Charlie Hebdo

Two Roads to Public Sociology

A Life of Critical Engagement

Capitalism vs. Climate Justice

Practicing Public Sociology

Global Symposia:
  > Protest in Informal Settlements
  > Changing Patterns of Work in France
  > Indonesian Sociology
This issue of Global Dialogue opens with Boaventura de Sousa Santos’ reflections on the horrendous killings of the Charlie Hebdo cartoonists. If ever there was a series of events that cried out for sociological analysis, then these are they – to consider the reason for the killings, the nature of the killers, the impact of cartoons, the response of the state, and the support it elicited. What we learn is that “freedom of speech” is less a given and more a terrain of contestation and the same applies to the meaning of “Muslim” and “terrorist” – one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter. And above all, as Santos manages to do so expertly, we have to take a global perspective. We have to see the events in the context of regimes of violence and extremism that are sweeping the world, much of it perpetrated by nation states and receiving too little attention.

The killings cry out for sociological analysis but sociologists are quiet, fearing to set foot on this treacherous terrain, fearing to become public sociologists. It can, indeed, be a dangerous business. Wrestling with these issues, Nira Yuval-Davis points to two roads to public sociology: one of the sociologist in exile who takes up positions from the margins and the other of the sociologist – the famous Israeli sociologist Baruch Kimmerling – taking on issues from within the Israeli center, but becoming ever more critical. Facing a very different set of challenges in Africa, the portrait of Issa Shivji reveals an activist scholar, uncompromising in his critique of the Tanzanian state and the public defense of university autonomy.

Public sociology is not necessarily dangerous, but simply complex and urgent. Herbert Docena has been following successive UN Conferences on climate change. Watching the dismal negotiations come to naught, he focuses on the growing anti-capitalist movements that call for more drastic interventions. Finally, important public sociology can be done locally as Ariane Hanemaayer and Christopher Schneider demonstrate with their coffee house meetings, which bring the university to publics, and their open classrooms, which bring publics to the university.

This issue of Global Dialogue also contains three symposia. We have a collection of essays on informal urban settlements and land evictions in Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, South Africa and Zambia. Despite the overweening violence ranged against inhabitants, protest continues – not spontaneous outbursts but politically organized actions, sometimes successful but more often not. We also showcase sociology from Indonesia, with five essays on the new democratic dispensation that is shaping the legacies of religion, education, labor and social mobility. Finally, we have three essays from France, focused on new patterns of work – newfangled fabrication laboratories, the workplace accommodation of chronic illness, and a pre-figuring of the “multi-active society” that dissolves the distinction between wage labor, unpaid care work and civic activities.

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In This Issue

Editorial: On Being a Public Sociologist
by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Portugal 2

Two Roads to Public Sociology
by Nira Yuval-Davis, UK 7

A Life of Critical Engagement: An Interview with Issa Shivji
by Sabatho Nyamensanda, Tanzania 10

Capitalism vs. Climate Justice
by Herbert Docena, Philippines and USA 13

Practicing Public Sociology
by Ariane Hanemaayer and Christopher J. Schneider, Canada 16

PROTEST IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS
Re-claiming the Right to the City: Popular Mobilization in Chile
by Simón Escoffier, UK 18

Squatters and Politics in Uruguay
by Maria José Álvarez Rivadulla, Colombia 20

The Growth of Brazil’s Homeless Workers’ Movement
by Cibele Rizek and André Dal’Bó, Brazil 22

Poor People’s Protests in South Africa
by Prashani Naidoo, South Africa 24

Zambia: Evictions without Social Movements
by Singumbe Muyeba, South Africa 26

CHANGING PATTERNS OF WORK IN FRANCE
Fablabs and Hackerspaces: A New Culture in the Making
by Isabelle Berrebi-Hoffmann, Marie-Christine Bureau, and Michel Lallement, France 28

Pursuing Gender Equality in a “Multi-Active Society”
by Bernard Fusullier, Belgium, and Chantal Nicole-Drancourt, France 30

Negotiating Chronic Illness at Work
by Anne-Marie Waser, Dominique Lhuillier, Frédéric Brugeliers, Pierre Lénel, Guillaume Huez, Joëlle Mezza, and Cathy Hermand, France 32

SOCIOLOGY IN INDONESIA
Celebrating Democracy in Indonesia
by Lucia Ratih Kusumadewi, Indonesia 34

Corporatizing of Indonesian Higher Education
by Kamanto Sunarto, Indonesia 36

Labor Movements and Working Class Politics in Indonesia
by Hari Nugroho, Indonesia 38

When Religion Becomes Legal Identity
by Antonius Cahyadi, Indonesia 40

Stimulating Upward Mobility in Indonesia
by Indera Ratna Irawati Pattinasarany, Indonesia 42
The heinous nature of the crime against the journalists and cartoonists from Charlie Hebdo makes it extremely difficult to offer a cool-headed analysis of what was entailed in this barbaric act, its context and precedents, as well as its impact and future repercussions. Still an analysis is urgently needed, lest we fan the flames of a fire that one of these days may well hit our children’s schools, our homes, our institutions and our consciences. Here are some thoughts towards that analysis.

> Violence and Democracy

One cannot draw a direct connection between the Charlie Hebdo tragedy and the fight against terrorism waged by the US and its allies since September 11, 2001. It is a known fact, however, that the West’s extreme aggressiveness has caused the death of many thousands of innocent civilians (mostly Muslims) and inflicted astounding levels of violence and torture on young Muslims against whom all suspicions of wrongdoing are speculative at best, as attested to by the...
report recently submitted to the US Congress. It is also well known that many young Islamic radicals claim that their radicalization stems from their anger at all that unaddressed violence. In view of this, we must stop and consider whether the best way to bring the spiral of violence to a halt is to pursue the same policies that have driven it so far, as has now become all too evident. The French response to the attack was to suspend democratic, constitutional normalcy with an undeclared state of siege. It assumed that this type of criminal should be shot dead rather than incarcerated and brought to justice, and that such behavior in no way seems to contradict Western values. We have entered a phase of low-intensity civil war. Who in Europe stands to gain from it? Certainly not the Podemos party in Spain, nor Greece’s Syriza.

> Freedom of Expression

The freedom to express oneself is a precious commodity, but it, too, has its limits, and the truth is that the overwhelming majority of those limits are imposed by those who advocate limitless freedom whenever their own freedom is curtailed. The examples of such limits are legion: in England a demonstrator can get herself arrested for saying that David Cameron has blood on his hands; in France Islamic women are not allowed to wear the hijab; in 2008, cartoonist Siné (Maurice Sinet) was fired from Charlie Hebdo for writing an allegedly anti-Semitic article. What this all means is that limits do exist, it’s just that they vary for different interest groups. Take Latin America, for example, where the major media, which are controlled by oligarchic families and big capital, are the first to cry out for unrestrained freedom of expression so that they can throw abuse at the progressive governments and silence all the good that these governments have done to promote the well-being of the poor. It seems that Charlie Hebdo knew no limits when it came to caricaturing Muslims, although many of its cartoons could be read as racist propaganda feeding the Islamophobic, anti-immigrant wave now sweeping over France and Europe in general. Besides many cartoons in which the Prophet is shown in indecent poses, one in particular was very much explored by the far right. It depicted a group of pregnant Muslim women presented as Boko Haram sex slaves, their hands resting on their swollen bellies, screaming “Hands off our welfare benefits.” At one stroke, the cartoon stigmatized Islam, women and the welfare state. As was to be expected, over the years the largest Muslim community in Europe saw this editorial line as offensive. On the other hand, however, its condemnation of the barbaric crime in Paris was immediate. We must therefore reflect on the contradictions and asymmetries of the lived values some of us believe to be universal.

> Tolerance and “Western values”

The context of the crime is dominated by two currents of opinion, none of which is conducive to building an inclusive, intercultural Europe. The more radical of the two is openly Islamophobic and anti-immigrant. These are the hardliners of the far right all across Europe and of the right wherever it feels threatened in upcoming elections (as was the case of Greece’s Antonis Samaras). For this current of thought, the enemies of European civilization are among “us” – they hate us, they wield our passports, and the situation cannot be solved unless they are eliminated. The anti-immigrant overtones are unmistakable. The other current is that of tolerance. These people are very different from us, they are a burden, but we have to “put up with them,” for, if nothing else, they are useful; we should do it, however, only if they behave moderately and assimilate our values.

But what are “Western values”? After many centuries of atrocities committed in the name of such values both within and outside Europe – from colonial violence to the two world wars – a degree of caution and much reflection are in order about what those values are and also about why, depending on the context, now some of them, now others, tend to take precedence. For example, no one questions the value of freedom, but the same cannot be said for equality and fraternity, the two values underlying the welfare state that prevailed in democratic Europe after World War II. In recent years, however, social protection – which used to ensure high levels of social integration – began to be questioned by conservative politicians and is now seen as an unaffordable luxury by governing parties whether they be center-left or center-right. Isn’t it true that the social crisis caused by the erosion of social protection and by growing unemployment, especially among youth, is like fuel to the flames of radicalism found among the younger generations, especially those who, in addition to unemployment, are the victims of ethnic and religious discrimination?

> A Clash of Fanaticisms, Not of Civilizations

What we are facing now is not a clash of civilizations, because Christian and Islamic civilizations share the same roots. What we have before us is a clash of fanaticisms, even if some of them are just too close to us to be recognized as such. History shows that fanaticisms and the way in which they clash have always been related to the economic and political interests of the elites. They have never been beneficial to the popular classes, which always bear the brunt of such clashes as foot soldiers. This is the case, in Europe and its areas of influence, of the Crusades and the Inquisition, the evangelization of colonial populations, the religious wars and the conflict in Northern Ireland. Outside Europe, a religion as peaceable as Buddhism has legitimated the slaughter of many thousands of members of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority; in 2003, Hindu fundamentalists also slaughtered the Muslim popula-
tions of Gujarat, and the likelihood of their rise to power as a result of President Modi’s recent victory makes one fear the worst; it is also in the name of religion that Israel is carrying on with its unpunished, ethnic cleansing of Palestine and that the so-called Islamic Emirate is slaughtering Muslim populations in Syria and in Iraq. Could it be that the defense of unrestrained secularism in an intercultural Europe, where many people do not identify with this particular value, is itself a form of extremism? Do extremisms oppose one another? Do they interconnect? What relationships are there between the jihadists and the Western secret services? How come the jihadists of the Islamic Emirate, who are now seen as terrorists, used to be freedom fighters when they were fighting against Gaddafi and Assad? How is it that the Islamic Emirate is funded by Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait and Turkey, all of them allies of the West? This being said, the fact remains that, over the last decade, at least, the overwhelming majority of victims of all fanaticisms (including Islamic fanaticism) belonged to non-fanatical Muslim populations.

> The Value of Human Life

The absolute, unconditional revulsion experienced by Europeans in the face of these deaths should make us wonder why they do not feel the same kind of revulsion in the face of a similar, if not much higher, number of innocent deaths caused by conflicts that, at bottom, may have something to do with the Charlie Hebdo tragedy. On that very same day, 37 young people were killed in a bomb attack in Yemen. Last summer, the Israeli invasion caused the death of 2,000 Palestinians, among them 1,500 civilians and 500 children. In Mexico, 102 journalists have been murdered since 2000 for speaking up for freedom of the press, and in November 2014, 43 young protestors were killed in Ayotzinapa, also in Mexico. Surely the difference in those reactions cannot be based on the notion that the life of white Europeans, coming from a Christian culture, is worth more than the lives of non-Europeans or of Europeans of another color, whose culture originates in different religions or in other regions. Is it because the latter live at a remove from the Europeans and are less familiar to them? On the other hand, does the Christian injunction to love one’s neighbor provide for such distinctions? Is it because the big media and the political leaders in the West tend to trivialize the suffering inflicted on those others, or even to demonize them to the point of making us think that they had it coming?

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Baruch Kimmerling, who suffered all his life from cerebral palsy and arrived in Israel as a refugee from Romania after 1948, was one of Israel’s most important and best known sociologists, not least because of his frequent contributions to the Israeli press.

Baruch and I were friends since we were undergraduates together at the Hebrew University, where Baruch remained throughout his life; I left after completing my MA in 1969, first to the USA and then to the UK. As research students we both rebelled against Shmuel Eisenstadt (who dominated Israeli sociology for nearly 40 years), but we differed in our sociological approaches and for many years also politically. In my twenties, I was radicalized to non- and then anti-Zionist analyses of Israeli state and society; after many more years and a systematic study of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and societies, Baruch reached similar conclusions – although he continued to label himself a Zionist. He developed important aspects of this field of sociology, while I “branched off” into what might be summed up as intersectional politics of belonging.

