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To commemorate the 65 years since the birth of the ISA, a panel of former Presidents was convened at the Yokohama World Congress to evaluate the past and look to the future. Their evaluations are published in this issue of Global Dialogue. They lament the unstoppable march of English as lingua franca against which they vainly hope that everyone become bilingual. The increasing size of the Congress seems equally inexorable – celebrated by some, questioned by others. Immanuel Wallerstein recalls the first Congress he attended in 1959 when there were intimate dialogues among the leading sociologists, nearly all, in those days, one might add, from the North. Margaret Archer considers the greater inclusiveness an incomplete project. She is critical of the rising power of Research Committees that have balkanized the ISA and prevented it from developing overarching visions of sociology. Their rise is part of deepening professionalization – the world of impact factors and performance indicators – driving ever-more superficial research. And, indeed, in this issue John Holmwood condemns the latest advances in audit culture engulfing academia.

This is a theme taken up by Michel Wieviorka who addresses the dangers of hyper-specialization and the challenges of the digital world. He also argues that sociological research must not overlook the power of evil in the modern world. T.K. Oommen follows with the obstacles to an international sociology – the continuing although anachronistic focus on the nation-state, arguing that we must separate nation from state and look to forces operating above and below the state. Piotr Sztompka takes internationalization to a polemical extreme in defending “one sociology for many worlds” and desairs of those who would create political divides in our midst whether they be from revolutionary pretenders or the advocates of indigenous sociologies. Finally, Alberto Martinelli, befitting his new role as President of the International Social Science Council, speaks of the important role sociology can play in advancing global democratic governance.

These are wise and distinguished sociologists with important warnings about the plight of sociology. But as Global Dialogue has shown time and again, the young sociologists of today are facing these challenges with courage and innovation. In this issue we have papers on the plight of migrant laborers in Italy and the way Italian youth are coping with economic crisis. We have papers from Lebanon on the changing face of sectarianism and how farmers survive in the Southern Lebanon war zone. We have papers on discriminated outsiders, “gypsies” in Egypt and immigrants in France. We have papers on the political fallout of the Gezi protests in Turkey, the manipulation of the media in Kazakhstan and a report on what natural scientists are doing about the plight of the planet. Despite the warnings of our former Presidents, sociology on the ground is doing well, reporting on a world that is not doing so well.

> Global Dialogue can be found in 14 languages at the [ISA website](http://isa.soc.sagepub.com)
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There is no such thing as immaculate perception. From the beginning, my own vision came through UNESCO spectacles: the ISA was founded to help “knit together social science scholars of the world” to advance these disciplines. Given that its 65 years span the divide between “high” and “late” modernity – and crucially, what happens next – the ISA could have taken this as its brief. It did not. Instead, it was one more participant making its own history within those structural and cultural confines. In looking backwards, there seems to be a remarkably good fit between the common periodization of these years and phases of the ISA’s history; goodwill was never lacking but prescience was.

What restrained us from trying to take a higher intellectual ground – by globalizing before the world did, or becoming geographically inclusive before the world was? All I will draw upon are my own experiences, starting from the 1966 World Congress at Evian-les-Bains – which, ironically, took place six kilometers from the chalet where I am now drafting this text. Like the town itself, the Congress was small, almost intimate, and very Eurocentric. The American presence was strong, but the liveliest were East European émigrés. We had some fun spotting the KGB officer from the small official delegations, but no success in deflecting safe and studied presentations into risky dialogue.

Some responsibility for this lies with our equally studied exercise of linguistic hegemony. Most North Americans and, of course, most English, remained – as they still do – unabashed monolinguals. In part, too, the infrastructure of communication was also an obstacle – manual typewriters, no photocopiers, snail mail and insecure phone lines were inhibiting factors. To bring this home to those born after the end of the 60s, when I became Editor of Current Sociology, I will pass over the joys of typing this out on an old Remington and inserting the accents in hand. Why did we think Trend Reports were useful, from 1952 when the Journal began? Because before the Internet, the only other resort for this basic information was Sociological Abstracts, thanks to the voluntary efforts of Leo Chall and his wife. That is the background to the period I call our own cold war.

**Cold Warriors “United” by Empiricism**

Certainly, the Philosophy of Social Science furthered empiricism and, whilst it is now seen as bankrupt, temporarily it formed a bond between West and East. Western countries were excited by the arrival of their first (room-sized) computer, the initial boost to Big Data. In Eastern Europe, detailed statistical studies provided a safe haven against political correctness. Moreover, statistics represented a form of Esperanto. In those Congresses of the 1970s, entering almost any session was to see yet another regression table projected from an overhead slide, inviting a quasi-mathematical discussion.
It was not that theory was dead. On the contrary, the star attraction at Uppsala (1978) was a scheduled debate between Parsons and Althusser – at least judging from the hundreds trudging to a distant aula through heavy rain. When the Chair finished announcing his regret that neither speaker could make it, up went the umbrellas and back we disconsolately went.

The ISA was not lacking in goodwill. We deliberately held Executive Committee meetings in Eastern Europe, smuggled out manuscripts from Bulgaria, visited Tbilisi, Ljubljana, Budapest and more to extend the network. Through repeated visits to Poland, some lifelong friendships were formed. There, too, in this period when national associations still dominated the ISA, we scratched the surface of the relationship between Polish members and the Party. Hosted at the lovely palace of Jabłonna, we were uneasily aware that feeding us had probably cost our colleagues a month of food coupons. The cook wanted to do better by us and promised zrazy zawijane on Thursday. All afternoon we smelled her preparations, but dinner was repeatedly delayed. Eventually, we saw a convoy of car headlights arriving from Warsaw and the poor cook had to tell us this was the Minister of Education’s party – and dinner was “off” for us. Many friendships lasted: in 1989, some had the joy of very unofficially driving to Gdansk – and being present in the shipyards when Solidarity broke the shackles.

> The Mexican Wave and Wake-up Call

As for the rest of the world, the ISA responded well to persecuted individuals, but much less so towards oppressed collectivities. Being still Eurocentric and not greatly helped by our North American cousins, there were very few who were familiar with other continents. Of course there were notable exceptions: Tom Bottomore and India, Alain Touraine and his inexhaustible knowledge of Latin America. But it took the ISA World Congress of Sociology in Mexico City (1982) to demonstrate how poorly we served Latin America. We were flabbergasted by the UNAM’s (National Autonomous University of Mexico) size and the wave of students wanting to attend the Congress. Ad hoc arrangements to accommodate them left many rightly outraged: “How can you come to our country and not recognize our language and concerns?” Collectively we got the message. Cardoso was elected as President there, although it would be several years before Spanish at last became an official ISA language. Our Congress theme for 1990 was “Sociology for One World” and I devoted my Presidential Address to it. Most Executive Committee members felt we were on the way with our international agenda. But I failed to register a small black cloud that I now believe put the brakes on this trajectory: the growing importance of the Research Committees.

> Twenty Years of Balkanization

Initially, the Research Committees’ specialization seemed a reasonable response to the growing number of professional sociologists worldwide and their variety of interests. As the RC’s influence swelled without countervailing agencies to offset fragmentation, two unintended consequences amplified. On the one hand, some Research Committees were commandeered by “sitting tenants,” representing a particular approach, effectively excluding others. On the other hand, RCs proliferated, but the absence of leading sociologists analyzing Late Modernity and its discontents was noticeable. In short, the ISA provided a shrinking platform for the discussion of “Where are we going?”

Increasingly, if “your” Research Committee became a fiefdom, the main alternative was to go and try another, because plenary sessions were ceasing to be a counter-balancing attraction. So I was very supportive of Michael Burawoy’s efforts to focus on central debates whilst simultaneously promoting Global Dialogue.

> Imperatives for the Future

As academe’s bureaucratic regulation intensifies, new performance indicators, ranking of publishing outlets and emphasis on impact factors, all mean that early career colleagues adopt a premature defensive specialization – if they do not take cover by conducting obscure ethnographies. The pressure to publish too fast and to fill up a CV means they have less time to read a complete book, let alone the complete works of those they are attacking or even the giants on whose shoulders they climb. Meanwhile, where is the forum for sociological discussions of world issues: the decline of Europe, climate change, intensifying inequalities, the restructuring of financialized capitalism versus the digital promise of a cultural commons? Where is the arena for sociological disputes about conceptualizing the contemporary world, its neoliberalism or the mantra that “There is no Alternative”?

The new Executive Committee’s composition is very international; it could either foster global representativeness within Balkanization, or it could formulate a new international agenda addressing global issues, seeking to explain where this one world is heading. I once thought that the best role for an ex-President was to remain silent, having had our say. However, I have come to think that we should speak out. After all, we share the rare privilege of having nothing to lose.

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Prerequisites for Internationalizing Sociology

by T. K. Oommen, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, and former ISA President, 1990-1994

The International Sociological Association was formed to foster international sociology, but we have not achieved consensus about the meaning of this elusive concept. Of course, it might be conceived as an aggregation of “national sociologies,” but even in demographic terms, “nations” vary, from those which have over a billion residents (China and India) to countries of five million or less. Moreover, social structures and cultural patterns of “nations” vary enormously; while some nations are multi-national, others are multi-ethnic or multi-tribal; some are nation-states, either in reality or in terms of their aspirations. To treat these disparate units as building blocks for international sociology is a tough proposition. And yet this is precisely what the ISA strives to do.

As Bauman notes, “[With] hardly any exception all the concepts and analytical tools currently employed by social scientists are geared to a view of the human world in which the most voluminous totality is a ‘society,’ a notion equivalent for all practical purposes, to the concept of the ‘nation-state’.” The first prerequisite for internationalization of sociology is to abandon the “nation-state” as a unit of sociological analysis, both to avoid “methodological nationalism” and because the ideal “nation-state” is hardly realized even in its cradle, Western Europe. Yet sociologists cannot substitute “mobility,” “global network,” or “multi-dimensional social spaces” for “society” (the fulcrum of their discipline) as some have advocated, because without societies none of these can be anchored.

A second prerequisite for internationalization of sociology is to overcome the irrational division between sociology and social/cultural anthropology. If anthropology analyzed the inferior Others – Savage, Black and Ethnographic – so-
ociology aimed to study modern, industrial or “programmed” societies. As Faliding rightly claims “[...] cultural and social anthropology comprise neither more nor less than the sociology of simpler peoples.” To insist that sociology is an offspring of modernity subjects non-modern societies to cognitive blackout, and ignores multiple modernities.

Intellectual dichotomies of the colonial period were transformed into a trichotomy during the Cold War era, based on politico-economic factors which had nothing to do with social or cultural structures. The Third World was characterized by underdevelopment, overpopulation and political chaos. The Second World was technologically modern but politically authoritarian, while the First World was modern, technologically efficient, democratic, and economically advanced.

But viewed in terms of social structures and cultural patterns, the Third World consisted of three entirely different entities, emerging from very different colonial experiences. If Africa and South Asia were subject to “retreatist colonialism,” Latin America, which experienced “replicative colonialism,” was constituted by immigrants drawn from a wide variety of ethnic groups. These “ethnic groups” living together in the territory of a state do not make a nation-state in the West European sense. Sociologists’ failure to challenge the Cold War’s three-world schema continues to complicate our understanding of settlement societies — including societies from the First as well as the Third World.

The conflation of state and nation is a common conceptual confusion and a persisting stumbling block to internationalization of sociology. “National traditions” in sociology invariably refer to studies undertaken within state boundaries. Before the Berlin Wall was built, and since its demolition, German sociology had only one national tradition, but for decades, there were two — one for East and another for West Germany. Before the dismantling of the Second World Soviet sociology encapsulated several national sociologies, but with the breakup of Soviet Union several national sociologies came to be recognized.

Linking sociology with the nation-state goes against the very grain of the discipline. Sociology analyzes social structures and cultural patterns in all varieties of societies — modern, pre-modern, simple, complex, agrarian, industrial. If sociology has a disciplinary interest in diversity, the nation-state relentlessly pursues the goal of homogenization. Paradoxically, the souls of sociology and the nation-state pull in opposite directions but they are chained together in one body, that of the body politic — which impedes sociology’s internationalization.

