Talking Sociology with John Holloway

Labinot Kunushevc

Neoliberal Think Tanks

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Market fundamentalism and neoliberalism are affecting everyday life and experience in many parts of the world. Money, markets, and neoliberal thinking are at the core of contemporary politics in different supra-, inter-, trans-, and national contexts. This issue opens with two reflections on these dominant tendencies of our time. In an interview, John Holloway, inspiring and keen-minded critic of capitalism, discusses the destructive forces of money, the dynamics of finance capitalism, and problematic developments in the European Union, but nevertheless emphasizes that another society is possible. The authors of our first symposium on neoliberal think tanks remind us that neoliberalism reflects the powerful tradition of the liberal idea of self-regulating markets. Neoliberal think tanks are influential protagonists of this idea although we might not be aware of that in our everyday life. Karin Fischer, a sociologist doing research on this phenomenon in international contexts, has put together a collection of articles, which show how such think tanks are working and influencing society.

In the last decade care and care work have become an issue that has received increasing attention from sociologists. For our second symposium, Heidi Gottfried and Jennifer Jihye Chun, well-known researchers in this field, have organized a collection of articles which take us around the globe to reflect on the deep ongoing and far-reaching changes in the organization of care and care work. Many facets of this topic – new care markets, the marketization of the body, changing family and gender arrangements, migration and global care chains – are considered to be fundamentally interwoven with the transformation of contemporary capitalism and relations of gender, race, and class. Additionally we present with the Research Network for Domestic Workers’ Rights an influential transnational initiative of social scientists and activists successfully struggling for better working conditions in the sector.

Over the last years, Hartmut Rosa, a German sociologist and social philosopher, has criticized modern capitalist societies for some of its core principles, that is, the constant need to accelerate, to grow, and to compete. Especially his thesis on resonance – or the lack of resonance – as one of the major problems of our time has been broadly discussed. In this issue he gives some insights into his concept of resonance.

Furthermore, an interview with Jasminka Lažnjak, who serves as the president of the Croatian Sociological Association, highlights developments in Eastern and Southeastern Europe and the challenges for sociology. Another article analyzes conflicts around urbanization in China. And last but not least, the Romanian team presents its work for Global Dialogue.

Brigitte Aulenbacher and Klaus Dörre, editors of Global Dialogue

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John Holloway, leading Marxist sociologist and theorist talks about the possibilities of creating a society based on a mutual recognition of human dignity and reminds us to liberate our creative power from the domination of money.

The impact of neoliberal think tanks on (global) political decision-making is on the rise. This symposium pursues the roots and developments of neoliberal think tank networks and examines their political, social and economic influences across the world.

This symposium sheds light on the pressing issues in the field of care and domestic work. Scholars from all over the globe report about the transformation of this area of labor, about domestic workers organizing across borders, and current struggles for decent working conditions.

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John Holloway
John Holloway is Professor of Sociology at the Autonomous University of Puebla, Mexico. He has published widely on Marxist theory, on the Zapatista movement and on the new forms of anti-capitalist struggle. His book Change the World Without Taking Power (2002, new edition 2010) has been translated into eleven languages and has stirred an international debate. His recent book, Crack Capitalism (2010), takes the argument further by suggesting that the only way in which we can think of revolution today is as the creation, expansion, multiplication, and confluence of cracks in capitalist domination. This interview is part of a project on influential social theory that also aims to explore the intersection of international and national sociology through conversations with prominent sociologists. It was conducted by Labinot Kunusheve, ISA Junior Sociologists Network associate member, who holds an MA in Sociology from the University of Pristina, Kosova.
LK: There are several theories that attempt to analyze and explain the world as a social system and the developments which lead to global inequality. How do you assess the role of Marxism today and what is the future of Marxism and of Marxists?

JH: The only scientific question that is left to us is: How do we get out of here? How do we stop the headlong rush towards human self-destruction? How do we create a society based on the mutual recognition of human dignity?

In other words it is not a question of this or that other school of thought. We have to start by saying that we do not have the answers; we do not know how to bring about the social transformation that is so obviously necessary, and think from there. The tradition of Marxist thought does not have the answers either, but it does have the merit of posing the question, the question of revolution. And as for the future, I do not know. But social anger is growing throughout the world and if it does not take a direction oriented towards radical social transformation, then the future is dark indeed. In this sense Marxism (or some sort of revolutionary theory) is crucial for the future of humanity.

LK: According to this article in the Daily Mail, newly unveiled documents reveal that the sugar industry paid and corrupted prestigious Harvard scientists to publish research saying fats, not sugar, were a chief cause of heart disease. How do you explain the corruption of academic consciousness for capitalist benefit?

JH: In a world dominated by money, corruption is built in the functioning of the system, and that includes academic work. But the problem is not just the obvious cases of corruption such as the one you mention, but all those academic and social forces that push us into conformism, that push us into accepting a society that is killing us. Probably almost all of those who read this interview are in some way involved in academic activity, as students or as professors. The challenge we face is to turn that activity against a system that is so obscene, so destructive, in all that we do: in our seminar discussions, in the essays or articles that we write.

LK: I am interested in the question of masculinities associated with different positions of power. Raewyn Connell, in an interview which I conducted with her, said: “It’s important to look at the gender dimension in the actions of people with economic power, as well as people with state power, in order to explain this.” Likewise, Anthony Giddens, in an interview I conducted with her, said: “The global financial crisis – still far from having been fully resolved – reflects some features, even including the gender dimension, given the role that ‘charged masculinity’ played in the aggressive behavior of those playing the world money markets.” What is your view of the role of those playing the world money markets and the relation of masculinity with economic power?

JH: An interesting question. I think I would read those propositions in the opposite direction. The aggressive behavior of those playing the world money markets in the financial crisis did not result from the gender of the actors, but rather the other way around. The aggressive behavior resulted from the nature of money and the constant, relentless drive for its self-expansion. The aggression that is inscribed in the nature of money makes it likely that its most effective, compulsive servants will be masculine, simply because the organization of our society has historically promoted that sort of behavior among men more than among women. As long as money exists, the behavior of those who dedicate their lives to its expansion will be aggressive, whatever their gender. To get rid of the sort of behavior that we identify as masculine aggression, we must get rid of money and establish our social relations on a different, more sensible basis.

LK: How can we create a form of responsible capitalism, in which the creation of wealth is reconciled with social needs?

JH: That is impossible. Capital is the negation of wealth creation driven by human needs. Capital is wealth creation driven by the expansion of value, that is, by profit. It is now as clear as can be that that sort of wealth creation is driving us towards self-annihilation.

LK: According to the global World Values Survey by Ronald Inglehart, there are two value systems: the materialist value system and the traditional value system. How do the views expressed in your books Change the World Without Taking Power and Crack Capitalism explain the dynamics of fluctuation between these two value systems and how do these value systems affect the inequality generated by capitalism?

JH: I don’t think it’s a question of finding a balance between value systems. We seem to be trapped in a system that is increasingly violent, increasingly exploitative, increasingly unequal. There is no in-between, there is no gentle capitalism, there is no halfway house. The experience of your close neighbors, the Greeks, makes that very, very clear. The argument of the books you mention is that we have to break with capitalism, but we do not know how to do it, so we must think and experiment. It cannot be done through the state, as your own experience in Yugoslavia and many, many other experiences make clear, so we must find other ways. In Crack Capitalism I explore these other ways in terms of the millions of cracks that already exist in the texture of capitalism, the millions of experiments in creating other ways of living, either out of...
necessity or as conscious attempts to create another way of living, and I come to the conclusion that the only way in which we can now conceive of revolution is in terms of the creation, expansion, multiplication, and confluence of such cracks.

**LK:** Do you believe that an egalitarian society is possible?

**JH:** Yes, but I don’t see that as the principal issue. The central issue is whether we can liberate our activity, our creative power, from the domination of money. Is this possible? I hope so, because I don’t see any other future for humanity.

Perhaps you should re-phrase the question and ask: do you believe that it is possible to continue with the present organization of society? To which the answer would be: Probably, but only in the short term, because it is likely that capitalism will not take very long to destroy us. The race is on: can we get rid of capitalism before it gets rid of us? I don’t know the answer, but I do know which side I’m on.

**LK:** The UK has voted by referendum to leave the EU, while Europe itself is facing many challenges, especially a structural economic and political crisis. These challenges are explained very well by Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winner for Economics, who has said that pressure from the USA, the IMF, and the World Bank has led states to privatize public assets by deindustrialization of economies, and created easily controllable oligarchs. How will this affect other countries inside and outside Europe in the context of the global crisis?

**JH:** Your last words, “the global crisis” are the important ones. The Zapatistas have been speaking of “the storm” (“la tormenta”) that is already upon us and very likely to get much worse in the coming years. This storm is being felt all over the world: Trump and Brexit are just one aspect of it. How do we deal with this? By turning our anger against capital. And, more immediately, by doing everything possible to reject nationalism. The present growth of nationalism in Europe is frightening. And the lesson of history is clear: nationalism means death and killing, nothing else.

**LK:** Since Kosova is a small country that became independent only ten years ago, we are still facing many challenges, especially in the process of visa liberalization and EU integration. This isolation is restricting free movement, contact with other European countries and cultures, integration into the European market, and access to European job opportunities, while 60% of our population is under 25 years of age. We feel the need for integration into and belonging the European Union. What would you suggest we do in order for Kosova to integrate into Europe?

**JH:** Is “belonging to the European Union” the same as “integrating into Europe”? Surely not. The European Union is an authoritarian structure strongly shaped by neoliberalism. It is not surprising that people have reacted against it, but the really frightening part of this rejection is the nationalism that accompanies it (in Brexit, for example). For me the most important aspect of the European Union is that it grew out of a fight against frontiers after the massacre of the Second World War. That is what we must carry on if we are to keep alive the best of European integration: the fight against frontiers. What would that mean for Kosova? Above all, the opening of frontiers to migrants, whether they come from Europe, the Middle East, Africa, or wherever. That is how you can promote contact with other countries and cultures, that is how you can enrich the lives of the 60% of the population who are under 25 years of age.

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Think tanks come in many shapes and sizes, but appear to be proliferating and growing in importance. Formerly supplementing universities and research institutions of interest groups or membership organizations, they have become critical agents in politics and policy making. The rise of the think tank model has pushed university-based intellectuals to the margins of public political debates. The think tank professional has replaced the university professor as an “expert” in the media.

Think tank professionals seek to present themselves as technocratic operators dedicated to neutral knowledge.
and evidence-based approaches. Also, the traditional American understanding of a think tank emphasizes independent expertise and the public interest.

But contrary to promotional images, most think tanks are policy-oriented. As organizations dedicated to policy-related expertise, consulting, and diffusion – the minimum requirement to function as a think tank, not an exhaustive definition – they secure, produce, and channel selected knowledge. It is the merit of critical think tank (network) studies to have demonstrated that think tank expertise is political rather than neutral and controversial rather than technocratic. Situated at the intersections of academia, economic interests, politics, and media, think tanks can thus be viewed as part of preference, civil society, and class formation processes.

This applies in particular to the “capacity building” of the neoliberal right. Free market think tanks were strategic trailblazers of the “neoliberal counter-revolution” in the 1970s. Since then, well-developed networks have engaged in the “battle of ideas” and contributed to the continuing strength of neoliberal paradigms. Connected and coordinated across borders and mostly with an elitist character, they attempt to conquer a larger audience and influence governance matters on a national and international scale. They devote a lot of creativity and corporate money to develop story lines and push politics in a certain direction. The transnational neoliberal architecture is hitherto unmatched by competing forces – since powerful corporations and billionaires lean largely to the political right. Free market environmentalism and climate change skepticism, emanating from neoliberal and neoconservative think tank networks and financed by the fossil fuel, mining, and energy industries, are a striking example of this.

The articles in this section highlight different aspects of the think tank phenomenon. Karin Fischer traces the development of the Atlas Network, thereby showing that think tank research should go beyond the study of individual organizations. Dieter Plehwe shares the “network approach” (http://thinktanknetworkresearch.net/) in his analysis of the proliferating (neoliberal) think tank landscape in Europe. Plehwe illuminates the politics of policy think tanks in their efforts to transform the EU along neoliberal and conservative lines.

Two case studies show how fiercely the “battle of ideas” is being pursued. Elaine McKewon describes the work of a neoliberal think tank in Australia in the field of climate change denial. She points to the wider (corporate) webs of influence and clarifies that the think tanks involved share membership in organized neoliberal networks. In Brazil, Atlas-affiliated “freedom fighters” became the main organizers against the Workers’ Party and Dilma Rousseff’s presidency. Hernán Ramírez traces the roots of these new actors back to the 1960s and shows their connections with older think tanks and networks of organized neoliberalism in Brazil and beyond.

Finally, Matthias Kipping discusses in his article an especially ingenious example of hiding the knowledge-interest nexus that characterizes the think tank model. Commercial global consulting firms afford themselves the luxury of maintaining think tanks, thereby taking advantage of their ostensibly non-profit character and their claims to legitimate, “evidence-based” knowledge.

What do these case studies suggest for critical think tank research? First, policy or partisan think tanks should be studied as transnational networks of individuals, organizations, and ideas. Second, research should detect the logic of constituencies and influence behind a think tank or a network in terms of ideological, financial, political, and academic commitments. Third, research on the subject should adopt a broader perspective and situate think tanks in civil society and class formation processes.
The Atlas Network: Littering the World with Free-Market Think Tanks

by Karin Fischer, Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

> Changing ideas about the world through profit-oriented principles.

Antony Fisher, a British businessman from an upper-class family, read the Reader’s Digest condensation of Hayek’s Road to Serfdom and was enthusiastic about it. In this wartime book, F.A. Hayek coupled socialism with fascism and lashed out at government planning which, in his view, inevitably leads to slavery. After the Second World War, Fisher wanted to go into politics but Hayek convinced him to “forget politics. Politicians just follow prevailing opinions. If you want to change events, you must change ideas.” In other words, convince academics, teachers, writers, journalists – and the politicians will follow. In this way, the think tank model was born.