When Baruch died in 2007, as one of the Israeli, Palestinian and international social scientists invited to give papers at a memorial conference, I spoke on the existential anxiety of Israelis – especially those Baruch called “the Akhusalim,” the Ashkenazi, Secular and Labor Zionists who were hegemonic in the Zionist movement for most of the 20th century. I related this existential anxiety to several endemic factors, some common to all hegemonic minorities in settler colonial projects; others common to “neo-liberal risk societies”; and others more specific to Israel, relating to its character as a permanent war society as well as to the rising messianic fundamentalist Jewishness which threatens to undermine Israel’s quasi-secular regime.

To my astonishment, what I said was generally positively received – very differently to the way my analysis had been received in the past. (However, although the radical messages delivered by speakers were not challenged at the conference, the volume of our papers has still not been pub-

Nira Yuval-Davis, an Israeli dissident, has been a long-standing defender of human rights: a founder member of Women Against Fundamentalism, and the international research network of Women in Militarized Conflict Zones, a consultant to different divisions of the United Nations as well as to various NGOs, including Amnesty International. Known internationally for her research on gender, racism, and religious fundamentalism, her books include Racialized Boundaries, Gender and Nation, The Politics of Belonging, Women against Fundamentalism. She is Director of the Research Centre on Migration, Refugees and Belonging at the University of East London. In this essay she conducts an internal conversation with the renowned Israeli sociologist, now deceased, Baruch Kimmerling, on the different roads to public sociology.
published, five years later, apparently because of resistance at the Van Lear Institute which hosted the conference.)

I would like to especially recommend Baruch’s autobiog-raphy², which is written with his usual wit and intellectual honesty, and which will also add to readers’ understanding of the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. However, it raises some important questions in relation to public sociology. I limit myself here to two main questions.

> Public and Professional Sociology

Baruch argues that he completely separated his public journalistic and professional academic work, a differentiation which flows from his Weberian belief in what Donna Haraway called “God’s trick of seeing everything from nowhere.” By contrast, I have argued for situated knowledge and situated imagination, following most feminist theorists and other radical traditions in the sociology of knowledge, Marxist and anti-racist. Rather than a relativist position – which insists that there are many truths that need to be judged on their own merits and therefore cannot be compared – I argue that one’s own standpoint (which include social locations, identifications and normative values systems, irreducible to each other but mediated by one’s life experiences and practices, fluid and contested as they are within particular structural and processual constraints) affect the ways one sees the world. Knowledge of “truth” can only be approximated by a dialogical constructive process, in which many situated gazes take part within particular spatial and temporal contexts.

My problem with Baruch’s dichotomy between the political and the professional is not just epistemological. Throughout my years as a sociologist and a political activist, I have found that the two modes of action nurture and provide critical insights for each other – with grassroots political activism helping to acquire empathetic understanding of other situated gazes on the one hand, and theoretical and empirical scholarship helping to refine and challenge some crude dichotomies of identity politics on the other hand. Moreover, often the line between the two seems artificial, when we consider why particular researchers embark on particular research projects and how they disseminate their research findings.

Baruch’s public interventions display the same pattern of overlapping preoccupations and mutual insights, starting from the moment he decided to study the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, after the 1969 cafeteria bombing on his university campus. I greatly doubt Baruch’s claim that he relied less on intuition in his “scientific” work than in his political work. As Baruch himself notes in relation to Kuhn’s theory of paradigmatic change, all data collection involves elements of selectivity. Nonetheless, I empathize with his frustration that people judged his sociological work only after reading his short public articles.

Baruch’s shifting paradigms of knowledge and his understanding of Israeli and Palestinian societies, however, raise a second issue, related to Baruch’s claim that his position as “a marginal at the center” was a precondition as well as the mode of his public sociology.

> The Role of Social Location in Public Sociology

In his thorough, reflective, honest way, Baruch describes his first article in Israel’s oldest newspaper Ha’aretz, as a thorough and extreme attack on Sabri Jiris’ book The Arabs in Israel. Much later, Baruch realized not only that Sabri had been right, but that, having no access to archival material, Sabri underestimated the scale and deviousness of the means by which Israeli Palestinians had been controlled and their lands confiscated. Baruch acknowledges a similar shift regarding lan Lustick’s book, Arabs in the Jewish State which he later justly praises highly. (Although he doesn’t mention it in his autobiography, when my co-edited book Israel and the Palestinians was published in 1975, he wrote to me as a concerned friend, recommending that I avoid including it on my CV. Many of the articles, including mine, correspond quite closely to Baruch’s later writings.)

Baruch Kimmerling, was born in 1939 to a Hungarian mother and a Romanian father. After escaping the Holocaust, Baruch’s family immigrated to Israel where he grew up. He studied sociology at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, where he researched and taught most of his adult life. After the bombing of its cafeteria in 1969, he turned to study the roots, history and actualities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, developing an approach at odds with the official Israeli narrative. As an outspoken critic of Israeli policies he was subject to wide and harsh recrimination. Through his writings and teaching he tried to influence Israeli public opinion in favor of a genuine democratic state that accepts all of its citizens without discrimination, renounces military aggressiveness and strives for peace through compromise and humanitarian approaches. Baruch Kimmerling died in 2007, faithful to his values and ideas, and very worried for Israel’s future. His books include Zionism and Territory: The Socioterritorial Dimensions of Zionist Politics (1983), The Invention and Decline of Israeliness: State, Culture and Military in Israel (2001); Politicide: Sharon’s War Against the Palestinians (2003).
Over the years, Baruch was able to reassess his understanding of the Israeli and Palestinian societies and conflicts; he became a wonderful public sociologist, whose writing influenced wider Israeli opinion in important ways. My understanding of various issues has also grown and changed throughout the years; I hope that like Baruch, this will continue till the day I die. However, I would like to take issue with two of Baruch’s claims.

Firstly, Baruch suggests that he developed his new perspective and understanding on his own, with little influence from the work of others whose works he’d read and with some of whom, over the years, he had spent many hours debating. This non-dialogical construction of self and of knowledge seems to misrepresent the process of knowledge and attitude acquisition. Ironically, it undermines the raison d’être of public sociology, which aims to present alternative analyses and presentation of facts.

Secondly, Baruch argues that he was able to become a public sociologist because, unlike the rest of us at the margin, he was trusted as “one of us.” In other words, he was “legitimate” in the eyes of the elites. Baruch suggests that this enabled him to be published in the mainstream Israeli press (which is indisputable), while others with a similar analysis (e.g. the members of the radical socialist and anti-Zionist organization, Matzpen) were less visible in the public arena because their views were considered illegitimate. This legitimacy, he suggests, is a precondition for effective work as a public sociologist.

Baruch suggests that his contingent acceptance as “one of them” stemmed in part from his attacks on books like those of Jiris and Lustick – the repudiation of analyses that he later came to respect. But this view leaves us with a major theoretical, as well as political, conundrum: must one “prove” oneself a trusted member of the collectivity, before one can accumulate the social capital required to be effective? What if that process of accumulation involves initially undermining the very cause for which one later becomes an advocate?

There is no easy answer to this question. Given the state of contemporary Israeli society and politics – as well as other parts of the region and the world as a whole – I often feel close to despair, even though I try to cling to Gramsci’s politics of hope, optimism of the will and pessimism of the intellect. Although Baruch started from the center, rather than the margins, he came to feel similarly frustrated and depressed. I would love to hear from other readers of Global Dialogue about where they feel public sociologists, and other public intellectuals, must locate themselves in order to be effective.

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2 The strategy of many of us in the “illegitimate” margins has been, on the one hand, to work as public activists in a variety of specific (often unpopular) campaigns in Israel, as well as to establish dialogues and solidarity with Palestinians and Arabs with similar values and, on the other hand, also work with socialists and human rights defenders outside Israel and the Middle East in order to influence international public and government support of Israel.
Issa Shivji is one of the great public intellectuals of postcolonial Africa. He was a law student (1967-1970) at the University of Dar es Salaam, growing up amidst distinguished leftist scholars such as sociologists Giovanni Arrighi, Immanuel Wallerstein and John Saul. These scholars came from all over the world, attracted to the formative intellectual ferment at the university. Even as a precocious student, Shivji began to challenge the socialist policies of the Ujamaa regime of Julius Nyerere, the first President of Tanzania. During this early period he wrote such celebrated and widely-debated works as *The Silent Class Struggle* that drew attention to the social forces that were politically (un)represented in the new postcolonies of Africa. After receiving degrees from the London School of Economics and the University of Dar es Salaam, he took up a post in the Faculty of Law which he never left until retiring in 2006. During that time he became a public figure devoted to land reform and constitutional law. He survived political turbulence despite his outspoken commentaries on the turn to neoliberalism in the 1980s as well as the corporatization of the university. In 2008 he was awarded the Julius Nyerere Chair in Pan-African Studies with the express purpose of restoring the university as a center of public debate. Professor Shivji has inspired many younger academics, such as the political science lecturer, Sabatho Nyamsenda, who conducted this interview. He was also an active participant in the ISA’s World Congress in Durban, South Africa (2006).
SN: Your association with the University of Dar es Salaam (also known as Mlimani, or the Hill) started in 1967 as a law student, and after graduating you joined the law faculty at the same university – a position that you held for 36 years. Why did you decide to remain at the University while most of your progressive colleagues joined other institutions?

IS: True, many of my comrades joined other institutions including the National Service Office, the Party and even the army. In hindsight, it may sound a bit naïve, but the truth is that it was a collective decision of comrades as to who would be most effective where. Comrades thought, and I agreed, that I should remain at the University to do progressive intellectual and ideological work.

The University did provide relative space for progressive ideas to flourish, a terrain where progressive intellectual camaraderie could be created and sustained. At the time, the overall nationalist commitment combined with the deeper intellectual understanding of the imperialist system helped to cultivate radical young scholars, many of whom ended up as teachers in secondary schools thus further fertilizing progressive thought and practice.

I have never regretted spending the whole of my working life at the Hill.

SN: In your Accumulation in an African Periphery you divide the post-colonial experience of African countries, and Tanzania in particular, into three phases: the nationalist phase (1960s and 1970s), the critical phase (1980s) and the neoliberal phase (1990s to the present). How did these changes affect Mlimani?

IS: Universities exist in a social environment and they are obviously affected by changes in that environment. The decade of the eighties was an extremely critical period for our country as, indeed, it was for the rest of Africa. Universities were starved of resources while at the same time being exposed to an incessant ideological and intellectual onslaught of neo-liberal prescriptions. Many of our colleagues left for universities in Southern Africa – Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland and later South Africa and Namibia.

But some stuck it out, including many young radical scholars who had imbibed progressive ideas during the first two decades of revolutionary nationalist fervor. They continued to do some very good work. For example, they led the intellectual side of the “great” constitutional debate in 1983-4 articulating anti-authoritarian and anti-statist positions. Of course, there were different tendencies, those seeing liberal democracy, human rights, multi-party as the ultimate goal and therefore demanding essentially reformist reforms. Then a minority tendency saw the struggle for democracy as a school for independent class actions; they called for revolutionary reforms. To give one example: The reformists would demand immediate institution of the multi-party system while revolutionaries would demand, first, a separation of the party and the state, and second, a protracted national debate taking stock of the post-independence period and chart out and build a new national consensus.

In the transition from the nationalist to the neo-liberal period, the Hill was still a hotbed of debates and ideological struggles. These fizzled out during the third phase government as neo-liberalism consolidated itself in the country and vocationalization and corporatization of the University gained momentum.

SN: In 2008, you were appointed the first incumbent of the Mwalimu Nyerere Professorial Chair in Pan-African Studies, known as Kigoda in Kiswahili. Soon after you were installed, you were quoted saying it was “an honor” for you “to keep Nyerere’s legacy alive.” Which legacy were you referring to, given the fact that the Nyerere you describe in your writings is vehemently opposed to Marxism and struggles from below?

IS: Nyerere was a radical nationalist. He was a progressive Pan-Africanist and broadly anti-imperialist. To be sure, his anti-imperialism was not grounded in radical political economy, as was Nkrumah’s. Yet, his pro-people stance was consistent; his anti-imperialist position supportable and his nationalistic progressive.

