40 Years after the Coup

Manuel Antonio Garretón

Sociology as a Vocation

Elizabeth Jelin, Immanuel Wallerstein

Global Protest Continues

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Egypt – Asef Bayat and Mohammed Bamyeh
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Inequality

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Traveling through Latin America, one quickly discovers its diversity. In this issue Juliana Franzoni and Diego Sánchez-Ancochea point to a broad continental turn against inequality. Nevertheless, even in this realm, differences are stark. Thus, Chile and Uruguay lie at the opposite ends of the spectrum between neoliberalism and social democracy. When it comes to social issues, the first is in the dark ages while the second is at the forefront of liberal legislation on drugs, gay rights, and abortion. Uruguay wiped out its indigenous population, and is racially and ethnically far more homogeneous than, for example, Peru. If in Uruguay the Tupamaros have entered the ruling left-wing coalition, in Peru and Colombia, the guerrilla movement is still waging an extra-parliamentary war. Indeed, Colombia is a living paradox – long-standing democracy combined with unregulated violence – so that Dejusticia, an organization of brilliant lawyers and social scientists, exploits Colombia’s liberal constitution to defend indigenous and other communities against violence.

Differences notwithstanding, Latin American social scientists have created patterns of continental collaboration. Thus, Chilean sociologist, Manuel Antonio Garretón, underlines the historic importance of academic and intellectual exchanges among Latin American countries, even during the dictatorship. Here South-South dialogue is more than an aspiration to develop a sociology in the South, of the South and for the South; it is a reality, although its very intensity can make dialogue beyond the region more difficult. Eliana Kaimowitz describes the difficulties Dejusticia experienced in organizing a workshop for young human rights advocates from all over the Global South. The first problem was to get the participants to Colombia. The major travel routes passed through Northern countries, requiring difficult-to-obtain transit visas, on top of which it was often difficult to obtain a Colombian visa itself. By contrast, coming from the Global North I did not even need a visa for Colombia. Moreover, the workshop was only possible due to lavish funding from the Ford Foundation. It is commonplace for Northern resources to be deployed to develop Southern research as in Ching Kwan Lee’s study of China in Africa, Helen Sampson’s study of migrant seafarers and international shipping, or Guy Standing’s study of basic income grants in India. Not surprisingly, elite Northern universities become a magnet for Southern talent.

Our two contributors to “Sociology as a Vocation” – Elizabeth Jelin and Immanuel Wallerstein – have dedicated themselves to promoting South-South as well as North-South dialogues. Just as Northern sociologists are by no means homogeneous – some more sensitive to global inequalities than others – so the South, too, is not homogeneous, with a minority being able to reach beyond national boundaries while the majority remains embedded in the local. If global inequalities limit South-South collaboration, so other resources, not least social media, become critical in connecting social movements – explored in this issue for Brazil, Egypt, and Turkey – as they do for sociologists through such platforms as our own Global Dialogue.

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Manuel Antonio Garretón is one of the most well-known social scientists in Latin America. He graduated from the Catholic University of Chile and received his PhD from École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. He has been the director of many academic institutions, taught in foreign and national universities and has been advisor of national and international, public and private organizations. There is little that he has not studied, but always with a political and theoretical lens. He is the author of many books on authoritarian regimes, social movements and the politics of transition as well as on the state of social science in Latin America. He is Professor of sociology at the University of Chile, recently held the Simón Bolívar Chair of Latin American Studies at Cambridge University, UK, and was President of ISA’s Research Committee on Social Class and Social Movements (RC47), 1998-2000. In 2007 he was awarded Chile’s National Prize of the Social Sciences and Humanities. The interview took place in Santiago, July 27, 2013.

MB: Manuel Antonio, over the last 50 years you have experienced some of the greatest and lowest moments of world history. Early on you were President of the Student Federation at the Catholic University in Santiago, after which, in 1967, you went to Paris to study under Alain Touraine. There you were thrown into the turbulence of 1968. In 1970 you returned to Chile, to discover an effervescent movement that would bring Salvador Allende to power. But here I am interested in the last 40 years since the coup. So, tell me, what were you doing in 1973?
**MAG:** After I returned from France I became director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Social Studies. It was a Marxist center, housed in the Catholic University, with leading social scientists. When the coup came I was expelled from the university, and my center was closed. I was 30 years old and I faced two options, either go into exile or stay. I was involved in university politics, always connected to national politics, so I stayed.

**MB:** What were you able to do in these organizations, for example, in FLACSO?

**MAG:** You must remember that Chile was one of the main headquarters in Latin America for international organizations. With the coup the flow of students dried up and FLACSO became a kind of empty institution, but those who stayed and new arrivals like myself devoted ourselves to research. In the beginning people came to study with us stayed and new arrivals like myself devoted ourselves to research. We gave lots of courses, untitled and without credit, especially late through the Academy of Christian Humanism. We tried to fill a gap in the new generation's education. They wanted to know what was going on in their country and in Latin America, and we were doing research on these topics. So it was a kind of free, informal, open university or counter-university.

But teaching was a small part of our job. Our main work was research, a lot of seminars, debates, going abroad, and inviting new people. It was some kind of public sociology in an authoritarian context!

**MB:** But how did you survive under the dictatorship as a critical intellectual, a sociologist?

**MAG:** The military took over the universities and expelled the majority and in others, like in the Catholic University, were a minority but a very significant minority because of their intellectual production and their influence over students. Those who stayed tried to gather under the umbrella of some existing institution or create new institutions. The same thing happened across Latin America where there were military regimes. An example was CEBRAP, the center in São Paulo created by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and his colleagues.

We could not create anything new so we went under the umbrella of FLACSO, the Latin American Faculty of Social Science that, until the coup, had been a living institution for training sociologists and political scientists at the graduate level. This operation was supported by important external foundations like the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Swedish foundations and even the British government under Harold Wilson. Later when the military cut the diplomatic immunity of such international organizations we took cover under the protection of the Church and the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano (Academy of Christian Humanism) created by Cardinal Raúl Silva Henríquez, which after the dictatorship became a university. But in the 1980s, other centers were created – consulting companies, corporations – that offered protection to social scientists.

**MB:** How was it that you had so much freedom under a dictatorship?

**MAG:** What you should understand is that the military did try to take over everything. In FLACSO, for example, because it was an intergovernmental agency, they appointed a military general to the council. He was later promoted to colonel and then was even appointed Rector (Chancellor) of the University of Chile. Although they tried to control these organizations and the Catholic Church too, it was nonetheless very difficult. They tried to sever the relations we were building with social movements, and after the first two or three years of heavy repression, they continued to censor our publications, the results of our surveys. But when they began the new economic order of neoliberalism, they also needed market research, and surveys were once again allowed. They tried to control the questions but only in an ineffectual and primitive way.

**MB:** If you were doing so much research, were there any obstacles to collecting data?

**MAG:** That’s an interesting question. You know, as a dictatorship, the military government was manipulating the data to such an extent that we could not rely on them. We had to produce our own data. For example, the economic institute, CEPLAN, that was led by Alejandro Foxley, who later became Minister of Finance in the democratic government, was forced to create parallel accounts. Other institutions had to calculate their own price index because the government measure was so distorted.

**MB:** What about data, but what about theory? At that time how did you think about the dictatorship and its future?

**MAG:** In Latin America in the 60s you had a new wave of social science, centered on Marxism that took over universities and replaced modernization theory. But the reality of dictatorship was entirely new. So we started looking for other frameworks. And I would say that in that moment, the Gramscian perspective was very useful in pointing to new fields. It opened a new window on the realities, and a door to exit from orthodox Marxism. And also, this was an important moment for political science that had hardly existed since sociology had been THE social science. Sociology is not good for studying political regimes; it’s good for studying social conditions of regimes or the social actors who will oppose regimes, but not for studying how a...
political regime works. So the sociologists became political scientists, or as we called ourselves “politólogos.”

**MB: As you describe it, it seems as though you were free to do whatever you fancied. I presume you were writing about this, too?**

**MAG:** Oh, we wrote a lot, and published it here in Chile. In the 80s FLACSO started a book series that included my own *El proceso político chileno*. I gave you a copy of the English translation, *The Chilean Political Process*. We also had our journals though some were banned. In the final analysis, these dictatorships were authoritarian regimes in the sense of Juan Linz, rather than fascist totalitarian regimes which controlled your private life. Of course, some did experience such invasive control, but they weren’t able to control intellectuals, except in their public engagement. For example, we were never invited on TV. But we could take our research to the radio. We had columns in our journals. We offered intellectual material for the opposition, in part because our research connected to people’s lived experience. We were able to draw on experiences from elsewhere, such as the transition from dictatorship in Spain (1976) to show what kind of opposition was possible. We became advisors to student organizations.