Hayek couldn’t have found a better companion to build an institution with the aim of spreading the idea of free markets, limited government, and individual liberty under the rule of law. Fisher founded the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in 1955 in London, which immediately opened an ideological artillery fire upon the political establishment, as one of its chairmen put it. Over time, the IEA converted the personnel of the Tory Party into neoliberals. It put together Margaret Thatcher’s election platform and helped shape her economic policies, in particular in the field of privatization and deregulation.

After the successful establishment of the IEA, Fisher – meanwhile well connected through neoliberal elite circles like the Mont Pelerin Society (MPS) – dedicated his considerable energy to the development of neoliberal think tanks. The Manhattan Institute and the National Center for Policy Analysis in the US, the Fraser Institute in Canada, and the Centre for Independent Studies in Australia – Fisher had a hand in all of them. At the beginning of the 1980s the time was right to start another offensive. The aim of the Atlas Economic Research Foundation, known simply as Atlas Network, was to “litter the world with free-market think tanks,” in the words of John Blundell, former Atlas President, General Director of the IEA, and MPS member. Since its foundation in 1981, Atlas has launched or nurtured some 475 institutions in over 90 countries worldwide, from Chile to Hong Kong and from Iceland to Ghana. The bulk of organizations are located in the US and in Europe,

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but Latin America counts 78 and East- and South-Asia no fewer than 37 radical pro-market think tanks (https://www.atlasnetwork.org/partners/global-directory).

Fisher’s entrepreneurial background and his MPS connections gave him good access to business leaders. Investor John Templeton, a number of other bankers, and General Electric were among the early donors. Pfizer, Procter & Gamble, Shell, ExxonMobil, British American Tobacco, and Philip Morris are among the Fortune 500 corporations that joined the generous donor front. Both transnational capital and local economic groups or family firms ensure a comfortable financial basis for Atlas-affiliated think tanks in every region of the world. In spite of the frequent claims to independence from state funds, Atlas members have received funding from the US State Department and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), for example.

> Strategic Replication and Cross-National Organizing

Atlas functions like an umbrella organization. On the one hand, it provides think tank entrepreneurs with significant sums of start-up money and advice and connects them with donors. On the other, Atlas integrates its members through joint events, e.g. the Regional Liberty Forums, travel grants, and awards. By developing a leadership academy and a MBA course for executives it enhances the professional character of think tank activities and personnel worldwide.

The Atlas family has a wide variety of members. There are think tanks which produce and popularize “pure doctrine” and keep some distance from concrete politics. Good examples in this regard are those who base their “war of ideas” on the principles of Hayekian thinking and Austrian Economics. Others are more public policy-oriented “do tanks” which engage in consultancy, and still others go beyond intellectual activities, focusing on direct action involving infiltration, fake news, and the defamation of personalities of the other side. The newly emerging Atlas-affiliated groups in Brazil that sparked and continue to fuel a cultural war against the Worker’s Party and its representatives are a good example.

From the beginning, the neoliberal institution builders had a globalist outlook. The removal of barriers against trade and investment is key to their utopia of “cosmopolitan capitalism.” Frequently overlooked, the international scope was also important to guide neoliberal state intervention everywhere. In the mid-1980s Atlas started to propagandize free-market ideology and build up like-minded intellectual circles in the former state-socialist countries in Eastern Europe. The 1980s and 1990s have also been a decisive period for think tank activities in Latin America and Asia. International and regional debt crises were followed by structural adjustment policies. While independent university research centers suffered from the crisis, well-staffed think tanks engaged in austerity-related economic and social policy advice. This is also the case in the Global North where the global financial crisis of 2007-8 called free-market think tanks into action, advocating austerity politics. From this we can see that regime change, crises, and political turmoil provide excellent opportunities for think tanks to mobilize resources and engage in agenda setting.

> One Message, Many Voices

What are the key topics on which the organized neoliberalism engages in the battle of ideas? The Atlas freedom fighters orchestrate concerted efforts against the welfare state, promoting asset-based, privatized welfare in the areas of housing, social security, health, and education. Public policy advice is focused on deregulation and re-regulation in a business-friendly way; low taxes are always a selling point. The transnational “sound money” campaign advocates monetary reforms based on rigid monetarist principles. The recruitment of the campaign leader Judy Shelton as an economic adviser to Donald Trump (and her nomination as chairwoman of the NED) is likely to reinforce these policy interventions. In the Global South, the focus is on strengthening ownership rights. The poor are seen as innovative entrepreneurs, trained to exploit diverse sources of income. The only thing which has to be done is the removal of strangling regulations and the restoration of property rights. Atlas is proud that the World Bank adopted this approach. The Bank’s Doing Business Index follows exactly Atlas’ policy recommendations.

Neoliberal policy is contested and the freedom fighters encounter resistance. There is also friction within the Atlas family. But the transnational neoliberal architecture built up by Atlas fulfills Fisher’s founding principle of strategic replication: One institute sounds like a lonely solo; many institutes, all singing a similar refrain, are the chorus needed to influence public opinion and ultimately public policy.

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Complexity and Simplification: European Policy Think Tanks

by Dieter Plehwe, Berlin Social Science Center (WZB), Germany

It has become common wisdom to attest to growing complexity in policy making. This is particularly true for shared and interlocking jurisdictions like the European Union and other arenas of inter- and trans-national coordination and cooperation. Increasing complexity requires the opposite: simplification. How is relevant knowledge secured on the input side of the equation and how can the dissemination of relevant knowledge be channeled? Who defines what belongs to the agenda-setting container and what goes to the waste bin?

At the same time, increasing reliance on expertise has fostered the politicization of expertise. If contested issues are dealt with at the level of expertise, contestation will inevitably involve competing expertise, which complicates efforts in simplification and requires the sorting of relevant difference.

This much is clear: Contrary to widespread promotional images, think tanks do not just, or even primarily, exist to provide evidence. Competing think tanks provide poli-
cy-related evidence for different and frequently opposing causes, projects, and world views.

> EU-level relevance making

Europe is known for the co-evolution of supranational negotiating, decision making and lobbying. But the EU is also a huge area of expertise peddling, both academic and policy-related. Due to majority voting in the European Council and the upgrading of the influence of the European Parliament’s involvement in the co-decision procedure, both Council and European Parliament have become major sites of influence – and expertise – peddling, in addition to the European Commission. Due to the weak institutional infrastructure in general and the lack of in-house expertise in particular, the European policy arena is wide open for external sources of knowledge. Hundreds of EU-level expert groups exist on a permanent and temporary basis, for example.

Unsurprisingly, both European interest groups and think tanks have rapidly grown in numbers. Unlike the commercial lobby firms, many think tanks have the advantage of a non-profit character and corresponding claims to knowledge legitimacy. While interest group knowledge can be considered biased by definition, think tank knowledge can be presented as unbiased even if a study is paid for by a client with a clear interest perspective. The positive image of think tanks and the negative image of lobby groups each have contributed strongly to the proliferation of think tanks despite the intimate relationship between expanded lobbying and think tank work.

If most domestic think tanks in EU member states have to deal with European policy matters as a result of European integration, the number of think tanks that are explicitly dedicated to EU matters is growing fast. One example of such an organization is the British think tank Open Europe. From its offices in London, Brussels, and Berlin, it promotes the EU as a solely economic union. Open Europe is supported by a number of British businesses and Tory politicians. Like many pro-market think tanks, it was part of the Stockholm Network, which was the British hub of the largest neoliberal European think tank network from the mid-1990s until 2009, counting more than one hundred members. It has since been succeeded by the New Direction Foundation and the related think tank network of the Alliance of European Conservatives and Reformists. Both the party family and the foundation will suffer from Brexit, but Open Europe and the New Direction Foundation are likely to continue working together to transform the EU along neoliberal and conservative lines. Since British interest groups will lose access to European decision-making circles after Brexit, they are likely to increase the use of alternative channels among which think tanks figure prominently.

Also growing out of the defunct Stockholm Network are international collaborations dedicated to specific tasks, for e.g., the Epicenter network in charge of the “nanny state index” promoted by the Swedish think tank Timbro to oppose government regulation and promote “consumer freedom.” Timbro is a powerful organization funded by the Swedish business associations since the late 1970s, and well-known for aggressive neoliberal advocacy in Sweden and across Europe. Timbro put a lot of weight behind austerity, “flexicurity,” and the neoliberal transformation of the welfare state in general.

> Shaping and selecting European integration knowledge

Among the larger European think tanks that promote European integration is the German Centre for Applied Policy Research. It benefits from the financial and organizational resources of Germany’s largest private corporate foundation, the Bertelsmann Foundation, but also uses resources from Munich’s Ludwig Maximilian University. Another example is Notre Europe in France. It was set up by former EU Commission President Jacques Delors. Located in Paris and Berlin, it is a good example of a think tank performing a “revolving door” function: founded by former Brussels insiders, it provides career opportunities for young professionals.

It appears adequate to end with a word on Bruegel, the most prominent think tank in the international economics and European economic policy field. It was conceived in 2005 by German and French interests. It operates with a staff of 30 and has funding from different member states and corporations, which allows it to keep a distance from the European Commission. Widely praised for both its academic and policy-related profile and quality, Bruegel hit rocky waters when it promoted Eurobonds to deal with the financial crisis. German funding comes from the Ministries of Finance and Economics, and the Minister of Economics was furious when the proposal authored by French and German economists with ties to social democracy seemed to generate political momentum. Bruegel’s authority threatened to undermine Germany’s stubborn opposition to sovereign debt pooling until Angela Merkel ended the debate in 2012 (“only over my dead body”). In an effort to reconcile funders and think tank, the German position in Bruegel’s advisory body was given to Merkel’s closest economic advisor, Lars-Hendrik Röller.

Arguably more important than domestic European linkages of knowledge and power are the transatlantic dimensions of Bruegel’s work. It has been set up to operate as strategic partner and corresponding institute to the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC. When Eurobonds were discussed in US media, for example, Bruegel’s blue bond proposal was the key reference. In the face of complexity, life is made easier for intellectuals, journalists, and decision makers by establishing a knowledge hierarchy, no matter how political a simplification it is.

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Long before post-truth politics and the “death of expertise,” there was climate denial. Over the past 30 years in the United States and Australia, we’ve seen the sprouts of these insidious phenomena take root and blight the landscape of public debate: the construction of a false scientific controversy in the news media (in essence, fake news based on the testimony of fake experts); a partisan war on science-based knowledge; contempt for the academic and scientific production of knowledge; and conspiracy theories designed to vilify scientists, destroy public trust in science, and fuel an anti-science social movement so hysterical and hostile that climate mitigation policies seem all but impossible.

Climate denial has been most strident and successful in the US and Australia, where neoliberal think tanks funded by the fossil fuel, mining, and energy industries operate as political entrepreneurs in the news media – where most people get their information about science. In Australia, climate denial can be traced to the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA), a neoliberal think tank based in Melbourne. Once a sleepy conservative think tank that raised funds to support the politically conservative Liberal Party, the IPA was the object of a hostile corporate takeover in the late 1970s, led by mining executive and neoliberal enthusiast Hugh Morgan. After the coup, the IPA was relaunched as a newly minted radical neoliberal think tank that waged public battles in the news media to achieve favorable policy outcomes for its donors. Since the late 1980s, the IPA has become the most high-profile opponent of climate science, climate change mitigation, and the renewable energy industry in Australia.

> The US-led invasion of the scientific field

The IPA is also part of a transnational neoliberal network that includes a high concentration of US think tanks. In 1998, Morgan’s right-hand man, Ray Evans, participated in a critical meeting of the American Petroleum Institute and the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) to help draft the Global Climate Science Communication Action Plan. The strategy involved engaging public relations expertise, recruiting scientists who reject the scientific consensus on climate change to participate in media outreach, and producing a steady stream of press releases, opinion pieces, and letters to the editor to dispute climate science and oppose the introduction of policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.

The following year, the IPA welcomed a senior representative of the GCC’s public relations firm, Burson-Marsteller, onto its board of directors. Soon after, the IPA advertised for a new Executive Director who would elevate the IPA’s public profile as a key participant in national debates to influence policy outcomes, personally engage as a persuasive public presence in the news media, and increase...
funding by identifying potential sponsors who might benefit from these activities. The successful applicant could expect a 50% bonus over and above the base salary of $140,000 if the Key Performance Indicators of media engagement and fund raising were met.

John Roskam, appointed Executive Director of the IPA in 2004, had previously worked as Director of Corporate Communications for the mining giant Rio Tinto and as a staffer and campaign manager for the Liberal Party. Roskam not only raised the public profile of the IPA by routinizing its access to the Australian news media: he also successfully registered the IPA as a non-partisan, non-profit research institute whose secret sponsors could claim their donations as tax deductions.

Meanwhile, Roskam established IPA front groups including the Australian Climate Science Coalition (ACSC), which was funded through the Heartland Institute in the US. The mission of the ACSC was to contest the global scientific consensus on climate change and prevent the Australian introduction of policies designed to reduce greenhouse gas emission and mitigate climate change.

> The war-by-media on climate science

On closer examination, the “scientific advisors” of the ACSC did not mount a science-based argument against the scientific consensus on climate change. On the contrary, as long-term associates of the IPA and regular contributors to the IPA Review, they continued to rely heavily on ideologically-based narratives that framed climate change as a leftist conspiracy. These same narratives spread out from the IPA to the general public via right-wing members of the press, who came to regard the IPA and its front groups as intellectual and ideological role models. Thus, the IPA’s rhetorical arsenal furnished right-wing journalists and editors with narratives that demonized climate scientists and the political left.

