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Interdisciplinarity and the Disciplines

This issue opens with two interviews. The first is with Frances Fox Piven, one of the most remarkable scholars in the history of US sociology. Her dedication to such issues as welfare rights, voter registration and most recently the Occupy Movement has informed her original analysis of social movements, calling attention to the power of insurgency. Over her long career she has fearlessly entered debates with such figures as Milton Friedman and, at the same time, borne the brunt of hostility from right-wing pundits. The second interview is with the French Middle East expert, François Burgat, who explains the appeal of the Islamic State to European Muslims, subjected to racist exclusion in their home country. Then follows an article by Jan Breman, the famous Dutch sociologist of the informal economy, who here disentangles the complex relation between anthropology and sociology. All three social scientists have a foot in sociology, but in dealing with public issues they demonstrate that disciplinary boundaries are unimportant by drawing on political science, anthropology and history as well as sociology.

The same is true of our contributors to the special section on Cuba. Luis Rumbaut and Rubén Rumbaut reflect on the historic agreement between Cuba and the US, drawing attention to the cumulative geopolitical and economic pressures that led to the rapprochement, while Luisa Steur considers its meaning from the standpoint of low-paid cleaners. Cognizant of the Soviet transition to the market economy, she sees how a similar shift in Cuba deepens inequalities that previously had been kept in check. In the following article, Luisa Steur interviews Afro-Cuban activist, Norberto Carbonell, who is loyal to the party but speaks openly of racism in Cuba. Publishing such an interview might not have been possible even a year ago.

But interdisciplinarity requires disciplines and sociology develops in national containers even as it is influenced by global fields – a point underlined by the six articles from Taiwan. This small island, suspended between China and the US, with a history of turbulent social movements has spawned one of the most vibrant sociologies in Asia. A nation sensitive to geopolitics, with a history of subjugation, has stimulated novel approaches to global sociology. Furthermore, many of our Taiwanese contributors participated in the democracy movement of the 1990s, and, thus, developed distinctive perspectives on social movements. As the articles show, the recent Sunflower Movement brought sociology and its critical visions into the national limelight, engaging publics beyond the academy.

Public sociology is also the theme of Rudolf Richter’s account of the history of Austrian sociology. His article is the first of a series that will introduce members of the ISA to the Third Forum of Sociology to be held in Vienna, July 10-14, 2016. The local organizing committee has been actively preparing an Austrian feast with its own blog http://isaforum2016.univie.ac.at/blog/.

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G' VOL. 5 / # 4 / DECEMBER 2015
Frances Fox Piven is an internationally renowned social scientist, and a much beloved teacher. She is a radical democrat and inspiring scholar-activist whose defense of the poor has dominated her remarkable and courageous career. Her first book, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Social Welfare (1971), co-authored with Richard A. Cloward, ignited a scholarly debate that reshaped the field of social welfare policy. Subsequent work analyzed the conditions under which the disruptive actions of the poor influenced the foundation of the modern US welfare state (Poor People's Movements, 1977) and were necessary for the advancement of progressive social policy and political reforms (The Breaking of the American Social Compact, 1997; Challenging Authority, 2006). She has always combined academic research with political engagement, pioneering such movements as the campaign for welfare rights and then voter registration as well as publicly supporting the Occupy Movement. She has never wavered in defending her ideas in the media, taking on such notable foes as the liberal economist Milton Friedman in a famous television debate. She has received many honors and awards, including serving as President of the American Sociological Association in 2007. In the conversation below she elaborates her theory of “interdependent power,” which is at the center of her work. Lorraine C. Minnite, a political scientist and policy scholar at Rutgers University, USA, interviewed Piven in Millerton, New York on May 30, 2015.

LM: I want to ask you about disruption, a recurrent theme in your work going back to your very first published article on “Low Income People in the Political Process,” as well as, “The Weight of the Poor,” your infamous article for The Nation, written with Richard Cloward in 1966. We hear a lot about disruption today. High-tech entrepreneurs preach the mantra of “disrupting” other industries for fun and profit, and analysts of social movements are also using the term more. Since it’s been a central preoccupation of yours for such a long time, could you talk about what you mean by disruption as a concept in social theory?

FP: Although the term is used more frequently, I don’t think it’s used carefully. In the tech industry it means innovation that disturbs markets, and social movement scholars mean collective action that is noisy, disorderly, or perhaps violent. But the noise and disorder aren’t good enough explanations of why disruption sometimes yields people at the bottom some power.

You mentioned my early work, written at a time when protests by poor Blacks (and, in New York City, Puerto Ricans)
were erupting. The protests were indeed very noisy and disorderly. Why?, I asked. By the early 1960s, large numbers of people had migrated to the central cities of the United States from the rural South and Puerto Rico. No doubt, they hoped for a better life. Certainly they were desperately poor. They found urban labor markets that did not offer them decent jobs, and municipal governments that denied them services. So, people gathered together, they marched, they yelled, they threw garbage on the lawns of city halls. And, in response, a lot of white liberals, often professionals in the field of social welfare, said, in effect, “We agree with your goals, but not with your methods. It’s true, you should have employment, you should have a source of income, you should have health care services, your apartments should have heat and hot water. But making noise, making trouble, is not the way to solve those problems. What you should do is get yourselves together, vote, petition your representatives,” that is, you should follow the routines of regular, normative democratic politics.

I puzzled about this. I came to the conclusion that people were doing what they were doing because the advice that they were getting from their liberal allies was bad advice. In fact, many of them had tried to use the normal procedures of redress. Many of them had tried to have a modicum of influence at city hall. They had applied for welfare, or other social services, only to find their applications ignored.

I concluded that the reason people turned to disruptive tactics was that these were the tactics that might be effective for them. That was my first take on the question of why low-income people were sometimes disruptive. In fact, of course, most of the time poor people were simply quiescent. But when they did emerge onto the political stage it was frequently in disorderly ways.

Over time, together with Richard Cloward, I developed what I think is a more analytical and more informed understanding of the actions that were called disruption. To appreciate what I’m going to argue, you have to step back from the specific behaviors of the people that are under scrutiny and ask the question: What role do these poor people play in the complex schemes of interdependent relations that constitute society, in the complex webs of cooperative relations that constitute society? Or, in another language, what role do they play in the division of labor?

**LM: A Durkheimian idea?**

**FP:** Yes, Durkheim certainly is an influence.

What are the consequences when people refuse their roles and become disruptive? Perhaps disruption is not only born of desperation but is in fact a source of power.

So, the argument: Poor people are often said to be excluded. This isn’t quite right. They usually are very much included, but included in order to be subjugated and exploited. They play important roles, as domestic workers or nannies, home health aides, and maids; or, as janitors, fast food and retail workers, cleaning people and trash collectors. In the last several decades, these kinds of jobs have become increasingly insecure as a result of the spread of part-time, on-demand and contract employment, and this while wages have been falling.

But are these workers in fact powerless? Think of domestic workers in the global cities of New York, or London, or San Francisco, or Boston. They mind the children, they clean the apartments, they may cook the dinners that better-off, better educated women who now work as professionals or middle-management would otherwise do. If the maids and nannies stop, the repercussions spread through the ranks of the lawyers, the accountants, the managers that make an increasingly financialized economy run.

In other words, domestic workers have a kind of power because if they don’t come to work, their employers may not be able to go to work. The refusal of the domestic workers is sand in the gears of a system of exchanges. That is the kind of disruption I’m talking about, the withdrawal of cooperation in a complex system of interdependencies. It is in effect a strike. When you withdraw your cooperation, the system is clogged. It may not stop altogether, but it doesn’t function well. The ability to shut things down has historically been the source of power for people at the bottom. That is interdependent, disruptive power.

**LM: In Poor People’s Movements, you and Richard Cloward argue for the central role of mass insurgency in explaining how we built a welfare state, how social reform happens. What’s your evaluation of what’s going on right now with respect to your theory of disruption and the power available to poor people to improve their lives?**

**FP:** Most of the time, people think of the electoral representative system as the arena in which their hopes can be realized, if they can be realized. However, I don’t think electoral politics works well for people at the very bottom. Increasingly, I think that it doesn’t work very well for most people, in the United States because of the growing corruption of electoral politics, and in Europe because supra-national institutions now over-ride national decisions. Nevertheless, the electoral system cannot be ignored. It is the reverberations of movements on electoral politics that largely determines their success or failure.

Indeed, electoral representative democracy is a remarkable institutional construction. It creates a sphere of relative equality, a sphere in which large proportions of the population have the right to vote in periodic elections, and key decision-makers in the state, in government, are vulnerable to those voters. In other words, ruling elites can be pushed out of office and out of power by those electorates.
Electoral representative democracy also guarantees certain rights to organize, so there is some capacity of those numerous atomized voters to develop a collective voice.

There are many variations on these basic features of electoral representative democracy, and they matter. But essentially what this invention does is create a sphere of social life in which almost everybody has a resource on which people at the very top depend, and that resource is in principle more or less equally distributed.

The problem is obvious. It is that this sphere of equality is not fenced off from the rest of society in which inequalities are extreme. And those inequalities inevitably spill over and distort what happens in electoral spheres. In the US, it is getting worse, with the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision [which overturned decades of US law limiting contributions to groups engaged in electioneering], and with the billions of dollars now spent on campaigns. Furthermore, it is an electoral representative system, and the translation of votes into representation is also severely distorted, partly by the American Constitution, but never more so than today, when lobbyists sit in on legislative committee discussions and regularly buy politicians.

However, my point now is a different one. Notice that at the heart of the luminous idea of electoral representative democracy is a reliance on a constructed interdependence between political elites and masses of voters.

As the movement escalates, it becomes more threatening to the political candidates that need to somehow keep together the large voter blocs necessary for electoral victory, as well as the money interests that fund the campaigns. When movements succeed, it is because politicians make concessions in order to tamp down these divisions.

**LM: Your theories of disruption, of interdependent power, of the electoral conditions under which movements can achieve reform, developed out of a deep engagement with US history and your own activism, especially your work with the Welfare Rights movement in New York City in the 1960s. How well do these theories explain political developments in other countries?**

**FP:** Some of this is true in other countries, although the strictly two-party US system may be especially vulnerable to movements. The protests in Greece helped to fracture the PASOK coalition and made possible the victory of Syriza, a coalition of the radical Left.

**LM: How do contemporary movement-electoral dynamics explain the election of Barack Obama, but also the limitations of what this has meant for progressive social reform?**

**FP:** Obama’s electoral support came primarily from the young, and from minorities. He took office when the financial recession was at its worst, but the movements had not yet emerged on any scale.

