Italian Sociology

The End of the Global Age?

Matteo Bortolini, Riccardo Emilio Chesta, Andrea Cossu, Flaminio Squazzoni, Aliakbar Akbaritabar, Annalisa Murgia, Barbara Poggio, Massimiliano Vaira

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> Remembering Ishwar Modi
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As I reflect on my last ten years of engagement with the ISA, I am struck by the continuing influence of the national on the form and content of sociology. We do have an international sociology best represented in the ISA by the array of Research Committees, Thematic Groups and Working Groups. Yet, even these often have a national or regional character. The spontaneous almost primordial unit around which most sociologists gravitate tends to be the nation rather than the globe. We do have a sociology of the global, but a global sociology with a global community is far more difficult to achieve, even in the digital age. Many of the problems we face – refugees, migration, climate change, finance capital, commercialization of higher education – have a global dimension and even though we may study that dimension, even advancing theories of it, forging a specifically global community of sociologists is challenging. In part this is a reflection of cultural and, in particular, linguistic diversity; in part the result of the way civil society – the standpoint of sociology – is constituted nationally by its relation to the nation-state. It is also difficult to straddle the field of higher education, so deeply hierarchical and whose conditions are so divergent across the globe, although, it should be said, disciplinary inequalities can be as deep within countries as between them. Indeed, inasmuch as there is a global community, it is made up of the connection among privileged groups of mobile and well-resourced cosmopolitans that separate themselves from grounded locals strapped of resources.

In this issue we have two contrasting examples of the influence of the national on sociology. Italian sociology has historically been balkanized by attachments to the Church, the Communist Party and the Socialist Party as well as by a long-standing North-South divide. If Italian political science has been discredited by its association with fascism, Italian sociology has been discredited by its association with the Red Brigades and other radical tendencies. New Zealand sociology, on the other hand, has links to British traditions in social policy, and struggles with the country’s internal colonial legacy. It is a small island, fearful of its powerful neighbor Australia.

In short, global influences on sociology are generally mediated by national legacies and fortications. The positioning of nations in the world has a dramatic influence on the formation of sociology: thus the interview with Ibrahim Berisha emphasizes the colonial experience of Albanians in Kosova while the interview with Martin Altbrow focuses on the global influence of Britain.

Since our last issue we have lost one of our most fervent advocates of the integration of national and global sociology, Ishwar Modi was devoted to Global Dialogue and its translation into Hindi as well as a guiding spirit in the internationalization of leisure studies. He will be sorely missed but his project will live on.

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As Andrea Cossu and I have argued in *Italian Sociology 1945-2010: An Intellectual and Institutional Profile*, the early 1990s marked the end of the “heroic,” foundational period of the discipline, giving way to a less charismatic, more professionalized scientific practice, best described as a paradoxical mix of “routinization without standardization.” The lack of a scientific or even pragmatic consensus on topics, methods, or theoretical frameworks affected the day-to-day practice of scientific work and relations between sociologists and their many publics – Italian and foreign colleagues, national and local political elites, social and religious movements, economic actors, and the mass media. Further, it prevented the development of a shared vision of a sociological community, of its professional and ethical standards, or its prospects. The discipline has struggled to construct a new, powerful master narrative about its past, present, or future – so much so, that even old myths of the “rebirth of postwar sociology” or the 1968 student revolts (see Chesta and Cossu in this issue, GD7.3) make little sense to young sociologists trained at established academic institutions.

To be sure, as many articles published in *Global Dialogue* have suggested, this pluralization of sociological approaches and research styles has occurred almost everywhere in the last 30 years. In Italy, however, the discipline’s particular history gives postmodern fragmentation a distinctively Italian flavor. Over the last fifteen years, the worldwide neoliberal turn in higher education, with its managerial and market ideologies and its
attack on the postwar assessment of academic professions, has weakened Italy’s componenti (camps), three powerful academic groupings that coalesced in the late 1960s around loosely-defined political fault lines – Roman Catholic, Communist, and Socialist. At the same time, younger scholars have been encouraged to widen their geographical, intellectual, and professional horizons, as more Italian sociologists now obtain degrees or take post-doctoral fellowships abroad, routinely participate in international meetings, and are active members of global scientific networks. As a result, some social scientists abandon Italian as their main publishing language, distancing themselves from ossified academic conventions, and making it increasingly unlikely that Italian sociology, as a discipline, can achieve a more defined or consensual image or practice (see Squazzoni and Akbaritabar in this issue, GD7.3).

In addition to these all-important dynamics, Italian sociology today faces three main challenges: its place within the nation’s cultural and intellectual imaginary, its role within social sciences and in neoliberal academia more broadly, and its institutional and associational infrastructure.

One of the biggest problems confronting Italian sociology is its lack of recognition in the national social imaginary (see both Vaira, and Murgia and Poggio in this issue, GD7.3). Apart from a handful of charismatic individuals from the first generations of sociologists who gained prominence as either top-level politicians or public intellectuals, the influence of the sociological profession on Italian society has been muted. On the one hand, the distant memory of Italy’s long 1968 through the 1970s (when several alumni of the University of Trento joined the terrorist group Red Brigades, while other sociologists led New Left organizations) contributes to a persistent image of the sociologist as a partisan and unreliable intellectual – an image reinforced by the current decision, on the part of some social scientists, to act as ideologues, “organic intellectuals,” or consultants in the service of political movements, trade unions, or civil society associations. On the other hand, since the mid-1980s, sociologists have been criticized as flamboyant, to the point that they are often seen as rapid tuttologi (know-it-alls). Although a younger generation of colleagues have risen to fame as public intellectuals – among them Ilvo Diamanti, Mauro Magatti, and Giovanni Semì, whose 2015 book Gentrification caused a sensation – it will take time and effort to renew the discipline’s image, or to re-establish its legitimacy in discussions of social processes.

The destiny of academic sociology remains intertwined with that of Italy’s system of higher education. In 2004-05, a national process sought to collect, analyze, and evaluate the scientific output of academic personnel. Although they had few real consequences, the findings painted a grim picture: Italian sociology fared the worst among the social sciences, prompting new efforts to improve the quality of published research. Later, the neoliberal Berlusconi government introduced a radical and much-contested reform of Italian higher education (law 240/2010), causing intense intra- and inter-disciplinary quarrels in late 2012. The publication of the findings of the ASN – the national process of scientific qualification – introduced a novel recruiting mechanism: only one out of five of those who had applied were considered qualified for future positions as full or associate professors. Moreover, Northern Italian universities fared much better than Central and Southern ones, with more candidates awarded the titles needed to further their careers.

As a result, debates about regional and sub-disciplinary inequalities, the power of the three academic camps, and the discipline’s fragmentation were conducted in unusually passionate terms. One of the harshest polemics focused on the evaluative criteria enshrined in the 2010 law, which disproportionately rewarded research-intensive careers. Papers published in foreign journals and membership in global research networks were all rated positively, while teaching and service at one’s home institution were not considered worthy of evaluation. On average, cosmopolitan sociologists who had partially or totally turned their backs on Italy’s sociological field fared better than their more locally-oriented colleagues.

Ultimately, the controversies over the 2010 reform had a profound, and maybe unexpected, impact on the Italian Sociological Association (AIS), created in 1983 as a shared clearing-house for the three camps to jointly manage the allocation of academic posts and research funding. The association gradually lost prestige and appeal, and its conduct in the aftermath of the publication of the results of the ASN persuaded many academic sociologists to withdraw from the association. As membership has fallen to new lows, the organization is trying to renew itself by strengthening both its public role and its appeal as the discipline’s main standard bearer. At the same time, however, economic sociologists – who generally fared better than average in the evaluation of scientific research – decided to abandon the AIS, creating a new sub-disciplinary professional association. In January 2017, the Italian Society of Economic Sociology (SISEC) held its first national conference, with about 220 members enrolled – roughly one out of ten academic sociologists. Only time will tell if this double renewal will bear fruit, and whether it will help Italian sociology move beyond one of the most turbulent and unpredictable phases in its history. ■
In contemporary debates in the social sciences, critical sociology and Marxism are typically located in the same box. In fact, their relationship is hardly self-evident. The reconstruction of the discipline in Italy after the Second World War perfectly illustrates the struggle for the hegemony of the study of “the social” – and the inherently conflictual relations between sociology and Marxism. It is not by chance that I use the concept of hegemony: the ambivalence on the part of Italian Marxists toward the social sciences can be traced back to Antonio Gramsci. From Gramsci’s philosophical background to his strategic conceptualization of intellectuals, and the way Gramsci’s work was used by the Italian Communist Party, many elements have contributed to the distance between Gramsci and postwar Italian sociology. In contrast to his wider appreciation by international social scientists, Gramsci is effectively a “stranger in his own land,” that is within the Italian field of social sciences.

> Crypto-idealism in Gramsci’s Marxism

In building his theoretical framework, Gramsci confronted the paramount public intellectual of his time: Neapolitan philosopher Benedetto Croce, whose theoretical and political influence was dominant through the first half of the twentieth century. In fact, the most cited and discussed author in Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* is neither Marx nor Lenin, but Croce.

As a proponent of idealistic historicism, Croce denied the very existence of a “science of the social,” engaging in fine epistemological reasoning to affirm the primacy of law, and definitively rejecting the possibility that sociology could be a scientific discipline. Despite his awareness of the limits of Croce’s paradigm – primarily his refusal to view Marxism as a philosophy of history – Gramsci explicitly called for an “anti-Croce” to overcome the Idealist and Spiritualist hegemony in Italian culture. At the same time, the *Prison Notebooks* seriously engage the era’s main works of social science – albeit from a critical standpoint, somehow recognizing social sciences’ promise for a rigorous study of Italian society and politics.

> Togliatti’s Gramsci

To understand how and why Italian intellectuals in the 1950s adopted a crypto-idealistic interpretation of Gramsci’s work, we cannot simply focus on his writings. Instead, we must look at the context in which Gramsci’s main writings – left sketched and scattered in a Fascist prison at the time of his death in 1937 – were first published. The *Prison Notebooks* only appeared posthumously, in a version prepared by Gramsci’s old friend Palmiro Togliatti, the main leader of the Communist Party, together with the communist journalist Felice Platone. This first edition divided Gramsci’s work into several different volumes, published between 1948 (*Historical Materialism and The Philosophy of Benedetto Croce*) and 1949 (*Intellectuals, Il Risorgimento and Notes on Machiavelli*). Togliatti and Platone presented
Gramsci as the main heir of the Italian cultural tradition, reconstructing an ideal intellectual lineage including De Sanctis, Spaventa, Labriola, Croce, and, finally, Gramsci. At the same time, a clear strategy of cultural hegemony was enacted through a peculiar “neo-Machiavellian” use of Gramsci’s analysis of mass party formation – or what Gramsci referred to as the “Modern Prince.”