This can be seen clearly in the lead-up to the first parliamentary debates on introducing an emissions trading scheme (ETS) in Australia in 2009. One of the ACSC’s scientific advisors, mining geologist and mining company director Ian Plimer, published a book through an IPA associate press which argued that anthropogenic climate change was impossible. He further claimed that climate change is a conspiracy between scientists and the political left, and ridiculed anyone who supported policies to mitigate climate change.

The publication of Plimer’s book followed a similar pattern to that of US think tanks, known to publish environmentally “skeptical” books in the lead-up to major policy debates. As in the US, Plimer embarked on a press tour, generating 219 articles in Australian newspapers. Notably, his association with the IPA was never mentioned.

While Plimer’s book was hailed by right-wing journalists and editors as an unassailable counter-argument against the scientific consensus view on climate change, scientific reviewers universally panned the tome as pulp fiction. Meanwhile, Plimer’s public statements simply denigrated climate scientists and anyone who supported climate change mitigation policies. In one media interview, he commented that “with some rabid environmentalists, human-induced global warming has evolved into a religious belief system […] so I make a great comparison between the way creationists operate and the way some of the environmentalists and global warmers operate.”

Despite his lack of expertise in climate science and his inability to mount a meaningful challenge to the scientific consensus on climate change, Plimer struck a chord with his constituents. Following the publication of his book, public trust in climate science decreased, the ETS was defeated, and right-wing politicians embraced Plimer as a modern-day Galileo.

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Since the 2013 uprisings, Brazil has undergone moments of enormous political turmoil and abrupt ideological change, promoting a turn from neo-developmentalist policies towards a new neoliberal agenda that had already begun during President Dilma Rousseff’s second mandate. This turn was not a spontaneous shift, but the result of the action of a large number of actors and factors. Some were already on the scene, while others emerged and consolidated as part of the conjuncture. For this reason, our discussion will begin with the new moment but will take pre-existing elements into account.

One of the epiphenomena that marked these events was undoubtedly the irruption of movements composed predominantly of young people wielding a right-wing neoliberal discourse. This is particularly the case of the Movimento Brasil Livre (Free Brazil Movement), Estudantes Pela Liberdade (Students For Liberty), and Vem Pra Rua (Take to the Streets). Although we still know very little about them, there is evidence linking them to initiatives within this great ideological swing and its think tanks. They disseminated their ideas primarily through the extensive use of social media networks, using various interconnected channels linked to other centers with neoliberal roots.

Within a very short period of time, the actions of these groups enabled them to recruit a huge mass of individuals and to provide them with a rudimentary narrative. The people they mobilized flooded the networks and mass media and from there descended upon city streets and squares, in mass meetings that created the conditions for the institutional actors who went on to depose the recently re-elected president.

Rather than organically structured organizations with a core from which actions and ideas irradiate, theirs became a network working through a freer form of symbiosis, triangulating resources. This network is intricate, all the more so given the fact that Brazil is a country with limited national representative organizations. This is especially true for its bourgeoisie, which tends to act according to regional cleavages and political parties representing their interests. The latter are largely dependent on local political bosses and lack coherent programmatic proposals.

> A brief historicization of our object

Some basic historical synthesis is necessary in order to understand the fabric of the neoliberal think tank networks that operate today. The penetration of ideas that can be associated with neoliberalism dates back to the mid-1950s, when they began to spread. They took root, institutionally, at the end of that decade, largely through
a first generation of think tanks. The Instituto Brasileiro de Ação Democrática (IBAD) and the Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais (IPES) stand out in this regard. Both provided their first contributions to the design of public policies for the political opponents of Labor President João Goulart; these elements were later applied during the first phase of the dictatorship but began to lose ground by the late 1960s.

The above-mentioned discontinuity is another of the characteristics marking the institutional development of neoliberalism in Brazil. In addition to the marked regional cleavages, the institutions we have mentioned are more oriented toward propagandistic than policy-making functions. Functions of the second type are reserved for a core group of private educational institutions, such as the Fundação Getúlio Vargas and the Pontifícia Universidade Católica de Rio de Janeiro (PUC-Rio). At the same time, no major energies are invested in the training of the technical staff recruited by these institutions, who tend to come from a similar social background to that of the entrepreneurial class, allowing for fluid movement between these two spheres.

The second wave of creation of neoliberal think tanks occurred after the democratic opening, during the 1980s, a period in which the Institutos Liberais (ILs) came to life. These were founded during those years after consultations with Antony Fisher, founder and inspirer of the Institute of Economic Affairs and the Atlas Network, and worked according to similar guidelines in Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and other capitals. The Porto Alegre headquarter adopted the name Instituto Liberdade and is under separate command.

This also helps us to understand why the figures that directed the economic policy of the Fernando H. Cardoso administration – during the golden days of Brazilian neoliberalism – came from the ranks of the PUC-Rio. They later enjoyed success as bankers, owners of investment funds, and party advisors. Once outside the government, they sought refuge in the Casa das Garças (or Instituto de Estudos de Política Econômica), perhaps the most important neoliberal think tank guided actively by its own way of thinking. Many of them are also members of the Instituto Millenium, founded by a philosopher from Porto Alegre and an economist from the PUC-Rio. Both of these people are also connected to hegemonic media corporations, which in turn claim to be advocacy think tanks. The Fórum da Liberdade has become the group’s most important conclave. It acts as a core organization that gathers its partners together once a year in Porto Alegre. The fluidity with which all of these organizations share members is also worth pointing out.

> Is there light at the end of the tunnel?

This is a troubling scenario, given the expansion of the network, its discourse, and its actions, which placed a neoliberal agenda at the forefront of Dilma’s own economic policy. This nonetheless did not prevent the fall of her appointee, and would later lead to her impeachment, enthroning Michel Temer and the economic team that has made a turn in the policy that Brazil had pursued until the year 2013.

Nonetheless, it now seems that current tendencies may be suffering a certain exhaustion. The allegations that were used to justify the change of regime have not been able to move beyond a kind of common sense that the international wave had already implanted, and have not been enough to produce consensus beyond particular circles. Furthermore, the public policies that have been promoted in the heat of this third neoliberal wave are also showing signs of failure, reflected as well in voters’ feeble interest in the candidates who uphold these. This contrasts with the persistent popularity of former president Luís Inácio Lula da Silva, which has firmly withstood the raging storm.

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Consulting Think Tanks: A Tool for Marketing or Hegemony?

by Matthias Kipping, York University, Canada

When looking at debates in the business press about the latest trends, say big data, artificial intelligence, or the future of manufacturing, one frequently comes across reports issued by the think tanks of the world’s major consulting firms. Most frequently cited is probably the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), but there are also references to, among others, the Accenture Institute for High Performance, the IBM Institute for Business Value or the Boston Consulting Group’s Henderson Institute. Most of their publications pertain to business-related issues, but some comment on macroeconomic developments and address broader questions such as the future of globalization or gender equality. The influence of these “institutes” and their “insights” is confirmed by one of the most widely-used think tank rankings. Among the top 25 “Best For Profit Think Tanks” it lists fourteen that are related to consulting firms, with the MGI taking top spot. “For Profit” is a misleading characterization though, since – unlike all the other consulting services – these insights come for free. The question then becomes why the consulting firms set them up in the first place.

Thought leadership or fear mongering?

The pioneer was the MGI in 1990, with others following soon. A simple answer regarding the rationale for their creation is that they serve as a marketing tool in what is
an increasingly competitive market for management advice. Managers buy consulting services based on “superior knowledge” – or at least that is how they have to justify their recourse to consulting firms to other stakeholders. In that perspective, consulting firms set up think tanks to demonstrate their “thought leadership,” and that is indeed how they frequently describe their objectives. While not directly referring to their think tanks, some academics studying consulting have highlighted a somewhat more self-serving motive for the purported thought leadership. They suggest that the succession of management ideas promoted by consultants – or “fashions” as they tend to call them to highlight their ephemeral nature – serve to create fear among managers about a highly uncertain, if not threatening, future, prompting them to hire consultants as a kind of guide, if not “comfort blanket.” Reading the reports produced by these think tanks indeed makes one concerned about how to deal with the challenging if not threatening developments they predict – a concern to which the reports themselves provide at best generic answers – hence, so goes the logic, prompting managers to reach out to the consulting firm behind the think tank that alerted them to these ominous trends.

> Copying or supplanting academia?

Going even further, these reports also help consultants open up new markets for their services, be they other functional areas, different sectors, or emerging economies. They serve to signal their relevant competence by providing deep “insights” on any of these topics to generate interest among potential clients and, ultimately, legitimacy for the solutions proposed to these clients. This leads to a second, broader motivation behind these think tanks. It concerns their position among the “authorities on management,” as some have called them, which also include business schools and management media. Not surprisingly, most of the “institutes” use the language of academia to describe their activities, labelling the consultants that put together the reports as “researchers” or “research fellows” and even hiring well-known academics, including Nobel laureates, as advisors. They also disseminate their results in well-known management media, either for free, when an article picks up their ideas, or in paid sections.

Deloitte has possibly gone furthest in this association by creating its own “Deloitte University Press.” Again, this could simply be understood as smart marketing, lending more credibility to what the consultants have to say. But it could also reflect an effort to carve out a larger space within the “management knowledge industry.” Management academics themselves might have created that opportunity by moving ever further towards a natural science paradigm of research – incidentally driven in part by the performance metrics introduced into the public service by those same consultants. Despite ceremoniously stating its relevance, most of today’s management research is largely unintelligible and often uninteresting to practicing managers, who are therefore all too happy to rely on the “research” provided by the consulting think tanks. The question is how much longer consultants will need to prop up their legitimacy with academic paraphernalia. Many business school professors already try to strengthen their credibility with practitioners and students by highlighting their consulting credentials.

> Colonizing everything?

This possible quest by the consultants for even more authority over defining best practices leads us to a yet broader rationale – and somewhat into conspiracy theory territory. Could the creation of these think tanks be part of a plot to dominate not only the evolution of business but also of the economy, society, and even polity at a global scale? This appears somewhat less outlandish when one considers the size and reach of many of these firms, which nowadays advise not only companies but many other organizations, including the Catholic Church, as well as governments of all colors. It becomes even more plausible when one considers the extraordinary number of alumni they have generated, many of whom now hold positions of leadership, in business and elsewhere, including academia – check the background of your Dean – and who are among the prime audiences for the insights provided by these think tanks and the common vision of the future they propose.

None of the above has to be sinister. All depends on the kind of ideas that are being generated and disseminated. These think tanks, and the consulting firms that created them, could act as a force for “good” – the greater good that is, not the one lining the pockets of their partners and shareholders. And there are indeed indications that some of these institutes have been doing just that, for instance with respect to gender equality or the need for a long-term oriented capitalism. However, the history of the management consulting industry and the impact it has had so far, does provide some cause for pause, if not concern.

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The study of care is at the center of contemporary debates about the stakes of social, political, and economic transformations taking place in the world today. An unprecedented number of women swept up in the human flow of crossing borders in search of work reproduces new and existing patterns of inequality along class, gender, racial, and national lines. The “crisis of care” raises concerns about the costs and consequences of a profoundly uneven and unjust neoliberal economy, especially for the predominantly poor, migrant, and racialized women who shoulder the disproportionate responsibility of caring for others. It also points to the preponderance of low-paid, informal jobs to take care of children, the elderly, and private households as well as ideologies of care that mask and often devalue the labor involved in activities ranging from cooking and cleaning to sex, intimacy, and biological reproduction. Our analytic lens, which takes intersectional feminist analysis and the global political economy as crucial starting points, magnifies the often-invisible labor of care and its significance in sustaining everyday life.

Market interventions and transnational circuits of care work have altered social relations and modes of belonging, from the moment of conception to end-of-life experiences. The labor of love confounds how we think about care and conceptualize care as work. Commonsense understandings expect care to be given freely, a labor of love, rewarded in terms of its intrinsic use value rather than compensated either in the “profane” medium of money or in relation to an abstract right of citizenship. While all forms of care and intimate labor have been devalued, one burgeoning area of inquiry is
the study of surrogate mothers who have not been accorded social, political, and legal recognition for their labor. Surrogate mothers’ labor is less legible due to the blurring of lines between commodity and gift exchanges. Intended parents can take refuge in the altruistic sentiments of the gift relationship rather than see themselves bound up in impersonal exploitative social relations and the increased commodification of intimacy and reproductive labor.

A diverse set of actors and institutions influence the value of care as socially necessary and integral to everyday life under capitalism. The exclusion of care workers from existing legal protections, whether as temporary migrants and voluntary surrogates or in non-wage labor activities, further devalues care work as a labor of love and devotion. Shifting its policy priorities, the state has withdrawn, retreated, and devolved responsibilities (and risks) for care, but also has pursued reforms fueling the marketization of care and intimate labor. Consider the case of Singapore: the state’s creation of highly marketized and privatized options for meeting care needs through a foreign domestic worker program underscores its role in advantaging middle- and upper-class families over working-class families. The twin processes of marketization and privatization of care are associated with insecure, low-wage jobs for care workers.

Love and care are transferred and transformed along global care chains. Evoking the image of globalized care chains enlarges the canvas on which we can visualize spatial power relationships. Inside the homes of migrant workers, family members left behind negotiate the demands of providing material and emotional forms of labor for their children and households. Evidence from post-socialist countries of Eastern Europe show that the labor of “motherly love” is not equally embraced by lone fathers who construct defensive forms of masculinity that shield them from ridicule and exclusion. Matching workers traveling long distances to care recipients and employers in crossborder transactions often involves multiple intermediaries from private labor brokers to bilateral national agreements. In Japan, expanding government-sponsored care programs for the rapidly-aging population produce an unexpected emphasis on professionally-trained migrants who can engage in cultural “bridgework” to bridge their ethnic “otherness” vis-a-vis Japanese care recipients. Globalized care chains link families from one region to another region of the world economy, and reflect the reorganization of public and private power relationships within and between the family, civil society, state, and economic institutions.