I think in retrospect, Obama’s presidency is best compared to Herbert Hoover’s – the Republican president in 1929 when the stock market crash that launched the Great Depression occurred – even though enthusiasts wanted to compare Obama to Hoover’s successor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the architect of the New Deal. There were protests in 1930-31, but they were small. It takes time for people to reconnoiter, to assess just what has happened, and what they can do about it.

The big protests began to unfold in the early 1930s, several years into the Great Depression, and several years into Hoover’s efforts to try to hold things together by repeatedly announcing that recovery was just around the corner.

Similarly in 2008: True, there were youthful activists like the Move-on folks working for the campaign. But they weren’t a protest movement. The student and labor protests in Wisconsin, then Occupy, the Fight for Fifteen, and Hands Up, Don’t Shoot, all these took time to develop. Of course, had they occurred in 2008, I think Obama would have been a better President. Now, in 2015, the movements are indeed escalating, including protests over low-wage work and policing. In the US we should hope the movements flourish, and partly because a Clinton presidency will not be able to ignore them.

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The Appeal of the Islamic State

An Interview with François Burgat

François Burgat is a political sociologist and senior researcher at the French Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), who has devoted his career to the analysis of political systems and civil societies in the Arab world. He is one of those rare scholars capable of understanding the Islamic movements without romanticizing or vilifying them, courageously confronting mainstream interpretations. Currently principal investigator of the European Research Council’s project “When Authoritarianism Fails in the Arab World,” his most recent publication is Pas de printemps pour la Syrie: Les clés pour comprendre les acteurs et les défis de la crise, 2011-2013 [No Spring for Syria: The keys to understanding actors and challenges of the crisis, 2011-2013]. He is interviewed by Sari Hanafi, who teaches at the American University of Beirut and is the ISA Vice-President for National Associations.
Since September 2014, the claim of the Islamic State (IS) that it is “lasting and expanding” unfortunately reflects the reality in Iraq and Syria, in spite of the international airstrike campaign. This expansion does not necessarily mean consolidation of power. The “Sunniland” that IS aims to establish is still contested, not only in the region but also by sectors of the occupied populations. In late 2014, the CIA estimated that between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters are defending the Islamic State’s holdings in Iraq and Syria, but other estimates put the figure as high as 200,000 fighters. This expansion has to be related to the context of failed repressive states in this area as well as ideological differences. Undoubtedly, IS and its franchises operate in different countries, thereby becoming a global phenomenon – so much so, that more than 6,000 Europeans, including 1,500 French citizens, have gone to fight in Syria. Many of these European recruits are of Muslim origin but some are converts to Islam. In the interview below, François Burgat offers his thoughts about the motivations leading Europeans to join IS.

SH: IS has brought new political imagination to the region: abolishing borders, empire building, etc. Do you think this is something that attracts young people?

FB: Yes, definitely. Although the sources of attraction are numerous and diverse, we can nevertheless point to the most common ones. To clarify the spectrum of motivations, I suggest two categories: “negative” motivations, which involve the rejection of the milieu of origin, such as France, and “positive” ones that draw individuals into the world of the Islamic State.

Before exploring these positive and negative motivations further, let me first consider alternative explanations for the appeal of IS – explanations that draw on “ideological” or “religious” variables and pin all the blame on “radical Islam,” which supposedly comes into play when youth are “contaminated” by reading a page of Sayyid Qutb or through encountering this or that “radical” Imam in the depths of some suburb or, more frequently, on the web.

In my view, this (Islamic) vocabulary can accelerate the process of radicalization, but it cannot explain personal transformation. The world history of radicalization has demonstrated that rebels’ vocabulary should not be confused with the origins of their rebellion. Regardless of religion or dogma, those who want to rebel have always found symbolic resources, religious or profane, through which they can express and justify their actions. “Islamological” interpretations of jihadist violence are popular in the West because identifying guilt in the Islamic faith allows observers (as non-Muslims), to deny any responsibility. Behind these arguments is often a “pedagogic illusion,” suggesting that the jihadists did not read the “right sura” or did not read it “thoroughly enough,” or did not understand what they read – all of which implies that the disastrous effects of radicalism in the Islamic world, and the globe more widely, could be eliminated through perfecting the religious education of a few million Muslims. I don’t have to explain the limitations of such an approach.

SH: Let’s return to the “negative” motivations to which you alluded at the beginning.

FB: “Negative” motivations are explanations that focus on the jihadist’s feeling of being “globally rejected,” fueling their own “global rejection” of the society in which they grew up. Among these Jihadists, a minority often suffer socio-economic failure or the difficulties of adaptation to adult life, often specifically related to challenges of being of North African or “Islamic” origin in countries of Europe. Simply put, many French jihadists move to Syria as a political reaction to individual or collective stigmatization: unequal education, unequal job opportunities, discrimination by the police or the law, and so on. However – and we talk less about this – these inequalities also reflect a lack of political representation at two levels. That the system of elective representation falls short is obvious when we look at statistics, but there are also the more harmful systematic restrictions on freedom of expression, especially on mainstream media. Moreover, these biases are aggravated by the media giving prominence to “official” and deeply unrepresentative Islamic “figures.”

These two layers of pernicious political domination began in the colonial era. First, the subjugated populations were silenced, and then they acquired an illusory sense of national belonging through false representatives, who accepted the terms of colonial domination. Two decades ago, in 1995, at the time of the Algerian Civil War, I interviewed young French Muslims who summed up the hardships of “coexistence” in such a discriminatory environment: “When French television talks about Algeria, Palestine or Islam, we are forced to switch channels! And, believe me, Monsieur, we switch channels so often our fingers hurt!” This programmed revulsion against immigrants and their descendants can take more blatantly offensive forms, such as spitting and other forms of aggression directed at wives and sisters for wearing a veil.

SH: Can you now say more about the “positive” appeal of the Islamic State?

FB: Yes, the need for citizens to break with the world that denies them their human aspirations is necessarily accompanied by more positive motivations. Even for Muslims who are perfectly integrated, both in economic and social terms, there are motivations that sometimes increase or merely replace negative motivations, triggering radical involvement first in the Syrian conflict and then in its interna-
tional aftermath. Historically, jihadist involvement proceeds from transnational ideological or denominational solidarity. Among their most important reasons, many partisans cite the desire to help their religious brothers who, in their view – which is to some extent understandable – have been abandoned by the West and massacred by barrels of explosives dropped from Assad’s helicopters. From the perspective of European history, these transnational and infra-state solidarities are not unique; consider the solidarity expressed in support of Spanish Republicans in 1936, which supported the formation of “international brigades” and included some famous Frenchmen. Or consider the Frenchman Régis Debray (former special advisor to President François Mitterand) who joined the Bolivian guerrilla movement. We hear little about the several hundred Christian citizens, many of them French, who fought alongside the Falangists in the Lebanese Civil War. We might also consider French citizens who enlist in the Israeli Army, even as it acts outside international law in the occupied territories.

Yet beyond expressing some kind of humanitarian solidarity, I think IS draws much of its appeal from the fact that it represents a utopia, a kind of free “Sunniland” that echoes what Khomeini’s Iran offered Shiites – a place (at least as IS perceives it) which gives Muslims the chance to live their religion according to their interpretation, with none of the obstacles found in their country of origin. Moreover, this is a world in which targets of Islamophobia can be defended by violent means if necessary, and, even more to the point, they can retaliate, on equal terms, against the military and symbolic violence, whether of bombs or cartoons.

Official accounts miss this wider context. Interpretations of the Paris attacks of January 7th are too narrowly confined to the victims who were shot by the Kalashnikovs of the “terrorists.” Governments and the media ignored those killed by the Israeli F-16s, the French Rafale fighter jets or the US drones. This is why we must “zoom out” and consider the “broader” spatial and temporal dimensions of this confrontation. In order to understand how negative emotions can lead to radicalism we must, therefore, situate these dynamics in an international and historical perspective. Only then can we perceive how they follow deep political fractures that date back to colonial times. Recently, they have been reopened by French unilateral policies, conducted directly or through alliances with third parties like Israel or the United States, in countries such as Mali or Iraq, the Gaza Strip or Yemen.

Nothing would have happened in Paris without these earlier conflicts and conquests that are nonetheless systematically absent in most “analyses” focusing solely on sociological variables. Let me conclude: fifteen years after the 9/11 attacks, what has sociology taught us about such attacks? I would say… almost nothing.
In the early twentieth century, the founding father of the social sciences in the Netherlands drew a line between sociology and anthropology. While anthropology would study the “less advanced” peoples, sociology would focus on the social organization of the “more advanced” societies – who all happened to be located in the West. This clear divide, however, soon proved all too simple.

From the seventeenth century onwards the Netherlands had built up a colonial empire; ruling overseas territories required knowledge of the social structures and culture...
of their population. Living in large-scale, multi-stratified and literate societies such as the East Indies, they were called natives rather than aboriginals (a label reserved for small and stateless tribal bands roaming around in their remote and unwieldy habitat as our primitive ancestors). The initial idea that colonies were for the benefit of the metropole, justifying the draining away of any surplus that could be tapped, had to be rephrased. Colonialism came to be portrayed as a civilizing mission.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, foreign domination was justified as guardianship, helping colonies to progress; the famous *mise en valeur* thesis promised to bring value where it was absent. The role of the Dutch colonial sociologist became similar to that of the British government anthropologist in colonial Africa: to advise authorities on the impact of policies, or to offer advice on how to keep the rising fervor of the Islamic movement in check, how to find out who was behind social revolts or, the question which obsessed colonial policy makers, how to make Javanese peasants imbibe the spirit of capitalism. The civilizing mission proclaimed that “where the natives are now, we were once; what we are now they are bound to become.” In order to realize the pledge of imitative transformation, the colonized mass had to be cut loose from their own past and identity, and recast as people without history.

Was the white man’s burden lifted when the freedom struggle put an end to colonial rule in the mid-twentieth century? Arguing that any scientific wisdom gathered on native custom and lore in the faraway domains should not be wasted, Dutch politicians authorized a few universities – Leiden and Amsterdam in particular – to establish chairs and courses in what was termed “non-western” sociology, dealing with the complex societies of former colonies. It was an odd label, since it declared what these societies were not but might become, passing through a route described as transitional. Seen as a separate discipline, “non-western sociology” was ranked between anthropology (devoted to tribal societies in such places as Papua New Guinea and Surinam) on the one hand and (western) sociology on the other hand. Unique to the Netherlands, it was actually an expression of parochialism, denying the universalizing agenda of scholarship put forward by thinkers like Weber, Tönnies or Durkheim.

This western-centric bias allowed practitioners of sociology to turn their backs on what came to be understood as the third world: they could restrict their craft to the
study of “modern” society in the global North. The civilizing mission endured, however, in the postcolonial era, expressed in a formal commitment to help “backward” countries in their attempt to catch up with “lead” nations. The awkward designation “non-western” – which put very diverse peoples and cultures under one heading – was now replaced by a more appealing manifesto, which aimed to promote development where it had failed to emerge, in the global South, and which gave rise to a development sociology, engaged in mapping how the rest of the world, home to the majority of mankind, would fare in the passage considered evolutionary from an agrarian-rural to an industrial urban way of life.

