersectionality is not restricted to researchers, sociologists, feminists, and critical race scholars; ordinary people use it themselves. Analyzing intersectionality requires that we pay attention to how people position themselves in different contexts and at different moments in their lives. It means acknowledging vulnerabilities which are not equal or similar in every situation and looking at how individuals develop strategies — often with considerable resourcefulness — to cushion or absorb these vulnerabilities. And, most important of all, it involves looking at the everyday strategies people use to resist or accommodate power: strategies that are inevitably more complicated and contradictory than we expect.

Direct all correspondence to:
Kathy Davis <k.e.davis@vu.nl>
Helma Lutz <lutz@soz.uni-frankfurt.de>

1. This analysis is based on an interview conducted by a colleague, the former civil rights activist and oral historian Mary Marshall Clark, as well as several autobiographies written by Ramphele herself.
> Fridays for Future: A Social Movements Perspective

by Koichi Hasegawa, Shokei Gakuin University, Japan, and member of the ISA Research Committee on Environment and Society (RC24)

Fridays for Future, a network of young people working on climate change issues, is still active despite the COVID-19 pandemic under which large face-to-face events are hard to hold. In Glasgow, UK, during the UN Climate Change Conference (COP26) in November 2021, about 100,000 people marched to demand more aggressive action to combat the climate crisis. In mid-September 2019, this campaign succeeded in mobilizing more than 7.6 million young people globally, which is the world record for the number of participants in a street campaign. We can evaluate that this is the most successful collective action worldwide. We may wonder why these campaigns have been so successful. However, in spite of this global success, in Japan involvement in these activities has been small and slow compared to the rapid upsurge elsewhere. Why have these campaigns in Japan been so limited in terms of the number of participants mobilized, cities where street campaigns have been held, and influence on the media and within government, at both the national and local level? This article offers some answers to these questions from the perspective of social movements, focusing on cultural framing, mobilizing resources, and the structure of political opportunities.

Main picture: Global Day of Action for Climate Justice. 100,000 people joined the Climate March in Glasgow at COP26 on November 6, 2021. Credit: Hanae Takahashi (Friends of the Earth Japan).

Smaller picture: Climate March in London on November 6, 2021. Credit: Amelia Collins (Friends of the Earth International).

Fridays for Future began on August 20, 2018, when Greta Thunberg, then a 15-year-old Swedish girl, started a protest by herself in front of the Swedish Parliament. This was the first day of the new school semester and the middle of the general election campaign in Sweden. Her original plan was to continue her strike for three weeks, until Friday, September 7: the end of the general election campaign. The “Climate Change Strike” or “school strike” which she started by boycotting her classes to demand that the government strengthen measures against climate change, was immediately spread through SNS (Social Networking Services) and media coverage overseas. In the wake of an unexpectedly big response to her protest, Greta decided to continue the

> Fridays for Future: the most successful collective action

...
strike every Friday after the general election until the Swedish government adopted more aggressive action to fulfill its promises under the Paris Agreement of 2015. Her TED (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) talk in November 2018 and her speech at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP24) in December that year were highly praised, and the climate change strike immediately spread worldwide as Fridays for Future campaigns.

Seven months after Greta’s first protest, on Friday, March 15, 2019, the campaign had expanded to include more than 1.4 million people, mainly youngsters, in more than 2000 cities in 125 countries around the world. Thirteen months after it had started, on Friday, September 20, 2019, just before the UN Climate Action Summit started on September 23, more than 4 million people participated in protests in 163 countries. The campaign continued until Friday, September 27, with more than 7.6 million participants in total in 185 countries over eight days. In most countries, many young people voluntarily participated in street demonstrations.

It was the largest collective action in the world to date on any issue or in any field. Prior to Greta’s actions, the largest climate change demonstration had been in New York, just before the UN Special Session on climate change in September 2014 with about 400,000 participants.

In 2020, due to the global COVID-19 pandemic, action on the street was strictly limited in most countries. But on Friday, September 25, 2020, a Global Day of Climate Action was called. Despite the pandemic, action was taken at 3200 locations around the world. In Germany, a total of 200,000 people participated in street actions at 450 locations.

The activities in Japan were poorly attended and slow to gain support, compared to the rapid upsurge around the world. The protests on March 15, 2019 were limited to a total of only 200 participants in Japan, in just two cities: Tokyo and Kyoto. However, the demonstration on September 20, 2019, named “the Global Climate March,” was attended by more than 5000 people in 27 cities across 23 prefectures. About 3000 people participated in Tokyo. To make it easier for people to participate, in Japan, the softer term march was used instead of strike or action.

The following characteristics of this movement are very interesting. (1) It consists of collective action mainly involving younger generations such as high school and university students. (2) Most of the participants were first-timers who had never been involved in any social movements or demonstrations before. (3) The action by young people of boycotting school classes and becoming involved in street action aimed at strengthening measures against climate change was essentially selfless. (4) It is not a one-off event, but still continues every Friday, and worldwide action has been held several times even during the COVID-19 pandemic. (5) It has spread all over the world including to developing countries. (6) SNS are used as a tool to call for participation. (7) Finally, it is a single issue activity focusing on climate change.

> Analysis through cultural framing, mobilization structure, and political opportunity structure

My framework for analyzing social movements, the triangular model of social movement (TRIM) is based on work by McAdam (1996), and consists of three elements: cultural framing, mobilization structure, and political opportunity structure (Hasegawa 2018). Cultural framing defines the common situation shared by all the participants: the world image and the self-image of the movement, which justifies the social movement and activities, and motivates citizens to participate. Cultural framing is a dynamic and strategic process that mediates dissatisfaction and orientation towards change. The mobilization structure focuses on what resources can be mobilized under which conditions. All kinds of resources, for example, human, financial, material and informational, as well as symbolic resources like legitimacy or justification, can be mobilized. Finally, the political opportunity structure is the whole of the institutional and non-institutional political conditions that define the social processes of the emergence, development, and decline of social movements.

This is an analytical framework that integrates the perspective of collective behavior, the theory of new social movements, and the resource mobilization perspective. It is a response to the three spheres of “social movement and culture,” “social movement and organization,” and “social movement and politics.”

The name of Fridays for Future and the symbolic icon of Greta Thunberg were extremely effective. It has been considered difficult for key players in the movement that has formed around climate change issues to remain potent symbols for many years, even though there are longstanding symbolic icons such as polar bears. The symbolic figures are limited to the former US Vice President Al Gore, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. In terms of personalizing the issue of climate change, it is extremely significant that Greta Thunberg emerged into the spotlight. In 2019, she was invited to the World Economic Forum in January, the EU Parliament in February, and the UN Climate Action Summit in September; and her voice impressed, time after time. In December that same year, she was named Person of the Year by Time magazine.