**MB: Were you already supplying critical analyses at the beginning of the dictatorship?**

**MAG:** Yes, even then. For example, a few months after the coup, I clandestinely organized the Russell Tribunal Report together with my colleagues expelled from the university. It was part of a broader international initiative to denounce crimes against humanity in Latin America, but especially in Chile because the overthrow of Allende had attracted so much attention and concern from abroad. In those days there were no computers and we had to disseminate our report with carbon copies!

With this kind of regime there were spaces, some of them protected by the church, some by international organizations, and others that were not institutionally protected at all because the military didn’t care. I think it also helped that Christian democracy moved from support for the coup to the opposition, protecting left intellectuals. So it was, that if you wanted to repress the intellectuals it meant you had to repress Christian democracy, which would mean repressing between 50 and 70% of the population.

**MB: So what happened to the ideas of socialism during the dictatorship?**

**MAG:** Many of us were very active in what was called “socialist renovation,” that is rethinking the relationship between socialism and democracy, a kind of Eurocommunism. Looking at the the Chilean experience from 1970 to 1973, but not being deceived by the rhetoric – because the rhetoric was very Marxist – we asked, what was Allende’s project? This was not social democracy because social democracy does not try to transform capitalism. In that sense, at that time – for us – to be called a social democrat was an insult. Afterwards, it has been high praise! It was an attempt to create a socialism with democracy without any historical precedent or theoretical framework. There was no experience of Marxists democratically elected to the state, in government, explicitly trying to make a transition to socialism.

**MB: So what, then, did the defeat of Allende mean?**

**MAG:** Again, the specificity of the Latin American left is important. Here you had classical Leninist parties who saw the defeat in military terms. Of course, they were right, there was a military defeat of the left but there was also a failure of a project, a failure to grapple with what Allende and the Unidad Popular were doing. They were trying to do two things: maintain democracy and make socialism. But with what framework? With a Leninist framework! But that’s impossible because it presumes a dual power, and the popular power was, in part, already in the state with Allende.

**MB: Aha. So what you are saying is that the Leninist theory did not correspond to the democratic socialist project?**

**MAG:** Yes, the Leninist discourse was not appropriate to the project, but it did scare the middle classes and others with fatal consequences. Second, if you want to make a revolution, that involves drastic and rapid change in the socio-economic and political model, according to Leninist theory, you need revolutionary method, that is a group that seizes power, takes over the state, and creates new institutions and a new social order, which entails violence and weapons.

**MB: All right. So what is the theory of the democratic socialist project? What replaces violence and weapons?**

**MAG:** Socio-political majority. If you have the political majority – the social and political majority – in the democratic framework, you win. You isolate those forces that want to destroy the socialist institutions and restore the capitalist system. Creating a political majority is absolutely different from one country to another. If you were Argentinian I would say take over the Peronist party; win the leadership of the Peronist party and you are the majority.

In Chile, to make a long story short, you have a society constructed after the 1930s, through the close relation between parties and social movements. Take the student movement – it was a federation in which the electoral candidates stood on different party lists. Student politics was like a youth wing of the party. It doesn’t mean manipulation, but a kind of imbrication, intertwining that meant that...
the student movement was never separate from national politics. More generally, you didn’t have social class in the strict terms, but each economic class was organized in relation to parties.

**MB:** So how do you create a political majority, then?

**MAG:** How do you create the majority? Coalition of parties. And how do you create a majority in a country divided into three main political forces – each one with several parties inside? The right included the liberal and conservative parties, and then in the 60s the National Party. The center, during the 30s and 40s, was represented by the Radical Party, and was later replaced by Christian Democracy. And the left included communists and socialists, but in the 60s also other minor parties that split from the center. So long as the left doesn’t have a political majority for transforming the whole of society, it has to make an alliance with one of the other poles, the center rather than the right. In the 1973 parliamentary elections Allende or rather Unidad Popular got 44 percent, but 44 percent in a democratic system is not a majority.

**MB:** But to make a coalition with the center means you compromise your project for transformation.

**MAG:** Undoubtedly. That is a problem. But what would your friend Gramsci say? You compromise in order to try to convince your ally, but with mobilization and social forces, not with weapons. That is politics. So that was the main lesson of 1973. If you want a major transformation of society within a democratic framework, and to deepen this democratic framework – you must have the political majority. Electoral majority, that is more votes than any other party, is not enough, you need a socio-political majority, expressed in percentages of votes greater than 50. In one of his famous speeches, around 1974, Berlinguer [the National Secretary of the Italian Communist Party, 1972-1984], says: “We will win the next election in Italy but we will not take office if the Christian Democracy will not join us in government.” In order to make big transformations you need a majority to isolate the conservative, restorationist, and military forces.

So to summarize, during the period after the coup we were working on what we called the socialist renovation: to create a new theoretical framework to address the relation between democracy and socialism. This involved the discussion of the dilemma you point to, but the discussion was really all about justifying building a coalition with Christian Democracy to fight the dictatorship. Since 1980 the Communist Party has been against this strategy.

**MB:** Next time we will discuss the implication of this “majoritarian” strategy for the overthrow of the dictatorship and the limits it set for the political regime that followed. For now, thank you Manuel Antonio for such a fascinating account of life and thought under the dictatorship.
I was just sixteen when the time came to choose a university professional career. The wave of modernization at the Universidad de Buenos Aires was in full bloom, and I chose the newly created Department of Sociology in the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras. It was an adolescent leap into the unknown and the mysterious. Nobody around me knew what sociology was. Yet sociology (or rather, a broader non-disciplinary social science outlook) soon became part of me, and it remained that way all my life. The historical moment was a special one: the controversies and political debates as to whether there should or should not be private education in Argentina, were fierce, and they literally spilled out on to the streets of the city. I was among those who rallied for free, lay, and universal public education. Since then, my personal life, my academic interests and my civic-political engagements have been firmly integrated into my personality. It is impossible to disentangle them, nor do I want to.

After my experience as a novice research apprentice in Buenos Aires and after doing research and teaching in Mexico, I did my doctoral studies in the US. I landed in New York City at the end of the sixties: May 1968, open admissions at City University, the protests against the US invasion in Cambodia (which I attended while in an ad-
vanced stage of pregnancy), and the beginning of the new wave of feminism reaffirmed how my personal and family life and my political beliefs are totally and inextricably integrated into my academic agenda.

Social inequalities and the struggles to attain equality and justice have been at the center of my attention. The specific topics and concerns shifted, according to the pressing trends and issues of the times as well as broader societal conditions: in the 1970s the subjects were migrants to Latin American cities, women in popular urban sectors, gender inequalities in the labor market, workers movements and labor protests; in the 1980s the subjects were new social movements and the struggles for citizenship and human rights during the processes of political transition in Latin America; and in the most recent period I have focused on struggles for the memory of political violence and repression, and the wider implications of struggles for social, economic, and cultural rights.

I care for people, I study their everyday practices from the more intimate and personal up to the collective and public-political level – thus my continuous concern with the family and the logics of care. I explore the meanings and feelings attached to action as well as their institutional and structural frames. I am interested in going beyond words, incorporating visual languages (especially photography) and actual practices. One thread that links my work is the interest in social phenomena from the standpoint of the multiplicity of temporalities and processes that they embody. To connect history and biography, rhythms and paces of change, conjunctures and the “longue durée” is, in my view, a key to understanding the social world and imagining paths into the future.

One of my passions is to see others develop their reflective abilities, to open their minds and hearts to previously unknown thoughts and experiences. There is no better compliment to my work than when someone tells me, “It made me think.” With students, this involves a constant concern about how they, as young scholars, become researchers. For decades I have devoted a good part of my time and effort to following the formative stages of young researchers. Intellectual curiosity and life experience are the initial ingredients; then comes the process of discovery, learning how to formulate one’s own questions, searching for original answers, and recognizing that one stands “on the shoulders of others.” Applying standard formulas will not do. It is not easy to nurture the intellectual imagination without imposing views and exerting the power that seniority carries with it. Breaking individualism and isolation, fostering horizontal dialogues and collaboration, have been my main tools. I have applied them while coordinating the program for training young researchers to study “Memories of Repression,” working with fellows from six Latin American countries. This is my main teaching responsibility in the Doctoral Program in the Social Sciences (run jointly by the Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento and the Instituto de Desarrollo Económico y Social in Buenos Aires).