Further, linking sociology with the state is especially problematic for “nations” that have not established their own sovereign states. There is a French sociology but no sociology of Brittany; there is a British sociology but no Welsh one; Spanish sociology but no Catalan one. The Kurdish nation, vivisected across several sovereign states, seems destined to remain without its own sociology. The fate of “national sociologies” seems inextricably intertwined with the political fortunes of nations: “no sovereign state, no sociology.” Can one meaningfully talk about a credible international sociology in such a situation?

Some might argue that we are already witnessing the demise of nation-states. The Second World’s dismantling gave birth to the notion of one world, and its logical corollary, global sociology. But this transformation occurred more in polity and economy, and hardly in society and culture. It was premature to assume that a “single sociology” would emerge. Nevertheless, because one communicative system exists, some have even envisioned a “world society” — a suggestion I see as an unintended slip back into an original sin, namely fashioning sociology after pure sciences. In the course of my Presidential Address to the XIIIth World Congress of Sociology (Bielefeld 1994), two decades ago, I argued that a “World Society discerned in terms of one culture, one civilization, one communication system and the like is not only impossible but not even desirable — pluralization encapsulates the very conception of world society.”

I close with two observations: One, in spite of the transformations in human societies, three dimensions are shared by all: unity (as philosophical realism upholds), multiplicity (as sociological nominalists suggest) and social process (as cultural pluralists hold). These dimensions vary across societies but the basics are there, offering hope for sociology’s internationalization. But instead of focusing on these basics, sociology has lionized economy, polity, technology, media, ecology and the like, relegating social structures and cultural patterns to the status of mere dependent variables.

Second, variation in social complexity stems more from stratification, heterogeneity and hierarchy than from levels of economic development or polity type. Human societies are stratified on the basis of class, gender, age and the like, but as they are also culturally heterogeneous — particularly with regard to religion, language, and race — intersectionality implies increased complexity. In hierarchical societies wherein social values legitimize inequality, complexity increases exponentially. An authentic internationalization of sociology should pursue both commonalities and specificities of societies. International sociology entails neither universalization nor indigenization but contextualization, avoiding both universalism’s hegemonization and indigenization’s parochialization. Indeed comparative sociology is the gateway to the internationalization of sociology.
ISA as an Organization
Some Dangers in its Progress

by Immanuel Wallerstein, Yale University, USA and former ISA President, 1994-1998

The first Congress I attended was the ISA’s third, held in 1959 in Stresa, a small town in northern Italy. I have attended thirteen of the fifteen congresses since then. In reflecting on the differences between the ISA in 1959, at the time of my own presidency in 1994-1998, and today, I wish to discuss four aspects of its organizational life: the composition of congress participants; language; ISA structures and program; and the effect of size.

Composition of Participants

While the official count of registrants in 1959 is 867, there were about 300 persons present in the plenary sessions, almost all from Europe and North America. To my memory, there was only one active participant from what we then called the Third World: Anouar Abdel-Malek from Egypt (although he worked in Paris). It was also the first congress to which the Soviet Union and other East European countries sent participants. Most were recently rebaptized philosophers, but so were many from Italy, the host country. “Sociology” was an emerging category, and the ISA played an important role in its creation.

By the time of my presidency, participation was much more international. Nonetheless, it was still unbalanced in its distribution. The financial cost of coming to a congress limited participation, as did the fact that sociology was still establishing itself in many countries.

By 2014, after much effort by the ISA, participation was more balanced, though still imperfect. The greatest improvement was in the participation of women as officials and as speakers. Distributive participation will probably continue to improve in future congresses.

Language

The ISA’s initial official languages were English and French. In 1959, French was widely used; probably, more French was spoken in 1959 than in the far larger 2014 congress. Most participants could understand, if not speak, both English and French. There was seldom translation, except on an ad hoc basis.

The first congress to be held in the Third World was in 1982, in Mexico City. There were of course many Mexican participants as well as other Latin Americans. The exclusive use of English and French sparked a revolt led by younger Mexican participants, demanding the right to speak in Spanish, with translation in both directions. Alain Touraine personally saved the situation by mounting the platform and translating from English and French into Spanish and vice versa. Spanish subsequently became the ISA’s third official language.
Nonetheless, English became the only language really used, except in a few ghetto sessions for French and Spanish speakers. If a French or Spanish speaker presented work, at a major session, many English speakers would simply walk out. When I was president, we appointed a special committee to study this problem, led by the same Alain Touraine. The committee proposed some solutions for improving an unhappy situation, but these suggestions were politely ignored.

In part this stemmed from wider international participation. For more and more participants, none of the three official languages was their native tongue; for most, English was the first “second language.” This was also an effect of US hegemony in the world-system: whereas earlier generations learned French, German, or Russian as a “second language,” younger generations switched to English.

Like many international organizations, ISA is now faced with the negatives of a lingua franca. An impoverished version of the lingua franca is in use; spoken and written versions grow apart. As US hegemony continues to decline, there will undoubtedly be demands for more languages: when Mandarin Chinese and Arabic become widely used for scientific communication, how will a future ISA adjust?

> Structure and Program of ISA

In 1959, a Council composed of representatives of member national associations elected a president and other officers from among its members, as well as an Executive Committee. When the USSR entered the ISA, these offices were distributed through private East-West negotiations.

In 1959, there were only two Research Committees. They were truly research committees – that is, they were not loci of debate, but groups that obtained funds for transnational research. One could not just join them. The members were invited. Subsequently, as the number of committees grew, a council was created and four of its members were added to the ISA Council.

The principal task of ISA structures was to choose the location of the next congress and to create a program. The (single) vice-president was charged with developing a program, together with a Program Committee — none of whose members served on the ISA Council. Quite the contrary! The idea was to find competent diverse individuals, avoiding apparatchiks serving on the council. Not even the president attended Program Committee meetings.

Over the years, the ISA created more vice-presidencies, but as late as my presidency, the Vice-President for Program was the leader in rank. My Vice-President for Program (and my successor as president), Alberto Martinelli appointed the committee, though other vice-presidents were invited to join as well. At some point, the Vice-President for Program was replaced at the top of the hierarchy by the Vice-President for Research, and finally, the post was eliminated altogether. The program will now be the work of the Executive Committee.

I believe this is an error that ISA will come to regret. Instead of ISA members chosen for their competencies and interests, we have turned the program over to those with sectorial interests, to negotiate time allocations. If the Executive Committee is dominated by one “faction,” it may not produce a truly integrated program. If the Executive Committee is badly divided, it may lead to a dysfunctional stalemate. I hope that ISA will reverse itself, giving the Vice-President for Program pride of place and independence.

> Effects of Size

The positive aspects of increased attendance and geographic distribution are obvious. The ISA has become much more inclusive. But inclusiveness can also mean exclusion. In 1959 the participants included nearly every sociologist considered an important scholar. Small group meetings involved a true exchange of views. With 6,000 people, and enormous numbers of research committees and other special meetings, there is no time for real debate. Sessions involve four or five “papers,” open at most to a question or two at the end. Most participants become passive participants.

Persons seeking real debate and/or cooperative work do better by organizing small meetings outside the congress. We all have limited energy, limited time, and limited money. Large size allows greater inclusion, but it also prompts withdrawal. There is no easy solution. Perhaps we could create a congress of small groups, self-organized, where no papers are given but where debate is around some concrete problem. This would be very hard to organize, and perhaps the suggestion is utopian. But it points again to the necessity of a program committee not fashioned by those whose interest is to maintain and foster particular organizational interests.

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Looking backward, we acknowledge that both sociology and its international association, the ISA, have made impressive advances; looking forward, we realize that there is much more to do to make them truly global. The promotion of international sociology was one of the ISA’s key goals from the start. ISA presidents have contributed in different ways to sociology’s internationalization. During my term as president in 1998-2002, for example, we created the Laboratory for PhD Students, a program which has grown steadily, as the Yokohama dialogue between senior and junior sociologists demonstrated.

However, much has still to be done to achieve the goal of a truly global sociology, which the ISA will continue to pursue for two main reasons: first, fostering the growth of global sociology improves the quality of sociological work and makes it more relevant for all; second, a strong ISA contributes (along with other international epistemic communities) to developing democratic global governance for a better world.

The main object and purpose of sociology as a science have not changed either, but, like the ISA, they have been globalized. At the core of sociological inquiry lies the basic question asked by Georg Simmel: how is society possible, that is, how can cooperation be fostered so that basic needs are met, social reproduction guaranteed and conflict regulated. This was a major concern of the classical thinkers, the founders of the ISA, the sociologists of my generation and the next. This question is still central, but now it must also be asked at the world level; and it becomes a more difficult question, because the social world of the 21st century is both a single system and a fragmented world.

Classical sociology had a world perspective, either as theorists of the world economy and society, like Marx or Pareto, or as great comparativists like Weber or Durkheim. But later – when I studied in Berkeley in the late 1960s and early 1970s – profession-
al sociology became more and more confined within national borders. This attitude is no longer possible: contemporary globalization not only implies that the world as such is a new object of study, but requires that any specific study (for example, of family patterns in Europe or Africa or of industrial relations in a Chinese or Brazilian firm) is not only comparative, but framed in a global context, since each region is increasingly interdependent with many others and the world as such is increasingly present in all of its parts. “Glocal” is no longer a neologism in our lexicon.

The sociology of today and tomorrow cannot but be global. It has to be scientific and critical, and it needs a clear identity, but at the same time it should be open to developing interdisciplinary cooperation among the social sciences and between them and the physical and biological sciences. This last requirement is a key institutional goal of the International Social Science Council (ISSC), the umbrella organization of social sciences’ international associations and national research councils. Recent ISSC flagship programs – which as ISSC president I contributed to developing – are all committed to develop a truly global scientific cooperation: the just published World Social Science Report provides a rich picture of the state of sociological research on the environment in all regions of the world; it is available online and worth reading. The theme of the third World Social Science Forum (to be held in September 2015 in Durban) is global justice; I warmly invite all sociologists to participate in this important international forum, which will coincide with a reassessment of the Millennium Development Goals. The five-year environmental research program Future Earth will be jointly coordinated by ISSC and ICSU (the parallel umbrella organization for the physical and natural sciences); ISSC will specifically manage the sub-project Transformations to Sustainability.

The ISA, by itself and within ISSC and ICSU, plays a global role by stimulating intellectually honest and skillful analyses of the different dimensions of globalization and by suggesting effective solutions to problems on the global agenda, like world inequality and global justice. Together with other international scientific associations, the ISA can significantly contribute to global democratic governance in a variety of ways. First, while most influential global actors – like powerful governments, multi-national corporations and fundamentalist religious or nationalist movements – are inspired by self-interest, by increased power or material gain, and tend to impose a unique Weltanschaung, international scientific associations act according to universalistic values. Everyone is evaluated in terms of scientific achievement, teaching ability and professional ethics, and not in terms of gender, ethnicity, age, or nationality. Second, international scientific associations can be an effective antidote against dogmatism and bigotry. In our scholarly work we are accustomed to confront different and even conflicting views, to submit contrary opinions to a fair evaluation in terms of logical consistency and empirical testing; the discourse of science is essentially anti-dogmatic and universalistic. Third, whereas the conveniences of trade or the requirements of diplomacy often persuade governments and corporations to shut one eye – or even both eyes – to violations of basic human rights, international scientific associations, although not entirely free, can be much more outspoken and explicit in the defense of those rights. The ISA has played and will continue to play a relevant role in defending the freedom of thought, speech, teaching, and scientific inquiry. Fourth, international scientific associations in the social sciences, although they face the widespread problems of hegemonic cultures and languages, seem better aware of the risks of ethnocentrism.

These are some of the most relevant ways through which the ISA and other international scientific associations can contribute to global governance and serve as a beneficial counterweight to economic and cultural domination. But in order to be effective these associations must grow in membership, and further develop their projects and scope of activity.