Fridays for Future – it just happened to be on a Friday, a target day of Greta’s protesting – is also a good framing. Like the #MeToo movement, these words and phrases can be understood by elementary school children in English-
speaking countries. The message is straightforward and positive. It is literally future-oriented. It contains only 16 letters, but it is a call for action on Fridays, expressing a sense of crisis for the future. It is also easy to use as an abbreviation and convenient for hashtags, as in #FFFSendai: just like Fridays for Future Kyoto or Fridays for Future Kobe, we can add not only a country name but also a local place name. Because it is easy to localize, it is easy for young people to organize around it in their own area. In Japan, a total of more than 30 groups of Fridays for Future have protested continuously in each region. Compared to negative, forbidden, and accusative framings such as “opposite,” “anti-xx,” and “do not do xx,” it is less likely to cause resistance or repulsion. It can also create interest in what Fridays for Future is.

Regarding the mobilization structure, well-established environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth, and the WWF (World Wide Fund for Nature) have retreated into the background. It is true that members of some established environmental NGOs and full-time staff of their secretariat are joining in to provide support, more or less; but basically, it does not rely on an organizational foundation. It is the best proof of the success of this framing that young people confront the climate crisis under the name of Fridays for Future.

Young people use SNS to communicate and mobilize information. Greta’s Twitter account has 5.05 million followers (as of the end of June 2022). Her Facebook page also has 3.55 million followers. Most of her Facebook articles have received more than 10,000 likes, and some more than 100,000 likes. Greta’s good sense of outreach, problem-raising ability, and coherent attitude are great things to learn from when thinking about mobilizing.

The timing of the political opportunity of 2019 was instrumental in the great response to Greta’s actions. 2019 was the year before the Paris Agreement began to be implemented in 2020, and it was easy for the media to cover it. If the action had taken place in 2012, it is doubtful that it would have received such a response.

In May 2019, the Guardian newspaper in the UK, which is the most enthusiastic of the world’s daily newspapers reporting on climate change, said that the name climate change did not fully convey the seriousness of the reality at the time. Declaring a policy change, it thereafter began to describe the situation as a climate crisis or a climate emergency.

Greta’s actions show continuity. On Friday, June 17, 2022, the school strike reached its 200th week; at 52 weeks/year, it has been going on for around four years.

> Japan: why the campaigns have been so limited

Japan’s Fridays for Future campaigns are extremely limited compared to those in other countries. Why have they been so limited in terms of the number of participants mobilized?

Japanese youth groups use the name Fridays for Future in English with no translation. This is a straightforward phrase, but in Japanese it would be very difficult to express and nobody has come up with a good counterpart phrase in Japanese. Similarly, there is no person who is a symbolic icon like Greta. Generally, in Japan, young people are silent, cynical, or indifferent, while many of the participants in street campaigns are foreigners and international school students. Even among Asian countries, the political achievements of Japanese social movements are poor; when compared to South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, the Philippines, etc., Japan’s social movements are weak in terms of funding, human resources, organizational foundations, and the involvement of experts. They are underpowered because cultural framing, resource mobilization, and political opportunities for social movements are all so weak. Eventually, the expansion of the mobilization will peak, and there is a possibility that we will face a diminished sense of political effectiveness and a sense of helplessness, with the idea that we are acting repeatedly, but in the end, we may not see any results from our activities. There are issues of how to maintain the energy of practices that continue repeating the same thing every time, and how to maintain the exercise as the freshness of participants and media coverage fade.

In terms of the structure of political opportunity, youth groups have not yet succeeded in finding an effective political route to push aggressive climate policy. There is no specific political program or agenda following the street protests. How should Fridays for Future campaigns be organized in new directions; what should the next step be; and who should their political allies be? This is all still very unclear. The upheaval caused by activism has failed to bring about victory in any national elections. Gaining political influence is still a difficult challenge for activists due to the limitations of their organizational backgrounds. In light of the political backlash fueled by ethno-centrism and populism, as well as the political pressure in the mass media, Japan’s civil society and civil activism on climate change issues stand at a crossroads, and their future direction remains uncertain. This might be a common issue not only for Japan’s Fridays for Future campaigns, but also for the overseas campaigns. But particularly under the political culture in Japan, where the political engagement of the general public is unlikely to increase, the issue of how to sustain the movement and make headway is very hard to tackle.

Direct all correspondence to Koichi Hasegawa <k_hasegawa@shokei.ac.jp>
How the Russian-Ukrainian War Affects Sociology

by Nataliya Chernysh, Ivan Franko Lviv National University, Ukraine

In my speech at the III Congress of the Sociological Association of Ukraine, I identified four stages in the development of sociological thought in the context of globalization. Structurally, each stage has seven components, which I consider of primary importance for understanding its specifics and determining general development trends: the nature of sociology at a particular time, its defining features, its basic concepts, its central themes, its major functions, its dominant feature, and the main methods employed in empirical research.

> The sociology of globalization

Stage I: sociology before globalization (from the beginnings of sociology up until 1985), when the first sociological works in this field appeared. Sociology was then considered the science of society; its abstract ideal was a Western-type society within its territorial and nation-state borders. In 2000, U. Beck called this “container” sociology. This is the period of the formation of the sociological canon.

Stage II (1985-2002): sociology of the era of the deployment of powerful globalization processes; thus, sociology becomes a science of humanity, which is globalized following the Western model in the form of Westernization, more specifically, Americanization (even more specifically, McDonaldization). That is why P. Berger calls the Americans the main globalizers. At this stage, the formation of the sociological canon continues.

Stage III (2002-2016): sociology of the era of multiple globalizations (the emergence of easternization, alternative globalization, etc.). That is, a global sociology is being formed, which is becoming a science of humanity globalized in various ways. In it, the local acquires the right to exist, and representatives of different national schools gain the opportunity to participate in sociological dialogue along with representatives of the “rich sociological North,” as M. Burawoy called it in 2008. Accordingly, there is a rapid expansion of the number of sociological works outside the sociological canon.

Stage IV (2016 - present): sociology of the post-globalization era, as there is a reduction of globalization processes and strengthening of the centrifugal forces of regionalization in the world. (Note that I use the term “post-globalization” by analogy with D. Bell’s term “post-industrial” in relation to the type of society that replaces industrial society, but preserves pre-industrial and industrial sectors.) Therefore, the sociology of this period increasingly becomes a science of fragmented humanity with the multiplication of regional formations. The corpus of works of a canonical and non-canonical character is formed with dialogical features and intensification of interdisciplinarity.