A relentless traveler, I have lived, taught, and researched in many places, in South and North America, Europe, and beyond. My living and working place is Buenos Aires, enriched by constant international contacts. In relation to the latter, my agenda is straightforward: to show colleagues in the centers of academic power in the dominant West that the “periphery” has something to offer the advancement of knowledge and the democratization of knowledge flows. Running contrary to the current geopolitical arrangement, the challenge is to develop truly cosmopolitan perspectives, open to what is going on in the world beyond our own locations. In fact, it was in the periphery that cosmopolitan scholarship emerged and was nurtured since scholars in the periphery have to know what is produced in the center. They also have to place that “central” knowledge in relation to their own academic location. Scholars in the center, by contrast, may consider what is produced in their own places as ipso facto universal, general, and even theoretical. In the long run, this attitude – too often embedded in institutions and systems of evaluation – has highly negative consequences, both in terms of the loss of significant and important knowledge for the advancement of our disciplines, and in terms of our values and aims towards a more equal world. Let us continue to actively work toward reversing such imbalances and inequalities.
The Historical Social Scientist

by Immanuel Wallerstein, Yale University, USA and former President of the ISA, 1994-1998

Immanuel Wallerstein’s contributions to social science are marked by a half-century of award-winning books and articles, starting with his study of colonialism and national liberation struggles in Africa in the 1960s. From there he moved to detailed historical scholarship of the emergence and subsequent dynamics of the “modern world-system.” In the 1970s Wallerstein’s world-system approach revitalized sociology as a comparative historical enterprise. His research program created a receptive space for social scientists of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, and, at the same time, he collaborated with scholars from other disciplines to rethink the meaning of the social sciences. Traveling tirelessly, he served in a multitude of organizations, including being President of the International Sociological Association. During his term of office he devoted himself to the inclusion of sociologists from around the world, especially from the Global South. His lifetime contributions were recently recognized by the ISA – the first to receive the Award for Excellence in Research and Practice.

I’m not sure that sociology is my vocation. As an undergraduate student, I roamed all over the social sciences. When I decided to do graduate work in sociology, it was because I felt that sociology, as an organizational structure, would turn out to be less confining than any other “discipline” that I could study. In retrospect, I think I was right about this.

I entered the department at Columbia University, which at the time (1950s) considered itself (with some justice) as the central locus of world sociology. I was however not a close fit for what was expected of Columbia students. I was not doing a dissertation with either Merton or Lazarsfeld. I was interested in Africa, the only one who had such an interest in the department. And Paul Lazarsfeld once told me that I was the only graduate student there who had ever heard of the French Revolution. A bit of an exaggera-
tion no doubt, but it presaged where I would be heading. Fortunately, the powers that be were somewhat bemused by my esoteric qualities, and they tolerated me.

I began teaching at Columbia as junior faculty in 1958. By 1963, Columbia had the first influx of graduate students who had been in the Peace Corps – therefore, students who had been in what we called at the time the Third World and who were obviously going to be interested in the politics and economics of the world outside the United States. The courses that I gave (alone and in collaboration with Terry Hopkins) were very popular with these students (and with students in other social science departments).

Then came the campus revolt of 1968. The sociology students were in the forefront, and the younger faculty were also deeply involved. The world-revolution of 1968 not only changed participants’ politics but also their epistemological outlooks. I wrote about this in an article entitled “The Culture of Sociology in Disarray: The Impact of 1968 on US Sociologists”1. In 1970-1971, I wrote Volume I of The Modern World-System. By now, I was finding the label “sociologist” somewhat inaccurate to describe my self-image. I began to think of myself as a “historical social scientist.”

The issue of self-description steadily emerged as a more and more serious problem, and this in two ways or on two fronts. The first was the image others had of me, especially outside the United States. In Europe, and especially in France where I have spent much time, other scholars writing about my views on this or that would describe me in various ways: as often as a historian, an economic historian, or an economist, or some combination of these, as a sociologist.

But the bigger problem was in the United States. Like large numbers of sociologists, I would submit projects to various foundations for funding. I encountered a perhaps unusual problem, especially if I submitted a project to the National Science Foundation. Even with the beneficent sympathy of the staff coordinator, the reviews would be dramatically split – two superenthusiastic and two totally negative. We discerned that this reflected a serious epistemological split about what was “good” science. And I turned my attention to studying the origins and the parameters of what I began to call the “structures of knowledge.”

This work led me to what I think is a clearer view of the disciplines (and therefore “vocations”) into which we divide our work – their history, their validity, their future. I believe that what we call disciplines are three separate things. (1) They are an intellectual claim to the autonomy of a category of phenomena with relatively clear boundaries, such that research falls either within or outside the boundaries. (2) They are organizational structures that claim a turf and pursue their claim to exclusive or primary rights to this turf in organizations within universities, in journals, and in national and international organizations. (3) They are a culture of common references, styles of work, and heroic figures, which the organizations pressure individuals to respect and validate.

In the Gulbenkian Commission report2 which I coordinated, we argued that the three meanings of disciplines fit together well in a period running from about 1870 to 1950 but that there came to be a disjuncture after that time, for a series of reasons. The result was our present situation, in which the previous intellectual claims about the boundaries are highly contested, and the work done under any of the labels overlaps considerably with the work done under other labels. One result is the high demand for inter-(multi-, trans-, etc.) disciplinary work.

At the same time, the organizational claims to turfs are, if anything, stronger than ever, and certainly resistant to any redefinition of boundaries. And the “cultures” of the various disciplines have evolved less than is often claimed, something that can be attested to by looking at footnote references of scholarly articles.

Finally, there is what I believe has been happening to the world-system in which we find ourselves, which I argue is a capitalist world-economy. I believe we are in the structural crisis of this system, and that impels us all to concern ourselves in a very active way with the possible outcomes of this structural crisis. I date the onset of this structural crisis from at least the world-revolution of 1968, and I anticipate that the crisis will not be resolved for another 20-40 years. As a result of this, I have been writing a good deal on this structural crisis, its likely consequences, and the moral and political choices it entails.

Hence, when someone asks me what kind of work I do, these days I say that my work is in three different arenas. First, I try to analyze the historical development of the modern world-system. Secondly, I try to analyze the structural crisis in which this world-system finds itself right now. And thirdly, I try to analyze the crisis in the structures of knowledge, which is part of the structural crisis of the modern world-system but which also needs a detailed particular analysis.

This trio of tasks is my vocation. And the best short description of this vocation is that of a historical social scientist. I should note however that I have my PhD in sociology and that I have had all my university appointments in departments of sociology. Furthermore, of course, I have been president of the International Sociological Association. I see no need to renounce these organizational affiliations, since no other would be better. And sociology, as I said earlier, is probably more tolerant of my stance than other disciplines would be.

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> The June Days in Brazil

by Ruy Braga, University of São Paulo, Brazil and ISA Board Member of Research Committee on Labor Movements (RC44) and Ricardo Antunes, State University of Campinas, Brazil

June 2013 will go down in the history of social uprisings in Brazil. Beginning on June 6 with a march in São Paulo, which attracted about 2,000 people in protest against hikes in public transport fares, the youth of Movimento Passe Livre [Free Fare Movement] (MPL) could never have imagined that they were shaking the country in an explosion only similar to the campaign for direct elections in 1984, while still under the military dictatorship.

Indeed, between June 19 and 23, in about 400 cities, including 22 state capitals, according to a survey carried out by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE), about 6% of the Brazilian population took to the streets in demonstrations and marches. There are three main reasons for this wave of popular mobilization. First, there is the exhaustion of the current development model based on the flexible exploitation of cheap labor, on the generation of jobs, and income redistribution. Second is the deepening of the global economic crisis with negative implications for the current regime of accumulation in Brazil, leading to a deceleration of economic growth. Third, the more or less latent state of social unrest which accompanied Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth between 2005 and 2010 turned into widespread popular indignation, which has spilled over into the streets over the last months.

Lula’s first term was marked by orthodox economic policies and ended in a noisy corruption scandal. This fact forced the government to redirect its course, further increasing social spending, increasing the minimum wage above inflation, and strengthening popular credit. As the political scientist André Singer demonstrated, this strategy helped ensure the consolidation of electoral support for Lula’s mode of economic regulation from the poorest sectors of the Brazilian population.

Furthermore, to manage the increasing burden created by public debt and to recover support from important sectors of the working class, the federal government fostered the formalization of the labor market. This process gave workers a higher degree of social protection. The acceleration of economic growth over the last decade, driven by the rise in Brazilian commodity prices made possible the combination of increased social spending and the expansion of labor protection.
However, there slowly emerged hidden critical trends within the current hegemonic regime. After all, in addition to advances in formalization, the buoyant labor market, and actual gains in minimum wages, the current development model also led to increasing numbers of accidents at work, intensification of employee turnover, higher rate of workforce outsourcing, more flexible working hours, along with a relative decline in investment in public transport, health, and education.

This other side of the model fostered a more or less permanent state of unrest among workers, especially among younger workers – unqualified, non-unionized, semi-skilled, and underpaid. We should not forget that over the last ten years, 94% of the jobs created in the formal labor market pay less than 1.5 times the minimum wage (about USD450).

Given that 65% of formal jobs were occupied by young people, between 18 and 28 years of age, we can understand why the social unrest generated by the exhaustion of the current model focused mainly on this group, leading it to play a key role at the beginning of the June Days. According to research conducted by “Plus Marketing” consultancy during the march of June 20, 2013 in Rio de Janeiro, most of the protesters were employed (70.4%), earning less than a minimum wage (34.3%). If we add those who earn up to 3 times the minimum wage (30.3%), then more than 64% of the one million who took to the streets in Rio de Janeiro are part of this urban proletariat in precarious situations.