The ISA has a special role to play, since sociology as a scientific discipline has a mandate to explore the complexity of contemporary social relations, to help human beings to live peacefully in a complex world, to recognize unity within diversity, to uphold peace, distributional justice, individual freedom, and cultural pluralism. Sociologists are relevant when they are not just engaged in pure description and interpretation of social phenomena. Sociologists are credible when they contribute as rigorous and dedicated scientists to the pursuit of broader goals. Today’s conflict-ridden world needs good sociologists, people in trouble need good sociologists, shortsighted leaders need good sociologists. Let us live up to our responsibility, mobilizing the talent and resources of the world sociological community.
The “Positivist” Manifesto

by Piotr Sztompka, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, and former ISA President, 2002-2006

Believe it or not, the Yokohama World Congress of Sociology is my eleventh. I joined the ISA in 1970, at the Congress held at Varna, Bulgaria, the first ever in Eastern Europe. Now, 40 years later, I venture to glance backward and forward. As a theorist I always look for general trends, and I have spotted two: one beneficial, offering reason for rejoicing, and another pernicious, even dangerous.

The ISA’s great achievement has been to reach beyond a Western European and American core, beginning when Eastern European sociology was embraced as a worthy partner. At New Delhi, Asia entered forcefully; at Mexico the vibrant and rich Latin American sociology was given the limelight. At Brisbane and now at Yokohama we saw the Pacific region’s vitality, while African sociology showed its innovativeness at Durban. We have become a truly international association. Only the People’s Republic of China, with its strong sociological achievements and dynamism, remains distant; but Chinese sociologists’ involvement at Yokohama is a promising sign.

I hope we will become not only international but transnational. Science does not have a fatherland, and sociology should not know national borders. To me, terms like Polish sociology, French sociology, Brazilian sociology etc. have only administrative connotations, no deeper meaning. I argue for “one sociology for many social worlds.”

The near-global extension of the sociological community has two implications. First, our research agenda has been tremendously enriched, offering insights into different ways of life, aspirations, and deprivations. Second, sociologists’ emotional or ethical sensitivity to poverty, oppression, discrimination, and exclusion has been strongly enhanced. Even though, in terms of formal logic, value judgments do not follow from facts, in a sociological sense they do. Solid, documented facts about the darkest sides of human existence mobilize moral impulse, breed repulsion and transform values. I call this a sociological syllogism, not a logical one. Both implications of the ISA extension are thus to be applauded.

So far so good. Unfortunately another tendency persists: new borders or even solid walls mean the sociological community remains divided, even though the criteria for division have changed. At my first Congress, the division was geo-political, as sociologists from Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Russia, were treated like poor cousins. Those of us from behind the Iron Curtain were partly responsible: we came in organized “delegations” with official “leaders,” avoiding open discussions and presenting papers on esoteric topics rather than engaging politically sensitive issues (my own debut at Varna involved a paper on “teleological language in sociology”).

|| Piotr Sztompka.
But in the late 1980s when that geo-political wall collapsed, new boundaries quickly emerged. First, these were based on global class divisions: sociologists from the poor South arrayed against those from the affluent North, with strong undercurrents of anti-Americanism and distrust of Europe’s sociological heritage. Then, identity divisions erupted, and cultural rather than geo-political or class factors became crucial. Some splits followed gender lines, while a new nationalism focusing on cultural roots produced language battles challenging the presumed “language imperialism” of English.

Though they may be pernicious, all these boundaries reflect real divisions. The sociological community is a micro-cosm of wider society, and it struggles to raise itself above extra-scientific tensions and conflicts. Understandable but not forgivable.

Recently, however, another, internal split has appeared, linked to epistemological disagreements. Some of us, perhaps a silent hidden majority, believe that sociology involves an intellectual endeavor aimed at providing a better understanding of mechanisms and regularities of social life, via systematic and methodologically controllable research. Sociology thus understood is close to science strictly conceived, even though it has obvious peculiarities akin to humanities and even to art. Were this view not widely shared, our Congresses would not include so many solid pieces of good sociological research, coming from all corners of the world.

At the other pole of an epistemological divide stands an outspoken and visible minority, for whom sociology is a revolutionary project aimed at mass mobilization. There is also resentment against the whole Western sociological tradition, favoring instead some elusive “indigenous sociologies.”

Sociology as science versus sociology as action, sociology as universal knowledge versus sociology as context-relative experience; these are the main dividing lines of controversy. I am strongly on the side of the former; Michael Burawoy calls me the “last positivist.” I am truly flattered: I much prefer to be the “last positivist” than the “last Leninist.” Sociologists are not good at making revolutions, and those who try end with masquerades, like dressing graduate students in red t-shirts, or turning academic sessions into political demonstrations.

The biggest service sociologists can provide for the world’s poor, exploited, marginalized and excluded is to understand by solid research the social mechanisms and regularities responsible for their fate. If one really wants to change an unequal and unjust society, the first duty is to understand it. Karl Marx will be remembered in the history of thought not for The Communist Manifesto, but rather for Das Kapital, where he examined the class mechanisms of bourgeois society. He spent most of his life in libraries, not on the barricades.

A focus on scholarly values – the pursuit of adequate descriptions, well-founded explanations, better interpretations, deeper understanding of society, through the power of reason, research and logical arguments – brings an additional benefit: it provides a space for building consensus within the sociological community. Scientific values unify, while the vested interests of politics, class or culture, are divisive.

Let us return to our job, leaving politics to politicians and ideology to revolutionaries. The sociological association should not be an arena of ideological conflict but an agora of academic debate. My dream is an ISA that is more a scholarly society than social movement, trade union or political party, an ISA where sessions resemble academic seminars rather than political rallies, where arguments replace slogans, and thinking precedes action rather than following it. I would like to see the ISA united by universal values of reason and a search for knowledge, over and above divisions brought about by diverse particular interests.

As Antonio Gramsci used to say, to predict in social matters is to act to make predictions come true. It is up to us all to push the ISA away from “politically correct” and fashionable tendencies. To paraphrase the famous quotation – one apparently close to the heart of our last President – “Sociologists of all countries, unite.” Yes, of course, but do not forget the next line: “You have nothing to lose but your ideological fetters, you have the whole world of knowledge to win.”

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3 See our heated debate in Contemporary Sociology 40(4): 388-410.
I was proud and happy to be ISA President and I gained enormously from it. Four years later, I would like to first make three short points about our Association.

First, we always have known the ISA to be open to those sociologists that cannot easily join us due to political reasons, as was the case for communist countries during the Cold War, and more recently for China’s association because of diplomatic issues posed by the inclusion of Taiwan’s Association. I am happy to see real progress today, including an interesting program during our Congress on China’s Reform and Social Transformation co-organized by Chinese and Japanese sociological societies.

Second: If we sociologists recognize the importance of cultural diversity it must be alive in our midst. This is why during my mandate I always fought for multilingualism. We should be able to communicate not only in our three official languages, but also in other languages, including Japanese when we meet in Japan! In Mexico, in 1982, we had only two official languages, English and French. But a strong pressure was exerted by our colleagues and Latin-American students, and Spanish was introduced as the Association’s third official language. And here, in Yokohama, I would have liked to see a more active effort to avoid regression: our posters for this Congress are in English only. No effort or imagination have been used: for instance, subtitles on the screen during the opening sessions were only in English, why not at least in Japanese? No simultaneous translation was provided for the presidential sessions. It is expensive, of course, but economic reasons are not the kind of explanations sociologists should accept without discussion. If we live and think and read only in English, if we elect our president only from Western universities, where are we going? There is a danger of a Westernization of sociology, of ethnocentrism under Western or American hegemony. Yes, we must criticize the way universalism is often referred too, when it appears in fact as a kind of domination. We must discuss universal values, in order to re-launch them, not in order to impose a new ethno-centric Western order on the whole community of social scientists.

Third: the ISA is an institution that provides support for the production and dissemination of knowledge. Yes, we love the ISA as a scientific and intellectual space, with its Research Committees for instance, but we also need
institutions to develop our individual and collective activities. Sociological research must not be subordinated to interests of any sort, be they economic, ideological or political. Research must be guided by the curiosity of the researcher; there must be an acceptance of risk; we should be encouraging cutting-edge research. I am not averse to economic spinoffs demonstrating that research can be useful; I have long practiced what Michael Burawoy calls “public sociology,” by which I mean that I am not an isolated academic in an ivory tower. But if we are to produce and disseminate knowledge responsibly, we need the freedom to be reflexive and critical – a freedom that requires institutions which ensure its conditions of existence. I would like now to propose three challenges we face as sociologists.

> The Challenge of the Digital Age

We are entering a world radically transformed by the Internet, new technologies and big data. Sociology is entering a new era: our ways of thinking, our objects, our methods, our paradigms, our analytical tools are changing. This means that new possibilities exist. We will have to work differently, with other actors, including those from arts, humanities, life sciences, with new forms of cooperation. Writing and publishing are changing, with huge debates about economic models for publishing, such as those involving open access. Libraries will play an increasingly important but unfamiliar role. We will be challenged in the production of knowledge by other actors, who are able to mobilize huge intellectual, financial and practical resources. New forms of inequalities will appear, for instance between those who have access to big data, or money to use new difficult algorithms, and those who do not. During the last twenty years, we have increasingly used the word “global”; we are now entering a very different era which is global, but also digital.

> Dangers of Hyper-Specialization and Disciplinarity

Worldwide, our subject is growing. Young researchers are better trained – much better, on average, than my generation. They are also more open to the world; they participate in networks, in a much fuller international life than was common 30 or 40 years ago. But they are also more specialized, often entrenched in the analysis of a restricted problem, the development of a specific approach, without participating as sociologists in general discussions, for example, on political or historical issues. This poses a challenge: how can we resist fragmentation, or hyper-specialization? How can we move from our specific domain to general concerns? This is crucial: we must combine or articulate specific interests, with general debates at the world, regional, national and local levels. To put it differently: we should be both social scientists and intellectuals. We should not accept the tendencies to hyper-specialization, which is why an association like ours, and a meeting like our Congress are so important. We form a global community despite our national and institutional affiliations or scientific orientations. True, in the past, some general debates were more ideological than scientific. But we should not let specific interests destroy participation in general exchanges.

> Facing Evil

I tend to be an optimist, trusting social movements and conflicts to produce new social relationships, or transform institutions. But in the part of the world where I live and elsewhere, I see the crisis as stronger than conflicts or social or cultural movements. What we might call anti-movements – violence, populism, nationalism, racism, xenophobia, fundamentalism or anti-Semitism – are growing; a theory of social movements should include the production and role of anti-movements. As a disciple of Alain Touraine I have always followed this line of analysis. We should consider evil to be part of our preoccupation. Yes, studying social movements and anti-movements is a priority for sociology; we must include the subjectivity of individuals as well as the logics of collective action, and consider seriously processes of subjectivation, and also of de-subjectivation.

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Behind the Cheap Tomato
Migrant Workers in Southern Italy

by Mimmo Perrotta, University of Bergamo, Italy

In September 2013, the national French television France 2 broadcast a report about the dramatic living and working conditions of migrant farmworkers in Puglia, Southern Italy. The report, Les récoltes de la honte (The Harvest of Shame), described the harvesting and processing of broccoli and tomatoes, grown in Puglia and sold in French supermarkets such as Auchan, Carrefour, and Leclerc, and reminded French consumers that their food is cheap because of the low wages of those farmworkers.

Other European media have similarly focused on migrant farmworkers in Southern Italy. In Norway, a campaign was launched against the exploitation of Puglia’s tomato harvesters, which pushed Norwegian unions and supermarket chains to ask Italian trade unions and growers’ unions to promote “ethical standards” in agricultural production. The British magazine The Ecologist published two interesting investigations. The first, in August 2011 described the supply chain of “pelati” (whole peeled canned tomatoes): tomatoes are harvested in Basilicata by African manual pickers, processed by companies such as Conserve Italia and La Doria, and finally sold by British supermarkets (Sainsbury’s, Waitrose, Tesco, Morrison’s). The second, in February 2012, analyzed the situation of citrus pickers in Rosarno (Calabria), calling on the Coca-Cola company and its controlled brand Fanta Orange to publicly declare the price they pay to Calabrian traders for oranges.
According to these journalistic reports, Southern Italian agriculture is characterized by low wages, by despotic labor control over farmworkers forced to live in abandoned houses in the countryside or in large ghettos and shantytowns, by semi-legal work, by the pervasive presence of farm labor contractors (called caporali), and by downward pressures on the prices of agricultural products and constraints on local growers imposed by traders and large-scale supermarket chains. In reality, the working and living conditions of migrant farmworkers are not much better in other European countries: migrant workers in agriculture experience difficult conditions across the continent, as European agriculture emulates the “Californian model” of intensive agriculture – with intensive exploitation of immigrants.