Meanwhile the domain of anthropology had also changed. “Our living ancestors” were no more. If not wiped out in the remote niches of Australia, Asia, Africa and the Americas when opened up in the march of progress, they were incorporated in larger state formations, losing whatever autonomy they tried tenaciously to retain. But with a different research method than sociology, anthropologists moved on, finding other sites to practice what they called “fieldwork,” coming close to the people under their lens, seeking their company and thus becoming familiar with what they were up to.

But how to draw the dividing line with sociology? The professor of anthropology at the University of Amsterdam, where I opted for Asian studies in the late 1950s, proposed that anthropology should concentrate on tradition, while modernity would be the preoccupation of sociology. That line of demarcation turned out to be a non-starter from the very beginning because it was impossible to nail down distinctive features on either side of that divide. The essential quest for both disciplines remains why, how and with what consequences processes of change evolve. They both discuss the relationship between past and present, rather than reifying the contrast opposing traditional to modern.

When I was nominated professor of comparative sociology at my alma mater in 1987 – I did not want a chair going under the name of “non-western” or “development” studies – a senior colleague and I together set up the Amsterdam School for Social Science Research (ASSR), with a PhD program that aimed to bring together sociology, anthropology and social history to promote research in a historical perspective on the dynamics of globalization. Although our academic exploits were quite successful, we were unable to persuade either the national sponsoring agency or the Board of the Amsterdam University to provide adequate funding for the program. Due to this critical lack of support, the ASSR was phased out and restructured as the Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research. The teaching staff in our faculty are split into two departments, sociology and anthropology, each with its own research profile.

Has the classical pair fallen apart again? By and large yes, since their respective focus is on the West and the Rest, the latter-day synonym for “more” and “less” advanced. The return to separation is messy on many counts but mainly because the societal and geo-political distinction between front-runners and latecomers makes nowadays even less sense than it did earlier on. The hallowed trajectory of transformation, spelling out how the lesser developed nations will catch up with the developed ones, has been obliterated. The Rest does not follow the West in many ways – and who knows, the direction and pace of change might well prove to be the other way round.

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The Third ISA Forum’s theme, formulated by the Forum President Markus Schulz, reads, “The Futures We Want: Global Sociology and the Struggles for a Better World.” The Forum’s location is an apt setting for this theme: Austrian sociology has long sought to combine scientific impact with social commitment.

In the 1930s, after the roaring '20s had bandaged the pain of the First World War, the Depression hit Austrian society. Together with statistician Hans Zeisel, Marie Jahoda and Paul Lazarsfeld conducted the famous “Marienthal Study,” which examined the impact of mass unemployment in the village of Marienthal after a factory shutdown. In the introduction to the study’s first German edition, Marie Jahoda explained the researchers’ intentions: first, to contribute to solving the problem of unemployment in Marienthal, and second, to offer an objective analysis of a societal situation — in this order. These intentions still guide Austrian sociology: systematic scientific endeavors dealing with societal problems.

In the foreword to a later edition, Paul Lazarsfeld noted that in addition, the researchers had also sought to develop new methods in the Marienthal study: they measured villagers’ walking speed, distributed time sheets, asked pupils to write essays on their wishes, used statistical data of the library on rented books and had families keep records of their meals.

In the context of the Forum theme, it is worth noting that the Marienthal researchers did not make any value judgments about the future, nor did they invent alternative futures. But the study offers one model of how to “struggle for a better world”: it provided a clearer understanding of a social problem which needed to be solved. Showing the consequences of unemployment for individuals as well as for the community, the study detailed the destruction of patterns of daily life and the path to resignation. The detailed account of this societal issue made policymakers’ responsibility unmistakable.

The scientific community in Vienna was also shaped by another group, the Vienna Circle. Rudolf Carnap and other advocates of logical positivism, including the statistician Otto Neurath, were influential in spreading sociological knowledge to the public — a common pattern in Austrian sociolo-
Together with the artist Gert Arntz, Neurath invented pictorial statistics, and founded Vienna’s “Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum” (Museum of Society and Economy), to disseminating social statistics to the public. The museum still exists today.

The Vienna Circle’s logical positivism is only one thread running through Austrian sociology, however. Karl Popper’s critical rationalism added another perspective. His famous book, The Open Society and Its Enemies, was an energetic polemic against “closed” communist societies. Leaving aside some of the book’s outbursts, Popper’s political argument is very clear: societies have to remain open to the future, but they all have, and will have, history. Any endeavor to close societies against external influences and build an ideal world – however humane the intention might be – leads to totalitarianism. That cannot be one of the “futures we want.”

The twentieth century’s two world wars had a tremendous impact on Austrian science and that of Central and Eastern Europe. After World War II Austrian sociology started from scratch, and it was not until the 1960s that a sociological department was founded at the University of Vienna. Initially, most sociologists explored social problems such as urban housing, the situation of youth and generational relations as their main research areas. Austrian sociologists researched and coordinated reports for the government on the situation of the family and care in an aging society. From the 1970s, more researchers analyzed the problems of migration, advising policymakers on new approaches. Social structural analysis about inequality and stratification were essential fields of research. Sociological studies continue to receive a great deal of public attention, and are often discussed in newspapers.

In recent decades, perhaps the defining characteristic of Austrian sociology has been a broad commitment to studying social problems, systematically applying scientific sociological methods. I expect the future of Austrian sociology to be very much in this tradition as can be seen in the blog of the ISA Forum:
http://isaforum2016.univie.ac.at/blog/

The integration of scientific knowledge with social impact raises questions closely connected to the theme of the third ISA Forum: What futures do we want? And how can we struggle for them?

I begin with the second question: How do we struggle? It is my personal opinion that sociologists should struggle as sociologists: systematically, scientifically, analytically, with the emancipatory interest once claimed by Jürgen Habermas. For sociologists, struggles for a better world have to involve struggles for improving sociological methods and theories, in order to understand social problems.

This leads to the first question: What futures do we want? While we can name social problems of our current society – extensive inequality, and disparities or differential access to resources, to name just two – it would be dangerous to describe an ideal future free of such problems. Ideal societies are always totalitarian, especially when a group of people – even sociologists – claim to know the truth.

Rather than asking for specific futures, perhaps sociologists should declare, as Karl Popper might have said, we want futures that are open to change, societies that have a continuing history.

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The US and Cuba: Making Up Is Hard To Do

by Luis E. Rumbaut, Cuban American Alliance, Washington D.C., USA and Rubén G. Rumbaut, University of California, Irvine, USA

What has become of the Cuban Revolution? Statue of José Martí gazes on the image of Che Guevara across the Plaza de la Revolución in Havana.

In a thirteen-minute address last December, President Barack Obama dismissed as a failure 53 years of a policy designed to strangle Cuba’s economy. The United States – or, at least, its Executive Branch – was ready to try a new approach, restoring diplomatic relations with an eye to becoming good neighbors and trade partners. To paraphrase José Martí, Cuba’s national hero and great intellectual of the late 19th century, negotiations had to be carried out in silence, for entrenched interests could have scuttled peace talks even before they began.

Suddenly, those interests were exposed as parochial and self-serving. The danger of counter-revolution was nothing compared to the threat posed by US corporations, which had been watching companies from around the world establishing themselves in Cuba, especially in tourism. Much more was possible: agriculture, cattle, light industry, tools, consumer goods, construction, housing and transportation, even joint ventures in high-tech biomedicine.

Today, businesses big and small support the president. More and more people travel under newly-relaxed rules.
More and more Cuban immigrants and visitors now take for granted the freedom to travel between Miami and Havana. Miami’s hard-liners are mostly as old as Fidel and Raúl; new arrivals, who did not experience the loss of wealth at the beginning of the revolution, are taking their place. Today, the new policy looks like an unstoppable wave.

But, while the possibilities are immense, so are the complications on the road to normalization. Restoring diplomatic relations is only the first step.

> The Updated Cuban Model

Years ago, before Obama’s announcement, Cuba began to debate a new and necessary economic approach. The discussions led to comprehensive guidelines involving grants of unused land, the legalization of small businesses, new autonomies for state enterprises, and support for agricultural and non-agricultural cooperatives.

Undoubtedly, Cuba must succeed definitively in generating much more food, substituting purchases abroad with home-grown foodstuffs. The all-important small farmers and cooperatives should see their incomes rise, creating a demand from new urban industries. With improved services and rising salaries, the people will enjoy much better material circumstances. But while that is the projection, the results so far are uneven. A host of factors complicate the picture, including the availability of basic agricultural inputs; dependable transportation between the countryside and the cities; refrigeration for produce; sufficient boxes and sacks; farm machinery and fuels and many other upgrades in a system long held back by inadequate infrastructure.

Cuban entrepreneurs are often inefficient, lacking skills in such aspects as small-business management, contracting, and general accounting – important not only for fiscal health but also for tax collection, a relatively new concern as the state shrinks and the private sector expands.

The state sector – which will remain dominant, especially in sugar, tourism, mines, oil and refineries, health, biomedicine, education, trains, air travel – must also improve productivity. Cuba faces also two unusual challenges: the need to consolidate the existing currencies (peso and convertible peso), and the aging of its population.

The first has long been a popular demand. The government is moving gradually, recognizing that citizens who now use primarily the non-convertible peso may find the stronger convertible currency out of their reach. The influx of dollars and goods from abroad – especially South Florida – affects households differently depending on whether they have supportive relatives abroad.

The aging of Cuba’s population is not unique, but it creates unique challenges. Cuba’s medical advances mean its people live longer than they did decades ago; but the emigration of well-prepared young people complicates the picture, as does urbanization. Decreasing percentages of young workers especially complicate the new land-use plans: agriculture needs youths, including those educated in agronomy, soil management, marketing, and related fields. Between the 2002 and 2012 censuses Cuba’s population declined for the first time since Cuba’s war of independence in the nineteenth century. The drop was due to low fertility and emigration; during this decade over 330,000 Cubans received legal permanent residence in the US.

While Cuba’s new economic plans involve efforts to raise agricultural productivity, new small businesses, improved management in state enterprises, the new port at Mariel, open (and potentially massive) tourism from the United States, and freer trade with all countries, should also contribute to a new prosperity.

> The Continuing Interests of the US

The United States’ policy shift stems not from kindness, but from broader concerns. Much has changed in
the region, including the success of organizations such as ALBA-TCP, Unasur, and Celac – none of which involve the United States, a sharp change from the past, when no inter-American organization could have avoided offering a place of honor to the United States. At the same time, Russia and especially China make inroads in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Traditional allies have resented the United States’ insistence that they accede to US policy on Cuba; at the United Nations last year, only Israel voted in favor of the blockade. The United States could not do away with Cuba. To the contrary, Cuba garnered respect and gratitude from countries around the world. Cuba won that battle, although peace is not assured.