This particular framing of the Marxist philosopher’s work had a double goal. First, Gramsci was connected to Croce and historical idealism – legitimizing the culture of the Communist Party among the dominant bourgeoisie. Second, his intellectual heritage had to be transformed to support the neo-Machiavellian direction of the historical movement, with Togliatti as the party’s leader, and the party as the main political actor leading the working class. Through this adaptation, Gramsci was presented as an advocate of representative democratic leadership for social movements, a progressive bourgeois philosopher rather than a scholar interested in subaltern cultures, and a historical idealist denying the value of the social sciences.

> The missing link

During the 1950s Gramsci’s work became a key tool for a generation of intellectuals seeking to create a left-wing bourgeoisie while accusing the newborn social sciences of being a “tool of the bosses” imported from the USA to ideologically tame the working class. In fact, one of Italy’s main proponents of sociology was the entrepreneur Adriano Olivetti, who gathered and subsidized technical experts and intellectuals tied to the Socialist Party. Within his firm in Ivrea, Olivetti created a “department of social relations,” where young scholars might study influential American sociological works, and apply sociological tools to the study of industrial relations.

Communist intellectuals and leaders remained skeptical of Olivetti’s project of “community enterprise,” seeing it as an employer’s effort to prevent class conflict through technocratic philanthropism. In an article published in the official journal Il Contemporaneo in September 1955, the communist intellectual Fabrizio Onofri disparaged Olivetti’s cultural and political movement as a weird messianism, defining Olivetti as an Allah of sorts, and describing sociologist Franco Ferrarotti, his right-hand man, as Olivetti’s prophet Mohammed. In the 1950s official Gramsci-ism became both an idealist philosophy of history built on fixed theoretical assumptions lacking empirical tests, and a manual for Togliatti’s “progressive democracy,” a strategy aimed at winning gradual concessions for the working class within the Italian Republic’s democratic institutions.

An alternative reading of Gramsci opened up with the emergence of the new critical leftist groups of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in the aftermath of two events. In 1955, internal union elections at the FIAT factory – one of the national centers for the working class movement – produced a shocking result: the CGIL, one of Italy’s main leftist unions and the PCI’s strongest factory-based ally, saw its share of the vote almost halved. A year later, the Soviet repression of protests in Budapest amplified latent grievances, producing a huge debate among left-wing intellectuals, many of whom abandoned the party.

However, when younger, engaged intellectuals (including the Quaderni Rossi group led by Raniero Panzieri) began challenging institutionalized Italian Marxism in the late 1950s, they turned to a militant form of sociological research – the “inchiesta operaia” (“working class inquiry”) – to criticize Togliatti’s interpretation of Gramsci. But this did not involve any real rediscovery of the theorist; in fact, it was only in 1967 that the Gramsci Institute prompted academic sociologists to explore Gramsci’s contribution, in a dialogue that nevertheless did not initiate a serious scientific program. And while the revolts of 1968 helped to renew critical sociology by importing works from the Frankfurt School, most academic sociologists shied away from critical theories in their attempt to professionalize. With the crisis of Marxism and macro-sociological theories at the end of the 1970s, Gramsci seemed to be just another object for the historiography of philosophy.

Here lies the paradox: at a crucial phase of their emergence and consolidation in Italy, neither academic nor public sociology were able to meet the “real Gramsci.” While in the rest of the world – from the US and the UK to Latin America and India – Gramsci’s theories provided crucial intellectual tools for social scientific research in cultural studies and subaltern group studies, and in political economy and international relations, in Italy his contributions were largely ignored, by academic and critical sociologists alike – a pattern which meant that the great Sardinian thinker became a global intellectual while largely remaining a “stranger in his own land.”

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For scientific disciplines, the path leading to intellectual acceptance and institutionalization is almost invariably difficult, involving not only debates about boundaries, but also the creation of a complex, and sometimes exclusive, infrastructure through which the discipline can establish itself and, hopefully, flourish. Post-World War Two Italy was no exception, particularly for the social sciences. Political science was often perceived as a “Fascist” discipline; statistics bore the stigma of its involvement in colonial efforts. Idealist philosophy ruled, with its frequent critiques of the social sciences – especially against the weakest of all, sociology.

Italian sociology thus took its first baby steps in an unfavorable environment, characterized not only by academic hostility and political attacks from the Italian Communist Party’s organic intellectuals, but also by Italian universities’ institutional constraints, which complicated efforts to create niches for emergent disciplines. A lethal mix of top-down, state-driven bureaucratization and local patrimonial dynamics meant that sociologists had to develop their discipline largely outside of universities. Sociologists helped, though sometimes they did so in a subordinate position, build an infrastructure of research centers, publishing houses, and schools for social workers – a configuration that had lasting impact even after the 1960s, when sociologists began to be accepted in academic ranks.

In Italy, reflections on the institutionalization of sociology have often revolved around the history of intellectual positions. As Matteo Bortolini and I have argued in Italian Sociology 1945-2010, however, one needs to dig deeper to understand why a cohort of young scholars – often marginalized within the established disciplines where they studied – became sociologists and, later, entered academia. The discovery of sociology by this cohort, in other words, has to be
examined sociologically, with a focus on fields, relations, and processes, thus replacing the focus on agency and intentional strategies that has characterized most previous accounts of the discipline in Italy.

The decade between 1951 (when one of the most important journals, Quaderni di Sociologia, was founded by Franco Ferrarotti and by his advisor, philosopher Nicola Abbagnano) and 1961 (when the first three full chairs of sociology were established after a national competition) saw the building of the discipline’s infrastructure and the creation of what are still the country’s main hubs of sociology. Looking back, Diana Pinto divided this era into two roughly equivalent periods: if 1950-56 was marked by the discovery of sociology, in the latter part of the period, sociology acquired “cultural centrality.” But “polycentrism” might have been a better metaphor.

Although the university was a central institution in the Italian intellectual field, sociologists did not turn en masse to academe until the late 1960s – when Balbo and colleagues diagnosed sociology as a “sick science,” acknowledging the failure of a dream that sociologists could serve as field marshals for the country’s modernization, thereby leaving academic positions as sociologists’ only viable alternative. Before that shift, sociology’s infrastructure in Italy was largely extra-academic, featuring research centers like the Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale in Milan, cultural associations like Il Mulino in Bologna, and political movements like Comunità, founded by the entrepreneur Adriano Olivetti, whose unusual entrepreneurial vision identified applied social science as a crucial instrument for empowering communities within and outside the factory. These research centers established lasting contacts with cultural foundations and international bodies (like the Ford Foundation and UNESCO), while prominent publishers – including Einaudi, Comunità (again, founded by Olivetti), and Il Mulino – were involved both in intellectual debates about how sociology differs from other disciplines (especially philosophy), and in diffusing empirical analysis and fieldwork. At the same time, a loose network of scholars in some university-based institutes (in Milan, Genoa, Turin, Florence, and Portici) pursued mostly applied research in Industrial Relations, Economic Sociology, Community Studies, and Electoral Geography.

By the end of the 1950s, Italian sociology was thus a Janus-faced discipline, torn between a focus on theory (with a strong functionalist inclination) as a means to achieve legitimacy, and efforts to conduct applied research. The results were mixed. “Theory” often meant a reproduction of dogmatic and partial readings of Parsons, Merton, and Lazarsfeld; fieldwork often involved standard surveys and basic ethnography, with little room for innovative research.

Despite this narrow focus, however, sociology became a “normal science,” something that was much needed. The first generation of sociologists (including Ferrarotti, Alessandro Pizzorno, Sabino Acquaviva, Eugenio Pennati, Achille Ardigò, Luciano Cavalli, Giorgio Braga, Filippo Barba- no, whose status as “libero docente” allowed them to teach courses in universities) used their expertise and credentials to establish disciplinary hubs in major universities. From that position, they trained a new, more specialized generation, whose members filled the ranks of the discipline in the context of Italy’s transition to a mass university system in which Social Sciences became more central.

Thus, during the 1960s, the discipline’s landscape changed dramatically. Gone was the dream that sociologists would serve as advisors to the prince for Italy’s modernization; instead, sociology found a more stable status within and outside the academia, which now became the major site for sociological training and reproduction. The first degree-granting institution was founded in Trento, in 1962; after this fateful choice, other Faculties of Sociology were established, along with majors in sociology in Faculties of Political Science.

Thus, some twenty years after the timid attempts to legitimize sociology in Italy, the academicization of sociology began in full force. For a long period, sociology had been a discipline whose field and habits was shaped more by the routine demands of research than by the intellectual prestige associated with acceptance by academe. Not surprisingly, this long exile from university rooms had huge consequences, shaping not only sociologists’ attitude, but also the type of research that was favored, as well as the theoretical orientation of even major figures. It was only from the late 1960s (and even more forcefully during the 1970s) that Italian sociology took decisive steps towards theoretical, empirical, and methodological sophistication.

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Internationalizing Sociology in Italy 1970s-2010s

by Flaminio Squazzoni and Aliakbar Akbaritabar, University of Brescia, Italy

Italian sociologists work in a wide range of educational and research institutions located in different regions of Italy. Established hiring and promotion practices – developed through a complicated mix of top-down regulations, co-existing and conflictual “paradigmatic” schools and local “cliques” – have allowed sociologists to expand their academic influence and find positions in many institutions. For example, across Italy’s universities, the number of sociology faculty is similar to that of economists (around 1,000 full, associate and assistant professors). However, while this may show our community’s successful evolution it is unclear whether these practices have truly fueled excellent research, or have jeopardized it.

To develop some quantitative insight into Italian sociologists’ publications, we took the names of all 1,227 Italian sociologists (including post-docs enrolled in 2016) from the MIUR (Italian Ministry of University and Research) website, and then searched the Scopus data set, which includes international journals, conference proceedings, monographs and book chapters, as well as the most prestigious national journals, from the 1970s to 2010s.

We found that 63.8% of Italian sociologists have at least one publication indexed in Scopus. This means that one out of three sociologists in Italy does not have a single record in recognized international journals, conference proceedings, book series or Italy’s most prestigious journals.