Since the 1970s, Southern Italy has become a destination region for foreign immigrants. In agriculture, according to official figures, there are around 110,000 foreign workers in southern Italy, and at least that many irregular workers: Tunisians and Moroccans (mainly in the greenhouses in Sicily and Campania), Indians (mainly in the livestock farming), sub-Saharan Africans and Eastern Europeans.

The Puglia and Basilicata regions, where I have conducted field research, both experience peak labor demand for tomato farming between June and October, especially at harvest time. The tomatoes will go to canning plants in Campania, to be turned into pelati, one of Italy’s best-known and most exported food products. Every summer, between 13,000 and 20,000 migrants, mostly from sub-Saharan Africa and Central and Eastern European countries, come looking for work. Some sub-Saharan African farmworkers have survived terrible journeys through the Sahara desert and across the Mediterranean Sea; many follow the harvest cycle across Italy’s southern regions, picking Calabria’s citrus fruit in winter, and Campania’s strawberries in the spring. Other African farmworkers hold residence permits, having worked for years in factories in Italy’s North. Fired after the economic crisis, now they struggle to find work on Southern Italy’s farms.

East Europeans are often permanent residents; Romanians are the largest group of foreign nationals in Italy. During periods of peak labor demand, many of them move to the South temporarily, from other parts of Europe, or from their home country, returning home once the tomato harvesting season is over. During the harvest period, seasonal workers live in ghettos in the countryside. Aside from occasional “humanitarian interventions,” they rarely interact with trade unions or local institutions; once the season is over they move on to other ghettos, in other regions.

Accommodation and employment of migrants are often organized by caporali, the informal farm labor contractors, often of the same nationality as the farmworkers, who ensure that crews are efficiently taken “just in time” to the businesses that require them. The caporali provide services to both farmworkers and their employers: they provide (temporary) accommodation during harvest time, transportation to fields, railway stations and supermarkets, as well as food, water and credit.

Most importantly, the caporali supervise work, and employers pay the caporale rather than individual farmworkers. For each 300kg container of tomatoes harvested, the caporale receives between 3.5 and 6 euros; he then pays workers – after he deducts a broker’s fee, the cost of transport to the fields and whatever workers owe for accommodation, food, water, and credit. Under this piece-rate system the strongest and most experienced pickers can earn up to 80-100 euros per day, but the slowest get only about 20 euros.

Caporali derive their power (and profit) from the segregation of the workforce and from the absence of “competitors”: in contrast to other parts of Italy and Europe, government interventions like seasonal labor quotas, public job centers or “formal” private intermediaries (cooperatives, temporary employment agencies) have little impact here. The economic crisis has intensified competition between workers from different countries and with different legal statuses, a fact which also makes it hard to organize collective forms of action.

Workers have different strategies for dealing with poor working conditions, despotic labor control and low wages. Romanians’ and Bulgarians’ most profitable resource is their mobility: because they have freedom of movement in Europe, they can go back and forth from Eastern Europe – where the cost of living and wages are still lower than in Western Europe – and can move elsewhere to look for other work. By contrast, African migrants’ more precarious legal status creates many challenges, including workplace conflicts, “ethnic” conflicts (such as the “Rosarno revolt” in Calabria, January 2010) and union conflicts (such as the strike held by foreign farmworkers in Nardò, Puglia, in 2011).

In 2014, all these conflicts, along with the campaigns by Europe’s mass media, NGOs, militant networks and migrant advocacy associations, have prompted regional administrations in Puglia and Basilicata to make promises of hosting farmworkers in reception centers, encourage companies to hire farmworkers through public job centers, and create new “ethical” brands for processed tomatoes and other agricultural products. During the tomato harvest in 2014 these interventions failed: once more, the farmers preferred to hire their harvesters through the mediation of the caporali and very few among the seasonal workers wanted to be “hosted” in the reception centers for fear of losing the employment guaranteed by the caporali in the ghettos.
The national Italian Strike Commission supervises and controls the right to strike, and protects consumers against strikes in the so-called public services – essential transportation, vital health facilities, local and national emergencies. In 2013, following strikes in the logistic sector, the Commission ruled that milk is a basic necessity; as a result, interrupting the transport of any brand of milk – no matter how many brands are still available – is considered an interruption of an essential public service.

When a few hundred migrant workers who were employed by a cooperative sub-contracted to a firm named Granarolo Logistics, an Italian food company with headquarters in Bologna, went on strike, the Commission vetoed their action. But many brands of milk are available at any Italian supermarket; milk may be a basic necessity, but it is difficult to describe the Granarolo brand as indispensable.

Italy’s cooperatives were formed as a form of self-defense in the late nineteenth century by workers who hoped to avoid both the worst forms of exploitation and emigration from Italy. By the early 1920s, the cooperative system was so firmly established, particularly in Northern and Central Italy, that even the fascist regime did not dare destroy it. However, in recent decades cooperatives have proliferated, and their participation in new activities expanded as they began to serve as sub-contractors to large firms. Cooperatives have increasingly responded to the requests of companies who farm out large chunks of their operations.

With this shift, working conditions within cooperative – for both partner-workers and non-partner-workers – have worsened, while cooperative democracy and participation among the partners and the steering committees of cooperatives have deteriorated. The segmentation of the workforce along ethnic lines is often a first step leading to the disintegration of solidarity within any cooperative. In 2011 the workforce of Italy’s 43,000 cooperatives amounted to about 1.3 million people, about 7.2% of the country’s gainfully employed persons. Their yearly turnover amounted to 140 billion euros, or 7% of the Italian GDP. Cooperatives are important in logistics, large retail,
construction, and auxiliary personal and company services. In the logistic sector about one quarter of the total workforce is employed by cooperatives, which function as subcontractors of national and multinational enterprises. In the logistic sector some cooperatives play the role of legally authorized temporary manpower agents.

Many companies outsource larger and larger segments of their production process to cooperatives, to reduce costs and to increase competitiveness – and cooperatives have less and less room to defend equal rights even among partners, let alone non-partners. In large areas of Northern Italy, local public institutions, cooperatives, and trade unions are closely linked, adopting similar if not overlapping political positions aiming to preserve “social harmony,” and to support local industrial interests. Catholic and former communist cooperatives find themselves now clustered in the same association, “L'alleanza delle cooperative italiane” (The Alliance of Italian Cooperatives), which includes over 90 per cent of all Italian cooperatives. They all have to submit to the imperatives of efficiency. Lega-coop, the former communist and the most important Confederation of the “Alliance”, also owns one of the biggest temporary work agencies in Italy, Obiettivo Lavoro.

The porters’ campaign in the cooperatives working for Granarolo Logistics is only one of a series of protests and strikes affecting supplies and communications in Northern Italy in 2011-2014. Many of them migrants from North Africa, over the last ten years increasing numbers have been employed by sub-contracting cooperatives. In some cases, striking migrants were fired; they run the risk of losing their Italian, residence rights, thereby immediately becoming undocumented aliens.

The first significant protest started at Piacenza, not far from Milan, in the summer of 2011, when workers, mostly migrants, working in cooperatives subcontracted to a large transport company downed tools to demand higher wages, complaining of a speed-up and lack of rights. The official Italian trade unions kept the strikers on hold. However, the strike at this subcontracting cooperative succeeded: workers managed to gain a national contract, wage increases, holidays, and sick pay, a success which inspired subsequent industrial action.

The most important campaign took place in 2012, at an Ikea warehouse in Piacenza. Cooperative workers, mostly from North Africa, asked for better wages, a slower work pace, and a regular labor contract. Workers went on strike, sitting down in front of the Ikea warehouse. The police were called in, beat the workers, and broke up the sit-in. After a few months of on-and-off industrial action and sit-ins in front of Ikea shopping centers at shopping malls across Italy, workers managed to obtain better working conditions. Their example soon spread to other Ikea shopping centers. This movement was marked by conspicuous work stoppages, sit-ins, and demonstrations in many transport hubs in Italy’s industrial heartland, including Piacenza, Bologna, Padua, Verona. University students, young occasional workers, and militants belonging to leftist social centers have helped workers during these strikes and demonstrations, protesting in particular against the use of cooperatives as a source of cheap temporary labor. Nevertheless, this campaign’s success stemmed largely from its reliance on channels of communication among North African neighborhoods, and from the inspiration they gained from the massive Arab Spring demonstrations.

Many migrant workers were only too familiar with the production cycles in subcontracting cooperatives, and therefore were able to minimize losses in wages while maximizing economic damage for the companies. Moreover, they worked closely with rank-and-file trade unionists and activists. But many migrant workers are looking for new ways to organize: they see traditional trade unions as engaged in maintaining the status quo, while permitting managers to farm out operations. Not surprisingly, workers want to get rid of the system of subcontracting cooperatives, as they believe that “it is better to confront the company directly.”

However, these events do not appear to have prompted second thoughts within the Italian cooperative movement as a whole, despite a widespread conviction among activists that subcontracting has little to do with traditional cooperatives. Stated briefly, the cooperative movement in Italy has diverged considerably from its initial aims and ideals. Migrant workers are reminding everyone of this divergence – and on October 16, 2014 another general strike of logistic sector workers was widely successful.
Young Italian Men Coping with the Economic Crisis

by Luisa M. Leonini, University of Milan, Italy

Michael, 22 years old, has been employed for almost a year in a well-known wine house in a now fashionable area of Milan. Working as a waiter with a fix-term contract, he found this job through social networks: his father works as a clerk in a shop in the same city area. Although his main job consists of “preparing appetizers,” Michael feels he is “growing,” and becoming more and more expert and knowledgeable in his field. In particular, Michael expressed his appreciation for his employer who is teaching him the basics of becoming a sommelier – a wine steward. In Michael’s view, this job is the first step toward entering a professional course to get formally qualified as a sommelier. Overall, Michael is satisfied with his current work, which allows him to save something each month and to think that some day he might open a business of his own.

During the interview Michael was asked how he understands adulthood, which he described in the following passage:

**Michael:** Becoming adult, means, first of all, responsibility. Being responsible. Because everyone can say, “I am an adult, I am 21, I have a car.” But it doesn’t mean anything! You are not an adult as long as you don’t know well what you want to do with your life. You are not an adult as long as you don’t… I don’t know how to say it... for me adulthood is about work, you know, work and responsibility, within the family. Compared to the rest of my friends, for example, I think I am more mature.

**Researcher:** What do you mean by mature?

**Michael:** Being mature means also being adult for me... Because I take care of my family, I pay the bills, I take care of my sister’s little children, I cook, I clean at home and I work! Few guys of my age do that, you know! But, most important I have ambitions, because I want to open my own business and I am trying to do everything to set up things in order to achieve that result.

Michael, like other respondents, defines adulthood in relational terms, as the capacity to take care of others, to accept responsibility for himself and for his family. This narrative of adulthood is counterposed to the frivolities of youth in the fields of consumption and social activities. The traditional “package deal” that defines a respectable adult man in terms of work, family and parenthood, has a significant hold on Michael’s views. This peculiar narrative is, however, strengthened by the peculiar position he occupies in his family: due to the separation of his parents and to the early pregnancy of his sister, Michael perceives himself as the member of the family most equipped to contribute to the family’s well-being. Within a contextual frame that makes it relatively difficult for him to experience the youthful frivolities which characterize his friends’ lives – and since he has been able to hold down a relatively stable and well-paid job – Michael sees the difficulties and the effort demanded by his family role as valuable markers of adulthood and manhood.

Compared to most of his friends, Michael occupies a relatively privileged position within the labor market in the context of the economic crisis, which allows him to save, and to imagine a future where saving will be translated into economic and symbolic capital.