In comparison to the neo-liberal political class that succeeded him, and mindful of the havoc that this class has created in our society, woe unto any progressive, even a Marxist, who wouldn’t want to recall Nyerere’s legacy and deploy it as an ideological resource in the struggle against the current rapacious phase of capitalism.

Nyerere was not a Marxist and he didn’t disguise himself as one. Marx himself when confronted with vulgar Marxism exclaimed: “I am not a Marxist!”

As a head of state, it is true he came out against struggles from below. But does that mean that a progressive person should not celebrate Nyerere’s progressive legacy and draw lessons from its contradictory character? My friend, a Marxist is not a purist; s/he is political!

SN: What do you mean by the “contradictory character” of Nyerere’s legacy?

IS: I can do no better than give an anecdote about Mwalimu himself. A few months after he had thrown out students from the Hill for demonstrating against the state in 1978, he visited the campus. One student was courageous enough to ask him something to the effect: “Mwalimu, you talk about democracy but when we demonstrated in the interest of democracy you sent the FFU [Field Force Unit] to beat us up!”

>>
Mwalimu stared at him, and then replied: “What did you expect? I am head of state; I preside over the institution which wields the monopoly of violence. If you cause chaos in the streets, of course I’d send in the FFU. But does that mean you shouldn’t fight for democracy? Democracy is never given on a silver platter!” [not his exact words]

And we all clapped. Mwalimu could have his cake and eat it!

SN: The Iranian revolutionary intellectual Ali Shariati once dubbed universities “invincible fortified fortresses,” whose main task is to produce intellectual slaves for the corporate world. Did the Kigoda, the Pan-African Studies Program, manage to open the gates of the Mlimani “fortress,” and link its intellectuals with the masses? If yes, how?

IS: It would be foolish for me to claim that Kigoda managed to open the gates of the university “fortress.” In Althusserian terms, universities are part of the ideological state apparatus. The dominant intellectuals there are undoubtedly producers and conveyors of dominant knowledge, which forms the basis of dominant ideologies.

But by the very nature of the process of production of knowledge, there is bound to be a clash of ideas. This allows some space for outlooks other than dominant ones. Nonetheless, such spaces should not be taken for granted. They have their limits and, in critical times, even those spaces are suppressed. It is a struggle to claim and reclaim on a continuous basis those progressive spaces. And like all struggles, these intellectual struggles also require imagination as to their forms and methods.

This is all that Kigoda attempted to do; nothing more. Perhaps it managed to cause some intellectual fervor; perhaps it managed to gain some credibility with young intellectuals and the people; perhaps it managed to excavate progressive archives of the Hill. Even that had limits, and those limits began to show towards the end of my term.

One can only do so much within the given circumstances. I think it was E.H. Carr, following Plekhanov and before him Marx, who said that while individuals make history, they do not choose the circumstances in which they do so.

SN: Nyerere once warned the oppressed against using money as their weapon. Yet, funding seems to have become central to intellectual projects nowadays. No work is done without money. Even the most progressive organizations have found it inevitable to kneel before the capitalist agencies in search of money. How did Kigoda run its activities?

IS: Yes, money, and donor money at that, has become the motor driving intellectual projects. Kigoda undoubtedly faced the problem of funding, but it established certain principles right at the outset. First, all administrative expenses, including the salaries of the Chair and his assistant, would come from the regular University budget. Second, Kigoda would avoid taking money from foreign donors. Third, whatever funding is given by domestic public institutions or friendly African intellectual organizations should be without strings attached. And, finally, the agenda and the activities of Kigoda would be set strictly by the Kigoda collective.

It was not easy but by keeping our budget modest, relying heavily on voluntary work and spending with a lot of prudence, we managed.

SN: Now that you have retired from the university, what are the projects you are planning to undertake?

IS: While still at the University, with two colleagues, Professor Saida Yahya-Othman and Dr. Ng'wanza Kamata, I embarked on the project to write a definitive biography of Mwalimu Nyerere supported by the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology. We have now more or less completed our research – if you can ever complete a research of this kind – and have now started the process of writing.

One of the important outcomes of that project is the establishment of the Nyerere Resource Centre (NRC). The Centre will have a documentation room where all the material we collected will be stored and made available to researchers. Around the Centre we will organize activities with a view to providing a platform for strategic thinking, debates and discussions. We hope to begin activities this year. It is my hope that NRC will become a hub for reflecting on many burning issues facing the country and the continent.

I feel that the neo-liberal, NGOism and consultancy culture with their emphasis on policy – more “action,” little thought – and prescriptive prognosis has taken a toll on our intellectual thinking, the result of which is that we have abdicated analyzing and understanding the world. We cannot fight for a better world without understanding the world better. For that, we need to take a longer view of history. Hopefully, the Centre will contribute towards reviving the culture of holistic, long-term thinking.

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As has become traditional since 1972, when the first UN conference on the environment was held in Stockholm, thousands of people from around the world once again gathered for an alternative “People’s Summit” in December (2014). They marched on the streets of Lima (Peru) while hundreds of state representatives met inside a military camp for the latest Conference of Parties (COP) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The calls from the “People’s Summit” varied as usual. Some waved colorful placards saying, “We call for a serious climate change law!” or “No more speeches, act!” – demands which suggest that there is or could be a harmony of interests between those marching and those meeting at the official conference some fourteen kilometers away, and that the latter could really pass a “serious climate change law” under the existing system.

But the more common demand I heard – indeed, the call expressed on the central banner behind which all marched – was “Change the System not the Climate!,” along with variations, such as “Save the planet from capitalism!” and other such statements as “Capitalists: Murderers!” or “COP: Nest of Predators” – demands which imply that there is a fundamental antagonism between those making the demands and those being addressed, and that those being addressed are incapable of “saving the planet” under the existing system.

This call for “system-change” has been voiced in an increasing number of places across the world in recent years; in the 400,000-strong march in New York last September, in the smaller demonstration in Warsaw at the 2013 UN summit, in the unprecedented world social movements’ conference on climate change in Cochabamba in 2010, in the Copenhagen summit last 2009 – and even inside the UN summit by Bolivia’s self-professed socialist President Evo Morales.

Its importance in Lima was, in part, a reflection of the heightened level of militancy on the continent where this year’s UN conference was held. But its growing resonance beyond Lima could also be a signal of a wider shift in people’s consciousness and identities worldwide and, with it, of a deeper shift in the broader balance of social forces around the global ecological crisis. It indicates the growing inability of the world’s dominant bloc to exercise one of their most potent powers: the ability to set the terms and the language of the debate by shaping how people view the world and categorize themselves.
Working to shape global culture or to mould people’s “common sense” so as to counter the ideas introduced by radical movements and defuse the antagonisms they kindled. And to a great extent, they succeeded. The once-powerful radical movements that for a time shook capitalist hegemony were pushed to the margins starting in the 70s and 80s. Those who demanded “system-change” were successfully cast as rabid extremists. Indeed, it became easier to imagine apocalypse than to imagine “system-change.”

Suddenly confronted with an unexpected upsurge of radical environmentalist movements that began blaming capitalism for global environmental problems and that in effect questioned their hegemony or their claim to promote universal interests, they have been forced to engage in a kind of struggle often missed by analysts of so-called “global environmental change”: the struggle over how to represent and make sense of this “change.”

Through the knowledge-production apparatuses of the OECD, the World Bank, the UN, and a constellation of NGOs and other organizations of global civil society, they would set out over the next two decades to try to counter, absorb and deflect radical environmentalist critiques by developing and diffusing discourses such as “sustainable development” or “ecological modernization” which blame the ecological crisis on “market failure,” or “vested interests,” or on just the fossil fuel industry – never the entire system – and that portray capital as benevolent, responsible “partners.” Through everyday, institutionalized practices – from the ways they calculate emissions by countries instead of by class to the ways they entice rather than punish polluters – they have sought to instill in people a common view: that the problem is not the system and the enemy is not capital.

In short, global elites have been working to shape global culture or to mold people’s “common sense” so as to counter the ideas introduced by radical movements and defuse the antagonisms they kindled. And to a great extent, they succeeded. The once-powerful radical movements that for a time shook capitalist hegemony were pushed to the margins starting in the 70s and 80s. Those who demanded “system-change” were successfully cast as rabid extremists. Indeed, it became easier to imagine apocalypse than to imagine “system-change.”

However, in Lima and across the world, an increasing number of people – including best-selling author Naomi Klein, Pope Francis, and other influential figures – are now again explicitly linking capitalism to climate change, categorizing capitalists as ruthless “predators” and imagining “systemic alternatives.” All this indicates that the hegemons did not entirely succeed in preventing a radical, global counter-hegemonic movement from re-emerging.

So far, however, as the outcome of the UN conference in Lima shows, this movement is still not powerful enough to prevent the world’s dominant groups from advancing their preferred “solution” to the ecological crisis.

For even as they deny that the crisis is intrinsically rooted in the system – and even as less far-sighted officials and business executives deny that there is a crisis and oppose even the weakest reforms – capitalism’s vanguards try to manage the global economy from their vantage points in the OECD, the World Bank, the universities, policy planning departments, etc. Such leaders have actually taken the slogans of radical environmentalists very seriously. They have been working very hard to “change the system” – but so as to keep it fundamentally the same.

Threatened by the ecological crisis and by radical movements, the more far-sighted of the intellectuals aligned with the dominant class have over the past 30 years been exploring and debating on how best to undertake some kind of “global environmental management” so as to “plan” or “regulate” capital’s exploitation of nature.

Over the last five years, many – mostly but not only from developed countries – have converged on a common approach: that of “ecological modernization” through global neoliberal regulation, a “solution” that calls for 1) setting up norms enjoining all governments to contribute to the goal of reducing total global emissions but ultimately leaves it to each government to decide whether, how, and by how much, while at the same time 2) engineering market mechanisms (carbon markets, taxes, etc.) that aim to “put a price on carbon” so as to entice capital to transition to “low-carbon” investments and technologies and to allow them to find “cost-effective” solutions to achieve their targets.

To be sure, proponents of this solution have not completely succeeded in gaining the consensus of global elites. There has been opposition from the Global South. In part because their own ability to secure consent to their rule at home depends on getting concessions from the North, many if not most ruling elites from developing countries have been campaigning for an alternative ecological modernization through more social-democratic global regulation. In this solution the world’s states, acting in concert as an international authority, would collectively set caps on total global emissions and undertake global redistributive policies by directly compelling governments to reduce their emissions and transfer resources to developing countries – rather than relying primarily on the workings of the market to achieve these goals.

But wracked by their internal weaknesses and contradictions, developing-country governments have, year after year, proven unable – or unwilling – to block the market solution proposed by developed countries and gain support for their own global solu-
tions. For all their bitter fights against their developed-country counterparts in the negotiations, many ruling elites from the South ultimately share the goal: to transform the system so as to keep it fundamentally unchanged.

The result is that the developed-country officials have been moving forward in gradually establishing the foundations for a new international climate change agreement – to be signed in Paris this year and to be effective in 2020 – along the lines of global neoliberal regulation. But this agreement is unlikely to drastically bring down emissions to levels that could avert catastrophic climate change or provide resources to cope with its effects. We are therefore moving toward a new agreement that could pave the way for climate chaos and a new era of barbarism.

But there is hope. After all, the dominant bloc’s ability to impose this solution ultimately rests on their continuing ability to deflect resistance – something that, in turn, depends on their continuing ability to represent themselves as “partners.” This, in turn, rests on convincing others that they are promoting a universal interest and that they can solve the crisis under the existing order, all of which would require material sacrifices that the hegemonic bloc appears unwilling or unable to make. Such a failure by the world’s dominant groups to back up their hegemonic claims will only breed more disillusionment, anger and anxiety, and we’re already seeing signs of this in the groups of moderate environmentalists who participated in the “walk-out” from the Lima talks and the growing acceptance of the conclusion, reached by movements as early as in 1972, that those inside the official meeting are incapable of passing a “serious climate change law.”

But whether this apparent hegemonic crisis will translate into a movement capable of mobilizing the required social force to counter the dominant elites’ non-solutions to climate change – whether disillusionment and anxiety will turn into active resistance – is by no means clear. Much depends on the ability to skillfully negotiate a long-standing tension: between the goal of bringing as many people from as many diverse political tendencies onto the streets and the goal of refashioning their “common sense” and subjectivities. These two goals have not always been congruent because forging broad coalitions creates pressures to aim for the “lowest common denominator,” pander to existing taken-for-granted beliefs, and speak the language of “common sense” – a language that reinforces rather than challenges the claims of the dominant. Without transforming common sense, even the broadest coalitions and the largest demonstrations could end up simply aiding the powerful in their goal of changing the system in order to keep it the same.