A few Italian sociologists’ names appear frequently in the data set. For example, five individuals have published more than 35 indexed publications. On the other hand, about 20% (249 sociologists) have published only one article in their whole career. If we consider the impact of publications, we found that 52.4% (1,840 out of 3,515 publications) had no citations reflected in the data.
Interestingly, the data suggested a geographical divide. Sociologists working in Northern (45.5%) and Central (27.2%) universities published significantly more than those working in Southern universities, suggesting either self-selection bias or a negative context effect, perhaps reflecting uneven socio-economic development across geographical regions. However, only further analysis of university hiring process, which would require reconstructing hiring committees and candidates via the MIUR database, could reveal whether this bias is more due to self-selection and homophily than to context effects.

While observers of Italian academy may not be surprised at this finding, we found other interesting results when time series were included. We considered international co-authorships, which suggest sociologists are more active in the international community and so more exposed to international research standards. After counting the number of non-Italian co-authors as a proportion of the total number of co-authors for each single individual, and scaling data over time, we found that the rate of international collaborations has significantly increased in recent years, as did the number of publications. These trends are quite similar, with a growth of more than 50% of international collaborations over the past ten years (see figure).

Although further analysis would require looking systematically at causal factors, this trend is probably a positive result of ANVUR (the Italian national agency for the evaluation of the university and research system) national research assessment, which was established in 2010 and assessed sociology research published from 2004. Although it takes time for scientists to adapt their publication strategies, many sociologists who were not particularly familiar with international journals probably realized the importance of publishing in well-established outlets. Alternatively, sociologists who published internationally may have decided to invest even more in international publications to pay off an initial investment.

We do not want to suggest that institutional pressures have simple Darwinian effects, in which scientists simply adapt to increase their fitness. However, increased competition for funds at national and international levels and growing attention to university and department productivity could promote increased internationalization and the importance of publishing in prestigious international journals for the purposes of increasing their academic reputation. In a nutshell, we could say “Eppur si muove” – “And yet it moves”!

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Gender Stereotypes in Italian Sociology

by Annalisa Murgia, Leeds University Business School, UK and Barbara Poggio, University of Trento, Italy

Italian sociology’s relationship with gender studies is rather complex, linked as it is to a series of phenomena and events that have characterized both the Italian academic context and the development of the feminist movement in Italy.

Gender perspectives entered Italy’s sociological debates in the late 1970s, thanks to a few pioneering women sociologists. As in many countries, theoretical reflections on gender first emerged in Italy outside academia, strongly linked to political activism for women’s equal rights, and around is-
sues like abortion and divorce. However, this close connection with political activism impeded the institutionalization of gender studies within an academic system intent on presenting itself as independent from political affiliations, and within sociology, a discipline seeking to combat accusations of political militancy and ideological goals.

But Italian society has long been characterized – and is still pervaded – by a traditional gender order, still clearly reflected in the university system. A wide gender gap can still be seen in scientific careers, especially in a persistent “scissor effect”: female undergraduate and graduate students outnumber males, and more women than men are PhDs and postdocs, but the female presence typically plummets in the transition into academic career. In political and social sciences, women made up only 26% of full professors, 39.3% of associate professors and 46.7% of assistant professors in 2015 (Ministry of Education, Universities and Research, 2016). Few women serve on the boards of scientific journals, especially high-ranking ones.

Moreover, the rigid structure of Italy’s academic curricula, which provide for a limited number of official courses linked to a centralized ministerial syllabus, contributes to the marginalization of gender studies in higher education. It is difficult to introduce new disciplines, especially if they do not enjoy full legitimacy – as in the case of gender studies – or if the proponents hold junior or marginalized academic positions.

At the same time, gender studies’ entry into academia was also hampered by debates within the feminist movement itself. In particular, the theory of difference, which has played an important role in Italy, favored claims for self-consciousness and separatism, and spawned distrust toward universities, perceived as bastions of academic and patriarchal power. Moreover, as Saraceno notes, Italy’s feminist scholars who wanted to have an influence in academic curricula, have long debated the institutional strategies to be adopted: should they introduce specific women and gender studies curricula, or should they try to mainstream a gender perspective? Given the institutional rigidity of the Italian university system, most opted for mainstreaming, introducing a focus on women, and then on gender, in regular teaching subjects, offering students seminars, initiatives, and events in addition to established curricula, and eventually creating gender research centers.

It was only in the late 1980s that gender studies began fighting for a more fully-recognized institutional status, a struggle that continued into the 21st century. In sociology, an important step in the institutionalization process came in 2012, with the creation of a specific section within the Italian Sociological Association.

Over the decades, Italy’s gender studies have gradually expanded – but that growth has been somewhat fragmented and unsystematic. Today, the presence of gender studies in the Italian academic community is still limited to specific settings; the accreditation of teaching and research on gender differences is often linked to individual female scholars, based on the recognition they have earned within their respective institutions and scientific communities. Moreover, opportunities for undergraduate and postgraduate training in gender studies are still very limited. One survey showed that out of all bachelor’s and master’s courses in 2011-12, only 57 courses focused on gender – a tiny proportion of all the courses offered in potential majors. A quarter of gender-focused courses were in the sociological area; there was no degree course specifically in gender studies. Postgraduate courses in gender studies were also limited: twelve specialized, six masters, and four doctoral courses. Recent years have seen a further setback in the launching or expansion of gender courses, both because of recent austerity policies and consequent funding cuts, and because the gender perspective still struggles to gain recognition within academia – a situation exacerbated by persistent accusations of political bias, and a widely-reported recent campaign by orthodox Catholic associations and movements seeking to deny gender studies’ scientific foundations. All this tends also to limit the recognition and dissemination of gender studies research, exacerbating researchers’ marginalization.

Despite the substantial output and the significant contribution made to the various disciplines of the social science and beyond, gender studies are today characterized in Italy by what Di Cori has called a “profile of identitarian indeterminacy.” Even in sociology, gender studies lacks a systematic and fully legitimized presence within institutional curricula, a pattern linked to persistent and significant gender imbalances in Italian university career paths.

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A Dominated Discipline in the Italian Academy

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Long contested, the recognition of sociology as a scientific and academic discipline in the Italian university is a recent event. As a latecomer, its recognition and institutionalization, within the academic field and at the societal level, cannot yet be considered fully established. Consequently, even today, sociology occupies a dominated position in the academic field. Working from a Bourdieusian perspective, this essay describes the state of the discipline in the 2000s, using official data regarding the number of tenured academics, study courses, and departments as indicators of sociology's relatively low degree of institutionalization, its dominated position, and its limited power within the Italian academic field, before turning to other aspects of the status and the state of the discipline.

Sociology can be considered a hybrid discipline, belonging to the soft sciences but located at the border between pure and applied research. Reflections on theoretical, epistemological, and ontological foundations make sociology closer to philosophy, a pure science, while the empirical dimension of sociological inquiries produces applied knowledge, useable for various purposes in different social spheres. Although other disciplines (e.g. economics, psychology, or physics) share this hybrid character with sociology, most lean more towards applied or pure poles, and these disciplines are often characterized by a neater and more institutionalized internal distinction between theoretical and practical/applied knowledge production than is generally the case within sociology.

In this regard, sociology occupies a somewhat liminal region of the academic field. Given its recent and still incomplete institutionalization and its hybrid feature, sociology retains an uncertain scientific “identity,” remaining confined to the margins of academia and often treated as irrelevant in public debate.

This liminal position of sociology, both in the academic field and in society, weakens the discipline’s power – a fact illustrated by national data that reveals the discipline’s lack of institutionalization, its marginal position in the academic field, and hence its limited power.

To start with, out of almost 900 departments in the entire Italian university system (which includes 97 public, private, and “virtual” institutions) there are currently only five departments of sociology – that is, departments in which “sociology” is included as part of the official title and where most staff members are sociologists. In 2012 (the last year for which data are available), out of 2,687 undergraduate study courses, only 18 were in sociology, offered by 16 institutions; there were 22 graduate courses out of 2,087, offered by 18 institutions. In 2016, there were fewer than ten doctoral programs in sociology out of a total of 913 PhD programs across disciplines.

These data rather eloquently demonstrate the discipline’s marginal position, but data on tenured academic staff, compared with other disciplines, are even more revealing. The table that follows summarizes the comparison throughout the 2000s. The six comparison disciplines represent nearly 60% of total academic tenured positions in Italian universities in 2015. The data demonstrate how numerically marginal sociology is, compared to more applied disciplines (like engineering/architecture, economics/statistics, law), “purer” disciplines (like arts and mathematics), and even psychology, a discipline with a similar recent academic history and, to some extent, a comparable hybrid nature.

As a disciplinary field, sociology suffers from a kind of fragmentation which can be conceived as a double balkanization. First, it is widely dispersed across different kinds of departments (e.g. political sciences, economics, law, medicine, engineering/architecture, humanities), of-
ten playing an ancillary role as a minor discipline dominated by other core disciplines. Although this is sometimes true for other disciplines (e.g. mathematics may be part of economics, engineering/architecture, medicine departments; psychology or law may be located in departments of political sciences, sociology, or economics) these are far more concentrated than sociology. For example, compared to Italy’s five departments of sociology, there are ten departments of arts, eighteen of psychology, twenty of law, 35 of mathematics, 56 of economics, 137 of engineering/architecture (a discipline which is also located in three specialized institutions called Polytechnics).

At the same time, sociology is also internally fragmented into the so-called componenti (camps), three academic groups based on “political” foundations rather than epistemological ones. This has largely prevented, and still prevents, Italian sociology from developing a unified approach towards academia as a whole and in its relations with other disciplines.

Finally, the sociological academic community has never been able to create a system of accreditation for professional sociologists, in contrast to medicine, law, engineering/architecture, psychology and, to some extent, economics. This has a twofold effect. First, it leaves sociology in a somewhat weak position in relation to the professionalized segment of the labor market: graduates in sociology are not considered professionals with definite skills and knowledge (it is often said that a sociologist is everything and nothing, neither fish nor fowl). Secondly, and relatedly, sociology is thus weak as a player within the academic field: the fact that the discipline does not claim to train “professionals” in the strict sense perpetuates its marginal position in the academic field.

Together, these structural conditions and dynamics provide at least an impressionistic understanding of sociology’s dominated position. Apparently poorly endowed with scientific, academic, or socio-economic capital, the discipline occupies a position removed from all three poles of Italy’s academic field – namely, the scientific recognition pole, the academic power pole, and the mundane pole of economic and social recognition. Sociology’s relatively scarce capital endowment in all three dimensions has meant that the discipline is characterized by limited opportunities for gaining symbolic and material resources. This condition – a product of the discipline’s institutional history, its academically and socially uncertain status as a science, its state of “double balkanization” and its lack of a professional accreditation – has relegated Italian sociology to the lower ranks of academia’s hierarchical space, leaving the discipline dominated and peripheral.

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RGZ: You have been a pioneer in the sociology of globalization. How did this come about?