> Where the sociology of globalization stands now

This fourth stage does not signify the disappearance of globalization processes as such and the decline of the sociology of globalization. Rather, new sociocultural realities are emerging and another reconfiguration of sociological knowledge is taking place, with a relative decrease in the share of globalization scenarios. For example, the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic has in many cases led to the collapse of global ties and relations, the reappearance of borders, or a decrease in the range of transnational entities and processes, which is reflected in the works of a growing number of sociologists.

This post-globalization period takes on a new identity during the Russian–Ukrainian war. Today we are witnessing the birth of a new kind of world order, which can be pictured as the reincarnation of the West (now in the form of the so-called “united collective West”) with its heart in Ukraine. That is to say, in my opinion, today there is no opposition between global and local, and no transformation...
“Today there an ingrowth of the local into the global, where the local becomes the core of the global”

of local into global. There is an ingrowth of the local into the global, where the local becomes the core of the global. In other words, there is a new type of global–local formation, with the supremacy of universal values embodied in the struggle for those values in the non-Western world; in this case, Ukraine. New global social movements are emerging, first of all a movement expressing solidarity with Ukraine. Their peculiarity is their extremely powerful influence on governments and a shortening of time for making decisions. New regional alliances are beginning to play a special role, sometimes between countries with which there are no common borders (I mean the so-called “small alliances” such as Great Britain–Ukraine–Poland or the Associated Trio: Ukraine–Moldova–Georgia).

Of course, these processes also require sociological reflections and discussions, dialogue between representatives of different national schools and movements. For example, the Russian–Ukrainian war is already gaining sociological meaning. I am referring to a letter from the President of the ISA, San Hanafi, describing Putin’s imperial paradigm and highlighting four lessons from this war for the Middle East. In general, I agree with many of the theses in that text, but at the same time I do not consider it correct to directly compare the wars in the Middle East with the current war in Ukraine, where genocide of the Ukrainian people is taking place. Every war is terrible, but Russia’s aggression against Ukraine poses a threat not only to Ukraine itself, but to many other countries in the world, if we do not work together to destroy a regime based on the imperial paradigm.

> Where sociology is heading

Now, we can establish the tendencies of present-day sociology according to the substance of the stages I have laid out here. A tentative list could include the following 10 notions:

(1) the rapid broadening of the boundaries of sociology, its subject matter and object of study as a result of the permeation of the canonical spheres of interest of the discipline as well as the introduction into the field of sociological reflections of phenomena related to artificial reality (virtual reality, augmented reality, artificial intelligence, etc.);

(2) the development and nurturing of a multi-dimensional and polyfunctional sociological reflexivity of a hybrid nature which is up to the task of producing concepts and models of sophisticated self-regulating systems of global, regional, or local proportions with an array of possibilities for their implementation in social practice;

(3) the shift from interdisciplinarity to transdisciplinarity and the appearance of an appropriate type of metatheorizing based on transdisciplinary syncrétism and holistic thinking;

(4) an increase in the significance and importance of the conceptualization of regional development projects as well as the issues of the coexistence of local, glocal, global, non-global, and post-global processes and phenomena;

(5) a significant sophistication of the terminology reflected in an increase of the number of hybrid terms stemming from the social and natural sciences, as well as technology and the humanities, accompanied by a synthesis of notions of postclassical and post-non-classical sociology;

(6) the shift of sociologists’ attention from mostly static to predominantly dynamic and even reactive societal transformations;

(7) the rising significance of the study of complex (predominantly non-material) social inequality with special attention on new forms of inequality embodied in social tension as well as new types of conflicts around opposing interests and values;

(8) the rising significance of the theoretical and cognitive functions of modern sociology under the conditions of hyperergia (or hyperdynamism) and reactive social transformations as well as the humanistic function due to the increasing dehumanization brought about by the continued introduction of new technologies and current hybrid wars;

(9) a diversification of the methods and techniques used in sociological scholarship through the use of newly synthesized and modified quantitative and qualitative methodologies as well as the adoption of methods from other disciplines. Their combined effect enables sociologists to obtain rapid and valid social results;

(10) the shift from verbal and non-verbal methods of sociological scholarship to the use of digital technologies, etc.
The ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war is a challenge to the entire civilized world. In the context of Ukraine today we can observe the collapse of all the principles of the international coexistence of states, and how human destinies are dependent on voluntarism and the imperial ambitions of one country, or in fact of one person at the head of the state who seeks to dictate his misanthropic ideology to the whole world. The horrors of war that every citizen of Ukraine is experiencing today also affect almost all spheres of the world community, which faces global challenges to its own security, particularly from Russia’s nuclear threats, as well as the latest migration challenges, global hunger, and energy and environmental crises. These may appear small compared to the tragedy, and in fact the genocide, that all Ukrainian people are going through. According to official statistics, during the first 115 days of the war, Russia killed more children in Ukraine than in Syria in the whole of 2021 or in Bosnia over the period 1992-1995.1

Reflecting on the problems of war and its consequences, as a sociologist and psychologist I think about a number of comparisons and analogies that fit in well with the concept of social trauma (P. Sztompka, J.C. Alexander, R. Eyerman, etc.): war as a global challenge; war that permeates human destinies; war as a way to create and construct a new vision and values of human existence; war as worries and life experience; war as a space for human activity and strength of spirit; war as a struggle for personal future and the fate of generations; war as genocide; war as a path to consolidation and solidarity, etc. All this continues. However, what unites all these associations with war is that, for the most part, we need a way of overcoming a traumatic event that affects each person’s life, as well as the whole of society. Every person who experiences war, or is molded in its crucible, has their own individual and unique life story. In their amalgamation, these life stories are “intertwined” or connected with the country where we were born, where we live and work, and whose history we create.

The history of Ukraine is like the flight of a wounded bird, which struggles to rise higher and higher, into the light, out of the darkness and uncertainty. During its progress, Ukraine has endured great historical trauma (for example, it is worth mentioning the events of the early twentieth century, the struggle of Ukrainians for independence from Bolshevik Russia, the Holodomor of the 1930s, the devastating German-Soviet war of 1941-1945, Chernobyl in 1986, and now the Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been going on since 2014 and which led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions) as well as the socio-cultural trauma of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which stemmed from a long period of social transformation and the breakdown of the old system of values with the fight for democracy during the Orange Revolution of 2004 and the struggle on the barricades for a European perspective during the Revolution of Dignity in 2013-14. The long historical path of struggle and suffering has been engraved in the social memory of the Ukrainian people; deep emotional experiences have led to mental trauma at the level of social groups and individuals. According to the Ministry of Health of Ukraine, some 15 million Ukrainians will need psychological support due to the full-scale war today, and 3-4 million will need medical treatment for mental disorders.2 At least one in five Ukrainians will suffer negative health consequences as a result of the war, with the number of people who experience mental health issues increasing each day the war continues.