While the totality of such practices conjures up a powerful system of intersectional oppressions, such trends are not without their opponents. In some cases, we see the adaptation of unions and civil society organizations to new organizing and policy challenges; in other cases, we see the development of unexpected yet critical alliances and solidarities in support of care workers and their just treatment. Whether in the confines of private households or in the corridors of government, care workers are actively negotiating and contesting relations of inequality and subordination, sometimes reproducing gendered and ethno-racialized divisions of labor, other times crafting solidaristic identities and subjectivities.

By interpolating a new political subject, the widespread and ever-increasing commodification of care has forged the basis for new forms of collective agency. At the global level, the waging of a long campaign by domestic workers’ organizations and their allies pressured the International Labor Organization (ILO) to adopt the first set of international standards for domestic workers (Convention No. 189) in 2011. After historical exclusion due to the links to domestic slavery, colonial servitude, and master-servant relations, this convention gives domestic workers a common vocabulary and a global platform for claiming rights as workers and leveraging national policies and international legal norms on human rights in their pursuit of improved working conditions and the expansion of “decent work” to domestic workers.

Historical legacies and national political contexts also shape the modes and means available to social movement actors. Domestic workers’ organizing dates back to the turn of the twentieth century, another momentous period of social and economic upheaval. Recent activism in the US and Mexico features innovative social movement strategies drawing on multiple intersecting identities from which to recruit members and allies. In India, the mobilizing frame centers on human rights and fosters international solidarity (rather than regional-level solidarity) to target the national government; whereas in Ecuador, the mobilizing frame centers on equal labor rights and emphasizes regional more than global-level solidarity. By taking advantage of new political opportunity structures, the changing transnational political economy of care has not only influenced the kinds of social actors engaged in regulating care, but has also transformed the political horizons of organizing and collective action.

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The increase in migration – in which half of the world’s 223 million migrants are now women – signals the different ways that care has become a global and transnational issue. Many women who migrate from poorer or fragile states find work in paid care, cleaning, or domestic service, looking after children, older people, and households in richer countries. They move from Global South to North as well as within both North and South. In parallel to these global care chains is the increased transnational recruitment by states and private agencies of nurses and doctors from low- and middle-income countries to work in the care homes and hospitals of the health services in the richer world. In the process, those migrant workers’ care commitments to their older parents or children become stretched over continents. At the same time, the care industry has become a big international business as private care providers move their operations across the globe. In a different move, financial organizations transfer migrants’ remittances back home. For some lower-middle income countries, such as the Philippines, nurses and care workers constitute a major state-led “export” and their country’s largest source of foreign currency.

This transnational political economy of care reflects and reinforces an accumulation of changes and crises affecting social, economic, and geopolitical inequalities. First is the global increase in women’s involvement in the labor market. In developed countries this is marked by a shift away from the “male breadwinner” model to one which assumes that all adults, men and women, are in paid work. In poorer regions of the world, the destruction of local economies, unemployment, and poverty have pressed women into assuming a greater breadwinning role.

In developed welfare states care has become a central social, political, and fiscal concern as ageing societies and declining fertility have increased the ratio of those needing support. However, these indicators of a care crisis are no less pressing in developing countries, where at its extreme – for different countries experience this in different forms – in Africa, AIDS, chronic illness, natural disasters, and a high child dependency ratio place enormous burdens on women who are expected to care and earn with very little infrastructural support. Migration, often into domestic and care work, is one way that women can find earning opportunities even though this intensifies the caring responsibilities of those left behind.

At the same time, developed states are cutting back on their social ex-
penditure and looking for cost-effective ways of meeting their care needs. The private market has increasingly become a central feature of care provision even in those welfare states with high public investment in care, such as Sweden. This involves contracting out state or local authority services to the private sector and providing families, disabled and older people with tax credits, vouchers, or benefits to help them pay for assistance from the care labor market. Where this is unregulated or poorly regulated, and this is especially so for work in private households, those with the least bargaining power fill the gap: local working-class women, migrants from rural areas (as in China), and, increasingly, transnational migrant women workers. They are often overqualified – in the European Union, migrants are more than twice as likely to be overqualified as their native-born counterparts. With fewer citizenship rights to housing and social protection, they are more subject to precarious, low-paid, and home-based work.

However, this relatively new phenomenon is also superimposed upon historical inequalities, that is, the ongoing devaluation of care labor as women’s “unskilled” work combined with a persistent racialized servitude in which minority ethnic women have traditionally been recruited privately or by welfare states into domestic and care work. While the work/life balance problems faced by many women can be resolved by outsourcing care and cleaning to women from poorer classes or countries, it does little to alter the enduring gendered divisions of labor in the household.

> The intersection of care with other global crises

The transnational movement of care labor intersects with other global crises. First, the effects of austerity following the global financial crisis have intensified states’ search for more cost-effective care provision. In Spain, where two-thirds of care workers are migrants, austerity’s squeeze on household incomes led to a decrease in the hours and pay of migrant workers. Remittances sent home have been halved. Second, the dependence of higher-income countries on migrant workers co-exists with a rise in anti-immigration xenophobia. The political debates about the refugee crisis are shaping changes in immigration policies which affect migrant care workers. These policies are becoming more restrictive not only toward “unskilled” workers (into which category care workers fall) but also in limiting migrant eligibility to basic welfare provision. Many of the political debates set state sovereignty and economic cost against human rights and humanitarianism. Indeed, in a Polanyian sense, all these crises – of finances, of care, and those facing migrants and refugees – render their subjects as fictitious commodities and jeopardize security, solidarity, and sustainability.

What to do? Transnational and international political activism by grassroots domestic worker organizations led in 2011 to the International Labour Organization’s Convention for the Rights of Domestic Workers. Other global strategies include the World Health Organization’s 2010 endorsement of an ethical code for countries to use in their recruitment of migrant health workers. These are important, but the issue of migrant care work needs to go beyond this. Care and migration are both issues of human rights and sustainability. Free movement, the rights of citizenship, as well as hospitality for those fleeing violence are essential. Care requires the recognition that there is a fundamental human right to be able to receive and to provide care. The predominant logic of policy-making focuses on productivism, the facilitation of markets, and on drawing women into the labor market where care needs have to be organized around paid work. A longer-term perspective requires care to be central to strategies for global social justice, to be recognized as a collective social good, and, like migrant labor, central to national and global economies, to well-being, interdependence, and human sustainability.

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In late March 2008, I got an urgent call from the United Nations’ specialized agency on labor, the International Labour Organization (ILO). To the surprise of many, the ILO’s Governing Body had just adopted a resolution requiring it to prepare to negotiate a new international treaty on decent work for domestic workers. I was asked to serve as the ILO’s lead expert, as part of a process of making domestic work visible.

> The “invisibility” of domestic work

As the people who care for others, domestic workers are accustomed to not being really seen, and not being really heard. Historical accounts remind us of the link to domestic slavery and colonial servitude, and of the persisting vestiges found in the “common sense” of the status-based relationship of the master and the servant. The many poignant sociological accounts of domestic work in post-colonial or post-apartheid states emphasize how domestic workers remain “invisible” even as they perform the hard and dirty work associated with social reproduction. The political economy literature stresses the extent to which domestic workers – often highly educated and with care responsibilities of their own – leave family and home to travel abroad to provide care. The literature captures the extent to which the magnitude of this staggering transnational, traditionally feminized care work remains economically and socially undervalued.

The ILO considers that there are at least 67 million women and men in domestic work; one in every 25 women workers worldwide is a domestic worker. Domestic workers’ contributions to the global economy are undervalued despite a rise in demand for privatized care. Some speak of global care chains; Rhacel Parreñas refers instead to care resource extraction, noting that the sending countries of the Global South provide subsidized, often well-educated workers to the Global North, which further enables the Global North to build its markets on the backs of migrants from the Global South. Transborder

by Adelle Blackett, McGill University, Canada
movement by domestic workers is a remittance-based strategy associated with a neoliberal approach to economic development anchored in temporary migration.

Domestic workers demanded recognition in the international standard setting. They had been organizing regionally for decades, and coalesced through a transnational network cum trade union federation to defend their rights in a unique international forum. The International Labour Organization was founded almost a century ago, in 1919, as a tripartite institution representing workers and employers alongside governments. The first words of its constitution state that “universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice,” and in 1944 the Declaration of Philadelphia added that “labour is not a commodity.” Despite urgent calls to adopt an instrument on domestic workers since 1936, standard setting on decent work for domestic workers waited until standard setting had gone out of fashion at the ILO. The stakes of adopting a new standard were high.

Regulating decent work for domestic workers

Mainstream labor law is under challenge, both under neoliberal austerity measures and for its boundary drawing that excludes increasingly marginalized and informal economy workers. Decent work for domestic workers was an exercise in both acknowledging and challenging labor law’s boundaries. I framed the ILO’s Law and Practice Report from a critical posture, while drawing strategically on rights discourse to foster inclusion: that is, domestic workers claimed the right to be included in labor law. The claim was significant because the Convention and Recommendation were not intended to be merely a symbolic instrument or an abstract “charter” of rights: they were detailed and comprehensive.

In a shift from traditional approaches to legal transplantation that are imagined to radiate out from the Global North to the rest of the world, the instruments built on regulatory experimentation that emerged largely from countries in the Global South such as South Africa and Uruguay, alongside countries like France. The standards were intended to broaden the notion of decent work that the ILO had been championing since it extended “decent work to all” in 1999. Under Convention No. 189 and Recommendation No. 201, decent work would come to mean decent working conditions, and much more. It would recognize domestic workers’ equality rights and freedom of association, and extend protection against forced labor and child labor. It would include access to social protection, encompassing maternity leave, occupational safety and health, and social security protections – even though there is some realist recognition that these might need to be provided progressively. But there was more still. A premium was placed on making sure that mechanisms for inspection and dispute resolution were actively available. Decent work would also mean that special attention was needed around the fault lines of migration, to rein in exploitative practices.

Convention No. 189 and its accompanying, supplementary Recommendation No. 201 seek no less than to shift the framework governing domestic work from one that enshrines subordination to one that dislodges asymmetrical power. They have been part of building an alternative, counterhegemonic, and transgressive transnational legal order, and they have allowed that order both to settle and be diffused.

The process is not without risks. I fear in particular that those regulating domestic work will continue the spatial perpetuation of subordination and servitude through – rather than despite – labor law reform initiatives in the wake of the new international standards, as neoliberal approaches to the so-called tertiary service economy proliferate and are embodied by marginalized, racialized women. Yet, it is significant that 25 countries from the Global South and Global North have ratified Convention No. 189 in the less than seven years since the new standards were adopted. It is also significant that learning communities have emerged to share experiences and promote decent work for domestic workers through forms of international solidarity. Most of all, it is significant that domestic workers have mobilized and continue to insist that in decent work for domestic workers, there is “nothing for us without us.”

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> Intersectional Histories of Domestic Worker Organizing

by Chris Tilly, University of California, Los Angeles, USA and member of ISA Research Committees on Sociology of Work (RC30), Labor Movements (RC44), and Social Classes and Social Movements (RC47), Georgina Rojas, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social (CIESAS), Mexico, and Nik Theodore, University of Illinois at Chicago, USA

Research on informal worker organizing has recently advanced from simply demonstrating that informally employed workers can organize successfully to analyzing how these organizations succeed. Though numerous case studies examine informal worker mobilization in a single sector within a single country within a single historical period (and often within a single organization), few studies have attempted to leverage cross-national or historical comparisons to explain the forms, strategies, and degree of success of informal worker movements.

There is tremendous potential for cross-national and historical analysis to illuminate how informal worker organizations function. Our comparative analysis of domestic worker organizing in Mexico and the United States looks both across history and across countries – admittedly a complex set of comparisons. This article summarizes a part of our work in progress. To theorize the actions of these worker organizations, we draw on analyses of intersectionality in social movements by Norma Alarcón and Jennifer Chun, among others, since domestic workers (henceforth DWs) are characterized by multiple, subordinate identities: as women, as low-status workers, and as members of marginalized racial and ethnic groups. In addition, we draw on multiple foundational social movement
literatures, including those examining resource mobilization, political opportunity structures, identity, and framing.

Three streams of activism characterize the evolution of organizing and advocacy trajectories in the two countries. The first two streams build on an intersectional “working woman” identity. One stream has mobilized elite labor feminists; the other consists of trade unions. The third stream, which we call “new social movements,” comprises various innovative grassroots movements built around identities as women, ethnic group members, or migrants (none of them actually “new” identities). The history we recount here draws on multiple sources, including our own recent fieldwork, but leans especially heavily on Mary Goldsmith’s historical research in Mexico, and that of Premilla Nadasen and Eileen Boris in the US.

> Comparing Mexican and US histories

In Mexico, a first wave of activism, roughly between 1900 and 1950, was initially propelled by elite feminists linked to the revolutionary movement and later the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Domestic workers joined in later, organizing dozens of unions (linked to the PRI) from the 1920s into the 1940s. Developments in the US during the same period were similar, though not as long-lived: elite labor feminists carried out vocal advocacy for domestic worker rights from the 1920s to the 1940s, and again in the 1960s. Like their Mexican sisters, US domestic workers organized unions during the period from the 1930s to the 1940s, in this case under the auspices of the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

Beginning in the 1970s, new social movements played an especially prominent role in a way that involved some ruptures with the past. In Mexico, new DW associations formed with support from liberation theology organizations and feminist intellectuals unconnected with, and often critical of, the PRI. They highlighted the disproportionately (intra-national) migrant and indigenous identities of Mexican domestic workers. In the US, the control of the National Committee on Household Employment, a vehicle for elite labor feminist advocacy that...
had functioned on and off from the 1920s, passed to Edith Barksdale-Sloan in 1972. Barksdale-Sloan, a black feminist who made common cause with the African American Civil Rights Movement, supported the formation of dozens of local organizations of black women domestic workers that flourished during the early 1970s but then declined. In the 1990s, US immigrant rights activists and women of color feminists responded to the demographic shift of domestic work increasingly from African-American to immigrant women by organizing new associations based primarily in immigrant communities, culminating in the formation of the National Domestic Workers Alliance in the 2000s.