A second group of our interviewees see adulthood very differently. In contrast to Michael, they define...
adulthood in terms of attaining autonomy in the field of leisure and consumption, rejecting the idea of saving, stressing that becoming a man means learning to “get by” every day, to cope with uncertain and precarious living and working conditions. Although their discursive positions shift somewhat, since they also value traditional adulthood, this group is keen to stress that becoming adult means acquiring an awareness that “every day could be your last.” Like the previous group, these young men are characterized by low educational achievement (and often by an educational trajectory marked by interruptions); in general, they work in economic sectors that have been more affected by the recession’s negative consequences, or in low-skilled occupations such as construction workers, janitors, waiters, removers, etc. that suffer from high levels of precarity.

Our hypothesis, although it needs to be investigated further, is that for this group, entrance into adult life has been defined in terms of the possibilities open to them.

Federico: I work ten hours a day, five days a week. It’s ten hours more than what my contract says. And you know how much I earn? 600 euros a month. I don’t see any prospect in the hair-dressing sector unless you open your own business. Ok, it’s only one year that I have been working there, but my colleague, she’s been working there for 18 years and she is earning 1,300 euros, and you don’t make a living on 1,300 euros!

Researcher: What do you do with the money you earn?

Federico: First, I bought a car! Then I spent my money on clothes. You see something you like and you buy it, I don’t think too much about it… I sweat to earn that miserable salary. It’s my money, so I go and buy something…

Researcher: Do you manage to save anything?

Federico: If I manage to save something, I use it for tattoos, which is my passion. I hope to have a tattoo on my full arm, but you know, tattoos cost money [laughing].

For this latter group of young workers, consumption and leisure are important fields of investment, allowing them to develop adult identities in individualistic terms, through a sense of competence and increased autonomy. While it may seem contradictory that lower wages and lower future working perspectives lead these young people to exalt consumption and the inability to save, given the field of possibilities and constraints open to them, perhaps consumption is the major space where these young adults can acquire self-worth and recognition, where they may experience an adult-like feeling of competent independence and autonomy.
Freelance Work in Italy

by Alessandro Gandini, University of Milan, Italy, and member of ISA Research Committee on the Sociology of Professional Groups (RC52)

In the last few decades, the rise of the creative and cultural industries has created a large number of mostly media-based professions, often popularized as the “creative class.” Today, this large workforce has converged into project-based and freelance careers, sometimes because they lack alternatives, but increasingly also as a result of personal choices, as these workers seek to find a balance between the professional and private domains in a precarious environment.

In Milan, freelance professions in the knowledge and creative industries provide a textbook example of the rise of a workforce focused on innovation and attractiveness. Importantly, the acquisition of a reputation appears essential to professional success. Journalists, consultants, communication experts, video makers – all freelance professional figures who locate themselves halfway between precarity and entrepreneurship – need to perform self-branding practices to trigger the loop of a “reputation economy” required to get jobs and to establish oneself successfully in the milieu. This is enacted mostly through face-to-face interactions and digital activity on social media, which becomes ever more central as interaction increasingly occurs at a distance. But this effort to establish a reputation often results in “extreme work,” with long hours and pressure to perform, which challenges the common assumptions about job quality and job satisfaction in this sector.

The rapid expansion of freelancing is obvious in Europe’s aggregate employment data. Freelance work satisfies a growing aspiration for an independent and self-organized working life on the one side, while also offering “traditional” budget-savvy reasons for explaining its popularity.

More than ten years after the celebratory diffusion of the idea of a “creative class,” a decade of policies that claimed to foster the individual entrepreneurial activity of “creative” workers in the knowledge industry has generated a labor market largely composed of professionals working in project-based and freelance careers, mostly based in cities, in an unstable balance between precarity and self-entrepreneurship. Milan is undoubtedly a paradigmatic example of this development.
Freelancers interviewed for this study are urban-based knowledge and creative workers aged 19 to 60, working as independent professionals within communication, public relations, media and design. These “freelancers” – that is, people who work on commission and contract jobs, at different levels – report average gross annual earnings of around 32,000 euros. However, this average obscures significant wage polarization: more than half of interviewees earned significantly less than 30,000 euros per year.

Freelancing in Milan is often seen as a second-best choice, as standard dependent jobs are still largely preferred. One respondent, a Public Relations consultant in her 40s, calls “freelancing” a strategy for paying employees less, and suggests the “coolness” of the job generally hides unfair working conditions. Similarly, a 20-something freelance journalist in Milan calls freelancing in Milan “a condition to be escaped.”

Nevertheless, some respondents described freelancing as offering greater freedom and self-organization on the job, both considered very rewarding aspects of the freelance profession. One middle-aged female communication professional said that working freelance means getting back your own time, as the strong sense of connection between the personal and professional relations allows her to strike a balance between the private and working lives.

Freelance work connotes a dimension of “socialization,” calling for a significant portion of work to be conducted through the management of social relations, through word-of-mouth, recommendations, referrals and, ultimately, one’s personal reputation in the professional network. Indeed, one’s personal reputation within professional networks seems to be the element that determines an independent freelancer’s professional success and career progression. The importance of networking means emphasizes practices of personal branding to profitably develop the image of “self-enterprise.”

One 48-year-old female consultant, for example, reported that her reputation in the field was critical when she sought to “reinvent herself,” after she had to resign from her previous job in the middle of the crisis. After resigning, she established contacts and social relations with those she considered the most relevant and reputed people in her professional context. This “relational work” granted her a first commission, which through her expanded network then led to a regular supply of work. Some of the work also came directly from social media as hirers found her well curated profile on LinkedIn, combined with her professional management of Twitter. The daily routines and tasks of freelance workers in the knowledge economy are, thus, very different from the conventional duties associated with “dependent” employment.

As these “portfolio” and “boundary-less” careers proliferate in the knowledge industry, a freelance worker’s degree of embeddedness in social networks where information circulates substantially through word-of-mouth becomes crucial to an individual’s chances of finding work. A professional image on social media has become instrumental to a successful professional life, since the digital dimension contributes to networking-building practices and helps cultivate a long-distance reputation.

As big firms become less directly involved in employing creative workers, freelancers and self-employed are called to discover new modalities for the collective construction of relationships and the management of social capital – relationships which in turn shape individual chances for recruitment and employment.

However, this also increases home working. Although a number of interviewees consider this condition satisfactory, for many workers it creates a diffused desire for relief from alienating home-work routines. Here, new organizational arrangements emerge, as those enacted by one junior professional who explains his decision to live with his associate in a flat that is at once their home and the headquarters of their startup.

New urban aggregations seem to be emerging within cities, responding to some of the problematic aspects of the freelance condition. The most prominent in this sense is the rise of spaces of co-working, which offer workers a shared environment where they can hire a desk and office-like facilities, together with engaging in social networking with other freelancers. In line with other major metropolitan areas, Milan is witnessing the diffusion of a great number of co-working spaces. There are different types of co-working spaces: some are local and small-scale spaces, populated by people working in advertising and public relations; others involve large-scale actors operating franchising models promoting social enterprise and social innovation. In these co-working spaces, workers share not just a space, but develop what they claim is an “open-source approach to work” that establishes communitarian relations.

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Although sectarianism generally implies fixed social and political relations organized along rigid sectarian lines, in Lebanon, these relations have shifted within a short period of time. This fast reconfiguration of sectarian dichotomies poses important questions. What is sectarianism and what does it mean in the Lebanese context? How can sectarian dichotomies shift so quickly in a country where the political system rests on a rigid balance of power between the different groups?

The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri on February 14, 2005 was a political earthquake that reconfigured Lebanon’s political and sectarian fault lines. It triggered the biggest demonstrations in the country’s history, dividing it into two camps: the “March 8th coalition,”
which reasserted its alliance with Syria and accused the US and Israel of killing Hariri; and the “March 14th coalition,” which directly accused the Syrian regime of backing the assassination. Initially, the events that followed the Hariri assassination seemed puzzling: both new coalitions incorporated parties which had been fierce enemies a few years earlier. The anti-Syrian coalition comprised many members, mainly of the Christian, Druze, and Sunni communities; whereas the counter-demonstrations by pro-Syrian groups included mainly Shia who rallied behind the Hezbollah and Amal parties, joined a year later by the largely Christian party of the Free Patriotic Movement. It was the first time since the 1975-1990 civil war that the main Christian-based and Muslim-based political parties in Lebanon mobilized together for a political cause.

Although, at first, much attention was given to the reconciliation between both confessional groups, the growing divide in the country was rapidly reframed as one between the “Sunnis” and the “Shias.” In May 2008, the political crisis in the country spiraled out of control. On May 7, Hezbollah fighters and their allies mobilized to seize the capital, Beirut. The violence quickly spread to other parts of the country, with Tripoli and the Shouf witnessing the most violent and brutal confrontations. Although many factions (some Druze, Christian and Alawi-based parties, in addition to some non-sectarian political parties such as the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party) have been involved in these clashes, the violence was still generally framed as a “Sunni-Shia” conflict.

Sectarianism and politics are two sides of the same coin in Lebanon. The political organization of society along clear sectarian lines and the adoption of consociational democracy as the basis of the political system made politics and sectarian identities intertwined. Moreover, the majority of political parties are based on clearly-defined sectarian communities, making it easy to turn political conflicts into sectarian ones. However the salience of sectarian divides depends mainly on the ability of opposing groups to compete in terms of size, political power, economic capacity or military strength.

Although most analyses of the Lebanese society focus on sectarianism, these usually fail to address the political and economic factors which drive Lebanese sectarianism. Whereas all sectarian identities can be socially relevant, only some become politically salient. In other words, what matters in understanding the dynamics of Lebanese society is not sectarianism per se, but rather the politicization of sectarianism.

Even at the individual level, sectarian identities go beyond religious affiliations, involving clear political and social connotations. To say that one is “Sunni” or “Shia” in the Lebanese context refers not only to religion by descent, but more importantly indicates political affiliation, societal belonging, and communal loyalties. Sectarian and political identities are often used interchangeably. This explains why Christian identity has ceased to be politically relevant in the wider sectarian discourse today, although it remains relevant socially. The fact that the Christian community is divided along political lines between the March 8th and March 14th coalitions has made it less salient in the country’s political polarization. This example shows that the content and boundaries of Lebanon’s social cleavages are in permanent flux, and identities are constantly in a process of definition and redefinition as political boundaries change – an acknowledgment which turns on its head the whole “primordial” approach that sees sectarianism as inborn and immutable.

Although the Hariri assassination was the turning point that reconfigured pre-existing sectarian relations, the roots of this change mainly lie in shifting internal socio-economic and political variables, in addition to the changing geopolitics of the Middle East and the role of external forces such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Israel and the US. The declining relevance of the historical “Christian-Muslim” schism in Lebanon and the rise of the “Sunni-Shia” divide can be attributed to the political weakening of “Christians” and the rise in “Shia” power.

The Taef Agreement that put an end to the civil war in 1990 amended the constitution to give more political power to the “Sunnis,” more military power to the “Shias,” and to marginalize the “Christians” by diminishing the role of the President of the Republic. Socio-economic factors have also contributed to the re-shaping of sectarian discourse. The Shia community’s upward mobility through urbanization and migration has made many Shia figures key investors and prominent actors in the Lebanese economy. Similarly, Hariri’s neo-liberal reconstruction policies after the civil war restructured class relations in Beirut, creating a new class of economic elites who emerged at the expense of the old Beirut (mainly Christian and Sunni) landowners and businessmen. Combined with the political power granted through the Taef agreement, the Sunni and Shia communities in Lebanon came out of the civil war as the two most powerful groups able to compete over power.

Like anywhere else, Lebanon’s conflict is essentially economic and political; conflict takes different forms and framings when it intersects with identities, but this intersection does not make it essentially a war of identities. Acknowledging the shifting nature of sectarianism and dissecting the structural factors that make sectarianism more or less politically salient at some points in time and not others are key in the analysis of any fragmented society. Such approach is clearly needed today in analyzing conflicts in the Arab region and the rise of extremist movements such as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.