The United States will likely pursue its goals of transforming Cuba into a dependent neoliberal island one way or another. That prediction holds irrespective of the party or president in power in Washington, and even if US corporations were to find profitable trade opportunities.

> The Elections of 2016 and 2018

What lies ahead? Obama’s presidency ends in 2016. It is possible for the Republicans to take the White House as well as both houses of Congress. The Republicans could take the White House; most of their current presidential candidates hew to regime change in Cuba as a promise unfulfilled. The Democrats have their own Congressional hard-liners; their leading presidential candidate, a committed neoliberal and practitioner of “soft power,” has said that she would return Latin America and the Caribbean to what they looked like during the years of her husband’s terms in office, before Hugo Chávez’s election in Venezuela. The federal legislation mandating the blockade can be undone only by a majority vote of the House and Senate.

In 2018, Cuba should have a new President, most likely the current First Vice-President, Miguel Díaz-Canel. He will take over the conduct of the new economy as well as the new society. He has declared that Cuba will continue to be socialist, even if market forces have space to operate and a new entrepreneurial class consolidates its standing.

Many countries are hoping for a reconciliation of the superpower and the stubborn island. It’s possible. The new policies – political, in the US, economic, in Cuba – favor the onset of an era of mutually-beneficial relations, but 55 years of disagreements are not soon forgotten.

For now, we know one thing: The US and Cuba will remain 90 miles away from each other.
Since 1959, the Cuban revolution has been dedicated to racial equality. In a country where slavery was abolished only in 1886, the revolution offered many black Cubans their first access to land and education, through the new universal egalitarian policies, and an explicit commitment to eliminating racial discrimination. Even critical scholars argue that though it falls short of racial democracy, Cuba has done more than any other society to eradicate racial inequality.

Yet since Cuba’s “Special Period” began in the early 1990s, resources have been severely limited. Market-oriented reforms have come at the price of rising inequalities, which are not color-blind: racial tensions have increased substantially. To counter this trend, several black artists and public intellectuals have created a vibrant anti-racist activist scene, partly attached to the government-sponsored “Regional Afro-descendant Articulation of Latin America and the Caribbean, Cuban Chapter” (abbreviated in Spanish to ARAAC).

It was at one of ARAAC’s events, that the interviewer, Luisa Steur, first met Norberto Mesa Carbonell – a sixty-year-old black man, leaning forward on his chair, eyes brimming with political passion. The following are excerpts from several long interviews in late 2014 and early 2015. Luisa Steur is from the University of Copenhagen and does research in Cuba. A longer version of this interview is available at Global Express: http://isa-global-dialogue.net/?p=4222

Norberto Mesa Carbonell.

**LS: Norberto, can you tell us a bit about yourself?**

**NMC:** Politically I am complicated. One of the revolution’s first great campaigns was the Cuban Literacy Campaign (1961); I had barely turned ten when I began to teach others to read and write! In 1963, when hurricane Flora swept over the island, I was thirteen, with a brigade picking coffee in Oriente. I wasn’t even sixteen in May, 1966, when there was a big military mobilization: we were there, behind the canons, waiting for American boats! That is to say, I was brought up with the practice of revolution. On the other hand, I read a lot. I was a leader of my worker group, organizer of a party cell.
The revolution meant a lot in my life. But something happened in 1980 that made me leave the party. During the “Mariel boatlift,” many poor people, many blacks, were leaving Cuba, because of poverty. We were supposed to treat them as traitors, to throw eggs at them. I found myself in a meeting where a young comrade was being criticized because he refused to participate. They expelled him! Leaving that meeting I was thinking, if my brother left on a boat, and people wanted to treat him like that, as scum, they’d have to fight me first. And so, I decided to send in a letter requesting my resignation. It was a question of conscience.

The revolution has achieved many positive things, including for blacks. That’s why I continue appealing to the governing institutions, sending them public letters; unlike political dissidents, I still think positively about those institutions. And I’ve stayed a revolutionary according to Fidel’s definition. The majority of blacks are with the Revolution – it’s logical, given all the revolution has brought to black people. But that’s not to say we should be “grateful” forever.

So when the 1990s came, with growing inequalities, including racial inequalities, we created the Cofradía de la Negritud [Brotherhood of Negritude] to fight racial discrimination. What is threatening about the Cofradía is that we cannot be labeled political dissidents. We work within the socialist discourse, even though we’re critical: we simply don’t want socialism with racial discrimination! Our struggle calls on the Communist Party to confront the problem of racism in Cuba. So long as the party doesn’t explicitly take up the problem, all other institutions will be hesitant to act.

**LS: What are the major problems related to racism in Cuba today? And have you experienced any of them yourself?**

**NMC:** Organizations of black people have often been repressed, accused of being “racist.” Blacks have had little chance to form a positive identity. You can see it in this idea of adelantar (moving forward), which means marrying a white person, getting rid of blackness! This whitening ideal limits the extent to which people can identify with their racial condition. It makes it difficult to confront the most serious racial problems today, which are about blacks being excluded from well-paid positions in the Cuban economy.

I have some first-hand experience. For years I worked at the Marina Hemingway. I started there in 1997, when a neighbor of mine became the boss of the shops there. So I asked whether there was a job for me – after all, we were from the same village, we had worked together before. And by then I had experience at the reception of international hotels, plus I spoke English. So he said, “Norberto, I’m going to help you, but listen, what are you saying about working at the reception or in the shops? That’s not possible. I’ll put you to work in the storehouse because here in the Marina Hemingway, blacks don’t work in contact with the public.” And that was someone who used to be a party leader! I needed the job so I said, “Ah, yes, the storehouse, why not…”

After a while, I heard they were looking for porters and I managed to secure a position. There were five of us – two who had some higher-up backing and felt secure, while myself and two others, all three of us black, actually had been studying English. But who were the first to be sent for re-training when the hotel didn’t need so many porters? Of course, we three blacks, who actually spoke English! I was sent to be trained as a security guard. I remember entering the place we were sent. There are few blacks in the tourism sector, but there, where they send excess staff for retraining, it was at least 60% black!

But things got worse: they laid me off, totally illegally. I complained to the union but nothing happened. I decided to file a complaint on the basis of the violation of the right to equality, established in the Penal Code. I went to a lawyers bureau first; from there I was sent to the municipal Prosecutors Office, who eventually sent me to the police station. I remember telling the official that I wanted to make a grievance regarding the right to equality. She looked at me with total incomprehension: “violation of the right to equality??” “Yes compañera, I want to accuse the hotel manager of racial discrimination!” She was dumbstruck. The head of the unit took my complaint – and they started an investigation! The hotel was full of commotion: the police investigator took it seriously and the manager of the hotel was transferred to another hotel. But eventually I received a letter from the prosecutor stating that the subject of my complaint did not constitute a criminal offense; no appeal was possible. And that’s where it died.

Cubatur were looking to hire tourist guides. I went running; with my hotel experience and English I was perfectly qualified! I was told the manager was not in, come back tomorrow. The third day, I was waiting for the manager when two young white men came in, talking about the job I had been waiting for. Suddenly the manager appeared to be in! When I wanted to join the two boys inside I was told there were no places left.

These problems exist with all the better jobs in Cuba. Most of my life I worked as a geneticist at one of Cuba’s most advanced dairy enterprises, raising Holstein cows. At the beginning, when I was at high-ranking meetings and noticed almost all the other attendants were white, I didn’t think much of it. Nowadays I pay more attention. Too many times I’ve seen blacks, well-qualified for their jobs, getting replaced by whites. This happened in the last job I held at Cuba’s prestigious bio-pharmaceutical enterprise: they were trying to get rid of all the black professionals – and of me all the more because of my activism. Many of my black
colleagues left because of harassment. In the end I chose to take early retirement.

Last year our organization wrote an open letter to the CTC (the Worker’s Central Union of Cuba), asking them to denounce this racism but did they do something? Nothing. We need the party to take leadership and acknowledge the problem exists. As long as that doesn’t happen, no other civil society organization will talk about it. “Building a prosperous and sustainable socialism” is the order of the day. “Prosperous and sustainable,” great – but what about racism?! All these new economic reforms, attracting foreign investment, increasing cuentapropismo (small entrepreneurship) – all this is bound to worsen racial inequality in this country.

LS: Does the economic problem of racism in Cuba mostly concern more skilled, more educated black workers?

NMC: The main problem of racism in Cuba is poverty. Many black youngsters cannot go to university. Instead of studying, many take small jobs simply to keep the family afloat. How is it possible that we bring almost a thousand Pakistani youngsters here to study to become doctors, paying for their education, but we can’t provide the five thousand poor Cuban youngsters who need money to study? This revolution was supposed to be “by the humble, for the humble” – and now only those families with money can let their children study?

You know that in Cuba there are thousands of acres full of weeds, because people don’t want to work on the land. At the same time, we have all these people who migrated to the cities but cannot find a proper place to live. My suggestion is to find black families who want to move to the countryside and set up an agricultural community. Of course, they need a lot of support, inputs, a tractor, etc. Why not ask some NGOs to support this financially? Of course the Cuban state has to grant them ownership of the land. These days land is being sold all over the place, so why not?

Here in Cuba in the nineteenth century, some farms actually belonged to free blacks, particularly in the Oriente Province. Many free blacks fought in the War of Independence [against Spain] – they left their farms to join in the Liberation Army. But American companies bought up their lands, because their title deeds weren’t registered properly. What happened to those blacks? They were ready to protest of course. To reclaim their land, many of them joined the 1912 revolt in the Eastern province, led by the Partido Independiente de Color. In the ensuing repression, many of them were killed.

So this resettlement program of today is a question of historical justice – for this government to give land to these people would be a great gesture. It should be for those who want – a program of historical justice for black families, but if some whites want to join, why not? But for blacks, this is one of the few ways to improve their economic conditions.

LS: How do you yourself get by these days, how do you find the resources to organize the activities of the Cofradía?

NMC: I live on a pension paid in pesos, a few dollars, and it’s not easy. I work at night as a guard for some rich guy, for $30 a month. It’s difficult to organize with so little money – people travelling from far expect at least something to eat. Sometimes we have to postpone meetings simply because we don’t have the means and everyone is too busy “luchando” [making ends meet]. But at least people know we are doing it out of sincerity, not because of ulterior motives. And we will continue, that’s for sure. I cannot think of my grandchildren facing the same problems that I faced or worse, falling back to where we were before the revolution.