What is needed is a strategy that does not alienate the public but also does not shrink from attacking the deeply entrenched categories and taken-for-granted worldviews and visions that motivate people to cast their lot with the system. This would entail scheduling “the big march” after rather than before the UN talks have ended in Paris so as to repudiate the view that “the people” are counting on the wisdom and the benevolence of the world’s elites to save the planet. It would require questioning progressive-sounding solutions that frame the climate crisis in terms of states rather than class, such as proposals to divide the “carbon budget” by countries. It would involve exhorting even progressive, socialist governments to embrace non-extractivist, non-fossil-fuel-dependent development paths.

Having succeeded in putting “Change the system!” on the agenda, the task now is to make it persuasive by spelling out our “systemic alternatives” and our “concrete phantasies.”

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The premise of public sociology is to engage publics in a dialogue of mutual education. There are of course many exciting ways to practice public sociology. In this short essay we explore two “analog” versions of practicing public sociology (for “digital” examples see the ISA’s “Public Sociology, Live!” or “e-public sociology” in Hanemaayer and Schneider, *The Public Sociology Debate*). The first practice involved developing a sociology “philosophers’ café,” which we refer to as the *Sunday Sociologist*. From this emerged our second practice, a university course version of what we had cultivated during our Sunday Sociologist gatherings in a local coffee house. Coffee houses – or “penny universities” as they were sometimes called (in reference to the penny admission fee) – have historically served as important social milieus where dialogical exchanges occurred among multiple publics, including students, merchants, and intellectuals.

Inspired by the “penny university,” in 2009 we launched the Sunday Sociologist ([www.sundaysociologist.com](http://www.sundaysociologist.com)), hoping to bring together individuals who held a wide range of different perspectives. We invited members of the community, university faculty, and students to come once a month to a local coffee shop in the heart of Kelowna, British Columbia, Canada, to debate and discuss issues of mutual...
importance (national news stories, viral videos, political projects, etc.). The goal of these meetings was to reach diverse populations, on the one hand, and to engage in mutual education about matters of local and global importance, on the other. The conversations often prompted fruitful and spirited debates, which helped to crystallize, shape, and develop our lives as professional sociologists by bringing to our attention important private troubles and public issues beyond the university classroom.

We chose to hold our meetings on the second Sunday of each month in the early evening. The scheduling reflected a deliberate effort to attract those with full-time employment who might otherwise be occupied working during the week. We advertised our sociologist cafe through a free webpage. The monthly gatherings were attended by various faculty members, university and high-school students, retired folks – as well as one individual, named Brendan, a self-identified “vacuum salesman” and “layman.”

Although our sociological cafe was named for the day of the week, our hope was to highlight the idea that no matter our walk of life, political or social persuasion, we all ponder sociological questions in our lives – whether we know it or not. Unlike the professional chemist, publics live in our laboratories – the social shapes them and they shape the social. The germ of the sociological imagination is already present. If the sociological imagination can inspire a Sunday evening of reflection, then the development of this type of thinking might be realized as a useful tool in the lives of publics we encounter in our coffee house gatherings.

The Sunday Sociologist inspired a university-sponsored course with its own syllabus. The idea was to invite members of the public to attend a sociology course. Each week an invited sociologist would offer an hour-long lecture in a publicly accessible manner, followed by an hour of small group discussion (the course was capped at 30 students). The course and each guest speaker were advertised weekly through university press releases and on social media (weekly attendance was usually around 100 people). Sociology students and members of the public were distributed between discussion groups so that they could engage in mutual dialogue. Then, together with invited sociology professors and the teaching assistant, we would move between groups, to listen, and to interject sociological materials into the dialogue.

Some of the people who frequented the Sunday Sociologist regularly attended the course. Reactions were enthusiastic! For example, the self-described vacuum salesman Brendan noted: “Being able to take part in these conversations, and finding out to my amazement that I have something to contribute has been empowering and energizing in a way that I have never experienced before.” Another public member attendee noted: “It has been a privilege and pleasure for someone not far short of 80 years, to listen to and mingle with younger and livelier minds.”

These initiatives in public sociology prompted us to think about our professional sociological commitments and perspectives. One of the most frequent dilemmas we encountered was how to make complex sociological ideas relevant and clear. We found our work within the community to be a demanding addition to our professional work, but an incredibly rewarding public teaching experience. There was a lot of public support for our projects, and we found it encouraging to explore new and innovative ways to engage communities in our work. The broader context likely contributed to the successes of these projects.

Kelowna is a particularly affluent retirement community, a very desirable place to live in the southern interior of British Columbia. Many of the public attendees at the Sunday Sociologist and the Public Sociology course were retired well-to-do individuals with undergraduate degrees. For example, Joyce, a regular public attendee of the Sunday Sociologist and the course, noted: “I’d forgotten how much I enjoyed college sociology in the 70s and 80s and how stimulated I feel again.” Attempts to develop similar projects in working-class communities of laborers, for example, might run into different challenges. Our project relied on assumptions that were specific to the community in which we created these projects: we could assume most individuals had access to computers and the internet, that they listened to local news and left-leaning radio channels which advertised the events, and that they were motivated to engage with the university in alternative capacities. Sociologists hoping to bring similar initiatives to their home communities might consider the challenges that might arise in the milieu within which they are working, in order to devise strategies through which to engage publics in their specific contexts.

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Despite a long history of social mobilization, since 1990 Chile’s urban poor have often been portrayed as passive political actors suffering from segregation and social illnesses. Based on my research in the borough of Peñalolén in Santiago, however, I argue that in some cases at least, the urban poor have been able to organize sustainable resistance, re-claiming their right to the city.

David Harvey (2008: 23) defines the right to the city as “the right to change ourselves by changing the city.” Connecting urbanization and capitalism, and in line with an academic tradition that asserts the priority of people over profit, Harvey suggests that human beings deserve the capacity to re-shape processes of urbanization by exercising collective power. For poor dwellers, exercising the right to the city often involves defending their urban habitat and their access to services and resources in the city, resisting urban processes of capitalist surplus production.

Mainstream scholarly accounts suggest that, through consistent collective mobilization, the Chilean urban poor have managed to effectively claim their right to the city – although at some times more systematically than others. Collective struggles over housing by Chile’s urban poor can be traced back to the 1920s. In connection with political parties and many other institutions, the so-called “dwellers movement” took a central role in the national political arena, pressuring the government through urban land takeovers. Between 1957 and 1970 land occupations became increasingly popular, reshaping Chilean cities, especially Santiago. In fact, in 1972, during the Allende administration, 16.6% of Santiago’s population lived in informal settlements (Santa María, 1973: 105).

As the home territories of leftist organizations, many shantytowns were severely repressed by the military dictatorship (1973-1989). Some became strongholds of grassroots resistance, playing a crucial role in the national opposition.
protests that from 1983 exposed the cruelty of the authoritarian regime.

After 1990 – when Chile restored its democracy – the prolific and coordinated dwellers’ actions vanished from the academic literature. Although several research centers devoted attention to popular mobilization through the 1980s – e.g. University of Chile, PUC, CIDU, SUR, Flacso, Vicaría de la Solidaridad – in the 1990s academic accounts emphasized democratization rather than collective action, describing shantytowns as nests of criminality, drug trafficking and other social illnesses (Hipsher, 1996; Tironi, 2003).

Santiago’s Eastern district of Peñalolén – as well as other initiatives developed in Chilean cities – offers a counter-example to those narratives of demobilization. In fact, Peñalolén’s popular neighborhoods have systematically held contentious political initiatives over the past 25 years, managing not only to claim their rights, but also to directly shape the district and residents’ immediate environment.

Demanding their “right to live,” organized through the Coordination of Committees of People with No House, almost 900 squatter families coming from different parts of Peñalolén invaded high-price land in the east of the district. In the winter of 1992 they produced Esperanza Andina: the first land occupation of Chile’s new democratic regime. Through strong communitarian organization, rejecting co-optation by political parties and the government, Esperanza Andina managed to assertively demand social housing within the local urban habitat – avoiding the peripheral relocation of the poor so often central to social housing policies. After several years of struggles, conflicts, and negotiations dwellers obtained land rights formalizing their neighborhoods, and acquired subsidies to build houses in the same lots.

In July 1999 the persistent housing demand, along with dwellers’ rejection of expulsion to the urban peripheries, led to another land occupation in Peñalolén. What became known as “Toma de Peñalolén” was clearly the biggest land occupation in Chile since 1990. Involving more than 1,800 families, the Toma pressured authorities to provide social housing subsidies within the district. Although the Toma’s organization eventually split, excluding a more radical faction from negotiations, by 2006 nearly 900 families were re-located in houses constructed in Peñalolén, while most others were allocated lots in other districts.

Peñalolén’s struggle over social housing has persisted until today. In fact, since 2006 the Movement of Dwellers in the Struggle (MPL) – a leftist grassroots organization born in the district – has coordinated local housing committees to demand a right to social housing in their district of residence.

Events in Peñalolén have however demonstrated that struggling over social housing may not be enough for poor dwellers to assert substantive rights in the city. In 2009 residents’ and grassroots organizations became aware that a new master plan for Peñalolén was to be implemented. Changing land regulation to allow the construction of buildings, incorporating new motorways to improve car access to the district, and attracting new retail shops, the new master plan aimed to upgrade the district by increasing land values. Additionally, the master plan did not include enough land to cover the district’s need for social housing. While some neighbors found those changes convenient, most resilient grassroots organizations rejected the looming gentrification process. Those organizations campaigned against the new master plan, calling for a legally binding district referendum. After disputed campaigns by the Municipality and local neighborhood organizations, in late December 2011 the master plan was democratically rejected. Protecting the district from gentrification, poor dwellers have managed to conserve an urban habitat that they created through self-construction and squatting in the 1960s and 70s.

Peñalolén’s eastern neighborhood, Lo Hermida, has developed a strong culture of contentious mobilization in the last 25 years. Drawing on communitarian values and an identity based in collective action, neighbors carry out different initiatives to collectively re-incorporate local zones that have been co-opted by other social actors. For example, residents organize music workshops or community orchards in neighborhood squares as a form of re-signifying and re-occupying zones taken by drug traffickers or threatened by private companies.

Historically condensing events of collective contestation, Peñalolén echoes many other initiatives by the Chilean urban poor that uphold their substantive access to rights in the city (Sugranyes, 2010). These struggles demonstrate that the Chilean urban poor are still able to mount effective, sustainable contentious collective action, demanding their right to the city.

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References


1 The movement by the Chilean urban poor between the 1920s and 1989 has been traditionally called “movimiento de pobladores” in Spanish. Although I use “pobladores” and “dwellers” interchangeably, this is not totally precise, for the word in Spanish has historically acquired a political meaning in Chile: it refers to urban poor residents who fight for their collective rights.
Montevideo changed drastically during the last two decades of the twentieth century: in the confluence of neoliberalism and democratization, Uruguay’s capital city grew increasingly unequal and segregated. Perhaps the most visible change – if only the tip of the iceberg – was the growth of informal settlements.

Montevideo’s squatter areas went through changes that were both quantitative and qualitative. Informal settlements expanded dramatically, but paradoxically, they were increasingly planned. Structural conditions, such as persistent de-industrialization, poverty, state retrenchment, low real wages, and perhaps even more directly, rising rents undoubtedly lie behind these changes. Yet, the picture remains incomplete if we do not examine the role of politics as well as of economic changes – the surge in land invasions was also shaped by democratization and electoral competition.

While many think of squatting as a spontaneous process, a “natural” consequence of harsh economic conditions, a closer look at Montevideo reveals the importance of organization as political networks responded to political opportunities such as elections or decentralization.

A precarious squatter settlement in Montevideo that grew on the fringes of an earlier planned occupation.

Photo by María José Álvarz Rivadulla.
In Latin America, the role of states and politics in shaping squatter settlements has long attracted attention in part because this relationship has been stronger than elsewhere. Yet Montevideo’s case is somewhat unusual, even in Latin America. Although land invasions-by-accretion, dubbed cantegriles, have occurred occasionally since the 1940s, the Uruguayan capital was able to absorb most rural migrants coming to the city during state-led industrialization through formal housing. Even in the 1980s, despite warning signs of growing urban socio-economic inequality, Montevideo was still more egalitarian than other cities of the continent, both economically and spatially.