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1 Hassan is the pseudonym of one of my interviewees. He participated in the 1975-1990 civil war and took to the streets again in the violent episode of May 2008.
> Cultivating the “Bitter Crop” in a Lebanon War Zone

by Munira Khayyat, American University in Cairo, Egypt

There is so much violent rupture going on in the Arab world – in particular in that roiling corner of the Eastern Mediterranean where the wars in Syria and Iraq continue to rage, radiating outwards – that it is hard, if not impossible, to notice the more continuous rhythms and practices that prosaically continue, the cycle of activities that undergird the daily fight for life in inhospitable, if not impossible, settings. One of those remarkably dependable cycles is this year’s tobacco crop, already coating the hills of South Lebanon in electric green, heralding high summer. The months of June, July, and August is tobacco season in the arid highlands of South Lebanon, and has been for centuries. Through repeated seasons of rupture the tobacco harvest has sustained the resilient inhabitants of these difficult margins.

Called “the bitter crop,” tobacco is cultivated by homesteads across the hills of South Lebanon for the state-owned monopoly Régie Libanaise de Tabacs et Tombacs, better known to those who doggedly serve it as the Régie. Yes, tobacco is a vile, labor-intensive, carcinogenic, exploitative market commodity; environmental or humanitarian outfits roll through South Lebanon touting replacement crops like thyme, or installing emblematic and quickly abandoned infrastructure like water-harvesting pools for “alternative” forms of agriculture. But the inhabitants of Lebanon’s southern marches will not let tobacco go. To them, it is synonymous with life: the income it ensures cannot be forgone in a context of so much existential insecurity. It is a (bitter) lifeline that has seen the inhabitants of this oft-violated border zone through years of conflict, invasions, occupations, neglect and grinding structural violence.

Today, tobacco is booming. Since South Lebanon’s last cycle of war in 2006 (locally referred to as the “July War”), tobacco has seen unprecedented growth – despite the fact that in the final hours of that vicious, month-long offensive, the Israeli Air Force dropped millions of cluster
bombs across South Lebanon, in an act of war against the landscape that is lifeline and livelihood. That year’s crop was scorched, ruined, and withered on the stalk. But even in the wake of this devastation, Lebanon’s southerners returned full force to cultivate a steadfast crop.

Today, tobacco fields sweep across the South, uprooting ancient olive and citrus groves, replacing subsistence agriculture with growing dependence on market-bought goods (because “tobacco cannot be eaten”). In a landscape peppered with land mines, cluster bombs, military infrastructure and no-go zones, tobacco is also overtaking livestock who need to be herded across increasingly militarized terrain. The South leans ever more on a crop and commodity that is increasingly marginalized and maligned, restricted and regulated on the global market.

Tobacco is a hardy weed that flourishes in arid highlands. Through its brief life (February – April as seedling, May to August as a field crop) it feeds off the dew of dawn, needing no irrigation. It is even more versatile as a crop in an impoverished rural area, as it requires no additional infrastructure or space: half-built (or half-destroyed) homes, front and back gardens, hillside terraces, irregular, often rocky plots of land. It has a readily available workforce: the women, children and elderly inhabitants of the homesteads of the “frontline villages,” where able-bodied males work abroad or in Lebanon’s cities. The residual population of these largely depopulated villages labor intensively on the crop that assures at least a supplemental family income, year after year.

Only those who hold licenses – which are limited in number and highly valued – may cultivate or sell tobacco. Prior to labor activism around tobacco in the 1960s and 70s, tobacco licenses were concentrated in the hands of the all-powerful landlords who owned most of the land. Today’s small farmers are descended from the sharecroppers who once worked the land. As guerrilla warfare in Lebanon’s southern borderland heated up in the 1960s and 70s, many landlords left for the cities; “their” peasants, who remained behind on the land, used remittances from a network of migrants in Africa, Latin America, Australia and elsewhere to buy small plots of land, eventually also acquiring tobacco licenses. Many peasants stuck around through invasions, a 22-year Israeli occupation of the border strip, the subsequent post-occupation era and the 2006 war. Through it all they farmed tobacco gaining a semblance of control over tobacco production by wresting the licenses away from the powerful.

What accounts for the success of tobacco along Lebanon’s southern marches? Why is tobacco, the bitter crop, the stalwart friend of the forgotten, downtrodden poor? On one level, it is about what works. And who works. The demography and geography as well as South Lebanon’s temporal and spatial rhythms, create an environment where tobacco farming thrives – and with it, a life on the land in an otherwise inhospitable place can continue. On another level, the crop’s success is structured and enabled by the Lebanese state, which bartered immense profit on the global tobacco market for a pact packaged as a generous social contract: the state pays a fixed price (8 to 13 USD per kilo) to licensed tobacco farmers, regardless of global price fluctuations.

This contract is both loved and hated by those who farm tobacco: the assured income harnesses them to an exploitative and destructive yet immensely profitable industry. The Lebanese state coaxes its “tobacco subsidy” in terms of pastoral care for its needy citizens, yet it happily pockets the massive profits it gains from this global trade.

Two narratives emerge about Lebanese tobacco. One narrative revolves around life, labor and love: many successful southerners ascribe their success to the fact that their families were able to farm tobacco, using the money to send them to school. Those who farm the crop – an overwhelming majority of whom are women – speak with pride of their skill in harvesting, sorting, threading, drying and packing the crop. In their eyes their tobacco is “the best in the world.”

Another narrative emerges from those who buy the crop, the officials of the Régie, who speak instead of uneven, even dubious quality. They bemoan having to buy the crop from households across the South – an unreliable commodity, which is re-sorted and repackaged and then stored in warehouses for long spells while the monopoly negotiates deals with global tobacco companies, who are required to buy a percentage of the annual Lebanese tobacco crop in return for an equal share in Lebanon’s commercial tobacco market. Some suggest that much of the laboriously cultivated tobacco of South Lebanon is simply trashed. The stark differences between the two narratives highlight the crop’s controversial nature.

Regardless of its ultimate fate and controversial uses, and because of a dearth of equally reliable alternatives, the cultivation of tobacco remains a lifeline in South Lebanon. The “frontline villages” of the Lebanese borderland are the most avid cultivators of the “bitter crop,” for it is in and through their labor for a market commodity that consistently sells at a stable price, that the villagers of South Lebanon manufacture a form of stability conducive to a marginally successful form of life in a space of constant rupture, destruction and violence.

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Many commentators have suggested the “new public management” of public services through “audit” may have run its course, and even that this approach has been replaced by an interest in “public value” (that is, a concern with maximizing the value of a service to the public). In the UK, this all seems rather hollow, as far as universities are concerned. Recent reforms have denied the public value of universities, addressing them solely from the perspective of their contribution to economic growth and investment in human capital to secure it, with students seen as “consumers.” In this context, the use of “audit” to shape universities, opening them up to market processes and reinforcing management control remains paramount.

In the UK, academics currently await the outcomes of the 2014 audit of research (the “REF”), due in December. The REF operates on a six-year cycle and determines part of a department’s income (the other sources being student fees and applications for external grants). The distribution of this income depends on scores assigned to publications evaluated by an academic peer review panel. The scores are anonymized and aggregated, and the submitting unit is scored for its research environment and for any external, non-academic impact of its research contribution.

The REF is very time-consuming for departments and it entails considerable costs for institutions managing the process. The process has also been criticized for the way in which it encourages “safe” research likely to be judged positively by panels, prompts game-playing by institutions, and reduces collegial relations by pushing universities to centralize the management of research.

Up to now, there has been no direct linkage between macro-management of overall university research strategies and goals, and the micro-management of individual academics because the judgments of the panels are subject to the Official Secrets Act, and so remain anonymous. This is about to change, however. The body responsible for REF, The Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), is now conducting a consultation over the “metricisation” of the REF.

This proposal was considered and rejected before the 2001 exercise, but it has now returned – not because the methodological difficulties in the use of bibliometric data (including subject differences in citation practices) have been overcome, but because the vast increase in available data has now made it worth trying.

The “metricisation” of the REF is a “Big Data” project, with every academic contributing data points by publishing and citing publications that are available for online searches. Moreover, the current system is so costly that private companies – for example, Thomson Reuters – may offer to provide metric data at a lower price. Professional judgment by a panel of peers would then be replaced by “crowd-sourced” judgments – the neoliberal version of academic freedom subject to a quasi-market. True, UK academics have been complicit in the REF as a “co-production,” but the metricisation of the REF would allow it to be the sole production of management together with a contracted “big data” company.

David Eastwood (a member of the Browne Review which recommended replacing public funding of higher education with fees and a leading advocate of the neoliberal project of a global market in higher education) has suggested that metricisation could be used further, as a means of internationalization. While the internationalization of the REF via peer review would be cumbersome, costly, and likely to provoke a hostile response from academics outside the UK, Eastwood suggests Britain could profit from the REF’s high international reputation – something much more likely to be accepted by university managements and ministers.
of education, than by academics. Funding bodies and policy makers outside the UK will be asked to collaborate in this project and, of course, will likely also to be subject to lobbying by private companies.

All of this has taken place without public discussion, either among academics or among wider publics with an interest in the future of democratic education. Academic freedom may not be the same as democratic freedom, but the latter is served by it.

The REF already subjects academic research to bureaucratic shaping by managements seeking to maximize funding, but its metricisation allows it to become a tool of micro-management. The very fact that a metrics-based REF operates on public data means that individual academics could be “tracked” in the same data (something not possible within the current version). Any company offering to provide a service in relation to the aggregation of data for purposes of ranking departments (nationally and internationally) could also offer the same service for individual departments in hiring decisions. Indeed, bibliometrics was initially developed in the early 1970s for precisely this purpose and “Big data” now provides a “marketable moment” (neoliberalism’s version of a “teachable moment”).

An illustration of this micro-management is evident in the recent moves of an English university – let us call it Russellton, to indicate its membership of the Russell Group of self-proclaimed “elite” universities. It first introduced an hours-based workload model to record time spent on different academic tasks and make it available for scrutiny by central management, on which I have written elsewhere. Now it has introduced a metrics-based research strategy, with three aspects: “goals,” “targets,” and “mechanisms.”

Here is an extract from this weighty document (especially weighty considering the paucity of its vision):

- **Goal 2:** To increase the number and proportion of high-quality outputs published by University of Russellton researchers:
  - **Target 2.1:** To achieve and maintain a REF GPA above the current Russell Group average of 2.71 (new benchmarks to be set following REF2014);
  - **Target 2.2:** To increase the quality of the University’s research portfolio, as measured by three-year field weighted citation impact, by 20 per cent by 2020 (1.68 in 2013);
  - **Target 2.3:** To double the proportion of publications in a three-year period in the top 10% of most cited outputs (21% in 2013);
  - **Target 2.4:** To increase the proportion of international co-authored publications in a three-year period to over 55% (40% in 2013);
  - **Target 2.5:** To increase the number of institutional citations in a three-year period by 30% with contributions from all academic disciplines (62,413 in 2013) […]
- **Mechanism 2.5:** To embed the use of open access, citations, h-indices and bibliometrics in the overall approach for the promotion of excellent individuals and for the assessment of the productivity and quality of research teams, where collaborative and co-authored work of the team can be benchmarked.

Thus, the turning of the audit screw is reducing the substance of academic life to “measureable moments” with academic freedom subordinated to market-based judgments of worth. It is this that HEFCE wants to bring to a university near you through its internationalization of audit.

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It comes as a surprise to many Egyptians that the word “Gypsy” originates from “Egyptian”: a medieval misconception linked to the mysterious Eastern travelers to Egypt. It continues to amaze Egyptians today that there are Egyptian Gypsies – or at least, that there are groups of people who are sometimes identified as Eastern Gypsies, or Dom, who are often viewed as possessing the psychic and magical powers often attributed to European Roma, and who have experienced similar marginalization and pariah-like status.

Eastern Gypsies are called Dom; different sub-groups are identified in Syria, Turkey, Israel and Egypt. However, whereas Doms and the Roma people have been dramatically stigmatized in most of Europe and some Middle Eastern countries, Doms in Egypt are not officially recognized, in part because religion is the main identifier in Egypt. The Egyptian national identity card, which identifies the religion of its holder, offers a choice between three religions: Christianity, Islam and Judaism. Up until very recently, people who were of a different religion than the official ones were simply denied access to a national identity card. Since religion is the official marker, other markers, such as ethnicity, are not used; groups whose identity would be defined in ethnic terms – the Bedouin, the Nubians, and, of course, the Doms – are socially ignored.