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An ambiguous commentary on the place of racism in Cuba today. “Agua blanca, agua negra,” [white water, black water] written on the water tanks above Callejón de Hamel in Central Havana, as part of a community art initiative to recognize Afro-Cuban culture. Photo by Luisa Steur.
December 17, 2014, the day Obama announces that the US and Cuba will restore full relations, is a memorable day in Havana. Juan, an ex-boxer turned street sweeper and muy fidelista (very loyal to Fidel), receives the news on the half-broken television he found in the trash one day and set up in the small office of the sanitation services of this Centro Havana neighborhood. As Juan learns through fragments of Raúl Castro’s speech that all the Five Cuban Heroes are now finally free, he is overwhelmed with emotion: finally the demands supported by marches and murals all over Cuba for so many years have been fulfilled. But by the evening, when I find him back at his everyday lucha (struggle), sifting through garbage for cans that he can sell for cash, a more mundane discussion has erupted among his co-workers: could it be true that the heroes will receive back pay for all those years they were in prison when they return to Cuba? And even a car and a house? Juan’s somewhat obligatory comment that no payment would outweigh their suffering in a yanki prison is met by his co-workers’ agnostic silence.

Juan’s neighbor, Mari, watches the news on an illegal Miami channel on her employer’s flat-screen television. The broadcast focuses on the distraught daughter of a US pilot, shot down by the Cuban military after one of the Five informed the Cuban authorities of what the daughter calls a “humanitarian intervention” but Cuba considered a “terrorist attack.” Mari’s employer owns a tourist house, which Mari cleans; she urges Mari to get back to work.
“This chica,” the employer mutters, “all she does is dream of working in Mexico – she has no idea what real work, in capitalism, means.” As her employer leaves, Mari defiantly counters, “The witch – let her see how she does without me. The only reason tourists visit this house is because of me!” Optimistically she adds, with all this news, no need to go to Mexico: surely the Cuban economy will prosper again, more tourists will come, life will be brighter.

But will life be brighter for people like Juan and Mari? Like many Cubans, they assume that change will be positive. An opening of the economy will mean dollars start flowing in; standards of living will return to the pre-1989 level, when ration cards ensured adequate food, and Cuban citizens enjoyed generous health care and education opportunities. Few consider the possibility that December 17, 2014, might mark the beginning of Cuba’s post-socialist path, one marked by privatization, marketization, state transformation, or inequality.

Take Juan: as a state-employed street sweeper, he earns around 800 pesos (roughly 32 dollars) – more than his bosses in the same enterprise. But many of Juan’s bosses are busy acquiring property which they rent out to tourists (at an average of 30 dollars a night in convertible pesos); they maintain international networks, and generally turn their organizational prerogatives into lucrative extractive knots within markets. Juan’s only hope of earning extra money on the side is his rickety garbage cart, and neighbors who might pay him to clean up after an event. His ration card ensures only basic items – not vegetables or meat, nor the milk he needs to manage a chronic ulcer. After ten years in Havana, he still has no registered address; without a doctor’s prescription, he must buy omeprazole on the black market. His anxiety is intensified by rumors that the state-run municipal services will be transformed into “cooperatives,” a process that may increase salaries but will also involve shedding workers – perhaps including Juan.

Mari at least has a registered address and enough cash to keep the wheels of various socialist services turning in her family’s favor. But as a self-employed worker (cuentapropista) – a growing category in Cuba – her earnings are only 40 dollars a month, with no security, benefits, or pension. Because her employer refuses to register her, inspectors demand bribes; Mari’s employer charges those costs to Mari, reducing her pay to zero and making her entirely dependent on tourist tips. Mari and her employer argue about what attracts tourists to the house, but clearly the negotiation is structurally unequal: even with tips, Mari earns at most about 25 dollars a week, whereas her employer earns up to 50 dollars a night. Mari lives on the brink of poverty, facing the prospect of becoming old without having been able to secure a proper pension, nor savings.

These stories unfortunately resonate with Eastern Europe’s experiences after socialism ended, where new “cooperatives” left many workers dispossessed, while former state managers turned their organizational prerogatives into (quasi) property rights, enthusiastically supporting further privatization. In Cuba, a growing class of urban kulaks – the property owners who benefit from tourism and real estate deals – may well push for further deregulation, the securing of property titles, and reduced taxation, moves which would come at the expense of most ordinary workers, and could further shred the socialist safety net.

Of course, Cuba is not Eastern Europe. Cuba’s socialism was built from a real, long-awaited, patiently prepared, popularly supported revolution, not from Soviet occupation. Socialism and revolution are autochthonous in Cuba, a reality which can be seen in workers’ pride as well as in the lively populist socialist savoir vivre that marks Centro Havana. In a changing international context Cuba could perhaps embark on a new-socialist rather than post-socialist path – though for that to occur, it may be necessary to acknowledge, and publicly debate, the risks that a post-socialist trajectory may involve.

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1 I conducted fieldwork in Havana from September 2014 to January 2015, with research affiliation to the Juan Marinello Center for Cultural Research. I thank participants of the “International seminar of socio-cultural anthropology” I co-organized there (January 9-12, 2015) and guests from the IUAES (International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences) Commission on Global Transformations and Manian Anthropology for insights used in this paper. Workers figuring in the article bear pseudonyms and are partly fictionalized.
The Sunflower Movement and Taiwan’s Embattled Sociology

by Ming-sho Ho, National Taiwan University, Taiwan

In protest against a sweeping trade liberalization agreement with China, Taiwan’s university students stormed the national legislature in the evening of March 18, 2014, unexpectedly giving rise to a 24-day occupation of parliament, and a subsequent political crisis. The so-called Sunflower Movement partly inspired and was often linked to Hong Kong’s Umbrella Revolution six months later. It was arguably the largest and longest episode of collective contention in Taiwan, where activism has surged since the conservative Kuomintang regained national power in 2008. In the end, the Sunflower Movement was peacefully concluded, with the disputed free-trade agreement halted in the legislative process.

Taiwan lacks any tradition of civil disobedience, and its generally conservative political culture is not fertile ground for radical protests. Yet the Sunflower Movement enjoyed considerable popular support for, at least, three overlapping reasons: first, it sought to defend democratic procedures, demanding more transparency and oversight over international negotiations; second, it protested against free trade; and third, it expressed a nationalist mobilization against China. There are even elements of a Polanyian social protection in this unusual anti-regime protest, since the People’s Republic of China’s territorial ambition over Taiwan is now couched in terms of “encouraging cross-strait economic exchange” – an exchange generally perceived to favor big corporations at the expense of wage earners and democracy.

Taiwan’s sociological community – both professors and students – was deeply involved in this unprecedented protest. In response to the Sunflower leaders’ call for a national class boycott, sociology departments in Tsinghua, Taipei, and Sun Yat-sen Universities suspended teaching activities, defying top-level administrators and the Ministry of Education. Many professional sociologists conducted teach-ins, both around the besieged parliament and on campus. In an experimental attempt at deliberative democracy among protest participants, a number of students and teachers participated in joint discussions over free trade, youth unemployment and other topics. Many other sociology majors camped out in the besieged parliament, ranging from Chen Wei-ting (a charismatic Sunflower lead-

Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement that challenged sociology’s public role.
er from Tsinghua University) to anonymous volunteers and participants. After a unanimous on-line vote by the leaders of the Taiwanese Sociological Association, the TSA published a pro-Sunflower statement on March 25. In November, in a gesture of recognition of student activism, the TSA invited Wei Yang, a core student activist, to offer the keynote speech at its annual meeting.

To be sure, a minority of dissenting voices among Taiwanese sociologists frowned upon professorial involvement. When the TSA newsletter published a piece arguing against political participation on the grounds of “value neutrality,” it was countered by a pro-participation discussion on the contemporary relevance of this Weberian concept. Importantly, this debate about sociology’s mission and public role demonstrated the discipline’s health and vitality.

The high-profile engagement of Taiwan’s sociological community naturally attracted a backlash from conservatives. A Kuomintang lawmaker later publicly decried sociologists for “doing nothing except inciting the students to take the streets” and requested the Minister of Education to look into sociology departments in public universities. Such defamation prompted an immediate response, and many students and teachers wrote op-ed pieces to defend sociology’s critical spirit – a precious occasion for public assertion of the discipline’s importance. A wave of protest phone calls to sociology departments proved more annoying, because most of the callers refused to identify themselves and used abrasive language, amounting to harassment of the office staff. The sociology department of Sun Yat-sen University received a self-identified parent’s call condemning the faculty’s decision to suspend regular teaching which, he claimed, had hurt the future of his daughter who was said to graduate in three months. (In fact, that department was only recently established, and it had no majors who were in their fourth year at the time of the protests.)

On balance, the Sunflower Movement’s immediate impact on Taiwanese sociology is almost certainly beneficial. With our teach-ins, deliberative democracy, and op-ed writing, the public visibility of our discipline was enhanced. Increasing numbers of participating students are now interested in sociology because its conceptual tools are well-suited for exploring how power is maintained, exercised and challenged in contemporary society. Applicants to the National Taiwan University’s graduate program in Sociology doubled in 2015, and many applicants cited their personal experience during the Sunflower Movement as the main motive for pursuing advanced study.

While we cannot know the long-term impact of the Sunflower Movement, past experience can serve as a rough guide. The Wild Lily Movement of 1990, a successful pro-democracy student-initiated protest, drew an influx of new blood into our discipline. Many ex-student activists are now professional sociologists in their mid-forties and early fifties. Their teaching and research gave rise to the engaged and embattled characteristics of Taiwanese sociology. Similarly, in time, the Sunflower generation is sure to reshape the contours of our discipline.

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> Which Comes First?
Labor or Environmental Movement?

by Hwa-Jen Liu, National Taiwan University, Taiwan and Treasurer of ISA Research Committee on Labor Movements (RC44)

On November 13, 1970, Korean textile worker Chun Tae-Il led a ten-man demonstration protesting dire working conditions, demanding “a nine-hour workday with four days off a month.” As the confrontation came to an end, Chun set himself on fire, shouting, “We are not machines! Enforce the labor code.” Chun’s self-immolation and the struggles it inspired heralded a budding democratic union movement and exposed deep capital-labor conflicts under the development scheme master-minded by the military junta.

Four months earlier, in Taiwan, 95 Taiwanese farmers demanded financial compensation and the relocation of a nearby food-processing facility which had discharged liquid toxins directly into the local irrigation system, causing crop damage to their fields two years in a row. This episode, along with the 64 similar petitions, picketing, and confrontational actions that took place in the same year, marked the first peak of Taiwan’s antipollution mobilization, which aimed to curb unlimited industrial expansion promoted by the developmental state.