Given the experience of the Ukrainian people, the current war has produced a new perception of reality; at the level of the average Ukrainian there has been a break with all preexisting myths of “Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood” – with any common path through the Great Patriotic War and the reconstruction of the economy in the postwar years. This understanding that we are different has become obvious even to those Ukrainians who did not wish to consider the idea of destroying common Slavic roots. Such an identity can especially be traced through the perception of war, which for us, Ukrainians, is really a war for our freedom, dignity and existence (for them, Russians, this is not a war, but a so-called special operation: heroization of their

Credit: Nastyaofly/Depositphotos.

by Yuriy Pachkovskyy, Ivan Franko National University of Lviv, Ukraine

> Collective and Individual Trauma
murdering leaders and hatred of everything Ukrainian). For us, Ukrainians, this war is a deeply traumatic event, but for them it is an occasion for emotional euphoria and the triumph of the symbols Z and V in the mass consciousness. This new life requires of all Ukrainians a great effort, struggle and consolidation, as it does of the whole democratic world and especially all Europeans without exception.

The special tragedy of this war was the anticipation of the military situation in the east of the country which had been going on for the previous eight years, and the (mis)understanding that had “hung” over the country, over each of us. February 24, 2022 represented a countdown to a new story for us, when all us adults asked ourselves the fateful question: “Do I want to go back to the USSR?” Or, alternatively: “Do I want to live in a country where there is respect for human rights, freedom and democracy?” The beginning of a new countdown is, in fact, a huge shock (the emotional state associated with a traumatic event), when the fate of the country was decided in the first 5-7 days after the massive Russian invasion along 1000 kilometers of our shared border. I asked students at the Sociology Department of the Ivan Franko National University of Lviv to describe (reconstruct) their perception of the war over the last three months, since it began. The strongest emotional impressions in their lives turned out to be related to the first day(s):

“For me, the morning of the beginning of the war was as if a loved one had died and I was going to the funeral. Everyone was scared. For the first few days, I was afraid to go outside, lying in bed all the time watching the news. On the third day of the war, I left home for the first time and went out with a friend for bread; the queues in the shops were long, and the shelves where essential goods should have been were almost empty. I was uncomfortable and scared.” (Vira, 19 years old)

“The first night after the declaration of war was long for me, every car passing by the house was like a helicopter or a rocket; because of this and the constant stress I could not sleep…“ (Dmytro, 21 years old)

“The first night was almost the worst. Due to the incredible stress, insomnia began, I watched the news all the time, I didn’t know what to do, I was in a panic. About three o’clock in the morning, three fighter jets flew over the house. It was such a loud, heavy, and lingering sound that as they flew, it seemed like an eternity. Since then, my panic has doubled. A few days without normal sleep and nutrition, full of fear and panic led to exhaustion. Since I could not study, I realized that this way I would not help anyone, and began to look for where I would be useful.” (Anastasiia, 20 years old)

“I cry every time I think I need to break up with someone or that I might lose someone… I believe it’s not as scary as in a movie, we have to go through it. I love my family and my relatives very much, despite all the troubles and quarrels. I want us all to be healthy and alive and to be together. May all be well. I want to live.” (Kseniia, 18 years old)

“At 7.44 in Lviv, an air raid alarm was heard for the first time. I jumped out of bed and ran out into the hallway to the neighbors. A grimace of a nervous smile froze on my face, and a tremor permeated my body…” (Martha, 18 years old)

It is believed that to overcome an injury takes as long as the person was under the influence of the traumatic event that led to the strong emotional experience. This process of “overcoming” can take months, years, or even decades, depending on the strength of the impact of the event on the person and their resistance to stress. From the standpoint of sociology, in my opinion, today the study of the collective trauma of war as an acute military stress in the context of “witness trauma”, “human suffering”, “searching for a new meaning of life”, “military anxiety syndrome”, “joint overcoming of traumatic events”, etc. is more timely than ever before. The current case of the Ukrainian society depicts a high degree of self-organization. This example could be an inspiration much more broadly for the prevention of collective trauma, whose consequences have a deeper psychotherapeutic significance, namely in its – paradoxically – constructive impact on society as a whole. For Ukraine, overcoming war as a collective trauma means:

1) the final break with the Soviet past and with what is connected with the Russian imperial encroachments and the “Russian world”;
2) an opportunity to restore its territorial integrity in combination with the provision of international guarantees of security and peace and land lease;
3) building civil society, and first of all, the capabilities of the volunteer movement, which has become widespread and has become one of the important prerequisites for the struggle for statehood;
4) opening a new European perspective for Ukraine as a candidate country for EU membership;
5) innovative progress as a postwar prospect of rebuilding the country with the involvement of Western investment and broad international programs to support those regions that have been particularly affected by hostilities;
6) upholding democratic (civilized) values, their inviolability in the modern world;
7) creating a new pattern of solidarity between countries united by a common understanding of the global threats posed by war;
8) being aware of the steadfastness of the Ukrainian people in defending their independence and realizing that Ukraine has already defeated the Russian aggressor with its inspired resistance.

Of course, overcoming a traumatic situation presupposes not only the coordinated action of the entire Ukrainian society, but also an understanding of the personal problems of each person affected by the war. In my opinion, the unifying factor that can combine the way out for the individual and the collective from this traumatic situation is the deep faith everyone has in victory.

Lviv, June 25, 2022

Direct all correspondence to Yuriy Pachkovskyy <ypachkovskyy@gmail.com>.

I have written on other occasions about the lack of methodology in the sociology of international relations and security studies, about the too close and perhaps fatal connection with journalism. Social scientists are obsessed with a prophetic function: probably in order to prove their capacity to enter the canon of causality, they seek to predict crises, trends, and election results. And every time they are accused of being wrong: before 2020 sociology did not pay attention to a possible pandemic; the signs of the war in Ukraine were misread; in every election cycle polls are not as accurate as the press and public would like.

> Two years full of surprises

The last two and a half years have been full of surprises. After the surprise of a flu like no other (the COVID-19 pandemic), came the surprise of a war that is amazingly similar to what we saw in the first half of the last century. The tragedy that war has brought to Ukraine is immense and has been much discussed. But the shock of war in the Western world, from images of refugees to images of bombings, tanks, and destroyed cities, is also one for knowledge. As in a real outsourcing exercise, people had believed for almost three decades that these issues were being dealt with by sociology, political science, international relations, strategic and security studies, military science, and diplomacy. Western society somehow saw itself removed from such concerns: weren’t there people who studied these problems and acted to prevent such things from happening again? So what have we learned, as sociologists, from what is happening in Ukraine?