But in the 1990s, squatter areas began to expand: in 1999, half of all Montevideo’s squatter settlements were less than fifteen years old, and about a third of these new settlements stemmed from organized land seizures. Some planned invasions even had a utopian intention, at least at the beginning; early residents wanted something more than solving basic housing needs. Generally emerging from radical factions of the left, their leaders saw planned land invasions as a grassroots kind of land reform, an implicit criticism of state housing policies. Others, less utopian, nevertheless organized to seize land, measuring and distributing plots, helping fellow squatters construct houses, delineating streets and public spaces, solving everyday needs, creating and enforcing norms. Further, they organized to demand public services, schools, health centers and neighborhood legalization. Squatter settlements are perhaps the most vital manifestation of recent political action by the urban poor in Uruguay, much as Portes and Walton described in their book Urban Latin America, for the rest of the continent 30 or 40 years earlier.

What lies behind this shift? The question is especially intriguing since Montevideo has not experienced actual population growth: rural migrants usually populate informal settlements elsewhere, but not in this city. Many of Montevideo’s squatters came from more established city neighborhoods, forced to move when they formed new families or as a result of precarious employment conditions linked to deindustrialization; others were expelled by soaring rents.

Yet, economic factors alone cannot explain why some groups and needy families decided to squat at particular moments and not at other more desperate times, for example, the 2002 economic crisis. Politics, and particularly electoral politics, mediated the emergence and consolidation of Montevideo’s new neighborhoods, especially the planned ones. The end of Uruguay’s dictatorship and the emergence of the leftist coalition Frente Amplio [Broad Front] as a third political force threatening to win, and finally winning power in the Montevideo municipality in 1990, increased electoral competition in the city – and amplified all parties’ incentives to tolerate, and even facilitate, new land invasions.

Most leaders of organized squatter settlements formed around the 1990s had ties with politicians of different parties. Though most insisted “we are apolitical here,” they were in fact hyper-political. In the past, community leaders might have turned to the Colorado Party to get roads repaired, because the Minister of Public Works came from the Colorado Party; but they would also maintain ties with a Frente Amplio councilman, who could provide information about land available for squatting, while also trying to stay in the good books of a deputy from the Blanco Party who visited the settlement.

Soon, however, all the city’s actors began to realize that what seemed a housing solution for needy families, or a way to gain votes for a party, could create big problems for the future. The living conditions in squatter settlements are precarious, and service provision can be prohibitively expensive – at a time when previously-occupied houses in formal neighborhoods fully equipped with public services stand empty. Municipal officials and politicians were very aware of this problem, which helps to explain why the number of land invasions did not surge during the 2002 economic crisis, and why outgoing President Mujica – usually sensitive to popular causes – personally intervened in a publicized land eviction in 2011. In addition, electoral competition for the votes of the urban poor diminished when the left formed the national government for a second time, in 2009.

Although Montevideo’s wave of land invasions may have been relatively short-lived, its consequences have left enduring urban and social traces. Even during the country’s current economic boom, the asentamientos (squatter settlements) still have reduced access to services, and experience a myriad of social and economic problems. The slum-upgrading program has expanded to many new neighborhoods, yet there is a limit to what infrastructure can do. Twenty to 25 years cannot be easily undone: a whole generation of kids who grew up in precarious conditions and in segregated poverty still carry the stigma of coming from squatter settlements, areas identified as red zones by the rest of the city’s residents.

Yet things are being done. Well-endowed public parks are being built in particularly deprived areas, close to squatter settlements. New housing programs are being implemented. A tax exemption incentive sparked the construction of social housing by private contractors in different areas of the city. Housing cooperatives have also been growing. Nevertheless, the effective inclusion of squatter settlements and their inhabitants still remains one of Montevideo’s greatest challenges.

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The Growth of Brazil’s Homeless Workers’ Movement

by Cibele Rizek and André Dal’Bó, University of São Paulo, Brazil

Brazil’s Homeless Workers Movement (MTST) was established in the late 1990s, uniting “workers, laborers, informal, underemployed and unemployed, who like millions of Brazilians have no access to decent housing, but instead live in rentals, in risky areas or situations of urban insecurity, located mainly in Brazil’s urban peripheries.” Now an energetic actor in Brazil’s urban politics, the MTST organized many of the street demonstrations that roiled Brazilian society during the last year, and its organizational dynamics offer a unique lens into the country’s political debates.

PROTEST IN INFORMAL SETTLEMENTS

Importantly, this movement has significant differences from the housing movements that emerged in the 1980s, which are now aligned with the federal government headed by the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Although the MTST was initially linked to the Landless Movement (MST – a basically agrarian insertion movement), the Homeless Workers Movement was founded during the 1997 National Peoples’ March, when landless movement activists were engaged in the Oziel Park urban occupation in Campinas, in the state of São Paulo. The first occupation by the MTST, named Anita Garibaldi, was organized five years later in Guarulhos.
Since that first occupation, the MTST has organized at least ten major occupations in the metropolitan regions of São Paulo and Campinas, including encampments called Chico Mendes (Taboo da Serra, 2005); João Candido (Itapeverica da Serra, 2007); Frei Tito (Campinas, 2007); Jesus Silverio (Embu das Artes, 2008); Zumbi dos Palmares (Sumaré, 2008); Dandara (Hortolandia and Santo André simultaneously, 2011); and the Novos Pinheirinhos (Santo André and Embu das Artes, 2012).

In June 2013, Brazil experienced an intense process of popular street protests, marking the end of a long period of popular demobilization linked to neoliberal policy shifts. Not coincidentally, the MTST has been increasingly active, clashing almost daily with private developers, the real estate market and the state. In addition to frequent street demonstrations, between June 2013 and August 2014, MTST-inspired occupations of abandoned and idle land and buildings have increased exponentially in São Paulo and other metropolitan areas: over 100 actions have been registered across Brazil over the past twelve months.

Brazil suffers from a growing housing shortage, with the deficit in metropolitan areas increasing by ten percent between 2011 and 2012. Thousands of Brazilian families are evicted from their homes every day by the exploding prices of land, real estate and rentals, characteristics of the current cycle of the real estate market boom. This housing deficit has occurred even as the Brazilian government implements the largest public housing program in the country’s history. Together with other social programs, the program known as ‘My House My Life’ (MCMV, which stands for Minha Casa Minha Vida) has contributed to economic growth, by promoting job creation, and access to consumption and services previously restricted to higher income classes.

Ironically, however, the social housing program has also strengthened urban segregation and exclusion, neither helping the poorest Brazilians from settling permanently in central city regions nor providing the services and infrastructure necessary for the daily life of the new residents of the expanding urban peripheries.

In this context, the Homeless Workers’ Movement’s protests have played a key role in shaping Brazilian urban policy. However, the movement’s growing links to the government’s social housing program have complicated its stance: negotiations over occupations have placed the movement simultaneously “inside” and “outside” government policy debates.

This ambiguity can be seen most clearly in the outcome of the movement’s occupations. Once an MTST occupation opens negotiations with a municipality, the city authorities are asked to expropriate occupied land – and then, frequently, the MTST calls for the inclusion of families involved in the occupation in the government’s social housing program. But new social housing may well contribute to spatial segregation, since new housing for the poor is almost inevitably constructed on urban peripheries, further exacerbating spatial inequality.

The MTST finds itself caught in an ambiguous position. Even as activists negotiate for places in the housing program – a public policy implemented by the real estate market – its occupations and street protests continue to be violently repressed through evictions, arrests, and even killings. Thus the Homeless Movement continues to illustrate what might otherwise remain hidden under Brazilian social policies: the unjust and unequal character of Brazil’s cities, the partial nature of the changes and social programs, the ongoing conflict and political struggle even after twelve years of Workers’ Party dominance. And, perhaps even more importantly, as a key protagonist in Brazil’s social struggles, the movement embodies the hope of a more just and egalitarian future for Brazil’s impoverished urban populations.

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The dominant narrative of South Africa’s first twenty years of non-racial electoral democracy emphasizes the successes of the formal political institutions, players, policies and processes shaped and activated in this period. Nonetheless, the informal intrudes constantly, perhaps most vocally in the form of protests that emerge in the first instance outside of any political party, organization or trade union, amongst poor people who come together around common problems that they face in their everyday lives.

Of particular significance are struggles of those in informal settlements and townships – places established by apartheid planners to entrench living conditions of “permanent informality” for black people. Such conditions were imagined as being necessary to keep black people in their subservient positions and “out of trouble.” After all, it was in response to illegal squatting by black people in the urban areas that the apartheid state had been forced over the years to evolve policies aimed at controlling the movement of black people (imagined only as cheap labor). These included the very establishment of “informal towns” and townships. But it was also in and from such spaces that struggles against apartheid flourished, and a different imagination of a life to be – after apartheid – was cultivated.

Today, over twenty years after the formal dismantling of apartheid institutions and policies, informality continues to characterize the lives of large numbers of the poor in South Africa. They are housed in (still growing) settlements in which apartheid-style living conditions persist. It is no wonder, then, that since the late 1990s, at least every winter (but increasingly throughout the year), poor residents of townships and informal settlements take to their local streets and highways to demand proper access to the resources necessary for a decent standard and quality of life, including water, electricity and decent housing (basic services). This has become an increasingly common feature of South African life, with a first small expansion at the beginning of the 2000s and a much bigger rate of proliferation since 2004.

As early as 1997, isolated incidents were reported across the country of
groups of poor residents protesting at being cut off from their household supplies of electricity and water. Over the following three years, such reports became far more common as poor communities felt the effects of the increasing implementation of different forms of privatization, coupled with job losses and the flexibilization of labor – the result of a neoliberal macro-economic policy agenda adopted by the ANC government in 1996. Water and electricity cut-offs and housing evictions increased as municipalities enforced a logic of payment for basic services. The affected residents came together to refuse the conditions imposed on them, engaging in various forms of protest (from marches and pickets, to refusing officials entry to worksites, damaging official property, and illegal reconnections to supplies of water and electricity). In these struggles they collaborated with other independent activists who were beginning to identify a common enemy across seemingly different and separate struggles – a common enemy that they named “neoliberalism.”

By 2001, the sustained actions and critiques of groups involved led to commentators proclaiming the emergence of “new social and community movements,” whose significance lay in that they were the first movements post-1994 to situate themselves outside of (and in an antagonistic position to) the ANC and the broader Congress movement. In an influential book published in 2002 with the title We Are The Poors, sociologist Ashwin Desai proclaimed the birth of a new political subject, “the poors,” born in the struggles of communities organizing (together with students, academics, researchers and other independent activists) to fight against the various effects of the ANC government’s adoption of neoliberal policies.

By 2004, many of these movements had entered a period of decline. The cumulative effects of state repression, intra-organizational political battles, and difficulties with accessing resources took their toll on collective driven largely by the energy and commitment of members (a majority unemployed and poor). In many cases, the very responses of the state to movement demands resulted in their paralysis. Ironically, 2004 was also the year that marked the beginning of an even bigger proliferation of struggles, very much like those made popular by the new movements of the early 2000s. Once again, the informal realm of politics would intrude, the formal responses to the earlier struggles having failed to satisfy the needs of all.

In fact, the proliferation of local-level protests led by poor people outside of any formal political structures since 2004 has been so striking as to lead to its description as a “rebellion of the poor,” by sociologist Peter Alexander. It has also seen the mainstream media coin and popularize the term “service delivery protests” as shorthand for such actions. Although poor “service delivery” (including basic services and the provision of infrastructure) is almost always at the heart of such protests, corrupt councilors, mismanagement of common funds and property, and poor communication between municipalities and their residents are often the catalysts for action. By 2012, protests were taking place at the rate of at least one a day.

In many cases, protests only erupt once residents have exhausted engagement through the official channels and have received no response from the municipality. In a collection of case studies entitled The Smoke That Calls, published by Karl Von Holdt et al. in 2011, protesters contend that sometimes the only way to get the attention of the relevant authorities is to set property alight or burn tires in barricades (to make “the smoke that calls”). Increasing actions of this nature have resulted in the media’s increasing use of the label “violent service delivery protests.” At the same time, the actions of the police have become increasingly violent, with newspapers reporting the death of at least 43 protesters at the hands of the police since 2009.