Neither Chun’s protest nor the Taiwanese farmers’ demands were isolated incidents and they, therefore, raise the following conundrum. Similarities in colonial heritage, authoritarian rule, and rapid industrialization >>
produced similarly harsh working conditions and a degraded environment in both countries. Yet the movements evolved in very different directions. Although Korea’s labor movement and Taiwan’s environmental movement began to take shape at the same time, it would take another decade before Korea’s environmental degradation and Taiwan’s labor plights aroused the same level of public passion. Given the structural similarities between Taiwan and Korea, why did the sequence of their labor and environmental movements unfold in reverse order?

The secret lies in the realization, and the limits, of two types of movement power – the particular characteristics that give each movement the ability to influence the world – in the context of developmental states and corporate economies. Organized labor’s leverage rests on the indispensable role of workers in the system of production and service delivery. By withholding labor power, workers prevent the capitalists from realizing profit. By contrast, the environmental movement does not have any organizational leverage but relies on the discursive ability to persuade the public of a new ideology, based on its claim to be working toward universal and collective good.

Although, in the 1980s, the Korean and Taiwanese states were both authoritarian, they nonetheless adopted different strategies in dealing with social movements: the Korean state adopted heavy repression and the Taiwanese state cunning incorporation. These differential strategies were successful in containing Korea’s environmental movement and Taiwan’s labor movement, but Korea’s labor movement found a way of dealing with repression just as Taiwanese farmers were able to respond to cooptation.

When Korea’s labor was heavily repressed and its grievances were unaddressed, unionists found loopholes to strengthen organizational infrastructures and build solidarity among workers; repression could not stop them from pursuing their leverage power. When Taiwan’s seemingly-almighty government failed to resolve problems linked to rampant environmental pollution, pollution victims and environmental advocates learned to petition higher administrative levels, taking up confrontational actions, and discussing their cause with whoever was willing to listen, including media outlets. The result was a broad dissemination of environmental ideas and gradual accumulation of ideological power. Ironically, even though the political context might still prevent successful movement outcomes, especially in the beginning, the context nevertheless favored particular types of strategies. This way the Korean labor movement consolidated its power of leverage while the Taiwanese environmental movement developed its ideological capacities and hence the early emergence of the different movements.

Once the two early-riser movements had established themselves as the prevailing oppositional forces, they set in motion national patterns for generating movement power. Korea’s labor movement left a legacy of uncompromising militancy and self-organization, while Taiwan’s environmentalists continued to rely on strategies involving pragmatism, political negotiations, and compromises. The subsequent movements – an environmental movement would follow labor movement in Korea and a labor movement would follow environmental movement in Taiwan – borrowed from and reacted to these “early-riser templates” for their organizational and cultural strategies.

This comparison reveals two sharply distinct movement trajectories structured around movement power. In both countries, labor movements enhanced their leverage by organizing strategic industries such as auto, petrochemical, postal services, and shipbuilding; both environmental movements maximized ideological power by mastering the art of public relations campaigns and grabbing news headlines.

Yet power maximization came at a price. Organized labor was tainted by claims that it represented a “labor aristocracy,” which cost it popular support. Its support base was further eroded when capital relocated plants,
eliminated lifelong employment guarantees, and deployed “unorganizable” immigrant and contingent workers.

Meanwhile in both countries, as environmental protection became part of public discourse, new and powerful contenders surfaced. Governmental environmental protection agencies, environmental consulting firms and private think tanks all jumped in to challenge the movements’ monopoly of environmental discourses. Further, both Taiwan’s and Korea’s environmental movements have continued to lose battles against corporate power, in part because their ecological visions have failed to include concerns about the economic survival of the poor and disadvantaged.

During crises, both labor and environmental movements have worked to acquire a second source of power, compensating for the limitations of their original advantage. Thus, labor movements sought to articulate their concerns in terms of a broad public interest, while environmental movements have tried to build greater leverage to counter corporate supremacy.

It is also at the moment of crisis that the possibility of a genuine labor-environment alliance increased, as both sides began to empathize with and appreciate each other’s predicament and accumulated skills. Labor in both cases has proved itself strong at grassroots organizing but weak in discursive production, whereas the environmental movement has tended to be stronger at discursive production and less strong in grassroots organizing. Each movement possesses a specific set of skills and natural talents that its counterpart lacks and needs.

This cross-movement comparison underscores the mutual complementarity of labor and environmental movements. Using “movement power” as a guiding concept to reorient the discussions on movement emergence, sequences, and trajectories, the cases of Taiwan and Korea reveal the basis of labor-environmental alliances. The comparison should prompt academics and activists alike to reassess the past and the future of labor and environmental movements, two forces that have significantly shaped social life – and our image of the future – in modern times.1

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1 A more extended argument can be found in Leverage of the Weak: Labor and Environmental Movements in Taiwan and South Korea, 2015, University of Minnesota Press.
Taiwan’s fertility rate is now one of the lowest in the world. Raising their ever-more precious and vulnerable children, Taiwanese parents are constantly advised by expert opinions, often translated from the West, to attend to children’s needs and emotions. Why do parents nowadays face even more intensified pressure, anxiety, and uncertainty, despite expanded access to cultural resources and market services? My research explores this conundrum based on school observation, discourse analysis, and in-depth interviews with parents from more than 50 families across the socioeconomic spectrum.

The nexus between parenting and class inequality has long been a critical topic in sociology, but the literature generally suffers from what Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller called “methodological nationalism.” Scholars tend to analyze class distinction in a single society as an enclosed unit of analysis, overlooking how societies are constituted by relations of exchange with and influence upon each other.

Taiwan offers a strategic research site for global sociology, an approach which introduces geographical space as central to the formation of knowledge and provincializes the theories and concepts of Eurocentric sociology. I use parenting as an empirical lens into the ways in which globalization shapes the micro-domains of family life and class inequality. Public discourses on childrearing were dramatically transformed in post-war Taiwan, as the status of children changed from being primarily seen as laboring bodies available to serve military nationalism, to being seen as healthy bodies subject to biopolitical governance. Similarly, parents’ roles were transformed: instead of being primarily enforcers of child discipline, they were increasingly treated as recipients of parental advice.

Many analysts believe that industrialization, urbanization, and fertility decline gave birth to modern notions of child-
hood and parenthood – a view which carries undertones of modernization, treating the experience of Western modernity as a universal model and overlooking power inequalities and cultural particularities around the globe.

Other common views see a global convergence of parenthood and childhood as an example of McDonaldization under the sweeping force of global capitalism, or as the result of worldwide circulation of scientific knowledge concerning children’s development and early education. Both versions run the risk of reducing globalization to an exogenous variable while overlooking local societies’ efforts to appropriate, indigenize and hybridize global elements.

South Korean scholar Chang Kyung-Sup has used the concept “compressed modernity” to describe a socialization condition in which economic, political, social and cultural changes occur rapidly, condensing both time and space. Diverse components of multiple civilizations – traditional, modern and postmodern, and indigenous, foreign and global elements – coexist, compete, and influence each other in these societies. I propose the concept “compressed parenthood” to describe the shifting, complex, and sometimes contradictory practices of parenting in the context of compressed modernity – a pattern that can be applied to Taiwan, and also to many other regions across the global South.

This concept contains three dimensions. First, Taiwan’s condensed and abridged economic and political development – including rapid industrialization and democratization – has led to intergenerational mobility and a vibrant civil society. Middle-class parents lament their own “lost childhood” in a poorer, authoritarian Taiwan; they are determined to break with childrearing traditions, and to offer their own children more happiness and autonomy. Changing styles of childrearing under the marked influence of US culture becomes an identity marker, through which many parents highlight their families’ upward mobility and cosmopolitan engagement.

Middle-class Taiwanese parents nevertheless develop distinct orientations to the globalized future they imagine for their children. Many seek to “cultivate global competitiveness,” strategically sending their children to English-language kindergartens, elite schools, and American summer camps, hoping to cultivate their global cultural capital.

On the other hand, a growing number of parents are pursuing a contrasting strategy, seeking to “orchestrate natural growth” – prioritizing children’s “natural growth” over what they see as harmful interventions from parents and institutions. Many of these parents choose alternative education programs, adopting Western pedagogy and jet-tisoning textbooks and examinations.

We come now to the second dimension of compressed parenthood. While these cultural scripts of parenting reflect new global influences, they often conflict with the Taiwanese reality. For instance, parents are frequently advised to spend a substantial amount of time communicating and interacting with children, but most workplaces in Taiwan are not family-friendly in terms of culture and organization. Dual-earner parents depend heavily on after-school programs or kinship networks for childcare. Despite their narrative of “generational rupture,” parents must rely on grandparents who cohabitate or live nearby, to raise children together.

In addition, parents generally face a sharp disjuncture between parental values and larger institutional environments. Despite embracing notions of happy childhood, they worry about their children’s ability to survive intense competition for getting into leading high schools and universities. They are also often concerned about whether their outspoken, opinionated children will adjust well in the future, since most corporations in Taiwan are still marked by cultures of collectivism and hierarchical authority.

Finally, compressed parenthood comes in different class-specific versions: parents across the class spectrum experience globalization and compressed modernity unevenly. Globalization offers more opportunities and resources to families with sufficient economic or cultural capital; those who cannot afford to move are prone to disadvantage or marginalization.

Taiwan’s capital outflow and labor inflow in recent decades have especially affected the job security of working-class men. Many of those who are not favored by local women seek foreign brides from Southeast Asia and China and form a new type of global family. In addition, the new parenting scripts – especially new prohibitions of corporal punishment at home and increased expectations of parental participation at school – hold implicit assumptions about parents’ time flexibility and capacity to communicate with children. Working-class parents, immigrant mothers, and other socially disadvantaged parents are increasingly subject to social criticism and labeled “high-risk families.”

Temporal and spatial compression helps explains why parenthood has become such a rewarding, demanding and yet difficult project in contemporary Taiwan. Analyzed from the perspective of global sociology, Western literature tends to reduce the transformation of parenting discourses to an endogenous process and fails to examine culture-bound historical constructs of family. We need to investigate how the critical context of globalization frames parental strategies of capital accumulation, and how it shapes unequal childhoods across class and national divides.

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Taiwan has experienced great economic, political and social changes during the last three decades. However, most sociological literature on Taiwan still only focuses on its story of successful development. Conventional wisdom usually includes:

- a strong and rational “developmental state” dominated by the Kuomintang’s (KMT) authoritarian technocrats, who achieved industrial upgrading through a policy of picking winners;
- an active export-oriented (globalized) economy based on successful land reform, together with an industrial structure dominated by small-to-medium enterprises (SMEs);
- a high rate of upward mobility, resulting from small business entrepreneurship, full employment and an expanding middle class.