MA: Well, I suppose globalization was something I came to relatively late. My career began in sociology after I’d done a degree in history. After that I went to the London School of Economics, started sociology there and then started a teaching job in 1961 – I was still at that time working on my dissertation on Max Weber. The dissertation took a very long time because I had teaching responsibilities – and my interests diverged. I eventually decided to concentrate on organizations. My first book was on bureaucracy. It was published in 1970.

RGZ: And eight times reprinted.

MA: Yes, it was extremely successful. I don’t know why, it was just a little book but students found it so useful and that was what I was known for, for many years. I found myself having a typical academic career, becoming a professor – and while I was a professor I then also became President of the British Sociological Association. This was in the 1980s. I became well-known after editing the journal, Sociology, for the British Sociological Association – and then I was invited to edit the journal, International Sociology, for the International Sociological Association. That was a big move for me. It happened in the middle of the
1980s when “globalization” was becoming important. As I rushed to finish my work on Max Weber, I asked myself: “What would Max Weber be doing today, if he were alive?” I thought he’d be working on this new direction of world history. He’d always been interested in the geopolitics as well as working on his intellectual projects; he was also a political figure and I thought he would have been interested in globalization.

So, I finished my book on Weber and in the same year – 1990 – I put together a series of papers with my assistant, Elizabeth King, that became, Globalization, Knowledge and Society: Readings from International Sociology. It was published for the ISA World Congress in Madrid and a copy was distributed to everyone who came to the conference – 4,000 sociologists from all over the world. This launched the word globalization in our discipline.

RGZ: Turning to more recent events concerning regionalism and globalization, after Brexit what do you think of the future of the European Union?

MA: I think one of the problems with the European Union (EU) in the past has been that it hasn’t developed a strong enough image in the rest of the world. It hasn’t spoken forcefully enough on global issues. It has been too turned in on its own politics. I think that has been a weakness in the past – but of course, it’s extremely difficult for an organization of over twenty countries to work together and construct something coherent. Extremely difficult.

With Brexit I think you can say that it could have two results for the European Union. On the one hand, it could encourage the EU to become stronger, more integrated, recognize that it does have weaknesses and that it needs to coordinate itself better. In this scenario in its negotiations with Britain it will find a common purpose more easily. I think it’s fair to say that the British government wants the European Union to be strong. It’s in no one’s interest for the Union to be weak. So if all sides agree that it is a win-win situation, if Britain and the EU can agree, the EU will be stronger. That’s one possibility. On the other hand, there is the possibility – and everyone must be afraid of this – that the same forces which led Britain to leave will encourage others in the EU to leave. And there are several countries where, as we know, there are anti-EU, anti-globalization, anti-establishment movements.

RGZ: What about the Schengen policy which lifts border controls on the movement of people within the EU, a principle that has come under attack, especially with the refugee crisis?

MA: When it comes to Schengen I think we learned that there has been a great deal of incompetence on the part of leaders. There has been too much talk of “this is a principle on which we cannot negotiate, we cannot compromise.” Principles are never fully realized, there are always compromises. And the great principle of the EU – the free movement of capital, labor, services, goods – has not been followed to perfection in any of the countries. So, for instance, the free movement of people varies from country to country depending on things like the social security laws or residency. Many towns, even, have their own residential qualifications. This matter of free movement could have been negotiated between Britain and the EU instead of becoming a kind of all-or-nothing principle. Other mistakes have been with regard to the refugee crisis – Merkel should not have said “let everyone come.” It made very little sense in political terms and it encouraged other countries to reject refugees altogether, leading to a great deal of disruption to the sense of belonging to a single community.

DAD: There has been a lot of talk about social media and social movements. What do you think has been the impact of digital communication?

MA: Young people growing up with digitalization might feel all movements are the result of – or enabled by – digitalization, but I should remind you that there was a worldwide youth movement back in 1968, long before digitalization. Also, the 1960s were a period of what was called the counterculture, associated with national revolutions and upheavals in universities. The interesting thing about such movements is that they happen spontaneously in different countries. They don’t necessarily require coordination across boundaries because they are responses to similar conditions in similar kinds of countries with similar kinds of development.

Digitalization does make a difference. It does enable spontaneous leadership to emerge and not necessarily the leadership one might expect. Let’s take the anti-globalization movement. The big event focused on the World Trade Organization meeting in Seattle in 1999, nearly twenty years ago. Thousands of people came to Seattle, especially from Canada. President Clinton was due to give a speech at the meeting but eventually had to call it off because of the demonstrations. Conventional media more than social media gave it worldwide coverage. There was no Facebook in 1999. So the effects of digitalization can, I think, be exaggerated. They do intensify communication, of course, and in that sense they increase the speed of response. Politicians understand that, so they now use social media for direct communication; we find the traditional press, newspapers, declining, although television has still a very important role to play because television has a studio so you can bring people together, face to face, even if they come from different countries.

Digitalization has more far-reaching consequences in other fields – in security, surveillance, interception of communications. The knowledge that the authorities get from each other, their secrets and their ability to hack into each other is much more important than simple communication. I know now that any e-mail I send can be intercepted, any of the information we send back and forth – if somebody wants to tap into it, they can.
**DAD:** From the beginning, sociologists have compared society to a biological organism, continuously metamorphosing. What do you think of this analogy?

**MA:** Well, we are talking about evolution here. The process of biological change is better understood than the process of social change. This is mainly because I think with social change the processes of inheritance, processes of identity formation, formation of social entities are cultural. One of the great capacities of human culture is that individuals free themselves from the conditions into which they are born, from the social units they belong to. The danger arises from human ingenuity, developing objects of destruction which endanger the rest of humanity – and I’m not thinking just of bombs, I’m also thinking of the invention of biological organisms, of viruses. Quite apart from the relatively slow progress of the technology that could change our biological makeup, the development of robotics of various kinds could make us redundant in many ways. Our ingenuity has created major threats to the human species.

**RGZ:** The Global Age is probably your most famous book. How do you evaluate it today, especially with regard to your arguments about political dynamics?

**MA:** The Global Age was written in the mid-1990s so twenty years ago. I was interested in why the new language of the “global” had become so popular. I came to the conclusion that the events of 1945, and then later the events of the 1970s, presented a new recognition of global issues, that is, of challenges to the planet. This is different from globalization, which in its narrow sense is an ideology used by the United States to promote its own interests in the world economy – a very special instance of a global issue. In post-war years the big issue was the threat of nuclear warfare, and later we had to face threats to the environment, increasing poverty, pollution of the sea and so on. These were issues that could only be tackled globally. For me that was why the language of the global became so important.

Globalization was an issue that became political in the context of American dominance and especially after 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Empire. So The Global Age was written really in reaction to all of those who thought globalization was a single unidirectional process. The global age is the age when human beings are under threat collectively.

Now, where are we twenty years later? I would suggest that the politics of the global age is crystalizing. The world has divided into two. On the one side, you have the enlightened, the globalized, or the educated who take advantage of a global world, who understand what the challenges are. That’s one set of people and they tend to be the leaders and also the opposition – the dominant political poles in every country. And then, on the other side, you have the rest. And there is an increasing divide between the two.

The politics of the global age have become transnational. So whatever happens in any particular country has to be seen as an aspect of globalized politics. That is I think much clearer to us now. So, ironically, when anyone sees and reads about potential change of power in the Netherlands, or what is happening in Ecuador, these changes can only be understood in terms of the relations between elites across the world and their local populations. It’s a global frame. There’s no way to understand political events in one country without reference to what happens elsewhere.

That’s my thesis on the global age. I believe it has only been reinforced by what has happened in the last twenty years. In that respect I do think digitalization is making a difference so much so that people may be losing focus on the global and becoming more interested in networks, more interested in connections and relations.

**DAD:** Looking back on your career, what three subjects do you wish you had studied when you began?

**MA:** I was brought up in a system that made a radical division between the natural sciences and the humanities, so I dropped natural sciences when I was quite young. I now realize that the intellectual problems of the natural sciences and the social sciences have much more in common than is sometimes understood. I wish I had had a better grasp of some of the fundamental issues concerning the natural sciences, regarding the identification of forces, and the language that we can use to describe them. So my first wish would be to have known more about the sciences.

So to the second wish: even at school, I was fascinated by China and when I went to the London School of Economics I was privileged to attend a seminar given by a very good sinologist and I wrote papers on China. Subsequently, in the 1980s I even visited China. But never, at any point in my career, did I consider learning Chinese. I’m learning it now, but I wish I’d learned Chinese when I was eighteen because it is a fundamentally different kind of language, a different kind of thinking – and such a different outlook on the world would have been a wonderful asset when I was eighteen.

The third wish: I suppose I would have benefited from a broader grasp of religion than the one that I had when I was young. I was brought up in the Church of England and then I was a student and became agnostic. As I got older I realized that the religions of the world hold profound insights. Of course, you have here in Romania one of the most wonderful thinkers on religion, Mircea Eliade. I didn’t read Eliade until I was in my fifties. I should have read him when I was in my twenties.

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The Legacy of Colonialism in Kosova

An Interview with Ibrahim Berisha

Ibrahim Berisha was born in the Republic of Kosova. He completed undergraduate degrees in Philosophy and Sociology in Prishtina, and then went on to postgraduate studies in Zagreb, Croatia, where he earned a PhD in Sociology of Communications. After working as a journalist and editor in Kosova and abroad, he now teaches at the Department of Sociology in the University of Prishtina, Kosova. He has published several books on the sociology of communications and socio-culture, as well as several collections of prose and poetry. His latest book is The Death of a Colony. This interview is conducted by Labinot Kunusheveci, holding an MA in Sociology from the University of Prishtina.

LK: In your book *The Death of a Colony*, you describe Kosova’s history as the history of a colony. What do you mean?

IB: First, it is important to remember that colonizers differ from one another, and the same applies to colonized people. But in what sense? For instance, colonizers differ in terms of the narratives through which they build a colonization process as well as the ends projected in such narratives. There was a difference, for example, between France’s colonization goals in Algeria, England’s goals in India, or Belgium’s goals in colonizing the Congo.

Serbian state colonization in Kosova started from myths, before expanding to include economic, political, and expansionist goals. European states did not base their colonial occupations on myths or on the construction of particular historical events as is the case with the Serbian colonization of Kosova through the 1389 Battle of Kosova that sought to “correct history.”
LK: Can you say more about the goals of the Serbian colonization of Kosovo as compared to more familiar forms of colonialism?