Lacking either identity-based categorization or statistical representation, it is almost impossible to estimate the size of Egypt’s Dom population. The main providers of data are evangelical organizations, who estimate the group to include between one and two million people, most of whom
are Muslim. Doms in Egypt are divided into different subgroups or tribes, a concept which is also more meaningful in a Middle Eastern context. Among the tribes names are the Ghagar, the Nawar, the Halebi – words which are also insults in Arabic. Evangelical organizations suggest that Ghagar, which means “vagrant,” may be the largest group of Egyptian Doms.

Since the Doms do not exist officially, there has been no attempt to either eradicate or assimilate them. In Europe, forced integration and marginalization seem to be the only two possible outcomes for the Roma groups, whose nomadism has often been perceived as defiance, or affinity with adverse allegiances. In Egypt, by contrast, nomadism has been historically an integrated aspect of the Egyptian society, even if nomads have been throughout the twentieth century regarded as anachronistic; furthermore, nomadism in the Middle East has mostly been associated with Bedouins and nomadic pastoralists, not with Gypsies.

The Egyptian state, then, seems oblivious to the existence of Gypsies, but are they nonetheless present in collective representations and imagination? The late Nabil Sobhi Hanna conducted ethnographic research about 50 years ago among the semi-nomadic Ghagar communities in the area of Sett Ghiranaha, in the Nile Delta region. The Ghaps he described often lived on the edge of villages, and had very specific occupations: horse and donkey dealers, iron workers and entertainers. More recently, many have established themselves in neighborhoods of downtown Cairo, Sayida Zeinab or the infamous City of the Dead, where they are metal workers, blacksmiths, “tinkers,” wool traders, shearers, saddlers, musicians and dancers or engaged in small trade as peddlers. They sometimes resort to begging, like many poor urban dwellers. Their neighbors in the City of the Dead are the Zabaleen, Orthodox Copts who are often trash collectors. While the vast majority of Doms are in fact sedentary, their contemporary activities are still linked to short-term spatial mobility: they work at short-term jobs, they occupy rented houses, they may move from place to place within a neighborhood. They still seem to exist on the margins of Egyptian society.

While most Egyptians are not aware of the presence of Gypsies, upon giving it more thought many acknowledge there are indeed Gypsies in Egypt, mentioning that they may have encountered women telling fortunes, travelers in rural areas, thieves or entertainers in religious festivals. Although Doms are not fully identified, they seem to exist at the margins of people’s subconscious, and can easily materialize in specific contexts and by fragments.

The figure of the “Gypsy” is often more present in the countryside: they may belong to yet another tribe in the complex rural system. Gypsies are known in a fragmented way for their contribution to Egyptian music or through the Ghawazee, belly dancers of the Nawar tribe known as beautiful temptresses. The Ghawazees were Harem dancers, who were banished from Cairo in the nineteenth century – later to be romanticized in movies such as the 1950s blockbuster, Tamr Hindi, in which a wealthy young man falls in love with a Ghawazee and tries to make a respectable person out of her. He fails, and the Ghawazee stays where she belongs. Some boundaries cannot be crossed.

Gypsies also perform as entertainers during Moulids – part pilgrimage, part carnival and part mystical Islamic ceremony. In Egypt, Moulids are not limited to the Prophet’s birthday (Moulids en Nabi), but can also refer to the celebration of local Sufi saints, often attracting the attention of Egyptian authorities because Moulids are approved by Shia and Sufi authorities but not by the Sunni, the Egyptian majority. Despite official disapproval, Moulids are widely practiced; they are similar to Christian carnivals, a time of anxiety and license, where usual norms can be broken: gender segregation is discarded, sexual taboos are forgotten, people dance in a state of general hysteria. Doms are very much part of the Moulid, which is not surprising given their association with entertainment and immoral arts. Women dance and men play music. Dom women do what respectable females may not, that sort of middle role that keeps them in the Simmelian stranger category.

So, who are the Gypsies of Egypt? Not officially recognized, they are known by the population as nomads and horse dealers in rural Egypt, or as entertainers, Moulids dancers and Ghawazees, fortune tellers and plain beggars in more urban areas. All in all, they are mostly part of poorer Egyptian communities, marginalized and ignored. Much as Edward Said suggested the Orient was shaped by European Orientalists in the nineteenth century, Gypsies were “othered” and constructed as exotic (oriental) others within the European boundaries. Ironically, in Egypt Gypsies have also been orientalized: the characteristics attributed to them are strikingly similar to those associated with the Orient, or with Gypsies inside Europe. The trichotomy of danger, revulsion and attraction, that was associated with Arab males (dangerous fanatics, etc.) or women (sensual Harem creatures, etc.), is also associated with Gypsies. The males are seen as untrustworthy and thieves, the women as mysterious, dangerous (fortune tellers, spell casters) and tempting, as belly-dancers, Ghawazees or prostitutes.

Studying Doms in Egypt is particularly fascinating because of the questions their experiences raise: Are there transnational Gypsy practices and identities that encompass borders and nation-states? How are these practices and identities constructed and what is their function? Are the Dom/Roma the eternal pariahs? Are they the eternal threat to the national identity? And how does a country like Egypt deal with such minorities, both religious and non-religious?

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Over the last decade, the rights of binational couples uniting a European Union citizen and a Third-Country National (TCN) have been profoundly eroded. As residents but not citizens, TCNs are entitled to a limited range of rights and their situation has become increasingly precarious. In France, for instance, the government uses legal-administrative means and invasive practices to interfere with the intimate lives of binational couples, both same-sex and heterosexual. Moreover, the French authorities seem to protect some nationalities and family types more than others.

Through interviews with couples, multi-sited ethnography, and participant observation of organizations defending binational families and migrants’ rights, such as Public Ban on Lovers and the Association for the Recognition of Homosexual and Transgender Rights for Immigrants and Residents, we explore legal reforms, a changing political context, and the attitudes of officers in charge of administrative practices that affect binational couples in France today.

In France, immigration policies distinguish between “selected” migration (immigration choisie, i.e. highly qualified migrants and needed workers) and “imposed” migration (immigration subie, i.e. family migrants and asylum seekers). Migrants who come to join partners or to establish families are considered an “imposition” – despite the fact that family migration is, in theory, protected by the Constitution and international conventions. In public discourse, family migration mixes national paternalism and the construction of boundaries. In reality, TCNs’ treatment depends on their country of origin, religion, sex, and sexual orientation: migrants from certain post-colonial countries such as Morocco or Algeria face more restrictions than others, because of their already significant presence in France; fears of a perceived “Muslim invasion” and the amalgam between “Arab” and “Muslim” affect the daily lives of couples.

Paradoxically, legislative implementation also affects French citizens who marry or form civil unions with TCNs. Stigmatization thus affects both TCNs and their European partners, who become “strangers” in their own society, suspected of threatening national identity because of their choice of a foreign partner.

> Restricting Migration

In France there are deep contradictions between the law and practice. Restricting family migration has been a legal priority since 2003, when five successive laws burdened the daily lives of binational couples. In 2006 two laws, “Sarkozy II” and “Clément’s law” aimed to identify fake marriages.
“Marriage has greatly evolved over the past few years, becoming a major migration issue […]. The number of fraudulent unions that are broken up by the mayors and diplomatic consular agents never stops rising” (P. Clément, National Assembly Speech, March 22, 2006)

The Civil register officer is required to interview future spouses together “or, if necessary, separately.” An officer who suspects fraud may refuse to authorize the wedding, requiring a criminal inquiry. In practice, since 2004, any spouse lacking a regular French residence permit must provide further information. Even after marrying, couples must prove the stability of their relationship and, at each appointment for renewing the TCN spouse’s residency permit, the French spouse has to go along to the Prefecture, providing bills or common documents to certify common family life.

By 2009 political discourses described binational marriages as the “first source of immigration,” sometimes raising fears of a new category of marriage, the “marriage of convenience” or “gray marriage” (mariage gris) – in which one partner is deceived by a foreign partner who only seeks French residence – in contrast to the marriage of convenience commonly called “white marriage” (mariage blanc), that is, a formal marriage in which the French partner is fully aware of the partner’s real intentions, helping to fool authorities. Out of the 278,600 marriages celebrated in France in 2004, 5,272 were transmitted by the Civil Register officers to the police (1.9%); of these, 737 were considered invalid, including 444 marked as marriages of convenience. In the end, only four people were convicted of a marriage of convenience.

To attain citizenship, the law requires that TCNs demonstrate “assimilation to the French community” (language test, knowledge of French citizens’ rights and duties, etc.). Marriage itself does not provide automatic access to French nationality: the delay in eligibility for citizenship has been extended from six months after marriage in 1984 to four years today.

> Administering binational marriage

Administrators controlling migration have acquired more and more discretionary power. The officials who deliver visas, residence and work permits must protect national security, and they often have a prejudicial vision of migration rather than a comprehensive knowledge of the rules. These officers occupy a lower position in the hierarchical administrative ladder, and their exercise of power depends on how they conceive of their work and the immigration question.

Officially, it is the Prefect who decides which foreigners should receive authorization to legally stay in France. But, in practice, binational couples, like all migrants, confront what Alexis Spire calls “foreigner counters” – officers who have daily dealings with migrants in a “dirty position,” removed from the bosses whose orders they are supposed to implement. “Dirtiness” comes from contact with foreigners and can be grasped by the “smells and the sounds [of foreign languages]” that pervade the waiting rooms of local offices – in contrast to the clean calm of the offices of the higher officials. The personal attitudes of the officers as well as the need to implement policy govern their interaction with spouses. Spouses have to negotiate their status with bureaucrats who have no real decision-making powers. They are under the ultimate authority of higher officials who are almost never in contact with foreigners.

> Facing racism and xenophobia

Immigration policies concerning binational families have led to multiple types of discrimination. As TCNs are unwanted, looked down upon by police and government workers, both their French spouses and the French officers who work alongside foreigners become what Goffman would term “initiates”, individuals who work with stigmatized individuals, and risk having the stigma extended to themselves. Traits such as age, economic status, and appearance may quell suspicions regarding couples’ sincere love, but this does not allay the stigma attached to foreigners and all who work with them.

The private lives of binational couples become public, as these individuals speak openly about their relationships, feelings, love, and problems, to solve the impasse of their situations and to denounce the stigmatization of their marriages. Interestingly, the French state and binational couples propose definitions of marriage that are not far from one another. For the two sides, love is the condition sine qua non of marriage. Institutional racism or governmental xenophobia, however, erode the boundaries between the private and the public spheres, and invade their family life.

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1 Notes from Laura Odasso’s fieldwork journal, December 10, 2009.
The Specter Haunting Turkey

by Aylin Topal, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

Over the last two years, Turkey’s social and political developments have triggered new debates on the country’s political regime. What is the nature of the regime, what led to the uprisings in June 2013, and what is the aftermath?¹

Neoliberalism in Turkey dates back to the year 1980: on January 24, 1980, the advent of Turkey’s structural adjustment program and on September 12, Turkey’s military coup d’état. The military came to power with two overriding objectives: first, to tame the political left and trade unions; and second, to continue the process of economic restructuring, maintaining the support of the Turkish bourgeoisie as well as western capitalist countries and the Bretton Woods institutions. The post-military regime era was very much in line with the New Right politics.

Twenty-two years later, in 2002, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) won a parliamentary majority – the first time in fifteen years that any party governed alone. Markets in general responded positively because, as a Merrill Lynch analysis pointed out, “the arrival of a single-party government would strengthen Turkey’s economic balances.” The party did not disappoint: a few months after it took office, the government declared that to end the ongoing economic crisis, it would minimize state involvement in economic activities, and privatize state economic enterprises – which has remained the JDP’s main fiscal strategy.

In May 2013, then Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan revealed the government’s redevelopment plans for Taksim Square, a central Istanbul area that has been the venue of political protests for decades. Adjacent to the Square, Gezi Park is one of the few remaining green spots in the city center. Redevelopment plans included reconstruction of a mosque in Taksim Square and a historical military barrack in the Gezi Park — now slated to include a shopping mall. The Prime Minister also informed the public about other government mega projects, including a third airport and a third bridge over the Bosphorus.