> A view from Romania and NATO’s relevance

Since Romania’s entry into NATO and the EU, Romanians have consistently been among the most pro-NATO, pro-EU, and pro-American peoples in the EU, and this was confirmed by Russia’s attack on Ukraine. In fact, the main global criticism of NATO in recent years has been that in a relatively stable security environment, where threats are no longer represented by states, but rather by asymmetric conflicts with non-state actors (e.g., terrorism), or isolated cases of states “quarreling” with the international order, a colossus like NATO becomes useless. Russia’s attack on Ukraine, although not formally recognized in Russia as a war, has reestablished NATO’s relevance as a guarantor of security for member states and compromised the idea of non-alignment (consider Finland and Sweden).

> Parties against the system

In recent years, Europe has seen the emergence of more or less successful anti-system parties, many of which have certain populist, sovereign, or Eurosceptic dimensions. The pandemic and efforts by European states to keep it under control have provided a platform for these movements, most of which are anti-vaccine and anti-restrictions or deny the existence of the pandemic. In Romania, the Russian invasion of Ukraine reduced the appeal of such anti-system movements and increased the popularity of NATO and the EU.

There has been much speculation about the closeness of anti-system movements to Russia, or to the themes of Russian propaganda – although this is extremely complex and difficult to prove. In the last three months, we have seen that the relation of these movements to war is atypical: from not addressing the issue of war publicly, to stating that Ukraine is not very democratic (as if this could change the fact that Russia is the clear aggressor in this war); from reducing empathy with the victims of war to a concern for the Romanian minority in Ukraine, to relativizing identification of the aggressor. So the war in Ukraine is a veritable litmus test for anti-system parties and their still incomprehensible weakness for Putin’s Russia.

> Realism takes its revenge

After 1990, the sociology of international relations lived in a certain end-of-history paradigm: the great wars were over, even the cold ones; liberalism had triumphed over realism. There would be one-off wars, explained by local or regional issues; but the world had become unipolar, with a series of mediocre powers unable to challenge the USA, the lone superpower paradigm. After September 11, 2001, the script seemed to have been rewritten, but only apparently. A new
adversary (terrorism) appeared, an axis of evil maintained by state actors; and challenging the world order, armed struggles, etc. became acts of delinquency, not war. The international system was no longer the peaceful one (although contradicted so many times by one-off wars) imagined after 1990. An asymmetrical and unconventional enemy had appeared but militarily speaking, the world was not in great danger, fear of generalized war was insignificant in the West, and the USA/NATO was still the central superpower of the international system. The system was still liberal. American president G.W. Bush said that Romania would become the bridge to the new Russia. Behind the military and economic power of the Western world was the soft-power factor. The West was expanding because it had candidate countries knocking on its door.

But realism was about to take its toll. After 2010, China could no longer be ignored as an economic power. About the same time, neither Russia nor China seemed willing to “consent” to the world order of the previous twenty years. If we look closely at Russia, we see its invasion of Georgia in 2008; in the early 2010s, some major attempts by Russia to stop a possible Euro-Atlantic shift by Ukraine and Moldova; in 2014, the Donbass rebellion with the support of Russia, followed by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. In the West, people no longer saw the possibility of war in Europe, so these episodes passed with relative ease. Russia was no longer the country it was before 2010, it was beginning to be seen as a potential aggressor, but maintaining world order prevailed.

In February 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine breaks out as a clear act of aggression that is incomprehensible to the general public. The idea that Ukraine’s orientation to the West makes Russia vulnerable to NATO and the EU is morally difficult to understand: 2014 marked a definitive rift between Russia and Ukraine. Russian public support for the war is mind-boggling. But an expert can recognize the adoption of a realistic paradigm and a rejection of the liberalism that seemed to have won the paradigm debate on international relations after almost 100 years of theoretical competition.

In addition, the war, with its missiles, tanks, helmets and machine guns – as in the documentaries and films about wars 50 years ago – made it clear that war has not disappeared. Nuclear weapons, about which international relations theory had hardly spoken since 1990, have not disappeared either. Not even the theory behind the phenomenon is new. Decades of international relations and security studies seem to have been wasted, as if we were returning to the Korean War and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

In summary, we are in a classic full-blown security dilemma. NATO is not directly involved in Ukraine, but is on high alert. Where will Russia stop? Fear of war is at its highest since 1990 in Eastern Europe. Modern warfare is not different from past one: it’s not economical, it’s not online, it’s not civilized, it’s not protective of civilians. Modern warfare is as classic as can be, only more destructive. Politicians, the military, analysts, and the general public have all lived in illusory comfort for two decades. Let’s not forget that fake news and Russian propaganda have been discussed for years, especially after 2014, but most have used the term “cyber warfare” for this, as if it replaced real war. We now see that fake news is doing what propaganda has always done: it has prepared the ground for a real war and is now helping to manage it.

> Let’s not forget about Moldova

If we consider the war in Ukraine from a Romanian perspective, we must mention Moldova. Romania’s sensitivities regarding the Republic of Moldova and corresponding identity ties are known. When the dice of 1990 were rolled, Moldova remained on the other side of the “wall” again, while Romania had only one coherent political project: Euro-Atlantic integration. And it looks like the project worked. One of the current fears is related to a possible extension of the conflict in Transnistria and the Republic of Moldova (unheard of until now). Moldova is probably the best example of a state caught offside by the belief that neutrality is of some use. It is an attempt at pragmatism: Moldova tried for 30 years to maintain a functional relationship with the EU/Romania and also with Russia.

In short, I believe that the first obligation of researchers is to replace claims to predict the future with a focus on probable scenarios to which they can find appropriate answers. It is not the first time in history that reality does not match theory. After all, the main flaw of the social sciences – their multiparadigmatic character – can prove to be an exceptional quality if we know how to use it when understanding the world is more important than validating our hypotheses.
> Why We Need Comparative Intersectional LGBT+ Data

by Sait Bayrakdar, King’s College London, UK and Andrew King, University of Surrey, UK

Despite some significant advances in many European countries over the past few decades, research shows that inequalities experienced by lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and other sexuality and gender diverse (LGBT+) individuals persist. Many people encounter this discrimination in a range of social environments, workplaces, and public spaces or when accessing public services.

> Current inequality data limitations

Understanding the extent of such inequalities is essential for devising informed policies to improve the lives of LGBT+ people. However, until recently, data sources that would allow policy makers to acquire such knowledge have not been available. Until the second decade of this century, many surveys did not routinely collect information about sexual orientation or gender identity; and even today, many major surveys still do not include questions on gender identity.