Protests today are also often linked to differences within the local structures of the ANC and its aligned formations. This has been seen the mobilization of groups of ANC members against their own elected leaders in municipalities. Sometimes these result from battles lost within the party or the state, and sometimes to expose and question the very forms of state patronage and access to channels for self-enrichment (through tenders, access to jobs and funding). As splits from within the ANC fold play themselves out, it will be interesting to see how new political players like the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and the United Front (launched by the National Union of Metalworkers together with other community and civil society formations) will relate to such local struggles of the poor.

Although political players tend to direct their attention to the realm of formal politics (parties and parliament), the informal continues to present itself as an ongoing site of contestation at a local level. It is here that the potential for alternative forms of engagement and production lies. A lot, however, depends on the collective potential and commitment to imagine politics differently.

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Zambia: Evictions without Social Movements

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In April 2013, fifteen armored vehicles and policemen stormed plot 10144 in Lusaka West. Unsuspecting residents woke up to the shock of being evicted. They could not do anything but watch because they were being threatened with weapons. Police demolished 33 houses. About 365 people, many of whom had occupied the land for twenty years became homeless. Some evictees were low-ranking police officers. There was no eviction notice provided. The Lusaka City Council and court bailiffs were not present. After the eviction, senior police officers appropriated the land for themselves. More evictions and demolitions followed during that month. Frustrated, on May 15 evicted families marched in solidarity towards the Vice-President’s Office but were stopped and dispersed by armed police. They did not possess a police permit, a requirement of the Public Order Act. Evictees had no one to turn to but themselves. Why was this spark not enough to begin a movement to prevent land evictions and why have existing housing social movements failed to protect the evicted? Here I explore possible answers to these questions.

The Lusaka West case was just one case among many. Evictions involving hundreds of households have occurred without inspiring organized action. In 2014 alone, several took place in Lusaka – fourteen houses were demolished on July 25 in Kanyama, 100 houses were demolished in Chinika on October 3 and on November 18 soldiers forcefully evicted villagers in Mikango Barracks. The
policy of demolishing housing built illegally on public and private land goes back to the Zambia government’s policy announced in 2007. Since coming to power in 2011, the Patriotic Front government has continued to eradicate illegal and even some upgraded squatter settlements – settlements that had acquired this status as part of the policy of previous governments. In the process of demolition, legal procedures have not been followed, and in some cases evictions have resulted in fatalities. This has only raised public concern.

These conditions are fertile for social mobilization – 70% of the urban population live in slums, which means it has a squatter settlement and urban population that could easily reach a critical mass; and the country has a strong documented history of protest and collective action.

How to explain the absence of protest? First, there is a long history of intolerance from among political elites starting with the maintenance of the Public Order Act of 1955. The Act was used by the British colonial administration to impose control over freedom fighters. Succeeding presidents have not repealed it. The Act requires protesters to obtain a permit through the police and Minister of Home Affairs. It is however vague as to the grounds for granting permits. They can only be obtained seven days before the day of protest. When the cause falls outside what is recognized by the law or when there is opposition from political elites, permits are often not granted. Moreover, the law does not recognize de facto tenure rights, so evictees from illegal settlements do not have legal backing for protest, despite having lived on the land for many years.

It is not only reactionary character of the political elite that contributes to the lack of protest, but also fear of the consequences of marching without a permit. Violation of the Public Order Act is often accompanied by use of police brutality evoking fear even among settlers in upgraded squatter settlements. For example, during forced evictions in Kampasa near the airport on June 14, 2013, two men were fatally shot, and one injured by the Zambia National Service. My interviewees in the upgraded squatter settlement, George, worried about the recent evictions and contemplated their own position even when they had a measure of tenure security through occupancy licenses. When asked what they would do if the government came to repossess their land, they felt that they would have to give it up and find somewhere else to go.

Government and civil society fail to protect potential evictees because of scarcity of financial resources. The right to housing is not enshrined in the constitution because, as President Mwanawasa argued in 2008, the government would then have to commit financial resources to ensure the fulfillment of that right – finances it claims it does not have. In this way, the government has publicly refused the obligation to compensate evictees. Rather than provide resources to improve the informal settlements, it is cheaper to simply demolish them.

Civil society also lacks the financial resources to protect illegal settlement dwellers from eviction. Although there is a strong presence of Zambia Land Alliance and Homeless International through an organization called The People’s Process on Housing and Poverty in Zambia which, in principle, should take up the fight against evictions, in reality they don’t. “Often times the alliance has not mobilized communities or handled land cases of public interest as expected by the public sometimes due to the lack of capacity or resources to follow up the cases” (Zambia Land Alliance, 2014, http://www.zla.org.zm/?p=9). In 2010, accusations of corruption led to suspension of disbursements of aid to both government and civil society organizations, which ground many projects to a halt for almost 2 years. Thus, these organizations only go as far as issuing statements and threats of demonstrations without actual follow-through.

In summary the two main challenges to the rise of an anti-eviction movement in Lusaka and to new social movements in Zambia are, first, the open hostility to any form of protest on the part of political elites and, second, the limited financial resources available to government and civil society to solve the housing problem. Once people are evicted they see no opportunity for redress and so collective protest would have no purpose. Only changes in the law on public order and increased economic growth could provide conditions under which anti-eviction movements might arise.

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New forms of sharing, as well as new ways of collaborative production and consumption, are raising questions for the current economy. Fablabs and hackerspaces have a particular place in this context where commons-inspired wealth is based on access and use rather than property. These collective manufacturing spaces, which appeared in the mid-2000s, are introducing a new work ethic: a maker culture. Dispersed all over the world, these spaces have different names: fablabs (fabrication laboratories), hackerspaces,
makerspaces, living labs, tech shops, among others. They are an invitation to rediscover the pleasure of throwing different objects together, of coding software programs, or simply imagining new styles of clothing and cooking. Across the globe, major metropolises are welcoming these new spaces that simultaneously promote new ways of manufacturing, collaboration, consumption and learning.

A 3D printer is often the center of attention at these sites, as it allows for the production of any object, using plans found on the Internet. Although results are still modest, progress is astounding. Most of these spaces also have professional equipment such as numerical control machines: cutters, laser cutters, silkscreen printers. Only a few years ago, months of training were necessary to successfully operate one of these machine tools to manufacture prototypes. Today, training to use them correctly takes only a few hours. Moreover, prices of machines and design software have dropped significantly. Thus, just as personal computers allow us to navigate the tech world, Personal Fabricators can allow anyone to engage the physical world.

However, even if they share common values, fabrication laboratories in Barcelona, Berlin, San Francisco, Paris or Beijing are not all alike. Fablabs were founded at MIT (Massachusetts) in the early 2000s and have formed a worldwide network. Hackerspaces have a different story. Their origins lie in California during the early 1970s with the Homebrew Computer Club, an incubator where hobbyists gathered to explore and invent information technology. Some shared their findings for free while others, including Steve Jobs and Bill Gates, took a more traditional capitalist route. Steeped in hacker spirit, hackerspaces are no different from fablabs from an organizational perspective. Even if coding practices are more advanced at these sites, hackerspaces are similarly equipped with materials for individuals to manufacture, invent, fiddle with different objects and make something. Moreover, just as with fablabs, public access is an important criterion, as well as the will to make these spaces not only sites of innovation and manufacturing but also places for collective learning and sharing knowledge.

Fabrication laboratories are partially anchored in the territories where they are located. They operate in networks that sketch the contours of new productive ecosystems. Some observers consider them the beginning of a new industrial revolution or the avant-garde of a civilized exit from capitalism. But one need not go that far to realize that these new worlds should be taken seriously. These spaces are laden with multiple innovations on technical, political and organizational levels. Though they may be located at the margins of the dominant economy, their growing success is indicative of socio-cultural shifts in the ways people work, design, produce, make decisions and take action.

Sociologists who have begun to study these new production sites show that although these spaces are heterogeneous, they have a shared mode of organization, partially issued from developer and hacker communities. The culture fostered by the free/open source world, founded a few decades ago, introduced new ways of working and collaborating relying on egalitarian and horizontal networks. They also developed new ways of sharing goods and services, for example, through the Copyleft license. The maker movement, which includes fabrication laboratories, also draws inspiration from a tradition critical of industrial society, initiated by William Morris in the world of design.

A recent survey of hackerspaces we conducted in northern California showed that these alternative maker worlds are mostly made up of young white educated thirty-year-olds disenchanted with academia. These spaces, frequented by both Google engineers and homeless techies, have one objective: to hack, that is, to innovate by engaging computers, physical objects and even society at large. Some makers actively participate in innovation processes for the Silicon Valley, while the more radical invest their energy at the service of those contesting the established order, such as the Occupy movement. In a time of generalized structural crisis, it is worth examining these alternative spaces, real utopias where new ways of working, decision-making, consumption and living together are being invented.

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Declining birth rates, decreasing employment rates among mothers, and the renunciation of motherhood are increasingly considered major risks, connected to the demography and levels of social welfare in “developed” countries. Although the financial and budgetary crises of the last few years affect all social contracts, they particularly threaten the dynamics of gender equality and worsen the conditions for a work-family balance.

Policymakers at all levels report growing awareness that women play a key role in shaping social cohesion. Women are recognized for their contribution to the labor market and domestic activities, a double involvement, which is particularly valued in difficult times, counterbalancing institutional deficiencies and disequilibrium while ensuring social and economic development.

A new global consensus recognizes that most people hope to take care of children and other dependent people, while still sustaining professional careers. They hope to sustain this double commitment without questioning the existing sexual division of labor and associated reproduction activities, which today, as always, assumes that women will take primary responsibility for domestic activities. Consequently, almost all countries now agree to help parents to meet these two objectives and to make work and family balance a major issue for individuals as much as for society.

At first glance, the public diagnoses appear sexually neutral: the point is to allow everyone to work for an in-
come. In all countries where the welfare state is strong (as well as in all countries where these programs are under construction), we see unprecedented expansion of social policies aimed at reconciling work and family obligations – from reforms of tax and benefit systems, to improved management of child care systems, as well as encouragement of practices that aim at a better balance of professional and family life in terms of the organization of work.

Yet in all the countries in question, a shift is taking place in the implementation of policies. Despite the gender-neutral rhetoric, measures laid out in political agendas (or within companies) are losing their neutrality in practice. Parent and family leaves for everyone become privileged ways to support working mothers; reduced working time for all is diluted through an explosion of part-time work for women; the length of a birth leave that should include both parents is judged in terms of its impact on the well-being of women and children, etc. In other words, at their core, these policies target not men nor parents but women, as actual or potential mothers. In October 2014, for example, Facebook and Apple frankly admitted as much, offering female employees “grappling with the competition of men and a more and more competitive work market” the option to freeze their oocytes so that they can consider having children once their careers are consolidated.

In part, this pattern reflects resistance to changing family patterns – changes that take place despite measures to help working parents. Moreover, maintaining mothers’ employment – when most mothers take on a “double shift” of work and family support – becomes a real political problem, provoking questions about whether requiring women to prioritize their “out-of-production” work is physically or psychologically sustainable, and whether these practices transgress ideals of social justice.

The battle to reconcile professional and family life is still far from being won. We begin with general questions (how to help parents to balance work and family life), but we offer only partial solutions (expecting mothers to earn incomes without changing the sexual division of labor).

To move forward, mobilization must start from criticizing and reconstructing the organizational and institutional foundations of the wage-based societies of the 19th century and the welfare states of the 20th century. We must question established social arrangements and deconstruct the naturalness of practices that follow from these arrangements. We must question social contracts involving gender relations: the idea of a world centered on production, the assumption of an atomized figure of the producer supported by a care-giver, the model of a male breadwinner for the family, the androcentric pact of solidarity. We must deconstruct the social partition of productive and reproductive activities, and the gendered assignment of their completion.

If we take these propositions seriously, we could then begin to consider an alternative society, starting with new frames of reference that would no longer treat as secondary socially-useful activities outside employment. We could begin to transform the wage-based society into a “multi-active society.” Employment would be re-imagined relative to other activities judged worthy of support in terms of social investment, without any of these activities being either hegemonic or reserved for men or women. Inactivity or non-work would become uncommon and the work-family articulation would no longer be a burden resting primarily on women.

This transformation requires the progressive construction of a new regime of activities, where the status of being “active” would no longer be defined in terms of a restrictive notion of employment, but rather based on a more inclusive notion of work, embracing care work and civic labor. From this perspective, society would no longer focus on paid work and overlook non-market forms of work; instead, we would move towards a broad conception of work emphasizing and recognizing the usefulness of all activities contributing to the well-being and common good.