Furthermore, evidence of a sharp increase in strikes in the country was already visible since at least 2008. According to updated information from the Department of Statistics and Socioeconomic Studies (DIEESE), after 2010 the number of strikes increased so that downtime in 2012 was 75% higher than in 2011, reaching a peak inferior only to the years 1989 and 1990. The combination of slowing economic growth and a still strong labor market helps to explain this important phenomenon.

Actually, the politically multi-form movement that we see in the streets is quite different from others that have taken place in Brazil’s recent history. Moreover, we can observe changes in the profiles of the demonstrators: in the beginning they were students and workers who use public transportation and who, through the MPL, since 2005, have organized demonstrations in several cities, like Florianópolis, Porto Alegre, Vitória, Salvador, in addition to youth activities linked to various leftist parties. They gradually increased and, after violent police repression during the June 13 march in the city of São Paulo, the protests widened, reaching the outskirts of the city where a plebeian crowd of youth started a mobilization process that blocked several roads. Subsequently, this mass of young people and workers in precarious conditions attracted the traditional working class: on July 11, about 3 million people participated in a general strike that paralyzed the main state capitals of the country.

All in all, these strikes and demonstrations destroyed the myth that Brazil was a middle-class country on the way to becoming the fifth world economic power – a country where the majority are satisfied with their rulers and with the current development model. The current cycle of mobilizations revealed the existence of a profound unease with the current development model, so protest will probably endure for quite some time.

There is now a mounting concern about the contradiction between, on the one hand, the resumption of the privatization cycle, illustrated by the recent privatization of ports, airports, and federal highways, and, on the other hand, popular demands for universal rights in such areas as health, education, and public transport. Or, as a widely reproduced sentence from a placard during the June Days puts it: “It is not about cents, it is about rights!”
The Limits of “Refolution”

by Asef Bayat, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA

The release of ex-president Hosni Mubarak from prison on August 22, 2013 represents a turning point; it marks a counter-revolutionary restitution that had begun probably the day after Mubarak’s resignation on February 11, 2011, but culminated on July 3, 2013 when General el-Sisi forcefully ousted the elected President Mohamed Morsi, the man of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. The military annulled the constitution and installed an interim civilian government to undertake new elections for a new president, parliament, and constitution. In a violent crackdown that left more than 1,000 (including 100 police) dead, the generals began to quell the defiant Muslim Brothers. With the Muslim Brothers in retreat and the “liberal-secular” opposition in disarray, the Mubarakists rejoiced in ecstasy and went on offensive in the media, in the streets, and in state institutions. An orgy of national
chauvinism, misinformation, and self-indulgence fed their fantasy of restoring the ancien régime. The old guard – the security captains, intelligence bosses, big businessmen, and media chiefs gained fresh blood. Soon, surveillance began to extend from the Brothers to hunt any known figure deemed defying the new rule – including left, liberal, and revolutionary. Even Mohamed El-Baradei, the ex-vice president of the new government was not spared. Stunned, the revolutionaries (those dispersed constituencies who initiated and carried through the uprising of January 25, 2011 for the cause of “bread, freedom, and social justice”) watched the counter-revolution march on.

How could this turn-around happen after over two years of incessant revolutionary struggle? If revolutions are about profound change, then all revolutions carry within them the germs of counter-revolution waiting for a chance to strike; but they rarely succeed, primarily because they lack wide popular support. The infamous 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte did not last long, and the French Revolution reasserted itself. The 1848 revolutions in Europe overcame the wave of formidable counter-revolutions as the new democracies defeated the old orders in the course of two decades. In the 20th century, the internal intrigues and international wars against the revolutions in Russia, China, Cuba, and Iran all failed, even though they rendered these revolutions deeply security-conscious and repressive. In the Philippines, the military’s consecutive coup attempts against Cory Aquino’s government, following the anti-Marcos “People’s Revolution” in 1986, were all neutralized. Only in Nicaragua, a rare experience of democratic polity after the 1979 revolution, the counter-revolution succeeded through the electoral means; the US-backed Contra-war severely undermined the revolutionary Sandinista government, thus ensuring the electoral victory of the rightist Violeta Chamorro in 1990.

But in Egypt the turn of events was not terribly far-fetched. Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen, as I have suggested elsewhere, did not experience revolutions in the 20th century sense of rapid and radical overhaul of the state; rather, they experienced “refo-lutions”, or revolutions that wanted to push for reforms in and through the institutions of the incumbent states. In this paradoxical trajectory, revolutionaries enjoyed massive popular support, but lacked administrative power; they earned remarkable hegemony, but did not actually rule, with the consequence that they had to rely on the institutions of the incumbent states (for instance, the ministries, the judiciary, the military) to change things. Of course it was naive to expect such institutions with deep-rooted vested interests to alter, let alone undo, themselves. If anything, they remained defiant waiting for a chance to counter-attack. Revolutionaries quickly realized their handicap, but could do little beyond leading otherwise heroic street protests; for they lacked a solid and coherent organization, a powerful leadership, let alone the coercive power to deploy when necessary.

Thus, while non-Islamist revolutionaries were rapidly marginalized, the highly-organized Muslim Brothers succeeded, even if with a slim majority, to form a government by election. But they failed to fulfill the revolution’s demand for “bread, freedom, and social justice.” If anything, they focused on consolidating their own power even if this meant compromising with the institutions of the “deep state,” such as the police and intelligent apparatus, which in fact needed a major overhaul. They deployed religion to justify rule, fantasized to “Islamize” the state, continued with the neoliberal economy, and showed a remarkable inability in governance. Already despised by the sizeable Mubarak supporters, the Brotherhood began rapidly to lose the sympathy of many ordinary people who had supported Morsi’s presidency. By the end of his first year, president Morsi and his patrons were deemed an obstacle to deepening the revolution. Thus, opposition to the Brotherhood’s rule in practice “allied” the anti-Mubarak revolutionaries with the counter-revolutionary Mubaraks, which together with millions of disenchanted ordinary Egyptians created the June 30th rebellion. The tamarrod (rebellion) movement served as a catalyst to mediate the “alliance” of these strange bedfellows. Its activists worked day and night for months prior to June 30th to mobilize dissent gathering, they claimed, some 22 million signatures of no-confidence in order to dismiss president Morsi.

Watching the immense dissent without a powerful unified leadership, the military encouraged and jumped on the wave to lead its sprawl, inserting itself as the leader of the “anti-Morsi revolution.” Many Egyptians, at the time, saw the military’s intervention as a necessary “revolutionary coercion” to remove the key barrier, i.e. the Brotherhood rule, which they deemed had stalled the revolution. But they could hardly imagine what the generals and their counter-revolutionary partners would do after July 3. The reports of the military and counter-revolutionary circles supporting the tamarrod with the intent of banishing Morsi should not obscure the genuine widespread dissent that the Brothers’ rule had already instigated. There is a difference between whatever the tamarrod leaders had in mind, and the popular idea of tamarrod that had captured the imagination of millions of ordinary Egyptians before the June 30th rebellion. In one of my random conversations with the people on the streets, I talked to a man, the father of four children and a mechanic for tourist boats, who had left his family behind in the southern city of Aswan to come to Cairo for work because he had lost his job. Angry at Morsi, he said that the Brothers didn’t “have the mind
to run the country;” “they say tourism is haram [not allowed], or that foreigners should return home.” The Brothers, he went on, “are terrible; but this June 30, it will be their end; people will go out to topple them.” He stated this on June 9, three weeks before June 30. The Brothers were, indeed, toppled, but the military and counter-revolution emerged triumphant.

The military’s move targeted not just the Muslim Brothers, but also the revolution per se. Like the Mubarakist old guard, they never came to terms with the very idea of revolution – the idea that Egypt had changed; that new actors, sentiments, and ways of doing things had emerged, and that these would be likely to disturb the established hierarchies – rulers vs ruled, rich vs poor, sheikhs vs lay people, men vs women, old vs young, or teachers vs students. To reassert its rule, the old guard has already intensified nationalist sentiments, but it will not hesitate to bring in conservative religiosity (even of Salafi type) along with economic neoliberalism, and redeploy its ideological trinity – Morals, Market, and Militarism.

Could this have been avoided given that the counter-revolution was determined to strike back? If the Muslim Brothers were genuinely inclusive, and were prepared to work with the non-Islamist opposition in a revolutionary coalition, and if the non-Islamist opposition were prepared to acknowledge the elected Islamists, even though illiberal, as a partner in a broad representative polity, things might have turned out differently. Indeed, a possible balance of forces between the elected Islamists, non-Islamist opposition, and the subdued old guard could by default have generated a space for debate on such issues as citizenship, civil liberties, and rights and responsibilities – a space in which parties could have learned through practice how to play the rules of democratic game. Of course, such polity would have been unlikely to address the powerful claims for social justice, but the subaltern classes would have had a greater opportunity for mobilization than they do have under the counter-revolution.