But DW unions also enjoyed a resurgence in both countries, fueled by some of the same new social movement energy. In the US, taking advantage of changes in state law affecting the large number of publicly funded homecare workers providing care to elderly and disabled persons, progressive public sector unions with strong bases among communities of color and women organized home-care unions in a number of populous states from the 1980s forward. In Mexico, the largest and most influential domestic worker association, the Center for Support and Training of Household Employees (CACEH) formed a trade union, the National Union of Men and Women Domestic Workers (SINACTRAHO) in 2015 – the first active domestic worker union since the 1940s – taking advantage of a political opportunity opening in Mexico City, which is a separate jurisdiction in Mexico. CACEH and SINACTRAHO’s main leader, Marcelina Bautista, in some ways embodies the Mexican DW movement’s entire evolution. A migrant from the poor, heavily indigenous state of Oaxaca, she first became active in a liberation theology organized group, then worked with middle-class feminist advocates, broke away to form a worker-led association, and then – again mentored by middle-class labor feminists – established a union.

> Deploying subjectivity

Across the three organizing streams, and to some extent within each stream over time, organizations in the US and Mexico have emphasized different aspects of DWs’ intersectional identities to mobilize new bases and forge alliances with external allies. The identities that have combined intersectionally to sustain DW organizing across these streams have been – without implying an evolutionary path – first as women, second as workers, and third as marginalized and racialized minorities. The movements have deployed what Chela Sandoval calls “tactical subjectivity,” accessing multiple mobilizing axes, frames, and allies in ways that adapt to shifting configurations of power. Their advances have been strengthened by changes in the political opportunity structure, which in turn have enabled DW organizations to achieve, not only public recognition and support from key civil society representatives, but also a growing national presence in policy-making circles. For domestic workers in these countries, then, intersectional identities have been fundamental both to attracting members and building organizational unity, and to formulating successful strategies. ■
In Geneva on June 16, 2011, amidst the clapping and singing of dozens of domestic workers gathered from all over the world, the International Labour Organization (ILO) passed Convention No. 189 “concerning decent work for domestic workers,” and the related Recommendation No. 201. This was a striking achievement in comparison to the traditional lack of rights for a category of laborers who, in different social contexts, usually belong to the most impoverished and socially stigmatized groups (poor women and children, undocumented migrants, ethnic minorities, etc.).

In several countries, domestic work is not recognized as “work” and is therefore excluded from labor protections. Domestic workers are often deprived of monetized salaries and compensated with only food and shelter. Also, in countries where domestic work is regulated through labor laws, the provisions differ significantly from those in place for other jobs, having lower remuneration and less social protection.

However, in recent years, there has been a gradual development of what can be seen as the “global governance of paid domestic work”: a multi-layered and highly heterogeneous framework for the improvement of domestic workers’ rights, with the interplay of different types of global and local actors. In the process, the status of paid domestic workers – their poor conditions and the discrimination they face in different parts of the world – has come to be seen as a “global problem” whose governance is a challenge that exceeds national borders. In fact, on the institutional side, not only the ILO, but also United Nations (UN) Women, the International Organization for Migration, the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the European Fundamental Rights Agency, the UN Commission on the Status of Women, and several international trade unions have undertaken specific actions to promote domestic workers’ rights in recent years. At the same time, the founding of the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF) in Montevideo in 2012 revealed the global expansion of this workers’ movement built upon new connections between existing national and regional organizations composed (exclusively) of domestic workers.

In this scenario, it is important to consider the impact of C189 on campaigns for domestic workers’ rights waged in different national contexts. In fact, when one gets closer to the specificities of each country case, the behavior of social movements, states, and international organizations in relation to this issue shows important differences. One can often see quite contrasting ways for state and non-state organizations to position themselves around the issue, revealing how the context-dependent character of domestic workers’ rights can ultimately condition the capacity of C189 to mobilize actors in each context. This raises questions such as: how are different local actors reacting to C189 as a “global governance” measure for domestic workers’ rights? What role does the state play in this process? How do such processes relate to wider political and social transformations taking place at the national and regional levels?
As an exemplary way to answer these questions, based on the data available to the research team of the project DomEQUAL, I consider the cases of India and Ecuador, which reflect contrasting examples of how local (state and non-state) actors have taken up C189 as an opportunity to mobilize for domestic workers’ rights.

On the state level, Ecuador and India have shown two opposite attitudes: the Ecuadorian government has actively promoted domestic workers’ rights within its broader socio-economic reforms, while the Indian government has been reluctant to put the question on its political agenda, despite the pressure of civil society groups. These national differences give shape to very different modalities in campaigns for domestic workers’ rights, resulting in different roles, purposes, and scope of action for key social actors.

The differences between India and Ecuador also reflect the differences between their geographical regions. The case of Ecuador mirrors the tendency in the Caribbean and Latin American region, during the time of the leftist governments in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, to improve the conditions of poor and vulnerable social groups, including women in domestic work. There seems to be an emulation effect there, with Latin American and Caribbean governments joining the ratification process one after another. Today the region has the highest concentration of ratifications, with fourteen signatories at the time of writing. The case of India is instead contextualized in a region where, in comparison to Latin America, fewer reforms have been adopted to improve the human rights of women and migrants in general. In all of Asia, only the Philippines have ratified C189 so far. This has a negative impact on domestic workers’ rights.

For these reasons, India and Ecuador also show different trends in relation to who occupies the role of “incumbent actor,” meaning the actor who has promoted new normative and legal advancements in domestic workers’ rights. Whereas in Ecuador it was the national government that promoted a new normative framework, this is not the case in India, where legislation exists only at the level of some local states (like Kerala); for the rest of the country the ILO remains the main actor in promoting the legal protection of domestic workers. In India, I argue that the national state could actually be described as an opponent inside the field.

In conclusion, we may draw the hypothesis that in these two countries the differences in the interaction between actors have rallied around different ideas: the improvement of the human rights of domestic workers in India, as opposed to the more specific improvements of their labor conditions in Ecuador. These two different configurations of the purpose of the campaign correspond to the different types of actors who, along with domestic workers’ organizations, support and promote the campaign. Given the very broad frame of the campaign in India, it was difficult to find any relevant actor working on equality and human rights issues who did not subscribe to the campaign for domestic workers’ rights. This was not the case in Ecuador, however, where stakeholders from the traditional feminist, indigenous, and workers’ movements were more reluctant to join the campaign, seeing it as separate from their own goals.

“...The status of paid domestic workers has come to be seen as a ‘global problem’ whose governance is a challenge that exceeds national borders...”

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Over the last fifteen years, studies have focused on the consequences of single female migration for their families, in particular for their non-migrating children; however, the gendered experiences and practices of stay-behind fathers have hardly been investigated. In my study on female migrant care workers from Eastern Europe I look at fatherhood practices of stay-behind fathers and their experiences with lone parenting in the post-socialist situation where men – unlike before – are required to perform breadwinning masculinity.

During the transformation from “socialism” to a “free market” economy in most of Eastern Europe, state-guaranteed and financed social safety nets were abolished or significantly reduced. Millions of people lost their jobs as a consequence of reforms to the economic system. Economic changes also included the abolition of state provision in the care sector: many kindergartens and schools were closed or privatized. With the adoption of a new political system came the rejection of “socialist matriarchy” and the re-introduction of traditional hegemonic masculinity, grounded in the ideal of the single male breadwinner. Under economic pressure, this ideal became difficult to fulfill and the
Large-scale migrations of men can be understood as attempts to meet the new standards of masculinity. At the same time, women – among them many mothers – started to migrate in even larger numbers, which can be seen as a continuation of their former co-breadwinner identity. In these cases, how do their husbands/partners experience the absence of their wives? Are these fathers subject to associated fears of losing their hegemonic masculinity? How is daily, hands-on care practiced in such families?

> Styles of stay-behind fathering

The study describes three types of care practices of stay-behind fathers: the “lone parent,” the “father commander,” and the “involved father.” The first is the case of Costica, the “lone parent.” Costica is a well-educated farmer in Moldavia who takes care of his three children as a lone parent. His wife left the family behind for many years when she worked as an undocumented care worker in an Italian family. All three children are involved in the work on the farm and the household; the father assigns the tasks but makes sure that work is divided equally and that schoolwork is not neglected. He does not question the necessity of caregiving to his children, but emphasizes his incapability of providing it like a mother. The father feels guilty that – as he puts it – he is robbing his children of their childhood. He compares his fathering practices to a carbon copy of mothering care and emphasizes his deficiencies.

The second type, the “father commander,” is much more widespread than the lone fathering type. The Ukrainian father Sergij, a former teacher, runs his own business during his wife’s shuttle migration as a domestic worker to Poland; he delegates the hands-on caring tasks partly to his parents-in-law and partly to the children and prides himself on avoiding household work. He presents himself as an expert in managing the mother’s absence by giving instructions to his family members; in his own words, he is commanding the troops. As soon as his wife returns, household and childcare responsibilities return to her. His fatherhood practice is in accordance with the gendered task distribution of traditional hegemonic masculinity.

A third type, the “involved parent,” which was very rare in the sample, is the case of Pawel, a Polish technician who stays behind with his five-year-old son when his wife works as a (circular) domestic worker in Germany. Like the majority of men in his situation, he keeps his job as supervisor in a car factory where he works in day and night shifts. Pawel takes pains to do justice to the care requirements and to all household and caring tasks; in his own words, he wants to manage alone. As an involved father he prides himself in doing both – bringing up his son and standing his ground at work – with all the complications that are usually associated with single mothers.

> Negotiating care performances

From these case studies, the differences between the fatherhood practice of the “involved father,” the “father commander,” and the “lone parent” become evident. What they have in common is the insistence on doing paid work, and hence the attempt to meet the hegemonic ideal of fatherhood even when this is eroded and financially not opportune. While Pawel takes charge of the “motherly” care tasks, the feminine coding seems to be unproblematic; but his care model collides with the demands of his workplace, and in this sense his experience equates to that of working mothers who suffer from a double workload. Sergij rejects any hint of role-swapping or attempting to replace the mother from the outset, and instead tries to uphold the outward appearance of sole breadwinner, despite the fact that the reality is otherwise.

I claim that the fatherhood practice of Pawel and Costica can certainly be called equal to that expected of a mother – a practice deriving from the co-breadwinner families under state socialism, where it was not an ideal but a practical reality. Given the current hegemonic fatherhood ideal, it is obvious that stay-behind fathers have little or no chance of being recognized as pioneers of modified fatherhood practice. Instead, they must protect themselves against the discrediting experience of being excluded and labelled wimps – and as a consequence of this, they do not question the current hegemonic model.

All in all, the cases illustrate two aspects of migration. Firstly, the emotional toll and the practical strain that family members experience in the context of family fragmentation. Stay-behind fathers must negotiate their caring performance not only with their partners but also in their neighborhood and the wider society. Because most Central and Eastern European countries consider the shuttle migration of women a “temporary absence” and refuse to acknowledge their economic contribution, these sending states deny special support programs to stay-behind families. Likewise, the beneficiaries of domestic and care work in receiving states are mostly ignorant of the emotional costs and struggles workers face. Secondly, when women become breadwinners, most sending societies realize that their absence at home causes lacunae and gender trouble. The upgrading and empowerment of fathering as dignified “work” could be an adequate response by the sending states; one which, alas, is nowhere to be seen.
Over the past few years, the issue of “work-life harmony” has come to the forefront as a public issue in Singapore. The Singapore state has increased social support to enable parents – particularly mothers – to balance wage work with the care of children. At the same time, the foreign domestic worker program, long a core component of the state’s solution to care needs, continues to grow unabated. In tandem with the growth in public policy attention, a wide range of commercial services oriented toward children have sprouted up. Childcare centers and kindergartens boast facilities, teacher-student ratios, and pedagogies commensurate with their price points. Specialist centers cater to parents who want their children to spend time on hobbies such as music, chess, art and craft, dance, fencing, martial arts, soccer, swimming, tennis, etc. Commercial “tuition centers,” academically oriented, are in every neighborhood’s shopping mall; these play central roles in the everyday routines of school-going children. Although these “enrichment” and tuition centers are not framed as centers of care, they form important components of the care infrastructure insofar as this is where some children spend many hours of their day, several times a week.

The logistics of moving between home, school, and centers are rendered possible by the vast number of migrant domestic workers (primarily from the Philippines and Indonesia) whose job includes precisely this daily movement of children from place to place. Indeed, in my neighborhood where many European, American, and Australian families live, mothers openly and regularly comment on how wonderful it is to raise children in Singapore, in contrast to their home countries. Two salient issues emerge as they talk about how their lifestyles here could not be replicated back home: first, there are so many interesting activities available to children; second, full-time paid help is so affordable. Their remarks bring into relief this fact: families with financial means, no matter their nationalities and in-

Contrasting realities in Singapore.
cluding Singaporean ones, find Singapore a great place to raise kids because they have access to First World services and Third World servitude.

In this context of expanded care options, the possibilities available to low-income Singaporeans are starkly different. Their everyday realities are hectic, with housework, errands, care for children, cooking, and sometimes physically-exhausting shift work as security guards, supermarket cashiers, and cleaners. They are stressed out and anxious about running out of money to buy food and pay for utilities. Their children, in contrast to middle-class children, are extraordinarily independent: they can cook rice and fry eggs at eight years old; go to and from school on their own; and even take care of younger siblings. Importantly, low-income parents speak of how they worry about their children alone at home with nothing to occupy them, or about losing their jobs when they take time off because their children are sick or on school holidays, or about the fact that their wages are insufficient to pay all their bills.