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> Negotiating Chronic Illness at Work

by Anne-Marie Waser, Dominique Lhuilier, Frédéric Brugéilles, Pierre Lénel, Guillaume Huez, Joëlle Mezza, and Cathy Hermand, Conservatoire national des arts et métiers, Paris, France

In France, keeping the working-age population employed has become a matter of concern for two reasons: this population is aging and increased percentages have been diagnosed with chronic illnesses, particularly cancer. Broad detection programs have increased the number of diagnosed cases per year, while medical progress, early detection and improved treatments with less side effects have transformed several previously mortal conditions into chronic illnesses. In France, almost 15 million people have been diagnosed with a chronic illness, roughly 20% of the working-age population.

Patient organizations have raised concerns about supporting those living with illness or disabilities for a long time. However, agencies in charge of developing research on several illnesses (hepatitis, HIV, cancer, multiple sclerosis, diabetes, among others) have recently begun to request qualitative social science research. Specifically, they are interested in learning more about individuals who resume work after a sick leave as well as how they remain employed. Within this context, we developed an action research project bringing together psychologists and sociologists to: a) understand the conditions under which a person diagnosed with an illness returns to work and remains employed; and b) intervene to offer individual and collective resources that favor their employment.

This action research project was carried out at three large French firms. Over two and a half years, we studied groups of people diagnosed with specific ailments who wished to return to work or pursue any activity that people like to do and that may or may not provide monetary resources (care, teaching, volunteer community work, etc.). To examine their social conditions, we considered three hierarchical levels in our study: a) practices of human resources management related to workplace health and social issues; b) intermediary staff who managed individual cases of sickness leave, chronic fatigue, temporary or permanent disability; c) workers who have returned to work after a diagnosis as well as their colleagues. We analyzed all the elements identified by this population as relevant to explaining the impact of an illness on working life, family life, environment, community, among others. More specifically, we inquired about the obstacles they faced, the resources employed to confront these obstacles, and under what conditions these resources could be used.

Our research was not limited to employees with a declared illness or disability. We tried to compare the resources available to employees who had not declared their illness to coworkers or supervisors with workers who had requested and obtained disability compensations.
order to obtain these social benefits, the latter requested a certificate of illness from an agency in charge of assessing these claims. Importantly, a majority of employees in France who have a chronic illness or disability do not request these benefits. Indeed, only 2.5 million people request certificates of illness, although some 9.9 million could do so. We sought to understand the consequences of declaring an illness, as well as the reasons why a majority might abstain from doing so.

Results showed that authorized compensations for a certified illness or disability may carry a stigma or be perceived as unjust. Issued by interdisciplinary expert commissions, these compensations are often quite rigid, while illnesses may be more flexible. They are often misunderstood in the work environment, as coworkers and supervisors are largely excluded from negotiating the type, variation and duration of a compensation. Further, there is a second obstacle to the implementation of these compensation measures: human resources or health services impose these from above, with only partial knowledge of real working conditions. Hence, these measures often ignore informal arrangements among coworkers, which are developed in agreement with management and may offer more flexibility. Based on reciprocity, all the local arrangements we have analyzed produce less tension in the workplace than dispositions imposed without prior negotiation. Moreover, the cases of reciprocity we observed involved both individual and collective activities. In sum, local arrangements were grounded in specific contexts.

Our study found that successful compensations — those perceived by social actors as fair and that endured beyond a sickness leave — have several characteristics: they are hybrids of legal measures and local arrangements; they are articulated by those who encounter difficulties in the workplace; and the compensation is jointly elaborated. These social actors spoke in favor of compensations for any disability and for any employee. They questioned some expert certificates of illnesses that offer rights, but were perceived as a means of taking advantage of an illness. Altogether, actions carried out within firms sought to create local conditions of reciprocity among those providing and receiving aid that went beyond solidarity, goodwill, mutual assistance, and disability compensation. We found that patient organizations provided real opportunities for participants to begin transforming their working conditions. Finally, they also allowed individuals to reappropriate the meaning of being ill, to reestablish an identity and to bring individual situations into the realm of collective rights.

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Greetings! Two fingers! Don’t forget to vote for Jokowi!” Slank, a famous rock band, sang with joy and jubilation in support of Indonesia’s presidential candidate Jokowi and his vice-presidential running mate, Jusuf Kalla, at Jakarta’s Bung Karno stadium on July 5, 2014. They were joined by tens of thousands of fellow supporters: young and old, men and women, poor and rich, sang along during the free concert. A few moments later the man they had been waiting for appeared: Jokowi climbed on the stage and greeted his supporters. The atmosphere became electric and clamorous, as the crowds throughout the stadium yelled “Jokowi! Jokowi!” while holding up two fingers.

This year, for the first time, elections in Indonesia were transformed into a “real party for people’s democracy.” The enthusiasm was unstoppable, as countless people participated in a vigorous campaign, engaging in activities that ranged from designing campaign activities to raising more than 295 billion rupiah in donations. On election day, after a vigorous political campaign rejecting the kind of money politics that had previously been accepted as normal prac-
tice, people worked together to monitor the elections to prevent fraud.

This is the face of Indonesia’s exciting new democracy: there has been significant change, from a democracy loaded with dirty politics and power-hungry politicians who often resorted to devious practices, to radical democratic reforms aimed at establishing a more civilized and humane democracy. During the recent Indonesian elections, the transaction-based political mobilization often practiced by the elites of political parties has lost popularity and seems on the verge of becoming obsolete. In its place we have witnessed the birth of a new political culture, based on voluntary participation.

What has caused this change? Few observers would have predicted the “reversal” that seemed to occur so suddenly, especially after Indonesia’s long history of dirty politics. Clearly, the “Jokowi Effect” has been a major factor in starting the ball rolling, but particular circumstances seem to have started the winds of change. At a certain point, the universe seemed to say “This is the time” – a time when longings for change were answered, and frustration and disgust at on-going chaos, corruption and political oligarchy reached a climax.

Joko Widodo, better known as Jokowi, has become increasingly popular in the last two years. An entrepreneur who started his political career in 2005 as the mayor of Solo, one of the major cities in Central Java, Jokowi is known as an honest and hardworking man, from a modest background. He is also loved for his humanistic approach in the implementation of government policies, cleaning up corruption in his municipality and working hard to turn the city of Solo into a center of tourism and culture. In 2013, Jokowi was named the third best mayor in the world by the City Mayors Foundation, and in 2014, Jokowi’s name was listed in Fortune magazine’s “50 Greatest World Leaders.”

Jokowi’s success in Solo jump-started his political career. Backed by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) – the country’s main opposition party – in 2012 he was elected governor of Indonesia’s capital, Jakarta. Together with the deputy governor Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok), also known for his integrity, Jokowi implemented various new programs, including programs for flood control and traffic congestion – problems which had not previously been taken seriously in this sprawling mega-city. In addition to controlling the river and improving public transport, Jokowi and Ahok also reformed urban planning, health care and education in Jakarta.

As the presidential election approached PDI-P advanced Jokowi as their presidential candidate. He was paired with Jusuf Kalla (JK), a senior politician from the Golkar Party and former vice-president. Jokowi’s vision for Indonesia was packaged as an invitation to start a “Mental Revolution,” as Jokowi invited the people of Indonesia to join his efforts. Anti-corruption and transparency, mutual help, creativity, independence and appreciation of differences are some of the fundamental values that underpin the Mental Revolution.

Once Jokowi and JK were designated as a team, polls showed support continuing to expand, especially from pro-democracy activists, scholars, musicians and artists, young people, students, businessmen and popular classes. These supporters worked in communities voluntarily, willingly, going unpaid; some even spent money from their own pockets. By contrast their political opponents, Prabowo and Hatta, were supported mainly by groups in search of power and money, reactionary groups, and corrupt politicians.

On July 22, 2014, the General Election Commission finally declared victory for Jokowi-JK, who won 53.1% of the vote. The opponents, Prabowo-Hatta, were declared defeated with 47.8% of the vote. Many analysts describe this as a victory of the people, noting that Jokowi-JK’s victory is not directly related to support from political parties. Jokowi-JK’s supporters were predominantly non-partisan: most were not affiliated to a particular political party, and many had not participated actively in previous elections.

Today, we have new hope for a healthy democracy and a politics of dignity for the Indonesian people. The new culture of voluntary participation in the last elections could prove to be an embryo of wider democratic reforms and a first step to social transformation in Indonesia.

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After the Indonesian reform movement ended 32 years of authoritarian military rule in 1998, the state introduced hotly contested educational reforms. Since 2003 the establishment of the Constitutional Court opened a new venue where society could challenge laws it regards as unconstitutional, and over the past decade, educational providers, students and civil society groups have brought suits over the new education laws.

In 1999 the government issued a government regulation which allowed the corporatization of certain public higher education institutions. Among the reasons given for the changes was to grant greater autonomy for enhance-
ing national competitiveness in re-
response to sharp competition caused by processes of globalization. Consequent-
yly, between 2000 and 2010 the government corporatized six public universities and two public institutes.

The corporatization of public universi-
ties and institutes triggered strong reac-
tions from the public, especially parents and students. In the past, tuition fees for public higher education institutions were tightly controlled by the government. As public higher education institutions continued to expand, government funding could no longer keep up with rising educational costs so that tuition became an increasingly important source of revenue. Periodic increases in tuition fees became common.

Students of public higher education institutions had in the past contested tuition hikes on their campuses through various means such as on-campus and street demonstrations, occupy movements, petitions, public debates, criticisms through the mass media and, more recently, through social media. Many students opposed the corporatization of public higher education institutions fearing higher tuition fees and a more general commercialization of education that would effectively prohibit underprivileged students from admission. Most of the time, however, these protests were in vain as campus authorities stood firm, knowing they could count on government support.

In 2003 the state issued a new law which among other things proposed to corporatize all educational institutions – formal and non-formal, at all levels from nursery to tertiary education, both public and private. A law corporatizing educational institutions was subsequently issued in 2009.

These two new laws alarmed private foundations that ran existing educational institutions, because their controls would be significantly curtailed. In 2006 sixteen private and non-governmental organizations asked the Court to conduct a judicial review of the 2003 law, in particular the article on corporatization. The request was rejected, however, because the law had not yet been enacted.

Parents, students and civil society organizations also began to request judicial reviews because they were interested in ensuring free public education and preventing the corporatization of public higher education that, in their view, would lead to commercialization. They argued that education was a public good, and that the entire cost of education was the state’s responsibility; they regarded any attempt to shift the burden of educational costs to society as unconstitutional.

In 2009, private and non-governmental organizations together with students, teachers, lecturers, parents, and scholars from various regions filed five separate requests for a review of the 2003 and 2009 laws. Their effort paid off: the Court revised a number of articles in the 2003 law and scrapped the entire 2009 law.

In most cases, these challenges to specific aspects of educational reform generally reflected the specific social location of the challenger. Organizations that administer educational providers were interested in the sustainability of their private educational institutions; they opposed corporatization because they would lose control over their educational institutions and would face legal uncertainties. After their requests for a review of the 2003 law and the 2009 law were granted, their resistance to the corporatization of educational institutions ended.

After the 2009 law was declared non-binding, however, the state issued in 2012 a new law on higher education providing a new legal basis for the corporatization of public higher education institutions. In 2013 undergraduate law students from a public university requested the Court to review six articles in the 2012 law; however, their requests were rejected.

What did the students, parents, concerned scholars and civil society organizations achieve with their requests for judicial reviews? Although the 2003 law was modified and the 2009 law scrapped, their goals – free education and the prevention of the corporatization of public higher education institutions – were not realized. Taken together, the Court’s decisions mean that:

1. Students of public higher institution have to pay tuition fees, subject to government controls;

2. Public higher education institutions are required to allocate at least 20% of available seats to high-achieving but economically underprivileged applicants, but are not obliged to allocate more than 20%;

3. Public higher education institutions are allowed to rely on different student entrance systems; the Court linked these decisions to affirmative action while students tend to view this policy as commercialization;

4. The corporatization of eligible public higher education institutions now continues unopposed.

Students, parents and civil society activists have exhausted all their options for attaining free public higher education, because decisions of the Constitutional Court cannot be appealed. Their defeat has demoralized the movement, and at present there are no initiatives to oppose the commercialization of higher education. Nonetheless, students at various public higher education institutions still contest tuition fees that are unfair to low-income families, but the object of their contestation is now their own institution rather than the state. ■

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GD VOL. 5 / # 1 / MARCH 2015
After a long period of absence from the political arena, the labor movement in Indonesia seems on the verge of a new political activism. In 2014, a number of union leaders were elected to parliament at the district level during the general election. This achievement is historic, since there has been no genuine representation of the working class in Indonesia’s national and local parliament for nearly 50 years. The debate about expanding the workers’ struggle beyond the workplace into the broader arena has been also roiling,
with several social and political experiments over the past decade. We can now ask: can the labor movement transform class politics in Indonesia?