IB: Both the goals and the processes differ: the British did not intend to empty India of the country’s population, but Serbia did. The Serbian state tried to accomplish total ethnic cleansing of the Albanian majority in Kosovo. Political intervention was legitimized on the basis of the idea that Kosovo had to be emptied of Albanians once and for all, by any means necessary. This has been tried several times, most recently during the tragic war of 1998-99. The “exercise” involved not only Serbian state authorities, but also religious, cultural, academic and artistic institutions. To put it in simpler terms: from the French perspective, Algeria was a land populated by Algerians, and it was clear that the French would eventually leave Algeria. In the case of Serbia, Kosova is seen as a territory inhabited only temporarily by Albanians, and occupation would be necessary until their final exodus.

LK: Do you think the colonization strategies were built upon state projects or rather shaped by the settlers?

IB: Colonization strategies were meant to produce concrete effects; in Kosovo, that meant social-demographic changes. The urban and rural structure and architecture changed wherever the Serbs settled in Kosovo after the twentieth century. The recovery of medieval history reshaped and inspired these changes, along with iconographic images and the establishment of new villages and towns, with schools, roads, and economic change. The organization of the population could be easily changed in cities and towns, since the entire Serbian administration was deployed there, with its military officers, gendarmerie, judges, and even to some extent politicians. Estates expropriated from legitimate Albanian owners in the name of agrarian reform were given to the colonial settlers.

In the last agrarian reform, during the communist era, families in villages were left with a maximum of ten hectares of land and forest – a pattern of dispossession that devastated family economies. In 1950, a rural family of 60 or more members was left with only ten hectares of land. This is when economic migration started. Young people would go to Belgrade and other cities of Yugoslavia to do menial work. Goldsmiths, bakers, confectioners, craftsmen in general, left Kosovo because there were no buyers for their products at home. But they did not lose touch with their families, sending money home.

By contrast, wherever the colonizers settled, they enjoyed full financial support from the central government. What did this social-demographic process look like in practice? If in 1912 the Serbs made up five percent of the population in Kosovo, in 1939 this percentage had risen to almost 40 percent. Colonization not only changed the demographic structure, but also the economic, social and cultural landscape. Segregation of Albanians in villages and non-urbanized areas of the cities deprived them of the fruits of social change. Then this isolation was used by the political establishment to justify treating Albanians as second-class citizens. For years Albanians were deprived of the right to education (for instance, university courses in Albanian only began in 1970), they were impoverished after losing their estates, and they lived as if on an isolated island. Of all peoples from former Yugoslavia, Albanians were the only ones whose language was not Slavic – yet another factor of isolation.

LK: It is commonly thought that during the communist period, under Tito’s rule, Albanians were in a better political and economic position. Is this true?

IB: The government in Belgrade could not agree to Albanians becoming an equal community, that is, to give Albanians and Serbs equal rights and responsibilities. What happened during Tito’s regime, beginning after 1966, might be described as cosmetic change without true reform. Albanians were the third largest nation in Yugoslavia, after the Serbs and Croats, but the Yugoslav state worked actively to change this. In the 1950s, around 200,000 Albanians migrated from Kosovo and in order to escape state oppression, there was a massive change of national identity: the number of “Turks” in Yugoslavia – that is, mainly Albanians who sought some sort of sanctuary by changing their identity – increased by 260%, from 97,945 in 1953, to 259,536 in 1961.

During the era of Tito, colonization continued to advance. Kosovo, which is rich in lead, zinc, silver, coal, magnesium, and other minerals, was treated as a region of natural resources but the ore was mainly processed in Serbia, Vojvodina and elsewhere. This is why Kosovo suffered continual underdevelopment.

LK: How has Albanian sociology looked upon Serbian ideology of political, ethnic and cultural domination over Kosovo?

IB: Albanian sociology in Kosovo is young, and has long been dominated by dogmatism and doctrinarism; the Department of Sociology and Philosophy only opened in Pristina in 1971, and the most famous Albanian sociologist, Professor Fehmi Agani, who wrote the influential book Sociological and Political Studies, was executed in 1999, during the war in Kosovo. Ukshin Hoti, another professor in the University of Pristina’s Sociology Department, was arrested on political charges in the 1990s, for advocating freedom of speech. He has been on the list of missing persons since 1999. Professor Hoti, who was educated in the United States, also focused on political sociology.

Today a team of young sociologists have broadened the scope of topics to include culture, social structure, reli-
region, gender equality, communications, politics, and so on. These young sociologists have mainly been educated abroad; they bring different methodological expertise and explore different questions. It is a sign of progress that those young scholars no longer pursue sociology through ideological lenses – lenses that serve as propaganda and retard sociology’s critical perspectives.

**LK: What are the consequences of colonization today?**

**IB:** Today we can speak of a post-colonial, post-socialist period. After a difficult period, Kosova’s society is in a period of reconstruction, attempting to integrate itself into international financial, political, and cultural institutions. However, this integration, although it seems to offer hope, has not produced the results that citizens would like. Disappointment, lack of freedom of movement, unemployment (especially among young people), remind people of the past and of the legacies of past discrimination and underdevelopment.

The failure of current policies to create more social equality has made young people cynical. Most young people want to leave Kosova, looking to the global job market as an opportunity to build a future. But success on the global market requires investment and change of the education system.

**LK: How have myths, glorifications, indoctrination and propaganda affected the Kosovar environment, and how has this produced a sense of inferiority among Albanians? Have Albanians been able to resist Serbian domination?**

**IB:** The Balkans are a big garden of illusions. Who will be the carrier of these “glorious memories” in the future? Intellectuals, artists, and mediocre politicians. They use deceptive words to comfort the public: homeland, nation, heroes and myths. Their language is dominated by folkloric patriotism and glorification supported by arrogance, and threats. They serve politicians who scramble for power without caring for those over whom they rule. Many are living in the past, seeking public attention by playing with the emotions of the people who only want jobs and well-being.

In a social environment like ours, indoctrination is widespread. Over the past five years many young people have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, responding to the propaganda that fills the political void and plays on their sense of hopelessness.

**LK: What role does the Yugoslav context play in Kosova’s politics today?**

**IB:** Yugoslavia is history now. It was created out of a cultural and political movement that was built on geographic closeness, and historical national and linguistic links among southern Slavs. It was a creature that could not survive because it was not built on principles of equality. Albanians suffered in every way, and therefore Yugoslavia has no place in their political consciousness today.

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On a rapidly urbanizing planet facing unprecedented wealth disparities, global warming, and the prospect of mass extinction, the question of how to live sustainably and equitably in cities assumes world-historical significance. The majority of the world’s populations are now urban dwellers – by 2050 two thirds of the world’s population will be living in cities – and in increasingly unequal societies. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon warns, “growing global inequality, increasing exposure to natural hazards, rapid urbanization and the overconsumption of energy and natural resources threaten to drive risk to dangerous and unpredictable levels with systemic global impacts.”

As disproportionate users of energy, cities are key to sustainable energy futures. They are currently responsible for three-quarters of global final energy demand and if urbanization continues as anticipated, by 2030 the world will need to invest some US$90 trillion in urban/land-use/energy infrastructure. For energy infrastructure alone, the International Energy Agency puts the figure for energy infrastructure at US$16 trillion over the next decade or so, adding that the electricity sector “will absorb the majority of this investment.” Getting energy provision and infrastructures right is therefore of paramount importance.

Aotearoa New Zealand is one of the world’s most urbanized nations, and since the 1980s it has also seen the globe’s greatest increase in economic inequality. We have recently embarked on a three-year research project, focusing on energy infrastructure in one of its cities: electrical power in post-disaster Ōtautahi (Christchurch).

Ordinarily, it is impossible to completely rebuild a city. But the 2010 and 2011 Canterbury earthquakes provided a unique chance to build afresh sustainably and equitably; to construct an inclusive and resilient electrical energy system capable of withstanding the shocks and stresses of future events like natural disasters, population growth, and anthropogenic climate change.

We view Christchurch as something of a worldwide laboratory: while researchers often focus on megacities, most of the planet’s population now live – and will continue to live – in small urban centers of half a million people or less.
And, like Christchurch, cities everywhere must grapple with the challenges of climate change and sea-level rise. “Christchurch is like every other modern city in building over its natural hazards... [but] is unique simply in having had so much of that change revealed all at once by its earthquakes. With much of the east sunk by up to a meter, it has become an international test bed for what to expect, how to cope, when you are a pancake-flat city almost level with a large ocean.”

Initial signs were promising. No city of comparable size has had such high levels of investment. Christchurch was the first New Zealand city to develop real-time energy-use figures, and one of the earliest globally to sign onto the “Cities Pilot the Future” Program, an exchange forum aimed at improving urban living. It also features in the Rockefeller Foundation’s 100 Resilient Cities.

Yet despite the “blank slate” that the earthquakes provided, the business-as-usual model prevails. Electricity is still centrally generated by big hydro, transmission and distribution are monopolized by a few private corporations, no solar infrastructure exists, distributed customer-generated power is minimal, and, even though Aotearoa New Zealand has enviable wind resources, they barely count.

This squandered opportunity is all the more dismal when viewed within the broader context of national electrical energy provision. Mid-twentieth century Aotearoa New Zealand derived all of its electricity from a single renewable source: hydroelectric power plants, supplemented by another renewable source, geothermal power. Today, however, fossil fuels make up a third of the national electrical energy mix – which, as Benjamin Sovacool and Charmaine Watts note, makes the New Zealand electricity sector “unique in the sense that it has been getting less renewable over time.”

In theory, the shift back to 100% renewable energy provision should not be a difficult pitch. The benefits of renewables are well-known and uncontroversial. They reduce negative externalities like air pollution per kilowatt hour, have more predictable and stable fuel prices and lower greenhouse gas emissions, consume less water when they operate, are more efficient, and provide better local employment opportunities and revenues. In sum, renewables are more sustainable, a better economic bet, and offer the prospect of greater resilience through enhanced community engagement and empowerment.

In practice, a transition back to 100% renewables should not be difficult either, and would be entirely feasible using today’s technologies. Aotearoa New Zealand enjoys a wealth of natural assets; according to the government, we rank number one in the world in terms of renewable resource per capita, with some of the world’s best wind resources, plentiful sunshine, and numerous lakes and rivers. If geothermal sources are included, Sovacool and Watts suggest the country’s electricity sector could be completely renewable by 2020.

But questions of energy are always entwined with political and economic interests, and new technologies or natural resource depletion may matter less than social, cultural and institutional factors, including state policy. Repeatedly, political elites and entrenched industry players prevail over energy experts, Indigenous groups and community activists – so much so that the greatest entry barrier facing renewables (particularly local small-scale distributed generation) is that the powers-that-be prefer large, concentrated plants.