These data limitations have restricted the opportunities to make comparisons between countries of the prevalence of LGBT+ inequalities: attempts to collect survey data have remained largely within national boundaries. Researchers have often limited data collection to their own country and then explored experiences and inequalities within national legislative, socioeconomic, political, and cultural contexts.
Undoubtedly, these data collected in individual countries are important and useful. However, such methodological decisions, often restricted by practical and local concerns, do not help to extend our understanding of LGBT+ inequalities to broader scenarios. Studies using data from a single country often do not allow researchers to examine how country-level contextual information may have an impact on LGBT+ inequalities. While the effects of some policy interventions can be teased out using longitudinal data, contextual factors that are embedded in long-term societal processes are hard to capture even in relatively long panel studies.

> Why the data should be comparative and intersectional

Adopting a comparative approach, whereby one explores inequalities across countries, allows us to understand how contextual factors may shape LGBT+ inequalities and discriminatory behaviour. This should be considered important from both a sociological and a policymaking perspective. It is significant sociologically as it shifts the focus from individual to contextual factors and highlights structural barriers to equality. From a policymaking perspective, it indicates how one country fares compared to others in attempting to create favourable outcomes and thereby highlights where governments and other organizations are failing to implement effective policies and what areas they may need to focus on.

However, there is a further issue. When surveys do not collect detailed data on social identities such as sexuality and gender identity, they prevent researchers from being able to compare not only between nations, but also across group differences or by considering what are often called ‘intersectional factors’: differences within and between LGBT+ people across a range of characteristics such as class, ethnicity, religiosity, ability, etc. It is important that these intersectional differences are understood in order to create more inclusive policies that serve all individuals from LGBT+ communities.

> A promising comparative and intersectional study

We applied a comparative intersectional approach in the CILIA-LGBTQI+ (Comparing Intersectional Life Course Inequalities amongst LGBTQI+ Citizens in Four European Countries) Project to address these problems. At the beginning of our project, which took place in England, Germany, Portugal, and Scotland, we reviewed literature and performed data mapping to identify the gaps in comparative intersectional knowledge. We found that we needed a dataset that would enable us to make cross-national and intersectional comparisons, but that suitable sources were very limited. The European Union Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender Survey (EU LGBT Survey) conducted by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights was, however, very useful in this regard. It consists of information from LGBT individuals across 28 European countries and considers their life-events, experiences of discrimination, and demographic characteristics. Its comparative design and detailed questions on LGBT-related experiences and incidents provided us with a unique opportunity to explore intersections of diverse communities using a comparative approach that pays attention to the national context.

> Some comparative and intersectional results

Our analysis of those data allowed us to examine the likelihood of experiences of discrimination, harassment, and violence in Germany, Portugal, and the UK. It showed some striking differences across lesbian, gay, bisexual, and trans individuals in the three countries. For example, while trans individuals appear to be more likely to experience incidents of discrimination, harassment, and violence in all three countries, lesbian women are more likely to experience discrimination and harassment than gay men are, although gay men are more likely to experience violence. Overall, LGBT experiences appear to be very diverse, and this deserves more attention in policymaking.

Moreover, there are also interesting differences between the three countries. While trans individuals are the group most likely to report discrimination, harassment, and violence in the UK, violence against them is also most prevalent in this country. Gay men are also more likely to become victims of violence in the UK than in Germany or Portugal. Other socio-demographic characteristics are also important in shaping LGBT individuals’ experiences. For example, being from an ethnic minority, or having a disability, increases the likelihood of experiencing violence in all three countries, while increased economic resources (as measured by household income) seems to reduce the likelihood of experiencing violence in Germany and the UK but not in Portugal.

> How to move policy forward

Such nuanced differences deserve attention as they imply that contextual factors, both within and between countries, influence the experiences of LGBT individuals. Therefore, we need more data that will allow us to examine LGBT inequalities comparatively and intersectionally. By this we mean that understanding the highly nuanced ways that our study shows that discrimination, harassment, and violence affect LGBT individuals is a first step to policy making that is proactive, as opposed to simply reactive. It will also provide for an approach to equality that moves beyond legislation per se, to understand how the interplay between structural and contextual factors shapes LGBT lives.

Direct all correspondence to:
Sait Bayrakdar <sait.bayrakdar@kcl.ac.uk>
Andrew King <Andrew.king@surrey.ac.uk>
Who Knows?
Recognition, Citation, and Epistemic Injustice

by Jana Bacevic, Durham University, UK

In many ways, the academic profession is becoming more diverse. Since 1990, women have constituted the majority of undergraduate and master’s-level graduate students globally. In the EU, women account for 54% of undergraduate students, 58% of master’s students, and 48% of graduates at doctoral level, but they still make up only 24% of professors. Minority ethnic scholars are underrepresented across the academic profession: in the UK, for instance, Black and minority ethnic scholars occupy only 7.3% of professorial roles.

The relationship between education, knowledge, and social justice

In recent years, these inequalities have become increasingly visible, thanks in part to the campaigns to decolonize the curriculum and to a growing awareness of the relationship between education, knowledge, and social justice. And yet, the relationship between social and epistemic inequalities runs deep and we need to look not only at who studies or teaches in our classrooms, but to our sources of knowledge as well, including reading lists: Whose voices are represented? Whose knowledge is framed as relevant — and for what?

The concept of epistemic injustice captures how social inequalities — for instance, those of gender and ethnicity/race — shape who can be recognized as a valid/credible possessor of knowledge. Formalized by Miranda Fricker, the concept was both influenced by and in turn has influenced philosophers, feminist epistemologists, and other scholars who study different forms of “credibility excess” or “deficit”: differences in how forms of identity-based prejudice influence the reception and interpretation of knowledge claims. For instance, who counts as a “credible witness” in court depends on how their class, gender, age, status, and ethnicity/race are perceived — often to the detriment of marginalized or historically disadvantaged groups.
However, these inequalities do not only exist at the level of individual knowledge contributions. They are part and parcel of how knowledge is produced, measured, valued, and exchanged; in other words, of the global political economy of knowledge production. In this sense, the question is not only who can be seen as a possessor of valid knowledge, but also what they can be seen as knowing about. As a social theorist and sociologist of knowledge, I refer to this as the relationship between epistemic subjects (those who know) and epistemic objects (what they know about).

**> The reproduction of social inequalities within academia**

In “Epistemic positioning and epistemic injustice: towards an intersectional political economy,” I developed the concept of epistemic positioning to show how judgments concerning knowers impact judgments about the objects of knowledge – and vice versa. A well-known example is when women’s knowledge claims are seen as “emotional” or “speaking from experience,” while those made by men or majority scholars are classified as “theoretical” or “general”. But there are more systematic and insidious forms of discrediting, such as, for instance, dubbing critical race theory or any other kind of identity-based knowledge inquiry “grievance studies.” I call this *bounding*, as it frames knowledge claims as *bound* to the personal experience (or “grievances”) of their subjects, rather than as equal contributions to scientific knowledge.