As it turns out, Singapore is not such a great place to raise children when one is low-income. The expansion of social support and the dizzying options available to some parent-consumers are not shaping people’s lives in the same ways across class lines. Class differences matter, and a work-care regime that appears to be incredibly “family-friendly” to some is not particularly family-friendly to others.

In this special issue, authors show the myriad ways in which there are constant and messy entanglements between the individual, intimate, and micro practices of persons and families on the one hand and the larger political economy of care on the other. My work too illustrates the ways in which the “choices” people make are shaped by the options available to them. The options available to families are, in spite of expansions in public support, still heavily dependent on market solutions and participation in formal wage labor. This story is part of a larger story of specific manifestations of neoliberal capitalism and the tendencies of states and societies to favor individualized and marketized solutions to meeting human needs. To the extent that these tendencies persist, if in varied forms, in the contemporary world, it is important to shed light on how these political economic developments are particularly damaging to people in low socioeconomic circumstances.

The expansion of care needs and the fulfillment of these needs through market solutions more generally and migrant care workers more specifically, are trends likely to persist, particularly in the wealthier cities of the world. We must cast a wide net on understanding the consequences of these trends to include people who are not themselves part of the “global care chain” but make lives in societies deeply entangled in the chain. Low-income families in a context where, despite social expansion, regimes retain important individualistic, market-oriented principles, and where migrant care workers take on care and household labor, continue to have their needs obscured, ignored, overlooked. Work and care under these circumstances entail hardship. Policy-makers and scholars alike have also generally ignored the fact that some of the care labor performed in higher-income families – shuttling children around for various extracurricular activities, for example – also compounds inequalities among children.

As feminist scholars and activists challenging existing state policies, societal norms, and corporate practices, we must continually insert the question of class variations and inequalities into the conversation. For too many of us and for too long, this has not been a high priority. We need more attention to the ways in which public policy addresses women’s needs in uneven ways; sustained critique of work-care-migration regimes that neglect the actual labor that happens in homes; deeper thinking about the ways in which labor within the home can be supported; more integration of discussion of low wages and work conditions when workplace policies are addressed; and an expanded view in thinking about the effects of paid domestic work on public policy and the well-being of various groups in society and along the global care chain.

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While East Asian countries have widely recruited migrant domestic helpers or caregivers from Southeast Asia, Japan has been hesitant to open the gate until very recently. In 2014, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe proposed a new policy to boost women’s labor participation by granting the entry of foreign domestic workers in six metropolitan areas. These workers, however, may not live in the residence of the household using their service; rather, they are employed and supervised by service agencies. Prospective workers must spend 400 hours in training programs to learn Japanese, housework skills, and cultural etiquette, including how to bow properly. A government officer said to The Japan Times (January 1, 2017): “It is a very Japanese way of doing things. We couldn’t have them flooding in like they do in Hong Kong.”

Prior to the arrival of migrant domestic workers, Japan has accepted registered nurse (Kangoshi) and certified care worker (Kaigo Fukushishi) candidates since 2008.
based on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) signed with Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Following a similar logic, the EPA care workers are not allowed to work in private homes. They are employed by medical institutions or care facilities to provide support for the elderly or disabled.

The employment of migrant care workers in Japan offers a pivotal case for researchers to examine how a society negotiates the cultural meaning and institutional arrangement of care in the production of “ideal migrant caregivers.” The government was very cautious at every step during the introduction of EPA candidates, including the control of quotas, state-to-state recruitment, and the provision of intensive training programs at great cost. Although these EPA candidates are skilled workers with nursing backgrounds, they must attend a training course run by institutions sanctioned by the Japan International Corporation of Welfare Services (JICWELS) and then work and study at a hospital or a care facility. They are expected to take the national exams to become a registered nurse or certified care worker. Those passing the national exams are eligible for indefinitely renewable visas and permanent residency in Japan.

The training curriculum aims to bridge ethnic differences and temper the otherness of migrants. Beata Świtek has called Japanese nursing homes an environment of “cultural intimacy,” where the mimicry of Japanese traditions recreates an essentialized image of the past, making the elderly residents feel comfortable in an institution despite their social isolation. Migrant workers are required to adopt interactive norms and practices in tune with Japanese care culture, allowing seniors to experience a sense of cultural intimacy and personal dignity as they receive care from workers without kinship or ethnic ties.

A substantial proportion of the curriculum involves the instruction of Japanese language – not just basic vocabulary for conversation but advanced skills in reading and writing (391 hours in pre-departure training and 675 hours in Japan). The most challenging goal is the proficiency in Chinese characters (Kanji), because Japanese medical specialists tend to use Kanji, instead of phonetic writing, in medical documents. Japanese proficiency is important not only in the facilitation of communication and documentation, but because speaking Japanese properly – with honorifics (Keiko) – also helps caregivers to give respect to the elderly.

The curriculum highlights the perception of care as a cultural practice and helps EPA candidates to learn about the cultural aspects of “Japanese care work.” The instruction about the cultural sense of “cleanliness” in Japan helps them to understand why tub bathing, instead of sponge bathing, is considered such an essential part of quality care for Japanese seniors. In Japan, the diaper manufacturers now sell more adult diapers than baby diapers. At the training sessions, the EPA candidates learn about the proper procedure to change diapers coded by color for different timings and purposes. They are trained to see the association of adult diapers with autonomy and dignity from the eyes of Japanese elders.

The curriculum also includes subjects on Japanese culture and society. They are taught about Japanese eating conventions, such as saying “itadakimasu” (“I gratefully receive”) while dining together with the wards. They learn to appreciate the aromas of special Japanese food, such as yuzu and wasabi. They also learn to respect traditional attire – being instructed about the correct ways of putting on a kimono (with the right side tucked under the left) – and the cultural sense of shame in order to offer proper assistance with dressing and undressing. Some EPA workers I interviewed identified this part of training as “very useful,” but some bluntly criticized it as being “totally useless” (“Nobody wears a kimono in a nursing home!”). The cultivation of migrant workers’ familiarity with Japanese traditions and culture has more symbolic meaning than practical function; it enhances a sense of cultural intimacy not only for the elderly wards but also for the Japanese society at large.

The training program also involves communication and interaction with Japanese co-workers. The EPA candidates are instructed about the work culture in Japanese hospitals or care facilities, where the working hours tend to be long and rigid, and the status hierarchy at work is evident. Staff members must follow standardized procedures and write detailed documentation to ensure the conduct of professional care. The likelihood of EPA migrants gaining professional certification and achieving status mobility in Japan has been extremely low due to the high threshold of language proficiency. Even those who obtain the license decide to return home after all, because they feel isolated and excluded in Japan’s social and cultural environment.

Japan’s EPA program views and treats migrant care workers as “professional others.” Compared to the guest worker system in other East Asian host countries, the program does grant migrant workers with more access to entitlements and benefits. Although they can earn a ticket to permanent residency after passing the exams for professional certification, the evaluation of skills is so highly embedded in local culture and language that very few are able to achieve such status. As a result, professionalism does not provide a reliable pathway for their social mobility but becomes a mechanism for exclusion of foreigners.

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Pregnancy and Childbirth as Wage Labor

by Sharmila Rudrappa, The University of Texas-Austin, USA

Overdetermined by ideals of racial purity, patriarchal lineage, and maternal devotion, pregnancy and childbirth are never just natural phenomena but are intensely culturally mediated, gendered events that accentuate the social processes of gift-giving and exchange central to making families and communities. The reproductive household tasks mothers perform are understood as being imbued with devoted care, selfless love, and maternal sacrifice. Because of the salience these gendered forms of reproductive labor have in making families which are idealized as sacrosanct, pregnancy and childbirth are guarded from the taint of exchange of profane money which circulates in the crass world of markets marked by transactional, transient relationships. What happens, then, when women get pregnant and deliver babies in exchange for wages? What kind of wage labor is pregnancy and childbirth?

These questions arise in the context of commercial surrogacy where a surrogate mother gestates and births a baby or babies for an intended couple or single parent in exchange for wages. The surrogate mother has no genetic relationship to the embryos implanted in her, which legally belong to the intended parent(s). The embryos themselves emerge from a variety of market arrangements that involve the purchase of either human ova or sperm from sex cell banks or other individuals. Though various social actors are unclear about what exactly is being exchanged, industry standards establish that the money given to surrogate mothers is not for the baby, but for her gestational services toward creating that infant.

As I learned in my research on surrogacy, like most people, the working-class Indian surrogate mothers and upper-middle-class intended parents I interviewed had previously not exchanged money for pregnancy. These individuals have few resources with which to think about how to deal with the marketization of biological reproductive services. As a result, they fall into inherited ways of thinking about exchanges: is surrogacy a gift, or a commodity exchange? Gifts and commodities are terms used for objects that circulate in social spaces, but how they
circulate is an important distinction. The literature on gift-giving and commodities is extensive, but to state it succinctly, gift exchanges signify ongoing social relationships between individuals, or groups of individuals. Gift exchanges are not egalitarian but are marked by inequalities based on social hierarchies determined by age, gender, disabilities, sexuality, religion, race, and caste. Commodity exchanges, on the other hand, are typified by transience where workers and consumers typically are strangers to each other. In exchange for money, consumers receive a commodity from workers, who are almost always at a disadvantage because of the structures of capitalism. Thus, gifts or commodities reflect social relations. The gift or the commodity economy is bound up with the forms of the person, who is diversely constituted, and is, in turn, herself constituted by the gift or commodity exchange.

Through contesting whether pregnancy and childbirth is a gift or a commodity, the intended parents and surrogate mothers in my research negotiated the terms of their relationship with each other. Though the surrogate mothers thickly described the effort that went into gestational surrogacy and tried to negotiate better wages, they hoped that the tenets of gift-exchange would be maintained in commercial surrogacy. They knew their earnings through surrogacy would disappear in a matter of months, and they would have nothing concrete to show for their labor effort. They instead wished for ongoing social relationships with the upper-middle-class intended parents because they could potentially draw upon these networks for short-term loans, recommendations for jobs, and other social goods that could be converted to economic capital. The intended parents, however, were unequivocal: in spite of using the rubric of gifting in effusive claims that no amount of money could equal the child they were bestowed with through the surrogate mothers’ efforts, they acted like consumers in a capitalist society. They had no interest in maintaining relationships with working-class Third World women, and usually cut all contact once transactions were completed. As per their contracts, they were fair and impartial participants because they had paid up in full, and were not legally obliged to give anything more.

Though surrogacy agencies, infertility doctors, and intended parents do not explicitly say so, their interactions and inclinations toward surrogate mothers make it apparent that they perceive surrogacy as a form of wage labor. Various sociologists concur, with terms such as “mother worker” and “industrial womb” being used to describe these emergent forms of commodified reproductive labor.

But what sort of labor do pregnancy and childbirth become when incorporated into markets? At first glance, surrogacy could be seen as a form of intimate labor, which is the paid employment involved in forging, maintaining, and managing interpersonal ties through tending to the bodily needs and wants of care recipients. Intimate labor, though, does not involve the workers’ entire bodies as surrogacy does. Sex work may come close, but does not capture the forms of in-vivo processes of oogenesis and gestation that are harnessed in commercial surrogacy, which create surplus value. Because of the biological, bodily processes involved, surrogacy can be more accurately described as a form of clinical labor, where women acquiesce to giving doctors and other medical personnel access to their bodies in order to harness bodily processes for profit-making.

Understanding surrogacy as a form of clinical labor not only describes the processes by which surplus is extracted from gestation and pregnancy, it also affords pathways to legitimizing the biological reproductive labor that women perform in order to earn wages. Deepening forms of bodily commodification such as surrogacy are undoubtedly perverse developments, but they cannot simply be wished away for an ostensibly more innocent time when women’s labor remained wholly tied to the private realm of family and kin networks. Recognizing surrogacy as clinical labor is to appreciate the ways by which commodification of life has deepened, and opens paths to labor organizing and coalition building with other kinds of reproductive workers such as childcare workers, elementary school teachers, and nurses.

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The Research Network for Domestic Workers’ Rights

by Sabrina Marchetti, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, Italy and Helen Schwenken, University of Osnabrück, Germany and member of ISA Research Committee on Sociology of Migration (RC31) and Labor Movements (RC44), with input from Mary Goldsmith (Mexico), Sonal Sharma (India), Lisa-Marie Heimeshoff (Germany), Verna Viajar (Philippines), and Oksana Balashova (Ukraine)

The Research Network for Domestic Workers’ Rights (RN-DWR) is a global network of activist researchers and members of domestic worker organizations in the field of paid domestic work, which has existed for almost a decade.

Background

As the question of gender, migration, and globalization of care markets has attracted growing attention in the social sciences in the last decades, more academics are conducting research projects on the topic of paid domestic work, frequently in collaboration with domestic workers and their organizations. These research efforts are usually barely connected. Therefore, a core group of researchers affiliated with the International Center for Development and Decent Work and the Global Labour University (GLU), along with other researchers in different European and international universities started in 2009 the initiative RN-DWR, finding the support of WIEGO, the International Domestic Workers Federation (IDWF), and the Dutch trade union FNV Bondgenoten. This founding group expressed the need for a commitment not only to research domestic work, but also to collaborate with domestic workers both on research and on advocating for their rights.

As persons with a dual identity as researchers and activists, the founders of the network met various times in Geneva when doing background research to support the workers’ group during the negotiations on the ILO Convention No. 189, some of them also observing the negotiations for research purposes. Others contributed their perspectives from within the ILO. But this was not a researcher-only issue. In the GLU group, we discussed with domestic workers from the IDWF (then named IDWN) about research as such, and how researchers and organized domestic workers could better collaborate. Amongst many of the organized domestic workers there was a frus-
CARE IN CRISIS

Concern about research(ers): as they had to give a lot of time-consuming interviews, without ever seeing the results of the research or even seeing a benefit for themselves; others complained that some researchers were only interested in victim-type narratives about their lives and work as domestic workers. Therefore domestic workers were also sitting at the table when the network was founded and its principles were discussed.