Sociological research is therefore sorely needed to identify those who make key decisions, the bases on which they do so, and with what consequences. Paradoxically, however, the social sciences have mostly ignored energy and infrastructures – the matrix of modern existence – though this has begun to change in recent years, as energy systems are increasingly recognized as social systems. As the social sciences show signs of a new “turn to infrastructure,” new scholarship is examining what infrastructures are (means of sustenance and modes of governance) and what they do (mediate between nature and culture, distribute social and environmental benefits and harms, tie the local to the global, and provide the basis for modern life as we know it).

Rebuilding cities is a difficult task, one seldom faced. In Aotearoa New Zealand, it was last done in 1931, following the Napier earthquake. Much remains to be done in Christchurch today: The rebuilding is slow, painful, and deeply problematic. Residential surveys of Cantabrians consistently show huge levels of dissatisfaction with the government’s recovery priorities.

But there are also resources for hope. “The Māori disaster management response to the Christchurch earthquakes and subsequent urban recovery process constitutes an exemplar of best practice,” Christine Kenney and Suzanne Phibbs write. “During the emergency management phase, Māori risk management initiatives were collaborative, effective and shaped by kaupapa (cultural values), specifically the value, ‘aroha nui ki te tangata’ (extend love to all people).” Post-disaster, the people of Ōtautahi have shown world-class creativity in “temporary urbanism,” short-lived community-initiated constructions – community gardens, event venues and parks – which enhance shared city life.

Could these community innovations offer lessons for more enduring and sustaining urban structures? As we embark on a three-year research program into the process of rebuilding from the ground up, we hope that the lessons we learn may provide innovative understandings, practical guidance and policy considerations for those planning the transition to robust, transparent, equitable, culturally compatible and sustainable electrical power systems. ■
In contexts of war and natural disaster, children and youth are often considered the most vulnerable. Yet although they may be exposed to particularly high levels of physical, social, psychological, and political risk, simply treating children and youth as “victims” may overlook their unique forms of agency, creativity, and resourcefulness.

Seeking to move beyond this “deficit model,” I have begun a three-year comparative study, providing space for local voices, and prioritizing the lived experiences of youth in contexts of war, conflict, and disaster. Two of the cases included in this Royal Society Marsden Fund project focus on youths’ engagement with non-competitive action sports in contexts of political instability and ongoing conflict: the first, Skateistan, is a non-governmental skateboarding school for disadvantaged children in Afghanistan; and the second is a grassroots parkour group in Gaza. In two other cases, I am exploring the social, psychological, and civic significance of action sports for youth living in communities devastated by natural disaster as well as during the long process of recovery: we are looking at Christchurch following the 2010 and 2011 earthquakes, and New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina in 2005.

Preliminary findings from our research on post-earthquake Christchurch, New Zealand, is already yielding some insight into the myriad, often subtle, ways in which young people navigate plural, intersecting structures of power in their everyday lives, focusing particularly on their sporting participation and civic engagement. The 2011 earthquake killed 185 people and injured many more, flattening the downtown district and damaging or destroying almost 200,000 homes. Earthquakes that destroy vital infrastructure – roads, sewage, and water – also destroy sporting facilities (e.g., gyms, playing fields, swimming pools, club rooms, stadiums) – facilities whose destruction is rarely of immediate concern, but whose loss is often keenly felt in the weeks and months following a natural disaster, as residents seek to re-establish lifestyles and routines. Without ignoring the post-earthquake experiences of athletes and residents involved in organized, competitive, and recreational sports, I have focused on the experiences of highly-committed participants in non-competitive, unregulated action or “lifestyle” sports, exploring how these individuals adapted their sporting participation after the earthquakes.

Immediately following the earthquake, most participants viewed sporting activities as secondary to the health and wellbeing of family and friends. A few weeks after the earthquake, however, many recognized the damage done to their sporting participation. As Emma, a passionate surfer, explained, “Once we got most of the chores done, we started to realize that something huge was missing...”
from our lives." For many, damage to their favorite sporting spaces disrupted their familiar, deeply embodied, sporting practices. For skateboarders, the city center’s “red zoning” meant the loss of a favorite urban playground. Climbers lost access not only to their indoor climbing facility, but also to hundreds of climbing routes in the Port Hills, while mountain bikers lost hundreds of trails in the area. Extensive damage to major sewer lines forced the Christchurch City Council to release untreated wastewater into rivers, closing local beaches for nine months, disrupting the daily routines of local surfers and other beach users.

Participants in the study described strong physical, emotional and psychological responses to disrupted sporting practices, while others deeply mourned the loss of much-loved sporting places: “I feel so sad for the places we lost,” Japanese climber, Yukimi, said. “My favorite climbs were there, my projects were there. I miss them.”

Cultural geographer Tim Edensor writes that individuals often try to minimize the effects of a major disruption by trying to “restore familiar spaces, routines and timings.” This was certainly true for many lifestyle sport participants living in Christchurch, many of whom seek out the familiar rhythms of their sporting bodies and lifestyles to cope with daily stresses, to rebuild personal and collective identities, and to strengthen a sense of belonging in a new Christchurch. For example, many passionate surfers car-pooled to non-polluted surfing beaches outside Christchurch, and many climbers organized group bouldering trips, as beaches and bouldering routes became what Allison Williams terms “therapeutic landscapes.”

For some Christchurch residents, sporting participation helped escape (if only temporarily) from the stresses of daily life. For example, Aaron, a passionate surfer, described surfing’s importance for social interaction with his peers: “There is such a strong presence of community within surfing... you’d come back [from your surf] and be in a calm place for at least a few days.”

Some Christchurch youth also set about reappropriating earthquake spaces, demonstrating creative responses to the earthquake. Embracing their sporting culture’s do-it-yourself, anti-authoritarian attitude, some skateboarders created indoor skate parks in buildings set for demolition. Trent described the appropriation of damaged buildings as a “salute to all the people that look down their noses at us and think we’re just nuisance, good-for-nothing skaters.” Rather than “sitting around and moaning about all the damage, [we] are out there doing something, and saying ‘hey look what we can do with all the broken stuff’.” Through the creative use of earthquake-damaged spaces, skateboarders constructed different spatial re-imaginings of a post-earthquake city. In so doing, they subtly disrupted dominant readings of earthquake spaces as dead, damaged, and fit only for demolition.

In the wake of the earthquake, alternative sporting practices appear to offer an opportunity to redefine physical and emotional disaster geographies and rebuild social networks and connections. But such action-sport endeavors can also include exploitative and commercializing aspects. In 2015 the American-based denim corporation Levi Strauss announced that it would donate NZ$180,000 towards the building of a community skate park.

Most local youth and parents strongly favored the Levi-sponsored skate park; rather than criticizing the transnational corporation’s investment, they welcomed the offer with open arms. However, a few local residents used an online Council submissions forum to express concerns about Levi Strauss’ economic motives for investing in post-disaster Christchurch, and the Council’s complicity in this process. Comments like, “We need imaginative ways [sic] to maximize the environment, not a commercial advertising eyesore;” or, “Levi’s is a multinational looking for the best profile for their company, they care nothing for the community” reflected local residents’ concerns over what Naomi Klein has termed “disaster capitalism”, in which an international corporation saw a unique marketing opportunity in the disarray caused by the earthquakes and the lack of council funding available for sporting and recreational facilities.

Our ongoing study may be the first global investigation into the different possibilities offered by informal sporting activities for improving lives in conditions of war and disaster, as well as the various forms of power that enable or constrain such endeavors. Our study reveals a resourceful youth responding to local conditions, yet simultaneously influenced by global power structures and transnational networks.

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In the wake of the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s ascendancy, New Zealand’s immigration website has seen a barrage of interest from people wanting to escape their homelands. New Zealand (NZ) certainly has appeal: filmmakers love to capture our dramatic backdrops, and the country is, literally, a land of milk and honey. We are regarded as a welcoming, progressive and human-rights conscious country: NZ women were the first in the world to get the vote, in 1893; after World War II, Kiwis (New Zealanders) played a central role in developing international human rights; and we are well-known for our restorative justice approach to crime.

Yet, on closer inspection, NZ’s sheen starts to dim. Poverty is rife, sexual assault rates are high, and, in the context of neo-colonialism, Māori bear the brunt of high imprisonment rates. The image that so entices potential immigrants belies politics, policies and practices too often marked by exclusion, marginalization and criminalization.

Nowhere has this been more apparent than in NZ’s response to the systemic child abuse inflicted by adults in its state care and institutional environments. In recent years, thousands of New Zealanders have courageously come forward to offer testimonies of abuse. In my book, *The Road to Hell*, 105 victims describe being placed under state care and held in welfare residences – just a fraction of the more than 100,000 children who passed through these institutions from the 1950s to the 1990s.

These testimonies are chilling. Social welfare workers frequently separated siblings, sometimes placing them hundreds of miles apart. They held children in dark, isolated secure cells for days or months at a time, and sometimes administered electric shocks to youngsters for running away or being naughty. Children who complained about sexual abuse by predatory adults were told to keep quiet. Residential facilities had limited and sometimes no educational facilities, and “kingpin” children were told to control their peers, to ensure institutional compliance. Social workers told their charges that no-one loved them, and administered violent and degrading punishments – strapping children until they bled or making them clean a floor with a toothbrush – for the most minor misdemeanors. Approaching children as prisoners, they disregarded the relatively progressive policies and rules established for state care institutions, instead running traumatizing centers filled with fear.

Many years later, victims have started to disclose their pasts, exposing how state institutions directly harmed or failed to protect them. Charting the long-lived legacies of their violation – from depression to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, severe anxiety, substance abuse, family violence, prison sentences – victims have come forward in the hope that their experiences will be widely acknowledged, understood and responded to with care.

Instead, the NZ government has battened down the hatches. While many countries – Australia, Canada, UK, Ireland, among others – have grappled with the difficulties of providing victims of abuse with public acknowledgement and personal support, the NZ response offers a painful lesson in how states can manage truth-telling to secure state legitimacy, interests and finances, regardless of the consequences.

Most abuse claimants have sought redress through the Ministry of Social Development’s (MSD) “Historic Claims Unit.” Unfortunately, that Ministry is also the government...
department against which claims are being made. Many victims will never trust the agency responsible for their victimization, and they see no independence between the Unit and its “master.” One victim, Peter, remarked, “It’s like saying I’ll submit myself for a pointless anal examination [... they’re not going to give you a satisfactory response.”

Indeed, many victims have encountered a culture of disbelief and denigration within the Ministry, which for many years failed to investigate significant abuse claims, often working on the unlikely assumption that any victimization would have been officially recorded. Victims have been told that because there is nothing in their files to substantiate charges of ill-treatment, their claims are invalid.