This sounds like an abstract speculation, but it does have direct bearing on Tunisia. The ruling al-Nahda in Tunisia would serve its own interests if it were more inclusive in its workings with the secular opposition, acknowledging their concerns for civil and individual rights. And the secular forces which opposed Ben Ali would secure their new freedom if they would acknowledge the al-Nahda religious party as a player, and even a partner, in the Tunisian public sphere. A populist counter-revolution, if it succeeds, could wipe out not only political Islam, but also the secular intelligentsia that has just recovered from “political death” under Ben Ali’s police state.

The Street against the State

by Mohammed A. Bamyeh, University of Pittsburgh, USA, and Editor of the ISA’s International Sociology Reviews

In Cairo street art is ubiquitous and political. Here a wall painting connects Ancient Egyptian struggles to images of contemporary martyrs. Photo by Mohammed Bamyeh.

The first grand phase of the Egyptian Revolution is over: the period between February 11, 2011 and August 14, 2013 signals a clearly defined period. It begins with the apparent collapse of the old regime. It ends with its return, thirsting for revenge, but with a twist: now it claims to act on behalf of the revolution. An apparent majority of the population became disgruntled with the short-lived rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. That served as a basis for the military intervention that deposed the first democratically elected president in Egyptian history.

However, it is not at all clear that ordinary individuals who had supported the removal of Morsi actually wanted the bloodbath of August 14, when the military wiped out two pro-Morsi camps, killing nearly 1,000 people, or the two other smaller massacres preceding it. Nor is it clear they wanted the military to try to control the country even more tightly than it had under Mubarak, as it seems to be trying to do now. After all, there is nothing in Mubarak’s 30 years that resembles the atrocities committed by the military regime now in power. Nor did the Mubarak era witness such a uniformly pro-regime press. Two thirds of Egypt’s provinces are now ruled by high-level military or police officers. Most remarkable is how the security apparatus of the
old regime came back to life with such full force, even though there had been little signs of it for two and a half years. It is as if the old state simply had gone so deep underground that no one suspected that it existed anymore, only to resurface with all its full murderous potential at the appropriate moment. It is an apparatus that thrives on violence: it has tried its best to encourage its opponents to become violent, so as to justify deploying the full force of the security state.

The complex dynamics of the Egyptian Revolution cannot, however, be summarized in terms of struggle over state power. Indeed, most revolutionary energy since January 2011 has been discharged against the state, rather than as demands for a specific person or party to take it over. This popular attitude, rooted in ordinary anarchist propensities, has been understood neither by organized political parties nor by the military – the forces that have been struggling to take control of the state. Indeed, one of the least noted properties of the Egyptian Revolution is its dual sources of dynamism: on the one hand we have street dynamism, not led by any force but rooted in old techniques of living outside of and in spite of state impositions. On the other hand, we have the organized forces – notably the Brotherhood and the military, but also the organized liberal parties – that see in street dynamism only political opportunities for their own agendas, and not as a grand revolutionary spectacle heralding a new age and new ways of thinking. Indeed, one is struck by the intellectual mediocrity of Egypt’s political elite, evidenced in the sclerotic composition of the current government, in its uninspiring roadmap to democracy (which had already been proposed almost verbatim by the deposed president), in the unreadable quality of the media it sponsors, and in the countless low-grade conspiracy theories it had spun out during this crisis.

The Egyptian Revolution, like all recent Arab uprisings, was largely a movement of ordinary individuals. By “ordinary” I mean individuals who had no elaborate ideological commitments and no party affiliation; and those who before January 2011 almost never took part in street political protests, and rarely voted in elections. These revolutions of ordinary individuals did not rely on guidance from charismatic leaders or hierarchical organizations. To their participants they confirmed that the little person is now the agent of history. While this novel feeling has led to a vastly enriched culture of engagement, including much artistic creativity and highly dynamic debating and conversational environments everywhere, it has not generated a state that resembled or at least was itself inspired by this social dynamism from below. It seems that for most ordinary Egyptians, what they wanted out of their revolution was a state that lived with them rather than simply ruled them. But the Egyptian state has rarely been run according to this expectation, and after the August massacre it is even further away from such imaginings.

The current power-holders in Egypt capitalize on an unforgiving environment of polarization, which was the ultimate source of the August massacre. While that environment tends to benefit any government that promises to be strong enough to protect one party against another, it is also an environment that is conducive to politics being understood largely as the art of eliminating the adversary. This logic has produced several confrontations, paving the way for the large-scale slaughter on August 14: a crime against humanity, justified as “the will of the people.” The Wafd Party, among other liberal forces, immediately endorsed the horror, with the argument that the security forces simply took up the task delegated to them by “the people,” (by which he must have meant something like one third of the population).

But even if what happened on August 14 were the will of “the people,” it would still be a crime against humanity. Such a crime begins with the usual preparation: dehumanizing the enemy, which the Egyptian media and some Egyptian intellectuals have been doing ceaselessly, so that a bloodbath appears justifiable and rational. Second, this crime requires a certain approach to political life: a belief that politics is the art of eliminating one’s enemy, completely. And third, a belief that such a task can indeed be accomplished. All three ways of thinking have been in abundant supply in recent months. But especially since July 3, I have been hearing enemies of the Brotherhood saying that this was the moment to finish off the movement once and for all. Thus, a crime against humanity is in the final analysis an act of superstition: a belief that a little bloodbath will solve a problem we do not wish to understand. If revolutions are served by reason, as Herbert Marcuse understood already in 1940, they are undone by superstition, from which they must, in turn, be saved.

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TURKEY’S REBELLION

> From Insult to Insurrection

by Polat Alpman, Ankara University, Turkey

Islamic Conservatism has now come to power in Turkey, not once but three times, each time increasing its support. It has taken a political route that extends from political power to social and even cultural domination. It tries to remove the tutelage of the Turkish army, and, through economic and political reform, it tries to open such gridlocks as the Kurdish issue and the headscarf issue. It creates the European Union as an ideal, and with its psycho-economic administration it makes Turkey hospitable to international markets and effective in foreign affairs within its region.

Over time, the regime has acquired the support of the majority and this now motivates it to design social life in its own image. The political influence of the Turkish army has, indeed, diminished but the police force has been strengthened, which is now increasingly perceived as an organization working only for the benefit of the government. The academy and media have been censored (or self-censored). A bizarre “great man” discourse and “gentleman” politics have been routinized.

Still, discontent was mounting, marked by the unspoken anger of the victims of urban transformation, the oppressive use of subcontracting, and the absence of material improvements for the majority despite the supposed strengthening of the economy. Hunger strikes in prisons demand the possibility of conducting legal defense in one’s mother tongue. Closing Taksim Square to May Day celebrations with bogus excuses angers many, as does the construction of a third bridge in Istanbul which will be named after Yavuz Sultan Selim, the Ottoman Sultan who massacred a great number of Alevis. Then, there are also matters the government does not want to take up, such as the ubiquity of violence, tortures, rapes directed towards Kurdish children in Pozanti Prison, and the Roboski/Uludere massacre of Kurdish villagers in 2011 and the May 2013 “terrorist” bombings in Reyhanlı.

The Gezi Park incidents began as a mere protest. However, for the Prime Minister this protest was an ideological provocation engineered by both internal and external conspiracies. Through his excessive desire for power and
his unwillingness to make the compromises that democracy requires, the Prime Minister effectively turned the streets into an extension of his politics. The escalation of conflict that began on May 31 could have been avoided if the Prime Minister had not accused people of being “looters” and “servants of special interests.” Arriving at an agreement would have been much easier had he not constantly wagged his finger at the protestors, declaring them to be a public enemy, and had protestors not been killed by the police.

On June 1 people swept through police barricades en masse, entered Gezi Park and from there made their voice heard all over the world. The police retreated and left the park, which then became a festival for anyone to air their grievances. A new culture of resistance arose with its sense of humor, its graffiti, and the widespread use of social media. The feminist and LBGT movements were particularly prominent, exposing sexist discourses with slogans such as “do not swear at women, gays, prostitutes” or “resist obstinately, but not with cussing.”

On Saturday, June 15 the Prime Minister held a public demonstration in Ankara, supposedly to reveal the “special interests” and subversive forces at work behind the Gezi incidents. He said that the following day there would be a public demonstration in Istanbul and so Gezi Park would have to be evacuated immediately. The resulting police assault, using gas bombs, water cannons, and truncheons, turned into a fiasco. It being a weekend the park was like a fairground, full of kids, seniors and disabled, who were all bewildered by this sudden invasion of gas bombs. True to his word, the next day, the Prime Minister did arrive to a purged Istanbul to hold his public demonstration, unconcerned that the hospitals were full of wounded, injured, and even dead people while many activists were in custody.

Resistance has continued. People gather at Gezi Park and other parks to organize forums to discuss government politics and the future of the city. They are creating their own language, their own culture, and their own urban consciousness. The social movement has demanded that the government protect ethnic communities and that it conceive of society in terms of its plurality rather than simply in majoritarian terms. It demands unrestricted rights to freedom of expression and association.