On the less bright side, the standard story acknowledges that Taiwan is a patriarchal society where gender discrimination, influenced by traditional Confucian culture, persists in families, education and labor market. The story usually ends with the peaceful democratic transition based on a moderate middle class (see table below).
Since 2007, however, this account of the “Taiwanese miracle” has been called into question by the Asian financial crises and the Great Recession. When the ex-authoritarian KMT elites returned to power in 2008, technocrats blamed political turmoil on democracy, and on the pro-independent policies of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government. The KMT administration pursued a more neoliberal developmental policy agenda, emphasizing expanded trade with China. Since March 2014, when public concern over increasing “China impacts” erupted into Taiwan’s greatest student movement since the 1990s, popular debates – including criticisms of Taiwan’s government’s relations with China, and of the tendency for the KMT to ally with big business while overlooking local SMEs and youth employment – have challenged the “miracle paradigm.”

Recent studies have criticized Taiwan’s “developmental state,” arguing that a conservative and corrupt political coalition served KMT authoritarianism, excluding active SMEs and Taiwanese political participation. These studies call attention to similar criticisms of China’s rapid economic development and the “authoritarian resilience” of the Communist party-state. In the context of the economic slowdown, the Chinese central and local states look more predatory than developmental. Revisiting Taiwan’s experience, a better explanation of the association between economic growth and the authoritarian strong state suggests that the former nurtured the latter, not vice versa, while Taiwan’s welfare state and citizenship regime only became political concerns after democratization.

Due to the heavy investment of Taiwan’s big business groups in China since the early 1990s, Taiwan’s industrial structure has changed dramatically. SME’s share of exported value declined from 76% to 18%. Today, 82% of Taiwan’s exports come from big companies; SME dominance has been replaced by monopoly and multinational capital. For example, the total revenue of Taiwan’s largest enterprise, the Hon-Hai (Foxconn) group, approached 21% of Taiwan’s GDP in 2013; and as Foxconn’s labor conflicts suggest, the concentration of Taiwanese capital has benefited from the exploitation of migrant workers in mainland China and from land expropriation under China’s party-state authoritarianism.

Taiwan’s changing industrial structure has also reshaped social stratification. In the 1990s, an urban middle class was composed of SME employers and skilled workers, which led to high rates of class mobility. When the economy slowed down, however, wealth and income inequality increased, and class mobility declined. As in other post-industrial societies, job security has been undermined, and both precarious jobs and the numbers of working poor have increased.

The only good news may be the mitigation of gender inequality. Gender differences in education and earnings have declined, and are now narrower than in Taiwan’s East Asian neighbors. However, labor market and family-based discrimination may not have greatly improved. Curiously, some research suggests that marriage may make women less happy. In fact, Taiwanese female employees tend to avoid marriage and pregnancy to hold on to their jobs, autonomy, and earning, which has led to a low marriage rate, a divorce rate as high as in the US, and one of the world’s lowest fertility rates.

These economic and social changes have reshaped Taiwan’s political landscape. The political science literature has usually focused on conflicts between the KMT authoritarian party-state and the indigenous civil society, but since the democratic transition of the 1990s, increasing economic inequality and generational injustice have provoked new political cleavages. Some electoral studies suggest that DPP support comes mainly from blue-collar workers and peasants (mostly males), and from younger Taiwanese with more liberal values.

Since 2008, the KMT government has tried to stimulate the economy by cooperating with China’s party-state, and encouraging collaboration between Taiwanese and Chinese big business. What Jieh-min Wu has termed the “cross-strait states-businesses coalition of authoritarian capitalism” is suspected of pursuing economic and political integration of Taiwan and China through the free trade agenda. The government has promoted this agenda through neoliberal “trickle-down” ideology, driven by an implied nostalgia for KMT authoritarianism – an agenda that has deepened tensions along Taiwan’s longstanding divisions of nationality, class, and generation.

The transformation of Taiwan belies its image as a model of development. Long viewed as the engine of the country’s growth, Taiwan’s SMEs are fading away. Big businessmen and KMT technocrats, whose strengths depended on the country’s strong state, are now the advocates of free trade and openness to China. Young Taiwanese face unemployment, downward mobility, job insecurity, and stagnant wages as well as higher tax and social insurance rates. In a book that unexpectedly became a sociological bestseller and source of ideas for the Sunflower Movement, I argue that these social changes have produced an intense generational conflict that follows the contours of a widening class division.¹ In contrast to our long-ago economic miracle, some young scholars now call for a paradigm shift in Taiwanese sociology, focusing on the social collapse that may lie in our future.


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A full account of the current status of sociology in Taiwan would be impossible; instead, I offer a few examples illustrating how sociologists "do sociology" in Taiwan. I begin with the most recent annual meeting of the Taiwan Sociological Association (TSA) in November, 2014. For the past twenty years, the association’s annual meeting has been an important community event for its members, now reaching 500. This year, the meeting, held at the National Tsing-hua University, included 64 sessions with 180 papers on topics ranging from studies of political economy to post-modern subjectivities, as well as forums on the East Asia region and on transformations in China. Special guests representing the Japanese Sociological Association and the Korean Sociological Association, as well as Chinese scholars from universities in Hong Kong, were invited to attend.

One of the most notable events of this year’s program was the opening keynote speech. In a departure from tradition, a young graduate student, Yang Wei, was asked to speak about his activism, and reflect on the campaign that occupied the Parliament building and came to be known as the “Sunflower Movement” (See Ming-sho Ho’s article in this issue). This unconventional speech reflects the general outlook of Taiwanese sociologists, many of whom have challenged traditional paradigms with serious debates about inequality, democracy, justice, and citizenship.

But, as in many places, TSA members hold divergent social and political stances, and differ in their sociological imaginations and practices. In the hallways at the annual meeting, members openly expressed opposing opinions about what appeared to be an official endorsement of the occupation movement. Some members were concerned about the danger of politicizing the association with social activism, worrying that it might drag down the organization’s professional status, and damage TSA’s identity as a scholarly association. Taiwan has had its share of debates of this nature, legacies inherited from our discipline’s early founding.

But the TSA is also important for other activities. For instance, it publishes an eminent peer-reviewed bi-annual journal, the Taiwanese Journal of Sociology, along with three newsletters, and a very popular blog site called “Streetcorner Sociology” (see the article by Hong-zen Wang in this issue), which serves as a quick venue for empirical findings and for debates on current affairs.

TSA’s membership overlaps with those of other scholarly associations, including the Taiwanese Feminist Scholars’ Association, the Cultural Studies Association, the Social Welfare Association of Taiwan, Taiwan’s STS (Science, Technology and Society) Association and so on. These “spinning” and “creolizing” relations with adjacent fields and related subject matters give intellectual energy to both sociology and the larger community of social sciences.

In the following, I describe three edited volumes published in the past ten years, to illustrate the substantive interests of Taiwanese sociologists. Each of the volumes represents a particular style: (1) the conventional or “mainstream”, (2) the “transnational” or global, and (3) the “public” type. The selection is very limited but all have been well received and can be taken to be representative of such publications.

Social Change in Taiwan, 1985—2005: Mass Communications and Political Behavior (edited by M. Chang, V. Lo and H. Shyu, 2013) represents what we might term the mainstream of Taiwanese sociology, with articles examining changing political participation and mass communications in Taiwan during the democratization period. These studies are based on national sample data collected since 1989 by the Taiwan Social Change Survey (TSCS) project. These surveys offer “snap shots” which can be used to construct over time trends in citizenship, national identity, religion, gender, family, employment, globalization and other key concepts of mainstream sociology. Since 2002 the project has also included modules from the International Social

by Mau-kuei Chang, Academia Sinica, Taiwan, and member of the ISA Research Committee on Racism, Nationalism, and Ethnic Relations (RC05)
Survey Program (ISSP) and from the East Asian Social Survey (EASS). The data set is open to scholars worldwide, and useful in comparative studies.

To Cross or Not to Cross: Transnational Taiwan, Taiwan’s Transnationality (edited by H. Wang and P. Guo, 2009) exemplifies the “transnational” character of Taiwanese sociology. In it sociologists, anthropologists and historians suggest that the contemporary context of high mobility and rapid globalization requires us to look beyond the “nation-state.” This volume represents emergent scholarship on the flows of people, culture and capital, crossing social and geographical boundaries from the perspective of Taiwan. Together, the volume’s articles challenge existing territorial assumptions about society. The themes contained in the volume include studies of female domestic workers from Southeast Asia, the global expansion of Taiwan’s Buddhist associations, identity and gender issues in immigrant marriages, and Taiwanese businessmen and women caught between China and Taiwan.

The public strand of Taiwanese sociology is represented by the most recent publication, Streetcorner Sociology (edited by H. Wang, 2015). The book contains 34 articles by 37 contributors, who were asked to write short essays or comments in plain language, explaining sociological findings and reasoning for general readers. The essays are organized into five themes: Political Life, Difficult and Hard Lives, Gender Issues, Lives at the Margins, and the Alternative Way. All articles appeared first as posts on the blog site Streetcorner Sociology (see article by Hong-zen Wang in this issue). The Facebook site was created in February, 2014, and within a month, it attracted more than 3,000 visitors per day. In 2014, every article received 6,700 hits on average, far surpassing other forums in the same period. Despite the fact that all its posts are in the public domain, the sales of the printed volume have broken all records for social science publications in Taiwan.

In the past, critics have suggested that Taiwan’s sociology lacks a character of its own, and have accused it of being too dependent on Western sociology. Thinking back twenty years ago, I have to agree. However, successive generations of sociologists have had to meet many challenges, including pressures for cooptation from an authoritarian state, suspicions held by cultural conservatives, debates about the indigenization of social science in the face of Western influence, and paradigm struggles between China-centrism and Taiwan-centrism. Today, sociology has become organically embedded in society. It has embraced the advance of knowledge of and for the public. Some of the big concepts like class, class reproduction, state, domination, power, social movement, gender, civil society, citizenship, and globalization have been incorporated into high school teaching and the language of mass media.

Despite these seeming successes, new challenges are looming large. One challenge is posed by an aging population and a shrinking population of college-eligible students. Another challenge is the sweeping power of market fundamentalism and global competition. Sociologists and sociology institutions are under administrative pressure to standardize research assessment which provides the rationale for withdrawing resources from disciplines in the humanities and social science that are deemed to be of limited utility. Moreover, all these challenges are occurring at a time of deepening inequalities. But these challenges do not mark Taiwanese sociology as different from sociology elsewhere. So sociologists of the world march into the future side by side.

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isseminating professional knowledge in Taiwan’s current academic environment is not an easy job: university administrations do not encourage such “unproductive” work. Any social scientist who wants to engage in public affairs risks being stigmatized as “unacademic.” Some scholars write their own blogs, but they are often not sustained because they require so much time.

In 2009, a few Taiwanese anthropologists experimented with running a collective blog, called guavanthropology that offers a short commentary every week to disseminate anthropological research. The blog did not attract much attention in its first few years, but it set an example for the sociology community.