The Ministry has also blamed victims for ongoing problems, arguing that claimants’ harms have not emerged from abuse in care, but from other life experiences. Sue, for example, was informed that she had no valid claim as the Ministry deemed that her difficulties resulted from her drinking, which began early in life. The authority refused to acknowledge any link between Sue’s drinking and her experiences of violence, sexual assaults, solitary confinement and lack of schooling while she was in state care.

In recent years, the Ministry has pursued a “fast-track” process that has so far settled over 700 claims. Victims are often thankful to receive a short letter of apology recognizing aspects of their victimization – generally the first time they have heard any official regret. Some victims receive compensation, although the average payment, about NZ$20,000, is relatively low compared to other jurisdictions. However, to receive their sum, victims must sign away their right to make further legal claims – and in a new twist, those who have received any compensation now face threats that the Ministry will cut their welfare benefits, on the grounds that they hold too many assets.

There are, however, two further alternative routes for redress. First, victims can bring legal cases, although the state has often relied on legal technicalities to minimize claims. Under a Statute of Limitations, victims are told their claims are outdated, regardless of their compelling nature. Further, state agencies may withdraw legal aid especially when they believe further claims would not be successful.

Second, between 2008 and 2015, victims could describe their experiences to a Confidential Listening and Assistance Service, and then receive limited assistance: ten counselling sessions, help with finding records or relatives, and so on. However, as the service’s title made clear, this process remained confidential, avoiding public disclosure of claims of abuse. As Sue has put it, “We don’t have the Westminster system here, we have the Axminster system,” which has worked to maintain public silence over the most serious state violence and harms.

Hiding histories of state disregard, marginalization and serious violence means that we don’t make things better for victims. And violations continue. The ongoing litany of damaging NZ state actions against children is shameful, from secure cells in schools to long prison lockdowns, unreasonable punishments in Child, Youth and Family residences, or multiple out-of-home-care placements. In silencing the past, the process perpetuates socio-cultural and institutional tolerance of damaging practices.

Other countries offer examples of more appropriate approaches: openly telling difficult stories, acknowledging the state’s role, mapping the links between abuse and long-term damage, providing support, independently adjudicating measures for redress, and publicly apologizing. As a necessary form of moral repair, a guilty state’s willingness to take open responsibility for heinous acts of violence can help countless traumatized victims who live with shame, fear, despair and loss. Official acknowledgement, perhaps through a “Commission of Recognition, Repair and Prevention,” could help victims come to terms with the past, and should be a national priority.

1 “Axminster” is a play on the word “Ax” meaning to “get rid of.”

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Activism and Academia

by Dylan Taylor, Victoria University of Wellington, Aotearoa New Zealand

Parliamentary politics in Aotearoa New Zealand is in a state of torpor. The country’s Fifth National Government, for whom another term looks likely, has continued the neoliberal project ushered in by the Fourth Labour Government in 1984, predictably pursuing tax cuts, creeping privatization, and employer-focused changes to employment law. The outcomes have been predictable: deepening levels of inequality, rising rates of homelessness, and increasingly precarious employment.

The Labour and Green parties, linked through a memorandum of understanding ahead of the 2017 elections, have publicly committed to “budget responsibility” should they win this year’s general election – a code for “business as usual,” though with small concessions to the worst-off. Like many other developed democracies, Aotearoa New Zealand has seen declining voter turnout and increasing cynicism towards politicians, a trend which the Labour-Green coalition seems unlikely to reverse.

Outside the parliamentary sphere, however, innovative projects seeking to challenge neoliberalism can be found. Along with colleagues in other social science disciplines, sociologists are playing important roles in reinvigorating a culture of critique and hope, and in creating counter-hegemonic institutions.

These promising developments include the foundation of a radical left-wing think tank, Economic and Social Research Aotearoa (ESRA); the launch of Counterfutures: Left Thought & Practice Aotearoa, a publication bringing together the voices of activists and academics; and the convening of the annual Social Movements, Resistance and Social Change (SMRSC) conference. All three initiatives embody a strong commitment to challenging the neoliberal status quo.

ESRA was publicly launched in 2016, stemming from Sue Bradford’s doctoral thesis exploring the feasibility of a left-wing think tank in Aotearoa New Zealand. A long-time activist for beneficiary and poor groups and a former Green MP, Bradford has drawn together academics and activists to seed “a culture of resistance, solidarity and hope, informed by and translating the issues and hopes of exploited, oppressed and marginalized people” (https://esra.nz/about/). Early initiatives include enquiries into the country’s housing crisis, a rethinking of economic planning, and a discussion of new forms of political organization.

ESRA’s kaupapa (the Māori word for “program” or “purpose”) is firmly committed to recognizing Māori sovereignty in Aotearoa New Zealand (something which was promised in the country’s founding document, the Treaty of Waitangi, but that has not been honored by any Government since...
The initiative seeks to explore strategies to “move in practical ways beyond capitalism and colonialism,” guided by a sensibility that is becoming ever more salient for the social sciences – that valid and insightful forms of knowledge “come from below,” and that such knowledges are essential for thinking through how alternative forms of social organization might take shape.

Similar sensibilities animate the new publication, Counterfutures. The journal aims “to intervene in and inaugurate debates about how to understand, imagine and influence our society, politics, culture and environment” (https://counterfutures.nz). It seeks to stage a dialogue between academic researchers and the knowledges produced by those grounded in community groups, unions, and activist organizations. In addition to peer-reviewed academic articles, the journal also publishes “interventions” on contemporary political and social issues, and interviews with activists and scholars. Counterfutures is widely available in independent book stores and in leading university libraries, and it releases its content free online within six months of publication – an approach which ensures the journal is not trapped behind paywalls. The diverse readership attracted to Counterfutures attests to an appetite for alternative thinking informed by robust research, and the exploration of novel possibilities for political organization.

Counterfutures’ first three issues include authors from diverse backgrounds: LGBTQI+ groups, sociology, Māori activism, psychology, prison abolitionists, philosophy, anti-poverty groups, historians, unionists, criminology, environmental organizations, and communication studies. The list spans the activist and academic divide, and is also strongly cross-disciplinary.

The same ethos is evident in the annual SMRSC conference. First organized in 2014 by the recently-arrived Turkish academic Ozan Nadir Alakavuklar, the conference has rapidly grown. Its third iteration attracted over 400 attendees, and was considered a landmark event for Aotearoa’s extra-parliamentary Left – the first time since the 1970s that such large numbers had come together from so many different backgrounds. Contributions to the conference covered Māori sovereignty, alternative approaches to the economy, Pasifika activism, the future of work, climate justice, health and disability justice, and contemporary unionism. Importantly, participants came from both activist and academic backgrounds (http://counterfutures.nz/2/editorial.pdf).

SMRSC participants and organizers have confronted the tensions emerging from diversity constructively, rather than downplaying or side-stepping them. In 2015, the SMRSC conference revealed tensions between activist and academic approaches to knowledge production and dissemination – a revelation that produced the 2016 conference theme, “The academic-activist divide.” In turn, the 2016 conference highlighted ongoing tensions between Māori and Pākehā (Aotearoa New Zealanders of European descent) on the Left, prompting the conference’s 2017 theme, Ka whawhai tonu matou, “Beyond capitalism – beyond colonisation” (https://esra.nz/socialmovements2017/).

There is cause for cautious optimism, despite a backdrop of deepening inequality and disengagement from parliamentary politics. First, the diversity of actors coming together signals a re-convergence on the extra-parliamentary Left. Like many developed countries, Aotearoa New Zealand has witnessed a fragmentation of the Left – one marked, also, by a split between the so-called materialist Left and identity politics. Despite lingering tensions, these new initiatives suggest that these are not, in fact, separate domains, and that effective social change builds on the recognition that the material and cultural are dialectically intertwined.

Second, these initiatives display a strong commitment to the notion that the knowledges produced by social movements and activism are legitimate and cutting-edge. For those in the academy, this commitment also involves ensuring that their work is of use to the groups with whom they collaborate and do research. The influence of indigenous scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith is important in this respect, along with that of public sociology and the growing field of activist scholarship. In combining knowledges arising from concrete social struggles with that produced in the academy, a productive field of new knowledges takes form.

Finally, the collaboration of diverse actors, and the range of knowledges they produce, underpin a counter-hegemonic project: a project that dares to ask how we might organize society differently. This involves reinvigorating the idea of equality, seeking new forms of political and economic organization, decolonizing, and initiating more sustainable environmental practices. This project is in its early days, and is admittedly fragile, but the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis shows that when alternatives are not on the table, we will be stuck with “business as usual.” These initiatives in Aotearoa New Zealand, in which activists and academics are coming together to collaborate in new and productive ways, bear the promise of alternative futures.

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In Aotearoa New Zealand, the social marginalization of Māori is apparent in disproportionate rates of criminalization and victimization – a situation that parallels that of other Indigenous peoples who have experienced widespread dispossession in Anglo-settler countries. A minority population of only 15% of the general population, Māori are more likely than the country’s other citizens to experience arrests, convictions and punitive punishments. Despite New Zealand’s international reputation for innovative restorative justice practices that draw upon Māori traditions, its imprisonment rate remains comparatively high – a situation that has been particularly detrimental for Māori, who comprise 50% of the country’s male and 60% of female prisoners. Despite wide recognition that this system has failed to reduce crime rates and causes children and families of prisoners to experience profound problems of social exclusion, recent news reports indicate that prison rosters will probably continue to grow.

Criminal justice interventions aimed at Māori have been rationalized in different ways from the colonial period to the present. At various times in the country’s history, representatives and officials from New Zealand state agencies have attempted to explain criminal offending amongst Māori as a supposedly self-evident social problem manifesting itself in the traditions and structures of Māori communities. More recently, ideas around the exposure to risk factors and criminogenic needs have come to dominate analyses, often constructing Māori as a population in need of active state intervention. Most policy responses rely on theoretical and empirical analyses arising from the British or North American contexts, yet they inform the ongoing social control of the Māori – largely ignoring the social and cultural differences between those who are theorized about, that is Māori, and the social, historical and political context in which the underlying theories have arisen.
For decades Māori have challenged the systemic racism of state policies and institutionalization in New Zealand. Criticisms of this approach appear in the influential re-flux of state policies and institutionalization in New Zealand. For decades Māori have challenged the systemic racism of state policies and institutionalization in New Zealand. Criticisms of this approach appear in the influential re-flux of state policies and institutionalization in New Zealand.