The second kind of positioning, *domaining*, is closely tied to the first: it is when knowledge contributions by certain kinds of knowers get associated with *domains* or disciplines based on the identity of the speaker. For instance, women on academic panels are often contributing the “gender” or “feminist” perspective on the subject, while Black and minority scholars get invited to speak “on race.” What complicates things is that these forms of positioning are often strategically used by scholars to navigate the networks of academic patronage and recognition. But they also impose an artificial boundary on who can be seen as knowing about what: while minority scholars are usually framed as experts on an element of their identity or heritage, white and “unmarked” scholars can be experts on anything. This makes their academic capital significantly more convertible: you stand a higher chance of getting employed if you can teach on several topics, rather than if you are an expert in just one domain. Coupled with *bounding*, that is, the tendency to reduce knowledge claims to the identity of their producers, this contributes to the reproduction of social inequalities within academia.

**> The Matthew effect**

However, success in the academic profession is not only a result of expertise being recognized in appropriate contexts; it is often a question of being recognized, or credited, at all. Women and minority academics often experience the third form of positioning: *non-attribute* – their work is used, but without proper citation or credit. Sometimes this deteriorates into full-blown “appropriation”, where credit goes to someone else – this *someone* frequently being male, white, senior and privileged. Of course, we have a name for this in sociology: the Matthew effect.

Usually attributed to Robert Merton, the “Matthew effect in science” (named after the Gospel according to Matthew: “For to every one who has will more be given, and he will have abundance; but from him who has not, even what he has will be taken away”) describes the tendency for credit for scientific discoveries to go to the most senior, and recognized, scientist in the team. In 1993, Margaret Rossiter coined a related term, the *Matilda effect*, to conceptualize the tendency for credit to go to men, rather than women. But few sociologists know that potentially the most famous case of both the Matilda and Matthew effects is, precisely, *The Matthew Effect*.

First published under Merton’s name in *The Matthew Effect in Science* in the journal Science, the concept of the Matthew effect was co-developed by Merton and Harriet Zuckerman, whose research on Nobel Prize winners provided the key empirical material for the study. Merton, in fact, explicitly acknowledged this in the second and third printings of *The Matthew Effect*, stating in a footnote that he “drew upon the interview and other materials of the Zuckerman study to such an extent that, clearly, the paper should have appeared under joint authorship” and that “a sufficient sense of distributive and commutative justice requires one to recognize, however belatedly, that to write a scientific and scholarly paper is not sufficient grounds for designating oneself as its sole author”. And yet this did not change how the concept is remembered: most sociologists, to this day, still credit Merton for coining the term.

**> The requirements of epistemic justice**

This suggests belated assertions of authorship cannot reverse long-term effects of epistemic injustice. Women and minority academics who demand recognition are often seen as being annoying, aggressive, or petty. *Bounding* and *domaining* make it easier to justify excluding someone from the reference list – if their research was only about a certain object (universities, say, rather than power) or if it was primarily based on experience (rather than, say, theorization), and in particular if they are petty about it.

As our professions and reading lists continue to diversify, we need to remain attentive to the tendency not only to exclude but also to position certain scholars and their work as less important, valid, or applicable. Epistemic justice requires that each one of us does the work, and gets credit for the work they do. ■

Direct all correspondence to Jana Bacevic <jana.bacevic@gmail.com>
> Profitable Bodies and Care Mobilities in Central and Eastern Europe

by Petra Ezzeddine, Charles University Prague, Czech Republic and Kristine Krause, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Landscapes of care are rapidly changing in the Visegrad countries (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary), due to overall marketization of care regimes, outmigration, changes in gender relations, and an increasingly aging population. These developments are leading to new complexities and a diversification of the care sector, consisting of different business actors (including some from the spa and tourism sector), whilst also affecting the role of both the family and the state. Furthermore, care provision is challenged due to gaps created through the outmigration of women into the care markets of richer European countries. Related to this, though involving far fewer people, is the movement of elderly persons in the opposite direction, to countries where care costs are roughly two third less than in more expensive neighboring countries.

In our current research projects “Transnational care landscapes in Central Europe: Privatization, marketization and overlapping mobilities” and “Relocating Care within Europe,” we investigate these two interrelated care mobilities: migrant care workers from Central and Eastern European countries in Germany, and the tiny but emblematic phenomenon of the relocation of German senior citizens to care facilities in Visegrad countries. Both trends can be understood as being complicit in generating profit: extracting labor from “working” bodies (migrant labor) and “entitlements” from frail elderly bodies.

> Social reproduction, social citizenship and the body

Despite its centrality in social reproduction and social citizenship, the body is easily overlooked. It is, however, the primary intersection where potentially tension-filled dynamics come together at the smallest scale: the body needs to be nurtured, washed, clothed, and rested. For a worker’s body to be able to work, other bodies must provide services.

Social reproduction is a term developed by Marxist feminists to capture all the invisible work that is needed to repair, maintain, and sustain the daily lives of societies, including social relations and the maintenance of the environments people live in. In a corresponding sense, social citizenship denotes the entitlement to social protection and education that should enable people to become, and remain, healthy and well-educated citizens.

Therefore, social reproduction and social citizenship are closely related. They both take part in the reproduction of the wider systems and infrastructures needed to make “living” and the functioning of a society possible, including care work. When the correlation between the two changes, a problem of social reproduction arises; as occurs when the elderly are moved for care, which can be seen as a relocation of social citizenship. In trying to understand the landscapes of care mobilities in Europe, we use both terms, social reproduction and social citizenship, as analytical tools.

> Landscapes of care mobilities in CEE

The outsourcing of care to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), and the emergence of private care infrastructures, are related to labor migration in various ways through both past and present mobilities. For example, Polish migrant care workers who have worked in Germany are now among the founders of private care homes back in Poland, and...
they are also sought after as staff because of their work experience and language skills. Recruitment agencies have developed and offer intermediary services for families, connecting them to care homes in the region. Moreover, the elderly in private care homes in the Visegrad countries are often the parents of children who have migrated to work in another country, thereby earning enough to pay for their parents’ care back home. In other cases, the elderly are themselves returned migrants who, after having spent their working lives in Austria or Germany, have earned the right to insurance from these countries and can therefore afford private care. These cases add complexity to the question of social citizenship in European welfare states.

In the Visegrad countries, the emergence of private care facilities seems to be directly related to the care drain caused by outmigration, as illustrated by an example from our research. In a care home located just 2 km from Germany within the Czech Republic, German and Czech senior citizens are cared for together. However, their care is not provided by Czech care workers, because these have left the Czech market for better paid care work in Germany; the jobs are filled, in turn, by migrant care workers from Ukraine and Moldova.