On this basis, the RN-DWR was officially launched in Geneva at the ILO’s International Labour Conference in June 2011 that negotiated and passed Convention No. 189 “Decent work for domestic workers.” Promoting the ratification of the C189 and studying its impact is, therefore, one of the main tasks of the network.

> Principles

The RN-DWR coordinates and conducts research based on the following principles:

- Conducting meaningful, quality research that also meets the needs of domestic worker organizing efforts.

- Cultivating trusting, communicative relationships with researchers and representatives of IDWF and other domestic workers’ organizations.

- Making research results accessible not only to academic audiences, but also to domestic workers and their organizations.

- Building a community of like-minded researchers in the field, possibly extended to all geographical areas.

- Presenting, publishing, and disseminating research results to promote domestic workers’ activities and campaigns for rights.

> Practices

A key task of the network is to maintain a global map of researchers that share its key principles, and to connect them with each other. For this purpose, since 2011 the coordinators of the RN-DWR regularly edit a newsletter that brings together information about current research in the field and developments in respect to domestic workers’ rights.

About once a year in early summer the network meets, usually either attached to a conference organized by a network member or to the International Sociological Association or labor studies conferences. Network members give updates about regional developments in the rights of domestic workers, and interesting research, and potential joint research questions are also discussed.

In 2014 we published the manual “We want to be the protagonists of our own stories,” A manual on how domestic workers and researchers can jointly conduct research (Kassel: Kassel University Press, free download). The manual is a result of a collaborative research project of the network on social security needs of domestic workers. Domestic workers in South Africa and the Netherlands joined us in this project. It is also meant to support domestic workers’ organizations in documenting their work without being dependent on professional researchers.

> Challenges

The narrative so far may sound like a fully successful experiment by like-minded activist-researchers who manage to be globally connected and produce socially-relevant research, partly as research in collaboration with, and accountable to, domestic workers. However, there are many challenges.

After almost ten years of the network’s activities, some of its very active researchers have (at least partially) moved to other research foci or left the universities or organizations in which they could do that kind of activist research. Also, quite naturally, the momentum around the preparation for the ILO Convention No. 189 has vanished, and research and activism has come back to “normal,” meaning that some of the enthusiasm, but also public interest, on this issue is not that strong any longer. Taking the principles of the network seriously, we also have to concede that the collaboration with domestic workers’ organizations in developing our research agenda as well as the efforts to make our publications accessible to domestic workers and their organizations could be much stronger and more systematic. Researchers in our network who are employed in regular universities also notice that participatory and action research is often difficult to integrate into traditional research environments and in evaluation criteria that apply to academic careers. Finally, the regional diffusion of the network is uneven and there are many blank spots on our global map. Nonetheless, despite these deficits and challenges, the interactions within the network and the contacts that we facilitate are much appreciated amongst our members – all the more as activist research in this field is not very common and therefore the existence of a global network with this focus is a true advantage in our daily research practices.

For more, visit our blog or find us on Facebook.

1 For references see our blog and newsletter.

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What is a non-alienated form of being in the world? What is alienation’s other? This is the question which the following contribution seeks to answer by establishing the concept of resonance as a sociological concept.

Alienation, I want to claim, is a particular mode of relating to the world of things, to people, and to one’s self in which there is no responsivity; i.e., no meaningful inner connection. It is a relationship without genuine relation.
In this mode, there certainly are causal and instrumental connections and interactions, but the world (in all its qualities) cannot be appropriated by the subject, it cannot be made to “speak,” it appears to be without sound and color. Alienation thus is a relationship which is marked by the absence of a true, vibrant exchange and connection: between a silent and grey world and a “dry” subject there is no life, both appear to be either “frozen” or genuinely chaotic and mutually aversive. Hence, in the state of alienation, self and world appear to be related in an utterly indifferent or even hostile way.

Interestingly, the true sense of alienation becomes much more comprehensible when we start to think of its alternative. Alienation’s other is a mode of relating the subject there is no life, both appear to be either “frozen” or genuinely chaotic and mutually aversive. Hence, in the state of alienation, self and world appear to be related in an utterly indifferent or even hostile way.

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Thus, resonance is not just built on the experience of being touched or affected, but also on the perception of what we can call self-efficacy. In the social dimension, self-efficacy is experienced when we realize that we are capable of actually reaching out to and affecting others, and that they truly listen and connect to us and answer in turn. But self-efficacy, of course, can also be experienced when we play soccer or the piano, when we write a text we struggle with (and which inevitably speaks its own voice), and even when we stand at the shoreline of the ocean and “connect” with the rolling waves, the water, and the wind. Only in such a mode of receptive affection and responsive self-efficacy are self and world related in an appropriative way; the encounter transforms both sides, the subject and the world experienced. Of course, the notorious problem with this claim is that it immediately provokes the objection that while the subject might well be transformed by the interaction with the violin or the ocean, the latter hardly change. But while this argument in fact depends on a perhaps not-so-innocent epistemology in which the only things capable of responding are human beings, that is, on an “asymmetrical anthropology,” it cannot be disputed that the experienced world is affected by such encounters. That resonances of this sort are vital elements of any identity formation, can be read from the fact that claims such as “after reading that book,” or “after hearing that music” or “after meeting that group” or “after climbing that mountain,” “I was a different person” are standard ingredients of almost all (auto-)biographical accounts given, for example, in interviews. It is important to notice here that the transformative effects of resonance are beyond the control of the subject: when something really touches us, we can never know or predict in advance what we will become as a result of this.

To sum up, resonance as alienation’s other, then, is defined by four crucial elements: first, by “af<–fection” in the sense of the experience of being truly touched or moved; second, by “e–>motion” as the experience of responsive (as opposed to purely instrumental) self-efficacy; third, by its transformative quality; and fourth, by an intrinsic moment of unpredictability, i.e., of non-controllability or non-disposability. We can never simply establish resonance instrumentally or bring it about at will; it always remains elusive. Put differently: whether or not we “hear the call” is beyond our will and control. This in part is due to the fact that resonance is not an echo – it does not mean...
to hear oneself amplified or to simply feel re-assured, but involves encounter with some real “other” that remains beyond our control, that speaks in its own voice or key different from ours, and therefore remains “alien” to us.

Even more than this, this “other” needs to be experienced as a source of “strong evaluation” in the sense of Charles Taylor: only when we feel that this other (which can be a person, but also a piece of music, a mountain, or a historical event, for example) has something important to tell or teach, irrespective of whether we like to hear it or not, can we truly feel “grasped” and touched. Resonance, therefore, inevitably requires a moment of self-transcendence. It does not require, however, that we have a clear cognitive concept or previous experience of this other. We can all of a sudden be touched and shaken by something that appears to be alien altogether.

Therefore, resonance certainly is not just consonance or harmony; quite the opposite, it requires difference and sometimes opposition and contradiction in order to enable real encounter. Thus, in a completely harmonious or consonant world, there would be no resonance at all, for we would be incapable of discerning the voice of an “other” – and by consequence, of developing and discerning our own voice. Yet, a world in which there is only dissonance and conflict would not allow for experiences of resonance either: such a world would be experienced as merely repulsive. In short, resonance requires difference that allows for the possibility of self-transforming appropriation, and a responsive relationship that entails progressive, mutual transformation and adaptation. Resonance, then, is a condition between consonance and irrevocable dissonance. Because of this, I am convinced the concept can provide the key to overcome the traditional standoff between theories and philosophies based on identity and conceptions centered on difference. Resonance does not require identity, but the transformative appropriation of difference.

The non-disposability and moment-like character of resonance does not mean that it is completely random and contingent. For while the actual experience can never be completely controlled and predicted, there are two elements involved here which depend on social conditions and therefore turn resonance into a concept that can be used as a tool for social criticism. First, subjects individually and collectively experience resonance typically along particular “axes” of resonance. Thus, for some, music provides such an axis so that whenever they go to the concert hall, or to the opera, or to the festival arena they have a good chance of having that experience. For others, it will be the museum, the library, or the temple, the forest or the shoreline. More than that, we also foster social relationships that provide something like a reliable axis of resonance – we can expect moments of resonance when we are with our lovers, with our kids, or with our friends even though we all know that, very often, our respective encounters remain indifferent or even repulsive. And just as much, as we know from evidence provided by the sociology of labor, very many people develop intense relationships of resonance with their work, not just with their colleagues at the workplace, but also with the materials and tasks they are working and struggling with. Thus, the dough “responds” to the baker as does the hair to the barber, the wood to the carpenter, the plant to the gardener, or the text to the writer. In each of these cases, we find a true two-way relationship which involves experiences of self-efficacy, resistance, contradiction, appropriation, as well as mutual transformation.

When we scrutinize these axes more closely, we find that we can systematically distinguish three different dimensions of resonance: the social, material, and existential dimensions of resonance. Social axes are those that connect us with, and relate us to, other human beings. In most contemporary societies, love, friendship, but also democratic citizenship are conceptualized as “resonant” relationships of this type. Material axes are those we establish with certain objects – natural or artefactual, pieces of art, amulets, or tools and materials we work with or use for sports. Yet, I believe with philosophers like Karl Jaspers, William James, and Martin Buber that human subjects also seek and find existential “axes of resonance” that connect them with and relate them to life, or existence, or the universe as such. As those authors tried to show quite convincingly, this is what brings about religious experiences, and what makes religion plausible in the first place. The central element of the Bible, or the Quran, or the Upanishads, is the idea that at the root of our existence, at the heart of our being, there is not a silent, indifferent, or repulsive universe, dead matter, or blind mechanisms, but a process of resonance and response. There are, of course, other axes of existential resonance that do not depend on religious ideas. Nature, in particular, is experienced as an ultimate, comprehensive, as well as responsive reality. To listen to the voice of nature has become a central idea not just in idealistic philosophy, but even more so in many everyday routines and practices. In a strikingly similar way, art and music open up an analogous axis for the recipient. In each case, resonance does not need to be a pleasant, harmonious experience, but can harbor essentially disturbing aspects too.

Now, while I take it that such concrete axes of resonance are not anthropologically given but rather culturally and historically constructed, the establishment of some such axes is nevertheless indispensable for a good life, for they provide contexts in which subjects are disposed to open up to experiences of resonance. To shift into a mode of dispositional resonance requires taking the risk of making ourselves vulnerable. It conceptually implies that we let ourselves be touched, and even transformed, in a non-
predictable and non-controllable way. Thus, in contexts where we are full of fear, or in stress, or in fight mode, or focused on bringing about a certain result, we do not seek or allow for resonance; quite the contrary, doing so would be dangerous and harmful. Given this, it becomes obvious that it would be foolish to require that we should always be in a mode of dispositional resonance. The capacity to leave this mode, to distance oneself from the world, to take a cold, instrumental, analytical stance towards it, is very obviously a cultural achievement that is indispensable not just for keeping up the business of modern science and technology, but to actually provide and safeguard a form of life that allows for human resonance in the three dimensions mentioned.

With this conception in our toolkit, I believe that we can start to use resonance as a yardstick for critical sociology in the sense of a critique of the prevailing social conditions. Its starting point is the idea that a good life requires the existence of reliable and viable axes of resonance in all three dimensions. A subject will have a good life, I claim, if he or she finds and preserves social, material, and existential axes of resonance which allow for iterative and periodic reassurance of existential responsivity and connection, i.e. of a resonant mode of being. The possibility of such a good life, then, is endangered if the conditions for these axes and for the dispositional mode of resonance are structurally or systematically undermined.

The dominant institutional mode of dynamic stabilization, which requires incessant growth, acceleration, and innovation in order to reproduce the social structure and the institutional status quo, inevitably implies the tendency and the potential for such a systematic undermining, for it forces subjects into a mode of “dispositional alienation”: they are forced into a reifying, instrumental mode of relating to objects and subjects in order to increase and secure their resources, to speed up, and to optimize their equipment. The pervasive logic of competition in particular undermines the possibility of entering a mode of resonance – we cannot compete and resonate simultaneously. Furthermore, as we know from research on empathy and from neurological studies, time pressure actually works as a sure preventer of resonance. The same is true, of course, if we are driven by fear. Fear forces us to erect barriers and to close down our minds, it shifts us to a mode in which we precisely try not to be touched by “the world.” Therefore, the conditions of resonance are such that they require contexts of mutual trust and fearlessness; and these contexts in turn require time and stability as background conditions. Finally, the pervasive bureaucratic attempts to completely control processes and outcomes in order to ensure their efficiency and transparency, which define late modern workplace conditions, are equally problematic for relationships of resonance, because they are incompatible with the latter’s unpredictability and transformative potential. What is needed, then, is a thorough critique of the conditions of resonance.

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> Sociology for Cooperation Against Balkanization

An Interview with Jasmina Lažnjak

Jasmina Lažnjak is well known in the field of sociology of science and technology, social aspects of innovation and innovation policy, economic sociology, sociology of work, and other fields. She is Professor of Sociology in the Department of Sociology at the University of Zagreb, Croatia, and current president of the Croatian Sociological Association (CSA). Her most recent book, co-authored with Jadranka Švarc, is Innovation Culture in Crony Capitalism. Does Hofstede’s Model Matter? (2017). This interview is part of a project on influential social theory that also aims to explore the intersection of international and national sociology through conversations with prominent sociologists. It was conducted by Labinot Kunushević, ISA Junior Sociologists Network associate member, who holds an MA in Sociology from the University of Pristina, Kosova.

LK: What can you say from your experience at the University of Zagreb and in the Croatian Sociological Association (CSA)?

JL: Although the status of professional associations has changed recently in terms of legal regulation and some financial restrictions, the activities within the Croatian Sociological Association (CSA) have increased in the past decade. The CSA was founded in 1959 with about 50 members. Today we have more than 200 members.