As the actions in Gezi Park developed from protest to riot and, now, from riot to resistance they have turned into a most influential social movement, calling for the replacement of personal rule with a more thorough institutionalization of democracy. Along with the Gezi demands, the protestors call attention to the Kurdish problem. Everyone is watching how the government will approach these issues, and whether it is capable of changing its path.

1 The phrase of “gentleman” is an adjective commonly used for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and this phrase implies a “one man” administration.
The façade of Atatürk Cultural Center – an icon of Istanbul – was turned into a picturesque gallery, portraying resistance to the Center’s demolition and to the proposed redevelopment of Gezi Park and Taksim Square.
“To live like a tree single and at liberty and brotherly like the trees of a forest, this yearning is ours.”

Nazim Hikmet

It is very hard to express our feelings about the last two months of resistance, June and July of 2013, which were unique and inspiring not only for Turkey but all over the world. “Everywhere is Taksim; Everywhere is resistance” became a famous slogan, stated in many languages and occasions. Many people with environmental and urban consciences gathered to protest the urban demolition of Gezi Park next to Taksim Square, Istanbul. However, no one was thinking that defending “two or three trees” would lead to a broad movement for emancipation and dignity.

Still, it is difficult to claim that this movement was simply a reaction against the destruction of the park. Rather it was provoked by statements of the Prime Minister concerning the private lives of young people and women and restrictions of freedom of expression and human rights. It was a protest against new regulations, passed overnight without discussion and consultation, that displaced residents from city centers and shanty towns (gecekondu), from social housing and old neighborhoods. This type of official discourse continued during these two months, leading to a massive involvement of common people that was deepened by police interventions, turning the protests into battlefields. The government prohibited May 1st celebrations in 2013, which had been planned for Taksim Square, on the grounds of protests into battlefields. The government took the offensive against all aspects of art – actors, budgets, costumes and mise-en-scène of plays and performances.

Claiming an urban commons against the many forms of enclosures, professional groups and associations, political platforms, neighborhood associations came together under the banner of Taksim Solidarity that had been struggling for years with urban-related problems. During these days, different leftist, socialist, Kurdish, anarchist, and LGBT groups, Kemalist people, and more broadly common people from different classes and generations but especially young people from the “XY generation,” all walked together full of emotions and conviviality.

Gezi Park became an incandescent light for the right to city, the right to use and access the city center, the right to participate in decision-making about the production of space, the right to self-realization by making the city a work of art. One of the main resistance-related terms was çapulu, a word Prime Minister Erdoğan used in referring to the protesters as “looters.” The word was reapropriated by the protesters and given positive connotations, meaning people who were proud to be fighting for their rights, for their dignity as human beings, resisting all forms of oppression. This civil resistance has gone beyond party politics to become the site of collective performance and language, exiting closed halls for “solidarity forums” of neighborhood parks in cities across the country.

In such an environment, where so-called “information channels” only offer ideology, political art sprung up, gaining its strength from a creative humor, circulating in the social media, which surprised the structures of power and challenged their political traditions and repertoires. During these warlike but carnivalesque days, imagination, art, and humor produced new slogans of hope, outside conventional tropes, written on the walls of the re-appropriated and reclaimed streets.

The wide range of images, popular characters, words and cultural elements reflected the gathering of different groups, but all making the same democratic demands. The “unbalanced intelligence” of the humorous cultural repertoire of the 80s and 90s generations, usually accused of being apolitical, artfully resisted the “unbalanced violence of the police,” which caused six deaths, hundreds of injured, and fifteen people who lost their eyes. Protestors sung the lyrics of çapulu marches composed by themselves. Leading actors of popular TV series, such as Muhteşem Yüzyıl and Behzat Ç., became “popular figures” in the resistance. Not only from Turkey but from all over the world, artists like Patti Smith, Joan Baez, and Roger Waters have supported the protest with their photos, videos, and concerts. Plays on words became slogans of the movement: from popular movies (“V for Vendetta” has turned into “V for Mrs. Vildan,” describing housewives who participate in the resistance; the expression “Daytime Clark
Kent, Nightfall Superman” signified white-collar workers participating in the resistance after work) to singers (“Justin Bieber” turned into “Just in Biber/Pepper” which refers to excessive use of pepper gas by the police), songs (“Everyday I’m shuffling” turned into “Everyday I’m çapuling”), and football and commercial slogans (“Nokia connecting people” turned into “Fascism connecting people”).

The façade of Atatürk Cultural Center in Taksim Square was made the “common face” of the resistance as it was in the legendary pictures of May 1st celebrations. There were also other artistic creations in the Park, including theater, different forms of dance performances, film, and music. The most significant mascot of the resistance, commonly used in drawings on the walls, was the “penguin” which referred to the documentary on the CNN-Turk television channel that was broadcast at the very time of the violent police assaults. The Standing Man (“durandanadam”), who stood still and silent for eight hours during the protests was one of the Gezi Park heroes, like the Talcid Man (Talcid is a medication for the stomach to diminish the effects of pepper gas) or the Woman in Red (the woman who faced the pepper spray in the early days). They were made into collective symbols through graphics displayed on Facebook. The Standing Man – who was actually the choreographer Erdem Gündüz – stood in front of Atatürk Cultural Center and initiated a new type of resistance, just by “standing.” Others would studiously read books in front of the police. Another important type of resistance, again a satirical play on the Prime Minister’s words, this time after he referred to the movement as “pots and pans, always the same noise”, led to making noise with pots and pans from balconies across the city. When the climate became calmer, protesters started to paint the stairs in the streets with the colors of the rainbow.

In short, the protests in Taksim Square and Gezi Park represented a new politicization, a collective memory and language beyond conventional politics. As scholars have underlined, but many politicians have denied, urban space has the potential to reveal its “spatial” injustices obscured in “politics as usual.” Revealing social divisions, art produces a universal unity by impressing scenes into the depths of our consciousness. The collective art of çapulcu, now known in English as “chapulling,” may be erased from the walls of the streets, but it will not be so easy to eradicate it from the hearts and minds of the witnesses and participants of Gezi resistance. Though it is no compensation for the loss of the murdered people, Ethem Sansülük, Abdullah Cömert, Mehmet Ayvalıtaş, Medeni Yıldırım, Ali Ismail Korkmaz, and Ahmet Atakan, we end with the optimistic slogan painted on street walls: “Nothing will be the same again, wipe away your tears.”
Globalization has brought not just greater inequalities but also chronic economic uncertainty to the world’s population. Governments have failed to effectively develop or adapt social protection systems to reduce economic insecurity. They have turned to means-testing, behavior-testing, selectivity, targeting, conditionality, and workfare. Emancipatory universalism has been sacrificed everywhere.

In that context, there has been renewed interest in universal unconditional basic income grants, namely cash transfers given to all citizens to ensure that they have a minimal income. While conditional cash transfers have become popular all over the world, the unconditional universal alternative has not been adequately considered. I joined SEWA (Self-Employed Women’s Association) in a project funded by UNICEF to launch pilot studies of the effectiveness of such universal income grants in India.

In India, public debate on cash benefits has been contentious. On one side are advocates of food subsidies, wishing to extend the Public Distribution System to 68% of the population, as planned in the National Food Security Bill, now before parliament. Critics believe it will worsen corruption, cost a vast amount, provide low-quality food and be unsustain-able. On the other side, advocates of cash transfers have been accused of wanting to dismantle public services and cut social spending. The real problem is that existing policies have left over 350 million people, about 30% of the population, mired in poverty, even after two decades of high economic growth.

In that context, in 2011 we launched two pilots to test the impact of basic income grants, funded by UNICEF, with SEWA as coordinator. Results were presented at a conference in Delhi on May 30-31 (2013), attended by the Deputy Chair of the Planning Commission and the Minister for Rural Development, who is in charge of cash transfer policies. A private presentation was later made to Sonia Gandhi, at her request.

In eight villages in Madhya Pradesh, every man, woman, and child was provided with a monthly payment of, initially, 200 rupees for each adult and 100 rupees for each child paid to the mother or guardian; these were later raised to 300 and 150 respectively. We also operated a similar scheme in a tribal village, where for 12 months every adult was paid 300 rupees a month, every child 150. Another tribal village was used as a comparison.

The money was paid individually, initially as cash and after three months into bank or cooperative accounts. National and state authorities learned the lessons they must follow if they are to roll out direct cash benefits across this vast country.

In the pilots, villagers were not allowed to substitute food subsidies for cash grants. No conditions were imposed on recipients. This we regard as crucial. Those who favor conditionality say in effect they do not trust people to do what is in their best interest and that the policymaker knows what is.

The designers of the pilots believe basic income grants will work optimally with good public services and social investment, and that they would operate better if implemented through a Voice organization, i.e., a body giving members the capacity to act in unison. This has been my position on basic income for many years, i.e., that it will only work optimally if the vulnerable have institutional representation. So, as a test of this claim, in half the villages selected, SEWA was operating, while in the other half it was not.