Another case of overlapping mobilities can be seen in the case of Roberto who had suffered a stroke and could no longer live on his own. His children, who could not afford a care home in Germany, moved him to one in Poland which advertised its services for seniors from Germany. Yet Roberto was not originally from Germany; he had moved there from Italy as a young ‘guest worker’, stayed on, had a family, and grew old there. His children, like many other German families, faced the problem of what to do in a care system that relies on obligatory care insurance that needs to be ‘topped up’ by pensions and family funds. In the Polish care home, Roberto tried to use his rudimentary knowledge of German, and Paula, an elderly Polish woman, sometimes translated for him. She grew up in a formerly German area in southwest Poland and spoke both languages. These two elderly people coming together in a private care home in Poland exemplify the complexity of social reproduction and citizenship in today’s Europe. It shows that along with current migration movements, shifting borders and historical displacements after WWII continue to play a role.

> Conclusion

Transnational care landscapes in Central Europe extract profits from both bodies that care and bodies that are cared for. We can observe trans-local social reproduction in the region reflected through two interrelated phenomena: (1) the transnationalization of care due to the outmigration of (female) care workers, resulting in a ‘care gap’ in their countries of origin; (2) the much smaller in scope and scale, reverse phenomenon of care outsourcing through which the elderly are relocated to places where care costs are roughly one-third of those in the home countries. Both phenomena challenge how we conceptualize rights and social reproduction, in terms of European social citizenship and care regimes. We argue that these care mobilities illuminate how the body is involved, but neglected, in the crisis of social reproduction and social citizenship in Europe and its uneven welfare geographies.
> Brokered Domestic Work: The Sri Lanka-Saudi Market

by Wasana Handapangoda, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

S
ince the early 1980s, Sri Lankan women have been migrating in great numbers as domestic workers to the oil-rich Arabian Gulf. This labor outflow was an outcome of Sri Lanka’s economic liberalization reforms in 1977 and the Arabian oil boom in 1973, which opened up a profuse market for paid domestic labor in a context of globalization. Today, migrant domestic work has become one of Sri Lanka’s key exports in terms of the contribution to foreign exchange earnings. Of the Gulf domestic labor importers, Saudi Arabia remains significant, with Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia having forged a mutually beneficial, longstanding buyer-seller exchange in the global care market. Sri Lanka can thus be identified as a transnational labor broker that trades on domestic labor for a commission, which is worker remittances.

In the process of care brokering, private migration brokers (PMBs) play a central role: the majority of Sri Lankan women seek their assistance in finding paid domestic work in the Gulf. This article provides a synopsis of domestic care brokering by PMBs in the Sri Lanka-Saudi care market as a constituent element of the global political economy of care. The paper draws on fieldwork carried out in Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia in 2019 and 2020, respectively.

> The brokering process of migrant domestic workers

The process of the mobilization of domestic care in the Sri Lanka-Saudi migration corridor involves PMBs based in both Sri Lanka and Saudi Arabia who provide the essential transnational linkage between Sri Lankan migrant

domestic workers (SLMDWs) and Saudi employers in the marketized delivery of domestic care.

As private recruitment agents outsourced by the respective governments, these PMBs in Sri Lanka (local agents – LAs) and Saudi Arabia (foreign agents – FAs) organize and ease the mobility of migrant domestic workers (MDWs) in many different ways. The process of mobility starts off with a Saudi employer’s “job order” for a SLMDW placed with a FA. Subsequently, the FA obtains the mandatory order approval by the Sri Lankan Mission in Saudi Arabia and dispatches the approved order to the LA who takes it from there. The LA, after obtaining order registration by the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), reaches out to find aspiring MDWs, screens them, and selects those who meet the criteria, e.g., salary, age, experience, language proficiency (Arabic), and religion (Muslim/non-Muslim). In searching for aspiring MDWs, the monetized service of Sri Lanka’s village-level subagents proves useful as the go-between linking city-based LAs and village-based aspiring MDWs, connecting them across geographical and social space.

The applications of the selected candidates are then dispatched to the FA, from which the employer chooses a MDW who best fits his/her criteria. Upon the employer’s confirmation, the LA continues with the mobilization process by helping the MDW to obtain SLBFE approval as well as the necessary documentation, including passport, visa, medical and SLBFE training certificates, and a two-year work contract. The LA also bears the MDW’s airfare and a personalized commission, with all recruitment costs recovered from the agency fee. Finally, after the MDW has arrived in Saudi Arabia, the FA receives her at the airport and entrusts her to the employer. During the contract, both the LA and FA are expected to provide the MDW with necessary follow-up services, e.g., intervention in the event of her ill-treatment by the employer.

Interestingly, this privatized arrangement of paid domestic labor does not come cheap. It involves a local agency fee of about $3500 for a SLMDW. This local agency fee is borne by the FA, who recovers it from the agency fee paid by the employer, equivalent to $5500 to $6500 for a SLMDW. The agency fee can thus vary depending on such factors as the MDW’s age, experience, religion, language proficiency, and references, which determine her “price” in the care market.

> Private migration brokers: facilitators or jeopardizers?

The SLMDWs’ experiences and outcomes of migration are significantly conditional upon PMBs, local and foreign, who afford them a strategic resource as enablers of their journeys abroad. That said, PMBs play a part in the precarization, if not hyper-precarization of migrant domestic work, given that an overwhelming majority of SLMDWs originate from already precarized, impoverished local backgrounds. The brokers are often responsible for the creation of structural conditions that jeopardize the lives of the MDWs in the circuits of mobility, primarily in terms of overpriced agency fee, disinformation, and lack of follow-up services. Of these, agency fee, often considered excessive and unreasonable, is explicitly linked to creating a situation of indentured/bonded labor. Given that agency fee is steep and borne by the employer, for MDWs it induces a relationship of indenture with their employers and resultant adverse working conditions in the Saudi homes.

PMBs are “a necessary evil” in the Sri Lanka-Saudi transnational care market. For MDWs, they are key to the realization of their migration trajectories and aspiration for socioeconomic mobility. Similarly, for the states at both ends of the care chain, they serve as agents of socioeconomic and political stability. All in all, PMBs apparently characterize an ever-present phenomenon in the Sri Lanka-Saudi migration corridor.

> Conclusion

Sri Lanka-Saudi domestic care brokering epitomizes an ideal instance of capitalist market penetration of social reproduction and the irregularities this eventuates. On a platform of neoliberal globalization, PMBs have increasingly represented domestic work as a desirable commodity, thus setting off conflicting discourses of economic potential and hyper-precarity. In this sense, brokered migrant domestic work questions the propriety of the intrusion of instrumental means into the reproductive realm; yet, it simultaneously unfolds the possibility of a union between the reproductive and the productive in the care economy.