The association continues with its mission to promote, develop, and protect sociology as a profession and discipline. The CSA relies solely on the voluntary work of its members and I would like to include more sociologists outside academia in our association; according to recent career research, about half of sociology graduates work outside narrowly defined sociological jobs in research and education.

LK: How are the programs, curricula, and paradigms on which Croatian sociology has been developed functioning? What is the relation between university and the work market?

JL: Croatian sociology wasn’t developed on a single paradigm despite the predominance of Marxism in the socialist era. The first sociology department was founded in 1963 at the University of Zagreb by late professor Rudi Supek,
who conceived sociology as an empirically and theoretically grounded discipline of critical thinking embedded in praxis philosophy. Regardless of that tradition, and at the same time in the very spirit of critical thinking, some sociologists built up their work under the influence of other paradigms, for instance the structural functionalist tradition, the Chicago school, or symbolic interactionism. Contemporary Croatian sociology reflects world sociology in terms of its multi-paradigmatic nature. Since there are five departments of sociology in Croatia, each of them tries to develop some specific subjects, concepts, and methodological approaches. Sociology, like many other disciplines, has faced the challenge of the new technologies and new professions that have emerged. I think that sociology as a discipline, with its generic characteristics of providing a “big picture” perspective, solid general knowledge, and methodological/statistical skills might position the sociological profession very high on the labor market. The fact that in Croatia sociology graduates have a low rate of unemployment and a wide range of not strictly traditional sociology jobs, from the NGO sector to local government, supports my statement.

**LK: Public sociology is becoming increasingly important. What can you say about it in Croatia and for the possibilities of regional cooperation?**

**JL:** Public sociology as a type of sociology shaped for dialogue with public non-academic audiences in Croatia is widely accepted as one of the major missions of sociology. The commitment to this institutionalized and widely embraced perspective has raised the discussion about how public sociology relates to the sociology oriented toward public policies. These are complementary missions and both approaches are very important parts of sociology that reinforce each other. Sociological expertise is a necessary part of policy analysis. We should improve curricular outcomes to develop skills needed in policy sociology for a stronger development of regional cooperation.

**LK: In the article “Integration of the Western Balkan Countries and Turkey in the Framework Programs: Some Empirical Evidence,” you, Jadranka Švarc, and Juraj Perković spoke about the barriers to cooperation of the Western Balkan countries and Turkey in the European Union (EU) Framework Programs. What are the results and new achievements?**

**JL:** As far as I know, Kosova has made great progress in the last decade, but the research infrastructure is still not satisfactory. As we found in our research, barriers for Western Balkan countries are of the same type as for the EU research community, but they are heavier and more difficult to overcome for Western Balkan countries. Significant improvements in infrastructure and a greater participation in international research and innovation cooperation will not happen without more investment in the research sector. The national science policymakers should create measures to stimulate both individual researchers and research institutions to participate in international research and innovation projects. Research cooperation and the mobility of researchers should be stimulated by special incentive measures. Also, education needs to be more tightly intertwined with research.

Special care should be devoted to capacity building at the level of research institutions. Although analysis revealed that researchers are relatively satisfied with the assistance provided by their institutions and by the efforts of their leaderships, it seems that this satisfaction is coming primarily from their lack of awareness about what kind of additional assistance they can expect. It would be useful to establish a system of intermediaries – a network of consultants or science managers located in the larger institutes, universities, or consortiums of interested parties – who would act as the interface between researchers/institutions and the EU administration.

**LK: What is your suggested strategy to face the risks of destabilization in the region?**

**JL:** It is a difficult question. Our region was always exposed to many risks, from local, national, and ethnic conflicts to the risks that threaten the whole world and which we seem not to be able to avoid, like the migration crisis and world terrorism. It is always easier to cope with the crisis when small neighboring countries are “on the same page” concerning a common issue. Cooperation and open dialogue regardless of differences are the best means of solving common problems. Of course, easier said than done, but I cannot see any other way. When the economic prosperity of the whole region is secured then we have a good common ground for cooperation. Open borders and free communication are necessary conditions for that.

**LK: It is true that there was a global commitment of significant political, diplomatic, military resources, as well as many international institutions, to find a solution to the Kosova crisis. How do you see the possibilities for the functioning of the state of Kosova and other Balkan countries, given the harsh climate of prejudice and rivalries in the region and the geopolitical calculations of the Great Powers?**

**JL:** I’m not an expert on Kosova and in fact I know very little about current issues. Generally I would agree with the statement that there is too much history in the Balkans, and that this is a burden we can’t discard easily. Kosova, as the youngest state that arose from the least developed autonomous region of the former Yugoslavia, faces many challenges of late modernization and transition. That makes it more dependent on international financial institutions and the Great Powers. The current crisis of the EU has delayed the enlargement of the EU to all Balkan countries that might have brought more stability.
to the region. Prejudice and rivalry are tools in the hands of our corrupt political elites in their striving for political power. Kosova, with over half of its population being young, and its enormous unemployment rate, is at great risk of protracted crises unless some serious structural change is carried out. Strengthening education to teach students to act upon their own independent thinking is the most important measure in that process. Otherwise we face the threat that the millennial generation in our region will be more trapped in nationalism, ethnocentrism, and totalitarianism than the generation of their parents and even more than their grandparents. Sociological theory and research can help in building trust and cooperation in our region to fight the process of balkanization.

**LK:** Do you see any risk that with the greater expansion of capitalism, citizens in various parts of the world may wish to return to other government systems? As irresponsible capitalism has created more social injustice, it is in a deep structural crisis. This is especially obvious in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, where the political class that came after the fall of Communist regimes is in the vast majority comprised of a corrupt political elite, and where there has been a decline of institutions of rule of law. What are your explanations and suggestions?

**JL:** Representative democracy is going through a phase of contestation by a growing segment of the population around the world. Many see a resolution in direct democracy and alternative governance models, although these have not brought the expected improvement in the democratization of decision-making processes and public impact on a broad spectrum of issues.

The democratization process in societies in transition has disappointed many citizens. The answer to these problems has emerged, on the one hand, in the movements advocating direct democracy and, on the other hand, in various populist movements. So far these movements have not seriously jeopardized crony capitalism as the dominant type in the region.

The democratic deficit is most visible in the failure to limit the power of financial sectors and a corrupt political elite. The transition from socialism to liberal democracies has generated different models in Eastern and South Eastern Europe, from liberal market models to more social-corporate models of capitalism. In addition to war, our region couldn’t escape from developing one or other kind of political capitalism, and that seems presently to be ruling in all countries of the region. Despite the fact that in global comparison our region doesn’t have as much social inequality, the gap between the small rich elite and the impoverished middle classes is widening. The policy of zero tolerance towards corruption in the political sphere, the independence of the judicial system, and new economic models that will boost employment are in my opinion necessary for any positive move.

**LK:** British sociologist Anthony Giddens, in an interview which I conducted with him, said that the EU is passing through a particularly troubled phase of its evolution and that the trust in the EU among its citizens has fallen precipitously in some member states. How can we understand the position of Kosova and Croatia in the European and global crises?

**JL:** Although I have never been a Eurosceptic it is obvious that Euro-bureaucrats don’t have the right and prompt means to tackle the issues that emerge in Europe. The discrepancy between the institutionalized power of Brussels and the EU, and the low level of responsibility they have taken for all delayed and bad policy moves, has produced diminishing trust in the EU. That has to be changed. The Euro crisis is the result of non-adjusted monetary and fiscal policies. A common market of labor, capital, and goods cannot function with such different arrangements within the Eurozone.

**LK:** Giddens has also said that only with the further progress of the EU can the problems of the Balkan countries be potentially resolved. He said that a key element is that Serbia should follow Croatia as a member state of the Union, and here it is his fervent hope that such a process will smooth the way for Kosova’s eventual membership too. My question is: since Kosova is a small country that became independent only ten years ago, it is still facing many challenges, especially in the process of visa liberalization and EU integration. This isolation is restricting our free movement, contact with other European countries and cultures, access to European job opportunities, and recognition within the European market, while 60% of our population is under 25 years of age. We feel the need for integration into and belonging to the European Union. What would you suggest should be done for Kosova to integrate into Europe?

**JL:** I agree with my distinguished colleague. My suggestion follows the argument I already made in response to previous questions. Integration into the EU is impeded, which might slow down the harmonization processes. Huge emigration from Kosova doesn’t help. I understand Kosova’s aspiration to EU membership given the experience of Croatia’s “long and winding road” to it. Stability and social security seem to be the main preconditions for further integration even though the bar has been raised higher with new candidacies. I believe in the future of the EU and in the benefits of membership for the European (semi)periphery. The failed expectations of immediate improvements in the quality of life and the benefits that are coming slower than initially expected should not discourage social and economic reforms.
In front of a half-destroyed house on the edge of one of China’s rapidly-growing cities, a “nail house” resister chased a real estate developer’s staff with two kitchen knives, accusing the “demolition gang” of constant harassment, and threatening to kill the developer. In the last few years, most of the villager’s neighbors had given up on keeping their homes, instead accepting compensation for their land, and moving into high-rise apartments. But in this village, twenty nail households had refused to move. Three months later, when I accompanied the real estate developer as part of my research on China’s urbanization policy, I watched, horrified, as bulldozers arrived to tear down the resister’s two-story rural house. The resister poured gasoline around his home, ignited a gasoline tank, closed his door, climbed onto the roof, and waited for the explosion to take his life.

But as I watched, two highly skilled members of the developer’s private security team dragged the resister from his roof. Others efficiently put out the fire, and used bulldozers to flatten his house. This was the tenth “nail house” – a term used for houses owned by peasants who stubbornly hold on – that they demolished that morning; the first nine took less than an hour to remove.

China’s rapid urbanization has triggered massive land expropriation: millions of peasant households have been evicted and relocated with minimal compensation. In the last ten years, the central state reformed the legal and institutional structures that control land conversion, seeking to protect peasants and farmland. But since land sales are still the main source of income for local municipalities, local authorities across China continue to expropriate farmlands, relocating peasants and converting residential areas for commercial use.

Today, land-based grievances provoke most of China’s popular protests: when all other solutions are exhausted, desperate peasants use their own bodies as moral leverage, stubbornly holding on to their old houses like nails hammered to the ground, desperate to retain their rural livelihoods.
Most sociological discussions of popular resistance and control in China revolve around the state-society division, identifying municipal and township governments as the main actors in silencing land-related peasant resistance. But this exclusive focus on state actors overlooks another powerful source of repression: private real estate developers, who have been allowed by local authorities to expropriate and dispossess peasants as a result of China’s new approach to funding urban infrastructure.

For two decades, China’s local governments have relied on bank loans to fund real estate clearance and upgrading; but since 2016, the central state has rigorously prohibited bank loans for land expropriation, instead encouraging local states to develop municipal bonds. Rather than relying on fledgling bond markets, however, many local authorities turn to a local ally – private real estate developers – for help.

During my fieldwork in 2016-8, I saw private real estate developers participate actively in each phase of land expropriation, and I watched real estate agents deploy multiple strategies to actively undermine peasant resisters’ claims to the land.

As several observers have pointed out, China’s local authorities have sometimes relied on “thugs for hire” to silence resistant nail households. But these conflicts can be messy: many village cadres sympathize with fellow peasants, and instead of following orders from their superiors, local officials may join fellow villagers, even becoming nail households themselves.

Undisciplined violence can lead to serious casualties and bad publicity. When that occurs, the strategy can backfire, sometimes prompting the central government to crack down, and tarnishing the careers of local bureaucrats. By outsourcing violence to private real estate developers, local governments seek to avoid the blame for any repression, efficiently achieving eviction and demolition. Developers can hire experienced gangsters (the so-called “demolition team”) who have already built their reputation for “zero-casualty” evictions by successfully demolishing nail houses in other villages.

Demolition team members drag resisters out of their houses, but avoid injuries; they are paid handsomely to risk being beaten up by villagers in the process. As both local officials and real estate informants reminded me, central and provincial governments tend to intervene only when the media reports on protests – which is most likely when the eviction involves serious casualties, or an unusually large number of participants. By minimizing physical injuries, these private security forces undermine the “body politics” of nail household resisters, and reduce the likelihood of central government intervention.

Prolonged resistance by nail household resisters complicates these processes, of course. Peasants who refuse to abandon their homes create lengthy delays and rapidly accumulating interest payments, sometimes pushing smaller fly-by-night real estate companies into bankruptcy.

But when resisters face real estate titans who can afford some delay in the process, peasant households are rendered fundamentally powerless. In everyday resistance, nail households endure constant harassment from demolition teams: their windows may be broken by hooligans, and water and electricity cut off by local municipal governments. For many of these resisters, long physical and psychological torments can be dangerous, triggering strokes, heart attacks, anxiety, or depression. By the time bulldozers tear houses down in the final raid, real estate developers have already exhausted resisters, mentally and physically.

While all nail households fight for fair compensation, their reasons for resisting vary. Near urban areas, many households put up fierce fights, since relocation cuts off their only source of income: many “urban villagers” build multi-story houses on their plots, renting rooms to migrant workers and office staff, or opening small businesses on the ground floor. In peripheral rural towns, peasants may become nail households because they can’t afford the apartments they are offered. After helping their offspring buy apartments, the older generation is often left behind in half-destroyed houses, with no other place to live.

No matter why peasants become “nails,” these conflicts take a toll. In one village, I watched an aging resister, furious, throw himself under the parked car of a real estate field staff member, swearing he would get revenge. Waving a long wooden stick, the resister threatened to hurt anyone who came near, including his wife, who was trying to calm him down. The resister’s face turned red and his breath became short, and his wife burst into tears. “It’s his heart. I know that one day, a heart attack will take his life, if we continue to live like this,” the wife cried. But no one seemed to listen.

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