Like every single piece of legislation the JDP had passed, these plans had not been discussed in parliament, let alone with any civil society organization. The Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects and the Union of Chambers of City Planners immediately reacted;
together with environmental activists, both organizations declared that they would block construction vehicles from entering the Park. On May 28, they pitched the first tents.

At dawn on May 31, police violently attacked the protestors, burning the tents and using excessive force, tear gas and water cannon on even non-resisting protestors. Defending the police, the Prime Minister criminalized the protestors, calling them “extreme groups” and çapulcu (looters or marauders).

That evening, opposition groups called for solidarity with Istanbul’s protestors, and millions rushed to parks in every Turkish city to protest the violent police crackdown, chanting “Everywhere Taksim, everywhere resistance,” “Dictator resign!” and “Jump! Jump! Whoever does not jump is Tayyip!”

This reaction was not surprising, as tensions and discontent had been growing. On December 18, 2012, police had brutally attacked a peaceful student protest when Erdoğan visited the Middle East Technical University (METU) to observe the launch of a military satellite. Instead of initiating an investigation into excessive police force, the Prime Minister attacked the faculty, saying, “Shame on professors who raised those students. Instructors first must teach their students how to be respectful.” Subsequent protests at METU and solidarity protests on campuses throughout the country were repressed, prompting international scrutiny. In April 2013, the Emek theatre was demolished to make room for an entertainment and shopping venue, generating widespread protests; again, peaceful demonstrations were dispersed with water cannons and pepper gas. The government’s disguised authoritarianism and conservatism became more evident in late May 2013 with a new law restricting the sale of alcohol – a law Tayyip Erdoğan explicitly noted sought to both protect youth and enforce religious laws. Around the same time, a kissing young couple was criticized in a subway station announcement; in protest, hundreds came together to kiss in the same station.

In response to the rising protests in solidarity with those in the Gezi Park, Erdoğan claimed he was “barely holding back the 50 percent” who had elected him, he said “there may be thousands of protestors on the streets, but I am able to bring millions” onto the street. Buses transported his supporters to public meetings protesting the Gezi demonstrations; crowds chanted, “Let’s crush Taksim” and “Minority, don’t test our patience.”

The Gezi Resistance questioned the nature of the political authority and undermined JDP rule, creating fissures in the state’s legitimacy. Ironically, this resistance catalyzed a regime change from disguised conservative authoritarianism to overt reactionary autocracy. Since July 2013, instead of addressing complaints, the JDP has criminalized its opposition, calling its efforts to weaken the government “civil coup attempts.”

Immediately after widespread corruption allegations against the Prime Minister, his family and his cabinet members, Erdoğan launched a battle against the Gülen Brotherhood and what was called a “parallel structure” within the state. An audio recording – reportedly made on December 17 (the day sons of three ministers were arrested for corruption and bribery allegations) – was posted on the internet, in which a man alleged to be Tayyip Erdoğan orders his son to dispose of vast amounts of cash. Following this Erdoğan claimed there had been “a coup attempt” of “lobbies” and “dark powers” meant to weaken the government in advance of upcoming elections, and demanded preemptive measures. Soon afterwards, the JDP-dominated parliament passed new laws granting intelligence service personnel immunity, and curbing freedoms of the press, expression and information. Nonetheless, on August 9, Erdoğan was elected President with 51.8% of votes cast, in an election with a 73.4% turnout. During the campaign, Tayyip Erdoğan said repeatedly that he would be a “hands-on executive President”, unlike his ceremonial predecessors. He seems determined to exercise the full powers granted to him, chairing cabinet meetings and appointing university rectors and some members of top judicial bodies. De jure parliamentarianism with de facto presendentialism would mean ruling without accountability – a perfect recipe for overt autocracy.

In the face of this regime change, the Turkish state under the control of the JDP government is suffering a deep legitimacy crisis. A specter is haunting the President and his government, the specter of Gezi Resistance…

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Manipulating Public Opinion in Kazakhstan

by Almas Taizhanov, Association of Sociologists of Kazakhstan, regular collective member of the ISA

Kazakhstan and Ukraine both have common border with Russia, and they share a common status as former Soviet Republics. But they share one more important and tragic similarity: both suffered substantial demographic losses during the famine caused by Soviet “collectivization” in 1932-1933.

Death from starvation and emigration during the famine resulted in the loss of up to 1,840,000 Kazakhs by 1934, about 47.3% of Kazakhstan’s 1930 population. The loss of almost half of the local population was “compensated” by several migration waves from the Russian Federation before and after World War II. For Kazakhstan, this reshaped the country’s demography: according to the 1959 USSR census, Kazakhs made up only 30% of the total Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic’s population, down from 58.5% in 1926.

The famine in Ukraine in the same period took the lives of around 3 million Ukrainians – a figure that is proportionally less than the Kazakh losses, as the Ukrainian population had reached 23 million by the time of the 1926 USSR census. Further, in Ukraine, the government confiscated grain, whereas the mostly nomadic Kazakhs lost their private livestock, their major source of nutrition. Ukrainians had more chance of surviving the famine.

As a result of migration waves from the Russian Federation to Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Russians comprise a significant part of the populations of both republics. This has been and is especially characteristic of the Northern regions of Kazakhstan bordering Russia and the Ukrainian regions next to Russia (Donetsk and Lugansk) – precisely where we see today’s ongoing conflict.

No sociological research is openly available on the risk of a separatist movement in Kazakhstan, especially in the Northern and Eastern regions of the country, where a substantial Russian population lives. However, at least one major separatist incident took place: in November 1999, a separatist armed mutiny broke out in Ust-Kamenogorsk city (in the eastern Kazakhstan region bordering Rus-
sia). Organized by a group of 22 Russians – eleven of whom (including the leader) were citizens of the Russian Federation – the mutiny was blocked by the Kazakhstan National Security Committee; all separatists received six to eight years in a Kazakhstan prison, and all returned to Russia after being released.

Despite this history, the population of Kazakhstan does not display great concern over separatism. Moreover, according to the survey conducted by the Kazakhstan based Center for Social and Political Researches, Strategy, after the start of the Ukrainian conflict, 61% of the Kazakhstan population supported the Russian Federation’s annexation of the Crimea, 23% were neutral about it or could not answer the question, and only 6% considered the annexation an illegal violation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity. The survey provides clear correlation between who controlled the media (Kazakhstan, Russian, or western media) and the reported attitudes to the conflict.

According to the 2011-2015 Strategic Development Plan of the Communication and Information Ministry of Kazakhstan, there are 2,740 Kazakhstan-based mass media organizations (print media, television and broadcast companies, electronic media, etc.). Out of these, 20% operate in the Kazakh language, and 34% in Russian. The rest of Kazakhstan’s mass media supposedly use both languages, but in fact, most are more oriented toward the Russian language. The presence of the Kazakh language in the Internet is extremely small as compared to that of the Russian language, so one can say that in Kazakhstan, the Internet is mostly in Russian. Further, Russian TV-channels can broadcast freely, and Russian newspapers and magazines are widely available in Kazakhstan.

According to the survey mentioned above, respondents’ most important sources of information were: Kazakhstan-based mass media (50%), and Russia-based mass media (31%). Other sources included Internet sites and social networks like Facebook (9%), and talking to friends, colleagues and relatives (7%). Western mass media was a source of information for only 1% of respondents of the Internet survey.

How does the source of information affect opinion? Of the respondents receiving information from Kazakhstan-based mass media, 54% agree with the Russian Federation actions, 20% do not agree, and 26% are uncertain. However, among respondents relying on the Russia-based media, approval of Russian Federation actions reached 84%, with only 4% disagreeing.

As for respondents who got their news from Western media sources, 31% supported Russia, 39% did not support, and 31% were uncertain. This is a rather surprising picture, especially for those who expected that respondents who read and watch Western news would be likely to show more disapproval of Russian actions. Among those whose major information source is the Internet, 48% support Russia, 35% are uncertain, and 17% do not agree. As mentioned above, the Internet is predominantly “Russian” for Kazakhstan, thus these results are not surprising.

During the current Ukrainian-Russian conflict, propaganda has reached a level that has not been seen since the Soviet era. Total control over television and print media has made it easy to raise the volume of propaganda. Extreme levels of propaganda from Russia and Ukraine are influencing the Kazakhstan population and the government. At the same time, there are no signs of propaganda from the Kazakhstan mass media (i.e. government) visible today. The result is Kazakh public opinion is dominated by the viewpoint of the Russian mass media and government. Further, it has produced acute ideological division in the Kazakhstan population with the so-called “national-patriots,” “liberals” and “westernized” on one side, and the “pro-Russians” on the other. The absence of independent sociological research prevents deeper analysis. The absence of serious research to counter the interested manipulation of public opinion could be a threat to the future stability of Kazakhstan.

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Members of the International Science Council (ICSU) met in Auckland Convention Center for their tri-annual General Assembly and decided on the key directions of international science in the coming years. The theme of the 31st General Assembly was “A Celebration of 30 years of Global Change Research.” It endorsed a key statement on open access to the scientific record and cautioned against the misuse of metrics in the evaluation of research.

Founded in 1931, ICSU is a non-governmental organization with a global membership of national scientific bodies (120 members representing 140 countries) and International Scientific Unions (31 members). The Council’s activities focus on three areas: planning and coordination of international research; science for policy; and strengthening the universality of science. ICSU is often called upon to speak on behalf of the global scientific community. It acts as an advisor to governments and UN agencies in matters ranging from the environment to the conduct of science.

New Zealand Prime Minister, John Key, opened the meeting, stressing the country’s unique environmental challenges and its contributions to international research. Peter Gluckman, the government’s chief science adviser and past president of New Zealand’s Royal Society, gave the keynote address: “The Changing Nature of Science; Can Scientists Rise to the Challenge?” He warned the audience that science systems are changing rapidly, and if we do not manage these changes properly, they can contribute to loss of public trust!

For five days – 31 August to 4 September, 2014 – ICSU reviewed the progress of its key programs during the past three decades, namely:

- Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change
- International Geosphere-Biosphere Program
- World Climate Research Program
- Diversitas (Biodiversity Science)
- International Human Dimensions Program
- Earth Science Program

These served as the foundational programs for Future Earth: Research for Global Sustainability, ICSU’s definitive program for the next decade.

ICSU is partnering with two academies in its efforts to build a new generation of scientists, namely, the Global Young Academy (GYA) and the World Academy of Scientists (TWAS). Started in 1990 and based in Berlin with support from the German Science Academy, GYA has a membership of 90 young scientists around the globe and regularly organizes workshops and conferences to share its research findings. TWAS is a global science academy and connects a network of scientists from 50 developing economies. Based in Trieste, Italy, TWAS aims to “advance innovation and sustainable prosperity in the developing world through research, education, policy and diplomacy.”

In 2010, ICSU invited the ISA to contribute to integrating the social sciences into its scientific endeavor. But much remains to be done in this area. Currently, ISA is re-thinking whether it is worthwhile to continue its participation in a body whose heart is in the “hard core” sciences. From 2010-2014, Alice Abreu, former member of the ISA Executive Committee (2006-2010) and ICSU regional director for Latin America, was ISA’s representative in ICSU. Meanwhile, Stewart Lockie (former president of ISA’s RC23 on the Environment) became a member of ICSU’s Committee on Strategic Planning and Research (2013-2014).

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We joined Global Dialogue with GD3.1 in November 2012. Since then, our team has changed with every number, but this is a positive feature, as we all have learned from each other in the process of translating and editing the Romanian version of Global Dialogue. We are all sociologists, the majority still PhD students, enthusiastic and passionate about our interests in sociology. The diverse topics in Global Dialogue have offered us, the GD Romanian team – as well as our professors and fellow colleagues – the opportunity to explore a global society.

Our team has six constant members who are presented below together with colleagues who have participated in at least five GD issues. Besides these permanent members, eleven other colleagues joined the team for at least one issue: Ramona Cantaragiu, Cristian Constantin Vereș, Angelica Helena Marinescu, Monica Nădreg, Ioana Cârțărescu, Mădălina Rapan, Andreea Acasandre, Daniela Gaba, Alexandru Duțu, Gabriela Ivan, Levente Szekedi.

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