Critics claim that cash benefits would be wasteful and inflationary, and would lower growth, by reducing the labor supply. Advocates believe they have the potential to unlock constraints to improved living standards and community-based economic development.
Starting with a baseline census that collected data on many demographic, social, and economic characteristics, and then an interim and final evaluation survey covering the same aspects, we studied the impact of the basic income grants over eighteen months, using randomized control trials (RCT) that compared the results in households and villages receiving basic incomes with the results in twelve other “control” villages where nobody received the basic incomes. In addition, over 80 detailed case studies giving individual and family accounts of experiences were conducted by an independent team.

We have much more analysis to do, but as the conference showed the story is fairly clear. Before mentioning a few findings, note that contrary to some assertions, a majority did not prefer subsidies (covering rice, wheat, kerosene and sugar), and as a result of the experience of basic incomes more came to prefer cash to subsidies. Eleven results stand out.

1. Many used money to improve their housing, latrines, walls and roofs, and to take precautions against malaria.

2. Nutrition was improved, particularly in scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribe (ST) households. Perhaps the most important finding was the significant improvement in the average weight-for-age of young children (World Health Organization z-score), and more so among girls.

3. There was a shift from ration shops to markets, made possible by increased financial liquidity. This improved diets, with more fresh vegetables and fruit, rather than the narrow staple of stale subsidized grains, often mixed with stones in the bags acquired through the shops of the Public Distribution System (PDS), the government-regulated food security system. Better diets helped to account for improved health and energy of children, linked to a reduced incidence of seasonal illness and more regular taking of medicines, as well as greater use of private healthcare. Public services must improve!

4. Better health helped to explain the improved school attendance and performance (figure 1), which was also the result of families being able to buy things like shoes and pay for transport to school. It is important that families were taking action themselves. There was no need for expensive conditionality. People treated as adults learn to be adults; people treated as children remain childlike. No conditionality is morally acceptable unless you would willingly have it applied to yourself.

5. The scheme had positive equity outcomes. In most respects, there was a bigger positive effect for disadvantaged groups – lower-caste families, women, and those with disabilities. Suddenly, they had their own money, which gave them a stronger bargaining position in the household. Empowering the disabled is a sadly neglected aspect of social policy.

6. The basic income grants led to small-scale investments – more and better seeds, sewing machines, establishment of little shops, repairs to equipment, and so on. This was associated with more production, and thus higher incomes. The positive effect on production and growth means that the elasticity of supply would offset inflationary pressure due to any increased demand for basic food and goods. It was encouraging to see the
revival of local strains of grain that had been wiped out by the PDS.

7. Contrary to the skeptics, the grants led to more labor and work (figure 2). But the story is nuanced. There was a shift from casual wage labor to more own-account (self-employed) farming and business activity, with less distress-driven out-migration. Women gained more than men.

8. There was an unanticipated reduction in bonded labor (naukar, gwala). This has huge positive implications for local development and equity.

9. Those with basic income were more likely to reduce debt and less likely to go into greater debt. One reason was that they had less need to borrow for short-term purposes, at exorbitant interest rates of 5% a month. Indeed, the only locals to complain about the pilots were moneylenders.

10. One cannot overestimate the importance of financial liquidity in low-income communities. Money is a scarce and monopolized commodity, giving moneylenders and officials enormous power. Bypassing them can help combat corruption. Even though families were desperately poor, many managed to put money aside, and thus avoid going into deeper debt when financial crises hit due to illness or bereavements.

11. The policy has transformative potential for both families and village communities. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Unlike food subsidy schemes that lock economic and power structures in place, entrenching corrupt dispensers of BPL (Below Poverty Line) cards, rations, and the numerous government schemes that supposedly exist, basic income grants gave villagers more control of their lives, and had beneficial equity and growth effects.

A claim we have made in the public debate in India is that universal schemes can be less costly than targeted schemes. Targeting, whether by the discredited BPL card or by other methods, is expensive to design and implement. All targeting methods have high exclusion errors – evaluation surveys showed that only a minority of the poorest had BPL cards.

In sum, basic income grants could be a vital part of a 21st-century social protection system. These are momentous times in Indian social policy. Old-style paternalism must be rejected and a new progressive system constructed. ■
Latin America has traditionally been the most unequal region of the world and has suffered from the negative consequences of inequality: dysfunctional politics, powerful elites, social tensions and difficulties to reduce poverty. During the past decade, however, for the first time since inequality statistics are available, the region as a whole and twelve out of eighteen countries have witnessed a drop in income inequality.

What accounts for this unprecedented change? There was the so-called “left-turn” in the political landscape: following democratic tran-
institutions mostly led by conservative governments, all across the region, progressive parties took over the executive power and gained majorities in the legislative in the early 2000s. There is little doubt that left-wing governments from Venezuela to Chile have placed distribution at the heart of their policy agenda, but inequality has also gone down under conservative administrations in countries like Colombia and Mexico. Across the board, there were policy changes reflecting the widespread disappointment with neoliberal ideas and their unmet promise that markets would create formal jobs and resources for (mostly anti-poverty) social policy.

Most new governments benefited from positive external conditions. With China buying lots of resources to fund its manufacturing miracle, the international price of commodities like gas, oil, soy and meat underwent an extraordinary increase and Latin American exports grew rapidly. Between 2000 and 2009, Latin American exports to China increased seven-fold, augmenting dollars available to fund new social programs.

The combination of fiscal resources and parties that believe in an active role of the state for distribution led to positive changes in labor and social policy. Formal employment increased along with average and minimum wages, and coverage in social programs expanded. Between 2008 and 2012 South America even succeeded in protecting formal jobs and social spending in the midst of one of the worst global crisis experimented in the last century. Over 100 million people were reached with monetary transfers through programs that link cash and access to basic social services – namely conditional cash transfer programs.

Of course, performance has not been the same across countries. Some have been more successful than others in promoting positive change not just in terms of social investment but of massive job creation and formalization of labor arrangements. In Brazil, the result of the effort to formalize jobs and increase minimum wages has been spectacular: between 2002 and 2012 the number of Brazilians in the middle class increased from 69 million (38 percentage of the total) to 104 million (53 per cent). Uruguay has become the only country in Latin America that uses collective bargaining successfully to benefit large segments of the population. Other countries have done very well in terms of expansionary social policies yet not so well in terms of improving labor conditions overall. Interestingly enough, this mixed performance is found in countries led by what some people call “good,” fiscally responsibly left (as in Chile), as well as those with a “bad,” “populist” left like Bolivia.

Recent improvements have led some to talk about a new era and offer Latin America as a showcase for the rest of the world – when inequality continues to grow from Madrid to Beijing. Yet we should be careful about excessive optimism and recognize significant shortcomings of Latin America’s recent path.

First, the massive gains of the 2000s in labor and social incorporation did not fully reach Central America, home to over 80 million people: countries north of Panama continued to rely on exporting their labor force, mostly to the United States and inequality only decreased significantly in El Salvador (and even there the reliability of data is in serious doubt due to constraints in accessing the very rich and the very poor in violent communities). Central American countries are struggling to increase government revenues, reduce the influence of the elite and, at the same time, develop good jobs and high-quality social services.

Secondly, in the region as a whole, the wealthy continue to control a majority of the resources and are failing to pay their fair share of taxes. With a few exceptions tied to the proceeds from oil and gas extraction in Bolivia and Argentina, distribution has taken place without touching corporate profits. Built largely around family ties, Latin American firms continue to be as stingy as before. In Brazil, the very rich have supposedly lost comparatively in the last years, but high-level executives in São Paulo earn an average of 600,000 dollars per year – more than in New York or London.

Last and very critically, there is a common lack of progress in the transformations of the economy. Same as a century ago, Latin America still sells raw material in exchange for manufactured goods with higher value added. This is particularly worrisome not only because it slows down the creation of formal employment and it makes progress dependent on China but also because this extractive economy poses a threat for the future of the planet.
Dear Michael, Greetings from Kitwe!

Yes, here I am doing ethnographic fieldwork in your old stomping ground – the Zambian Copperbelt. This month, I am based at the Nkana mine, which local residents assure me was once upon a time called “Rhokana” – the mine where you did your own research 40 years ago for The Colour of Class. Now I have ended up in the exact same spot. As you may know, under pressure from the IMF, the Zambian government was forced to privatize the copper mines, beginning in 1997. Nkana was “bundled” together with Mufulira, and sold to Glencore, the notoriously storied and powerful commodity trader based in Switzerland. The mining house is now called Mopani Copper Mines.

Chinese managers and supervisors underground at Chambishi Mine with an impressive drill. Photo by Sven Torfinn.