The economic liberalization and democratization underway since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998 generated new challenges and a different pattern of industrial conflict. State control has been replaced by market control. Mobile and powerful capital in a highly competitive global market becomes the “new opponent,” the new threat to union development. The basis of new unions is already being eroded by excessive flexibilization of the labor market – even before those new unions regained their footing following the collapse of Suharto’s corporatist state.

Today’s conditions prompt unions to focus on anti-flexibilization. Traditional agendas involving increasing wages, freedom of association, and resisting job termination are also part of this new framework. Unions attack the state for its liberalizing labor policies and companies for imposing precarious working conditions (Juliawan, 2011). Unions have, therefore, campaigned for a more effective social security system that would compensate for job insecurities and the increasing vulnerability of workers. The union movement has been at the center of demands to transform the social welfare system, thereby creating a much broader constituency amidst the loss of thousands of union members.

Broadening the labor movement’s constituency presents new challenges, however, particularly as unions try to obtain wider social and political support to deal with aggressive market pressures. Although many unions remain conservative, a number of local unions affiliated to progressive national unions have pursued two strategies. The first involves becoming leaders especially within working class communities but also building relations with different groups, including peasants and street vendors. A second strategy involves taking part in electoral politics. Here the objective is to build representation in local parliaments, opening a pathway for national representation in order to influence the policymaking process. Participating in electoral politics is also regarded as a vehicle for establishing a broader base of support for unions.

The pattern of industrial conflict and the transformation of unionism in the post-Suharto era may have stimulated a growing and more consolidated working-class movement, but the gains are never assured (Hadiz, 2001). For example, two leaders of a progressive union in the Bekasi industrial region, near Jakarta, successfully campaigned for local electoral seats in 2014. This was a successful experiment since they won through organized support from militant members. Following their historic victory, the leaders of the national union took a controversial position in the 2014 presidential election – mobilizing union members to support the presidential candidate who had served in Suharto’s authoritarian regime and who was endorsed largely by Islamic political parties lacking political roots in the working class. This has raised major questions about the interest of the unions’ national leaders in class politics.

Meanwhile, most of the other union experiments in electoral politics have fizzled out, failing to win significant votes even from workers’ communities. Many of those who did win electoral seats did not use their own union as a political base, benefitting instead from other party political machines. Instead of building a working-class politics, these politicians find themselves dealing with the pragmatics of money politics and competing with powerful religious ideologies.

A similar situation is found in efforts to broaden labor’s constituency through community-based movements. Although some unions were quite successful in establishing wide networks and exchanging social for political support, they nevertheless now find it difficult to establish a strategic common interest. Each group within the network tends to remain dominated by their own narrow horizons; support is simply exchanged between particular groups, without building a common class interest even among workers. Likewise, success in promoting a national social security system linking the working class to wider social groups cannot be regarded as the triumph of class politics: it reflects a cross-class citizens’ coalition rather than working-class interests per se.

While there are bright spots, the development of the current Indonesian labor movement is handicapped by the vulnerability of its social base. Although the young generation – which makes up most of the workforce and is the mainspring behind the current labor movement – never lived under the authoritarian regime. Instead, they have experienced a long history of depoliticization (Caraway et al., 2014). Industrial conflicts, social movements, and the collective consciousness constructed through these processes, are not sufficient to forge a sturdy class-based political movement. Moreover, cross-class interests as well as other identities such as ones based on religion are powerful rivals for the allegiance of workers.

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At the end of the Suharto era (1990s), the Indonesian public sphere was marked by religious sentiment and racial intolerance. Being non-Muslim or Chinese and, therefore, perceived as non-native Indonesian, was hard at that time. These sensitive issues were at play in the 1998 riots which triggered the “Reformation” that brought Suharto’s New Order to its end.

Racial discrimination toward Indonesian-Chinese – stipulated as government policy in 1967 when Suharto started ruling Indonesia – was prohibited in 2000 by Abdurrahman Wahid, Indonesia’s fourth President. Confucianism, which is perceived as the traditional religion of the Indonesian-Chinese, was recognized as one of the country’s official religions in 2006. While racial sentiment has been moderated over the past decade, religious sentiment and prejudice persist. The issue is so sensitive that people avoid religion in rational and critical public discourse. Politics make religion untouchable.

Throughout Indonesian history, religion has been used in politics, reaching its peak in the bureaucratization of religious legal identity in the 1970s. In the Dutch East Indies era (from the early nineteenth century until 1942), religion, especially Islam, was considered a political threat, because it could mobilize civil unrest. The Dutch colonial government let “religious Islam” grow, but repressed Islam as a political identity. Similar policies suppressed political activities by local indigenous religious groups. Expressions of religion were confined to the realm of personal affairs.

Under Japanese colonialism (1942-1945), Islam became a strategy of war. The Japanese mobilized anti-Dutch sentiment among Indonesia’s Muslim majority, creating a special unit of state administration to control and facilitate an Islamic movement; in independent Indonesia, this would become the Ministry of Religious Affairs.
During Indonesia’s early period of independence (1945-1959), groups who identified as a part of a broad Islamic movement claimed they had contributed to Indonesia’s independence and argued that Indonesia should become an Islamic state. On the other side, secular nationalist groups, including both Muslims and non-Muslims, insisted that Indonesia should be a state for all religions.

A compromise between these two groups was enshrined in the 1945 Indonesian Constitution (article 29). Indonesia was not a secular state, because it was based on the belief of an almighty god, but it did not specify any specific religious creed. Moreover the new state guaranteed religious freedom. But the compromise also established a Ministry of Religious Affairs in 1946, a step designed to accommodate Islamic groups.

In the era of Sukarno’s “guided democracy,” (1959-1965) there was polarization between religious groups and non-religious groups, with great tension between religious groups (Muslims and Catholics) on one side and communists on the other. Sukarno’s nationalist faction, which leaned toward socialism, tended to be more neutral in terms of religion. In order to make religious groups feel protected from atheist-communists attacks and to win support from religious groups, Sukarno introduced an anti-blasphemy law in 1965 concerning the “Prevention of Blasphemy and Abuse of Religions.” Later, this unexpected law served as a basis for the next phase of Islamization, as it was used against people seen as acting against religion (especially Islam).

During the Suharto era (1966-1998), religion became excessively bureaucratized. The anti-blasphemy law served as the guardian of religion’s position in the public domain. Under this law, the Suharto administration recognized several official state religions (Islam, Protestant, Roman Catholic, Buddhism and Hinduism), excluding Confucianism and local beliefs.

Ever since the Suharto era, Indonesian citizens have had to declare their religion officially on their ID cards. Effectively, the Ministry of Religious Affairs serves as an executive organ for exercising the governing power of the state. In addition, a marriage law that was enacted in 1974 intensified the power of religion in state administration: adhering to one of the country’s official religions is required for obtaining marriage and birth certificates. Meanwhile, the 1989 Religious Court Act established religion’s power deep in Indonesia’s administrative structure through the judicial branch of government. Religion became a legal identity. The Ministry of Religion strengthened the power of religion, giving it a bureaucratic basis; it penetrates state administration, differentiating between citizens. This is how Suharto brought religion under his wing.

With the Reformation (following Suharto’s resignation in 1998), Indonesia’s public sphere became a site of contestation for many groups (religious, ethnic, local and territorial communities), seeking public attention, and recognition from the state. In the Reformation era there emerged a new politicized Islamic movement expressed, for example, in the religious conflicts that erupted in the Moluccas in 1999. This upsurge in religious conflict led to a new tolerance for unrecognized (unofficial) religions and “other Islamic” (Ahmadiyya and Shia as well as the majority Sunni) identities to be represented on the public stage. Along with the recognition of Confucianism and local beliefs, previously unrecognized religious groups have been permitted to register their marriages since 2006. Individuals may now leave “religion” blank on their ID cards, even if they do not belong to one of the official religions.

However, religion often wins in political contests, suggesting that religious sentiment and ties remain stronger than any other socio-cultural affiliation. Religious sentiment in Indonesia’s public sphere is not uncomplicated. But clearly, when religion becomes a legal identity, religion has been regimented as a state instrument, exploited by the ruler to oversee the ruled. Through Indonesia’s state administrative agencies and its judicial branch, religion’s authority has been co-opted by the state, and strengthening its power over people’s everyday life. In such an organized form, religion becomes an administrative affair, threatening its spirituality.

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Stimulating Upward Mobility in Indonesia

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Indonesia experienced tremendous economic recovery after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, going from a low middle-income country to joining the G-20 group. In addition, Indonesia has attained political, financial and economic stability, and become one of the world’s largest democracies (World Bank, 2014a). Despite impressive growth, inequality is also rising, as evidenced in Indonesia’s Gini coefficient, which rose from 0.33 in 1999 to 0.41 in 2011. This increased inequality may lead...
to slower poverty reduction, decelerated economic growth, and increased conflict and social tension. Moreover, inequality both reflects and creates unfair access to public services: a child from the bottom decile of the population has a 43% likelihood of being physically stunted, compared to only 14% for the top decile. Likewise, the probability of dropping out of school is far higher for children from poorer homes: 71% of the lowest decile will leave school early, compared to 26% from the top (World Bank, 2014b).

For many years, inequality in Indonesia has been most obvious in unequal opportunities for upward social mobility. Which people are most successful in improving their social position, and what factors produce upward social mobility? My research examined inequality in the urban areas of two provinces, West and East Java, drawing on the longitudinal data compiled by the Indonesian Family Life Survey (IFLS) 1993-2007. The sample includes 1,177 men and women aged 20-64.

Opportunities for upward social mobility in urban Indonesia are greater for individuals from higher social classes than for lower-class Indonesians (Pattinasarany, 2012). The data shows around 27% social mobility from lower to middle classes compared to 45% from middle to upper classes. In fact, opportunities for social mobility barely exist in the lowest classes. In Indonesia, as in much of the world, the lower the social class, the smaller the chance for upward mobility. As well as class rigidity, there is also positional rigidity, keeping most respondents in the same class as their parents.

With regard to gender, men are more likely to move upward than similarly-situated women, especially for those who start out in the lower social class. The demands on women to fulfill gender roles, in the household as well as in professional life, complicate women’s careers, limiting their upward mobility. Education clearly influences upward social mobility in Indonesia. The higher the education level the greater the opportunity for upward social mobility. Paternal social class has the strongest influence on respondent’s class, while respondent’s education is the second strongest variable.

My qualitative research in rural Java supports the results of quantitative studies that lower-class individuals find it difficult to move into the middle or upper classes. However, there are some interesting exceptions whereby people from lower classes rise to the middle class, even without schooling. Here are three examples.

- Many Indonesians opt to work abroad as migrant workers, mostly as domestic workers (usually women) and factory or construction workers (mainly men). Decisions to work as migrants are mainly driven by the lack of job opportunities for less-educated Indonesians. Moreover, migrants may earn more than they could in Indonesia for a similar work and many send remittances to relatives living in villages. With these remittances families may move into a higher social class.

- Another path is through the inter-generational transmission of special skills. A community in Garut (West Java) is famous for producing the best men’s barbers in Java. For decades, this skill has been passed on from one generation to the next. Most successful professional hair clippers temporarily work outside their village in big cities such as Jakarta. Through their specific skills as barbers, many have successfully raised their family’s economic and social status.

- Thirdly, entrepreneurship offers an alternative path for moving up the social ladder. In most villages there is a small number of entrepreneurs who usually start as self-employed, but later moving on to micro-scale enterprises, and some even manage to expand their business into neighboring villages. They typically work in small shops, restaurants or trade. Depending on the location, some of these entrepreneurs may start their business with credit from bank or government programs or through corporate social responsibility programs. Successful entrepreneurs may be able to advance into higher social classes.

Further studies to explain and overcome the rigidity of Indonesia’s class structure, in particular the lack of upward mobility for those at the bottom of the income ladder, are ongoing. These studies are expected to open up discussion of potential government and private sector programs to mitigate unequal opportunities for social mobility.

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