Supported by Taiwanese sociologists, Streetcorner Sociology had its debut in February 2013. In two years it has published more than 130 articles, written by more than 100 Taiwanese sociologists. It has received 2.2 million views, and many of its posts have been reposted by different mass media.

Before Streetcorner Sociology was created, Taiwan boasted several popular science blogs like PanSci or Mapstalk, garnering millions of hits in a few years. Obviously, people seeking updated information today have learned to surf the Internet. Accordingly, if social scientists want to influence public opinion and social policies, they will have to engage in debates on the Internet. Further, many people have lost the patience needed to read long articles. According to one publisher, a short article which can be finished in three to five minutes is the optimal length for readers on the Internet. Therefore, from the beginning, contributors to Streetcorner Sociology have been advised to write less than 5,000 Chinese words, about 1,500 English words – too long for a newspaper public opinion column, but enough for a blog post to engage in public debate.

A key factor in Streetcorner Sociology’s success has been the wide support it has received from Taiwan’s so-
Sociological community. The Japanese Sociology Society has more than 3,000 members, while the Korean Sociology Association has more than 1,000 members; in contrast, Taiwan has fewer than 300 active sociologists. Different sub-committees of the Korean Sociology Association write textbooks on different topics – for instance, migration or social theory – to disseminate sociology knowledge. In Japan, similarly, there is a series of sociology handbooks, dealing with important sociological issues. Clearly, such efforts would be beyond the capacity of the small Taiwanese sociological community. Thus, short commentaries by sociologists in different spheres, writing collectively, offers a more effective channel for disseminating sociological contributions. As a small community, in which most sociologists know each other only too well, many Taiwanese sociologists have proved willing to contribute a short commentary every two years or so.

In the past few years, rising public interest in social and political issues has also contributed to the blog’s popularity. Discontent with the problems caused by economic globalization, China’s expansion, and the current conservative right-wing government prompted large student protests in March 2014; during the 50 days of occupations and protests, Streetcorner Sociology published more than 17 articles supporting the movement, and about 10,000 visitors viewed the site every day, up from only 1,700 in the previous month. The blog became an important site where movement supporters could debate public policy. Even government officials came to the blog to defend their policies. Streetcorner Sociology has become a window for those who are interested in Taiwan’s sociology, or with the social and political developments in the region. As Streetcorner Sociology has become better known, more and more high-school students read the blog to understand the discipline. This is especially important as, in the past, sociology has often been confused with social work. In addition, other news media in Taiwan report on the articles published on the blog, giving greater visibility to academic perspectives. Articles on the blog have also been reblogged by websites in China and Hong Kong. Perhaps not surprisingly, Chinese websites mainly repost those articles dealing with less sensitive political topics, such as the sociology of arts, tourism or community development. By contrast, Hong Kong blogs are interested in more political issues, dealing with questions about state and childhood, or with issues dealing with Hong Kong, Taiwan and China.

Most academic papers are read by fewer than ten people, and about a third of social science papers are never cited. If our time-consuming research attracts no readers – not even our academic colleagues – it would be very frustrating. In contrast, the coauthored Streetcorner Sociology shows that collective work can have strong social impact, and also demonstrates that sociologists can participate actively in social affairs without sacrificing their academic research.

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Always cheerful and friendly, kind, open-minded, welcoming, positive, cooperative, helpful, warm-hearted, understanding, an internationally active scientist, a skillful organizer, an inspiring personality – this is how friends and colleagues remember Jürgen Hartmann, who passed away on March 2, 2015.

Jürgen was born in Remscheid-Lennep (Germany) on March 18, 1944. As his father died in the war, Jürgen was raised by his mother. As a child, Jürgen spent many afternoons in the local bookstore. A voracious reader, he quickly befriended the owner, who let him read books for free in the shop’s backroom. Jürgen gratefully absorbed whatever he could get hold of: he read about other countries and cultures, he studied maps and even train timetables. This kindled his academic aspirations and inspired his desire to travel the world. It helped him read at lightning speed, and he could always find his way, no matter where he was, as if he were a human compass. As the son of a working
mother, Jürgen also learned early to prepare tasty meals, a skill he perfected throughout his life.

Jürgen earned his Master of Economics degree at the University of Cologne in 1969. As a student, he took on summer jobs in Stockholm and won a scholarship from Uppsala University, where he met his Swedish wife Solveig. In 1973, he received his PhD for a doctoral thesis on the student revolt in Sweden. After graduation, he worked at the Department of Sociology of Uppsala University until 1993, lecturing all across Sweden. From 1980 to 1982, he worked in Vienna as head of research at the European Centre for Social Welfare, Training and Research, a UN-affiliated organization; from 1983 to 1986, he directed the international project Integration of Youth into Society, launching his international career.

Jürgen’s first contact with the ISA dates back to the IXth ISA World Congress of Sociology held in Uppsala in July 1978. ISA’s Executive Secretary Izabela Barlinska, then a young student helping at the Congress Secretariat, recalls meeting Jürgen at the information desk. Then a young professor of the University of Uppsala, Jürgen felt that his help as a representative of the local academic community might be needed. And it definitely was! Both were inexperienced and new to the ISA structure, but both were eager to help the others. They became friends forever.

Working in an international setting with colleagues from different parts of the world was vital for Jürgen. He joined ISA’s Research Committee on Sociology of Youth (RC34), served as its treasurer (1982-86) and was elected its president in 1986. His predecessor, Petar-Emil Mitev, notes that “during the Cold War, Jürgen made a crucial contribution to turning RC34 into a model for cooperation between youth researchers in Western and Eastern Europe. Youth researchers from Eastern European countries could always count on his well-intended support and true devotion to common academic goals.”

“Jürgen’s leadership of the RC34 at a crucial time positioned him perfectly to observe and understand the massive changes in young people’s situation triggered in the Soviet Union by Glasnost and Perestroika,” says John Bynner, who came to admire Jürgen’s far-reaching analytic perspective and insightful comments when he worked with him in the comparative project European Youth and New Technologies (1987-1990), run by the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in the Social Sciences in Vienna. Sponsored by RC34, this project had unique value, spanning the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union. Bynner describes Jürgen as “a true internationalist bringing home to the less-well-initiated like myself the need to get away from blinkered national perspectives and move towards an understanding of relative differences in cultural assumptions and national priorities, especially in Eastern Europe where non-military and consumer interest in IT was still limited. Young people, through their growing demand for IT capability and cross-national media access, and as the next generation, were thus becoming one of the major harbingers of change. It is hard to appreciate now that Jürgen’s idea of a certificate of computer competence, with the status of a driving license, was seen, at the time, as utopian in Eastern countries. He recognized early on the significance of the transformation of the transition to adulthood brought about through new technology and the consequences of individualization, polarization and widening inequality in an increasingly globalized world which was its aftermath. That we wrestle with these things today as central to youth politics and policy is, in no small part, due to Jürgen’s influences that we can cherish to this day.”

As a truly international scientist, Jürgen managed to initiate cooperation with Chinese youth researchers under the RC34 umbrella. It is no coincidence that in the two periods following his presidency, RC34’s Vice-Presidents for Asia were from China. Jürgen played a key role in diplomatically paving the way for the first RC34 conference ever held in China, Asian Modernization and Youth (Shanghai, 1993).

Jürgen was also an excellent networker. Helena Helve, Nordic Youth Research Coordinator (1998-2004) and RC34 President (2002-2006), considers Jürgen a pioneer of Nordic youth research. Helena was impressed by “the fascinating keynote speech about youth movements in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s that Jürgen gave at a Nordic youth research conference. Jürgen actively promoted the cooperation of Nordic youth researchers. He was one of the founders of the Nordic Youth Research Symposium NYRIS and the Nordic youth research coordination. Even when he had become a well-known international scientist, he always considered himself a Nordic youth researcher. His work has internationalized and made Nordic youth research known all around the world.” Jürgen was also a member of CYRCE (Circle for Youth Research Cooperation in Europe) founded in 1990 by his successor, Sibylle Hübner-Funk, which contributed to building up and strengthening European youth research.

Jürgen’s broad knowledge, teaching experience and his ability to explain complicated issues clearly made him a sought-after speaker. There was something special about his presentation style: even when he spoke to large audiences, listeners felt he was speaking to them individually.

After his RC34 presidency, Jürgen was elected to the ISA’s Executive Committee: he served on the Finance Committee from 1990 to 1994, and as Vice-President for Finance from 1994 to 1998. In this role, he helped with ISA world congresses, bringing

Besides youth research, Jürgen was passionate about enhancing international understanding through exposure and experience; he viewed youth travel, from exchanges to tourism, as central. Lyudmila Nurse vividly remembers an incident in October 1992, in Moscow, where she organized the international conference Youth and Social Changes in Europe: Integration or Polarization. On the first day of the conference, the Director of the Youth Institute received a telephone call from the then-Ministry of Science and Technologies which was involved in the development of new youth policies in Russia. They wanted to meet with some of the western scholars who attended the conference. Jürgen was very enthusiastic about the fact that the conference had attracted the attention of the Russian government. We were thrilled to be invited to the Kremlin where our small group was received by Gennady Burbulis, the then-State Secretary of the Russian Federation who was thought to be the second most influential politician in Russia after President Boris Yeltsin. At the meeting, the main focus was on how to engage young people of Russia in the democratic process. Jürgen was the first to reply with a suggestion that sounded very simple and straightforward: Young people of Russia must be allowed to travel abroad and to see the world. At first, everybody thought it was such a simple thing to do; then Jürgen went on to explain that the country should also change and be attractive for young people to return. There was an engaging discussion and a great sense of satisfaction for Jürgen that his message about youth mobility was so well received.

Jürgen’s work on youth mobility and travel played a significant role in shaping youth research in this area. He systematically analyzed reasons for traveling and profiled youth travelers. In his works on youth mobility and travel in Western Europe, he linked European Union policies and the concept of “youth mobility” to the emergence of a European consciousness and a fruitful cooperation in economy, politics and culture, arguing, for example, that the European Interrail ticket contributed to young Swedes’ experience of being “European” to a much higher degree than any institutionalized exchange program, and that young people’s willingness to travel is correlated with their ability to speak foreign languages.

When Dalarna University entered into a partnership with five other European universities to create a program in European Tourism Management (ETM), Jürgen seized the opportunity to make his interest in tourism his profession, becoming director of the Swedish part of this Masters Program (1994-2008). He loved teaching and continued to lecture after retirement.

Jürgen was a true friend to many and a great colleague to all RC34 members. We will miss his team spirit, his cheerful smile and hugs, his hearty laughter, his enquiring mind, wise counsel and encouragement. If we build on the rich legacy he left us, he will live on in our work and memories.

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