Of course, there have been state attempts to reform justice practices to reflect culturally diverse values, and to address Māori concerns over criminal justice. Changes to the youth justice system since 1989, which include family group conferencing and the introduction of the Children, Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989 (CYPFA), illustrate this, aiming to divert youth offenders away from the formal court system, using family group conferences bringing offenders and family together with victims and their families. This conferencing style of justice is said to be drawn from Māori philosophies that see collective responsibilities in social relationships. However, despite the availability of conferencing alternatives, Māori make up an increasing proportion of children and youth aged 10 to 16 years who are prosecuted in Youth Courts — a figure that has now reached 62% of Youth Court prosecutions.

Some researchers have pointed out that conferencing models do not fundamentally alter the underlying philosophies or structures of state justice. Instead, state authority continues to be maintained through other forms of social control. Juan Tauri notes that family group conferencing is a largely non-Māori practice that uses only some Māori cultural practices. He argues that CYPFA itself was influenced by Jackson’s criticisms of ethnocentrism in justice, and that the process incorporates some Māori components in part due to submissions from Māori organizations. However, he notes, family group conferencing is largely non-traditional in practice, although some aspects of Māori custom are included in a practice largely administered by officials.

Developing meaningful analyses and critiques has been a concern of Māori in the academy and social sciences, requiring us to examine the ways in which we research social situations as Māori. Many of us support the development of Indigenous communities, and a work like Linda Smith’s Decolonizing Methodologies has influenced Māori and other scholars to explore theories and methods that recognize Indigenous experiences and knowledge. Similarly, many of us hope to develop a critical Indigenous criminology that recognizes Māori experiences and conceptualizations of wrongdoing and social harm.

Moving state responses beyond the administrative tough-on-crime fixation that has expanded punitive responses like incarceration will require moving beyond theoretical instruments that fail to take into account or respond to the social reality of Māori. Similarly, it will require social theorists to engage with and form emancipatory research partnerships with Indigenous peoples. An effort to build an Indigenous criminology will have to involve drawing attention to various interrelated elements of offending, the collective experiences of social harm. It would have to examine the role of the state and the criminal justice system in creating social marginalization and over-representation in prison populations. An Indigenous criminology which seeks to include the experiences of those most affected by the justice system must go beyond a fixation on administrative crime control and beyond the issues deemed important by the state.

New approaches would pay more attention to the ways coloniality, institutional racism and systemic violence operate to control and marginalize Indigenous peoples — as Māori scholars like Tracey McIntosh and Khylee Quince have demonstrated in their research, drawing attention to the experiences of Māori women in prison, and to the problems associated with intergenerational incarceration and victimization.

An Indigenous criminology must engage with Māori experiences, and include analyses of socially harmful transgressions and related social structural conditions. Potentially, this could also include research into the re-definition or denial of the Treaty of Waitangi rights, or into actions of the state or other powerful groups which are detrimental for Māori and other communities. Directed towards decolonization, the aim is to empower Māori and community control over justice, guided by Māori cultural frameworks.

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> Leisure Studies was his Passion

It was early morning on Tuesday, May 23 in Ahmedabad (India) when I received a distressing call from Professor B.K. Nagla about the sad passing of Professor Ishwar Modi at the age of 76. There are certain personalities who never die even after death because their ideas, memories and affectionate actions live on forever. Professor Ishwar Modi was one such personality. For global sociology in general and Indian sociology in particular the year 2017 will be remembered for two sad departures: first we lost Professor D.N. Dhanagre and now Professor Ishwar Modi.

Professor Modi began his academic career as a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at the University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India in 1974. I followed two years later. From the beginning Ishwar Prasad Modi was one of faculty’s and students’ favorites in the social sciences. He completed his PhD in the field of Leisure Studies under the guidance of the distinguished scholar, Professor Yogendra Singh. His academic career embraced multiple achievements. He served sociology as President of the Indian Sociological Society and President of the Rajasthan Sociological Association. His engagement with global sociology began in 1986 when the ISA World Congress was held in Delhi. He motivated a large number of students of sociology to participate in the World Congress as well as in other international conferences, and encouraged young faculty members to join the International Sociological Association.

Professor Modi was deeply committed to distributing global knowledge of sociology to Hindi-speaking...
students. He was instrumental in publishing *Global Dialogue*, the multilingual magazine of the ISA, in Hindi. For him producing *Global Dialogue* in Hindi was a mission but also an academic challenge. I had the opportunity to work with Professor Modi in this venture and observed his dedication. He always acted with the members of his team with a sense of equality and democracy. Since I am not a disciplined person, several times the Hindi publication of *Global Dialogue* was slightly delayed. But he always appreciated my translations. He also appreciated the commitment of the other members of the editorial board, Dr. Rashmi Jain, Dr. Jyoti Sidana, Dr. Prabha Sharma, Dr. Nidhi Bansal and Mr. Uday Singh. Similarly he also made determined efforts to introduce a research journal in Hindi under the auspices of the Indian Sociological Society – a quality journal now published regularly. All these efforts of Professor Modi have brought great academic benefit to sociology students who work in the Hindi language. I hope that, despite the sad demise of Professor Modi, the show will go on and *Global Dialogue*’s Hindi edition will continue to be published with the same academic commitment.

With his many interests, Professor Modi made contributions in many areas, including child welfare, youth activism, gender justice, working class issues and marginal peoples. During his extensive travels within and outside India, he spoke with a sociological voice on matters of health, poverty, ecology, demography, social movements, voting behavior and human rights. Besides leisure, tourism and mass media, which were his areas of specialization, Professor Modi made significant contributions to social theory. Within the ISA his deep commitments will always be remembered by members of RC13 (Research Committee on Leisure). He made academic trips to almost every country of the world. He was a prolific writer of books and research articles. His involvement in the teachers’ movement and in other social issues established him as a public intellectual and a critical sociologist.

Professor Modi will also be remembered for his exemplary affection. He and his family treated every visitor with deep love, care and regard. They are rare people indeed. To treat everyone as a family member was, for him, a defining principle of leisure.

The passing of Professor Modi is a great personal loss to his family and friends. The world of sociology will miss his physical absence, but his inspiration will always be with us. Goodbye Professor Modi, the community of sociology will miss you a lot, but you will always remain here in our memory lane.

Rajiv Gupta, President of the Indian Social Science Association
> A Source of Inspiration and Encouragement

Professor Ishwar Modi’s passing in May 2017 came after a long struggle with cancer, in which he continued to provide support and guidance to a new generation of Indian sociologists, and to a new generation of sociologists of leisure. His death is a sad loss to Indian sociology, sociology of leisure, and the academy more generally.

Ishwar had come to Research Committee 13 (Sociology of Leisure) of the ISA when he was already a globally renowned sociologist of leisure and tourism. He was encouraged to stand as President to lead RC13 through changing circumstances. He took on the task with vigor and good sense, and reached out to attract many new members to RC13 and the ISA more generally. As he stood a number of times as President he continued to undertake impressive research projects, and to write many monographs and edited collections – indeed, one final edited collection (Leisure, Health...
and Well-Being) was published as recently as April of this year with two RC13 colleagues as co-authors. As the President of RC13 he represented it on ISA’s Executive Committee, and worked well with colleagues there.

Beyond RC13 and the ISA, Ishwar was closely involved in two parallel developments. He was elected to the Board of Directors for the World Leisure and Recreation Association – what is now called World Leisure, the leading international professional body for leisure – on a number of occasions. He was so well respected by that organization that he was given honorary life membership. The second development was his active involvement in the Indian Sociological Society, which led to him receiving a Lifetime Award in 2015 from the Society for his efforts in promoting Indian sociology, and his world-class contribution to sociological research and teaching.

When the news of his passing was sent to the members of RC13, the sadness was mitigated by the memories and words of thanks members shared with one another. Everybody has a tale to tell about their first acquaintance with Ishwar, and how that meeting or contact became the basis of a long-standing friendship. From the most senior members of RC13 to many of our newest members, we all felt the same. Ishwar was our former President, our mentor and teacher, and someone who had devoted himself to making us feel welcome. It was Ishwar who set the inclusive tone of our decision-making, and the inclusive tone of our sessions at ISA events and our mid-term conferences. I personally valued Ishwar’s presence in RC13 and the ISA, and will always be grateful for his encouragement and his presence. I first met him in Hungary at an RC13 mid-term conference, though we had exchanged many emails beforehand, and like everyone involved in RC13 and the ISA, I am very sad that I will not see him again. But at the same time I think we are all very glad to have known Ishwar Modi, and to have been part of his world.

Karl Spracklen, Leeds Metropolitan University, UK and Vice-President and Executive Secretary of the ISA Research Committee on the Sociology of Leisure (RC13)
We became the Turkish editorial team of *Global Dialogue* (GD) in January 2015. Our team comprises a core of two, Gül Çorbacıoğlu and Irmak Evren, both PhD candidates at Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey. Our friend, Ahmet Seyhan Totan, has also been helping out with the design of our issues.

Keeping up with the latest sociological debates throughout the world and being able to translate them into Turkish bring us joy but it is also a challenging endeavor and a rather long process. It is more than a project of translation – we have to transform the (English) *Global Dialogue* into the (Turkish) *Küresel Diyalog*, attending to the coherence and integrity of the entire magazine. The whole process starts from the moment we receive the English texts for a new issue of GD. First of all, we divide up the articles – when there is a cluster of articles on a specific issue, or one that covers the scope of a specific country’s sociology, we take the interrelation of the articles into consideration – according to our fields of interest and to maximize our own individual enrichment. Then we work hard to meet the deadline. As a team of two it requires tenacity as well as responsibility!

When each of us is finished with the translation of the assigned articles, we exchange them so that we will have read all the articles as well as translated and edited them. We believe that a second review, as a reader rather than a translator, makes it possible to view the magazine from the standpoint of the audience – the community of sociologists and those who are interested in sociology. When we encounter terms that seem impossible to translate into Turkish, fearing that they would lose their meaning if we make a literal conversion, we study the relevant literature in Turkish and consult our professors, to see if the term has perhaps been coined recently and if not, how we might translate it. Where we think it appropriate, we make use of the very colorful landscape of Turkish proverbs and idioms. After translating everything, including the captions for the pictures, we send all the texts to our friend Seyhan, who is an expert in the techniques of design. When the layout is complete, we make a final check. Finally, we are proud to behold a new issue of *Küresel Diyalog*!

As soon as it is posted on ISA’s website, we spread the word to our communities, to our colleagues in the universities and to special interest groups who are eager to link the familiar and the strange in their quest for global sociology. Translating *Global Dialogue* into Turkish has introduced both of us to new issues and societies, and, with every new issue, we happily share our excitement and enthusiasm with the Turkish sociological community.

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