Those bungalows near the mine shaft may well be the ones you inhabited. They are now offices for management, engineers, and geologists. Skirting the mine are several high-density residential compounds where many miners live, amidst open sewage, mostly without electricity and with only communal water taps. My heart sinks every time I see small, barefooted children roaming the roadsides littered with debris and broken beer bottles. I cannot but wonder if you left Zambia at its most hopeful and confident moment, right before it began a steady decent into four decades of stagnation, even involution. It has only been since around 2004, when world copper prices made a strong recovery, fueled by voracious demands from China and India, that people saw signs of economic revival. But even now, joblessness and poverty are still pervasive.

I started visiting Zambia five years ago following Chinese capitalism to Africa. As a student of Chinese labor for almost twenty years, I was intrigued by the barrage of critical reports in the Western media on “Chinese labor exploitation,” stories that always ended with an ineluctable specter of “Chinese neocolonialism.” Indeed, Chinese signs are everywhere on the Copperbelt, announcing the arrival of the Bank of China, the contractors rehabilitating roads, erecting the sleek bird’s nest-shaped Ndola stadium, and building the infrastructure for the newly commissioned Zambia-China Economic Cooperation Zone, anchored by the Chinese state-owned Chambishi Copper Mine and the Chambishi Copper Smelter.

But soon after I arrived, I realized the Chinese presence is only part of a broader influx of international capital...
on the Copperbelt. The largest mining house here, Konkola Copper Mines, is owned by Vedanta, a London-listed multinational corporation hailing from India. One of the biggest mining corporations in the world, the Brazilian Vale, has recently acquired the Lubambe mine, and the South African First Quantum Minerals Limited is running the open pit mine in Kansanshi, by far the most profitable. Together with the Swiss-owned Mopani, it is easy to see how privatization of the Copperbelt has turned this area into a natural site for comparative sociology. I came with a puzzle: what is the peculiarity of Chinese capital in Africa? I am hoping that a double comparison – between Chinese and non-Chinese companies and between construction and mining – will allow me to specify the interests, capacities, and practices of the Chinese companies that distinguish them as “Chinese” rather than simply “capitalist.”

A cursory comparison between our different modes of entry into the field points to some of the sea changes in the Zambian political economy during the 40 years that separate our projects. Then as now, foreign capital is a powerful player. I always thought of them as gated kingdoms shrouded by layers of security checks and proprietary claims on company information. Through personal connections, you broke into this world as a full-time employee in the personnel research unit that serviced the two mining companies of the time – Anglo American Corporation and Roan Selection Trust. I tried pursuing a similar route, but my job interview with the secretary of the Chinese Communist Party at the Chinese smelter ended disastrously. The party boss did what a 21st-century manager would do – he “googled” me, and was horrified to see my work on labor protests in China and Zambia. Consoling me after my failed job interview, he said, “Wait until we are in power.” I did – his party won in the 2011 election! As the Vice-President of the Republic, he called up the CEOs of the major mines, and ushered me in as a Zambian Government Consultant.

This vignette underscores perhaps a significant realignment of interests between an African state and multinational mines. It reminds me of the necessity to take seriously the interest and agency of the Zambian state, and not to assume its powerlessness. Influenced by Frantz Fanon, your argument in *The Colour of Class* was that political independence without structural economic change could not bring about an autonomous nation state or an effective national bourgeoisie. But today, the single party regime of Zambia’s First Republic has been replaced by a competitive multi-party system since 1991, coinciding with the imposition of privatization and structural adjustment programs by the World Bank and IMF. Twenty years of neoliberalism have so exacerbated mass discontents about persistent poverty and inequality that political parties have been compelled to get tough with foreign-owned mines. In recent years, to the utter dismay and outrage of the mining companies, the Zambian Government has imposed Windfall Taxes (although later canceled), unilaterally nullified the Development Agreements used to privatize the mines, doubled the rates of mineral royalties, and is now training technocrats to conduct forensic auditing inside the mines. I see my research as part of this state effort to render the mines financially and sociologically legible. Of course, it is easier for politicians to ride the wave of “resource nationalism” – a nationalism that secures political support through dispensing the revenue from mining – than to nurture the state capacity that may generate development. Working with and within the Zambian Government only throws this into sharp and sad relief.

How will the Chinese and non-Chinese foreign investors navigate and orchestrate this new African reality? I will have to write a book rather than a greeting note to answer that. This is just a prologue to a global dialogue of the future.

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*Zambian workers face their Chinese boss. Photo by Sven Torfinn.*
Enduring the Waves

The Life and Work of a modern-day Seafarer

by Helen Sampson, Cardiff University, UK and Board member of the ISA Research Committee on Sociology of Work (RC30)

A seafarer is perched on a rail at the back of the ship. The hot Mexico sun beats down on him. It is so fierce that the air seems to crackle. The seafarer is at his mooring station, with a VHF radio, waiting for instructions. He has been there for two hours but he cannot walk away. He cannot seek shade and there is nothing to drink. He does not know how much longer he will wait. The ship is a tanker. It is berthed at a port in Mexico and has been delayed. The pilot is on board waiting to guide the vessel into open seas. The Captain and navigating officers are on the bridge. Yet still nothing happens. An inbound vessel has grounded in the approaches to the port and the ship is waiting for permission to depart. The throat of the seafarer is parched. He is tired and he is miserable but he will not complain.

I met this seafarer while doing participant observation research aboard ships at sea\(^1\) – research funded by the UK Economic and Social Re-
search Council at the Seafarers International Research Centre (SIRC), based at Cardiff University. His name was Miguel and I was with him and his fellow crew members on a voyage aboard a twenty-year-old tanker built in Japan. The tanker was relatively small by modern standards at 40,500 dead weight tons. Its total length was 179 meters and its width 30 meters. All the seafarers on board were men and they hailed from five countries. The officers were Croatian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi. The “ratings” – seafarers – were from the Philippines and the fitters were from Turkey. Miguel was a Filipino able-bodied seaman (AB). As such he was a rating but not the lowest ranked rating on board (who would be an “ordinary seaman” or a “messman”). Miguel and his fellow Filipinos were employed on a nine month contract by an agency which supplied seafarers to the ship operator. If he had complained he would have been sent home. If he had been sent home he feared he would have been blacklisted by crewing agents across Manila and might never have worked at sea again. Then, the new house he was building for his family would not have been completed. He would not have been able to afford his parents’ medical care and his children would not have received the education he wanted for them. Cousins, aunts, and uncles all depended on his dollar remittances and there were no opportunities ashore which would allow him to earn anything approaching the amount he was paid at sea. He did not even think of complaining.

The life of a seafarer is completely dominated by work. “Officers of the watch,” work seven days a week, every week of their contract. As one seafarer described it “My job is very tedious, very hard working... 365 days on board, everyday working, everyday working, everyday working.” Sometimes, when a ship is far from the coast seafarers who are not watch-keepers may be allowed to take Sunday off. On a few ships a barbecue might be arranged. On many, Sunday is not marked by anything special except for a few hours of rest. In port nothing disrupts the rhythm of work, neither the time of day nor the day of the week. The ship only makes money for its operator if it is regularly on the move. An efficient ship comes in and out of port in a matter of hours, loading and discharging cargo so quickly that seafarers rarely get a chance for shore leave. The ship is described by many as a prison but it’s a prison that pays and in developing countries there is a ready supply of seafarers willing to sacrifice their family lives, their friendships, and their own pleasures, for the financial return that regular work with reputable international companies may bring. As one seafarer explained “life on ship is very lonely... I miss my children, it’s hard working on ships, very hard.”

However, for many seafarers the price of work at sea is higher still. Seafaring is a dangerous occupation. In November 2011, a small bulk carrier off the coast of North Wales broke in two in rough seas and six of the eight seafarers on board died. A survivor described how “it broke in half right across the middle. I saw it with my own eyes... it was hopeless trying to save her”. This is not uncommon. In 2010 around one ship in every 670 was lost. There are risks, too, from the nature of the work on board: risks of back injuries; crushed fingers; broken bones; eye injuries; risks from the cargo and from heavy machinery; and risks from noxious fumes. Then too, there are concerns for the mental health of seafarers who are confined on a vessel for months on end. They may be working with other nationalities using a second language (generally English) to communicate. They may have infrequent contact with their families, poor food, and cramped accommodation. Furthermore they have little chance to get away from the surveillance of their managers. Life at sea is dominated by strict hierarchy and this pertains day and night, when working and when off duty. There is no escape and little respite.

2 Miguel is a pseudonym used to protect the identity of the seafarers who have participated in our research.
There were ten massacres in Puerto Rico in 2012. As of May 2013, the massacre-counting news media has reported a total of six massacres in this US Caribbean possession of 3.7 million inhabitants.

While in 2011 Puerto Rico obtained an unflattering position in the United Nations’ Global Study of Homicide and its murder rate made headlines in the New York Times, the fact that there have been sixteen massacres over a period of sixteen months has not received international attention. While I am not advocating for statistics of violence to be the measure of the island’s international recognition, it strikes me that one single massacre in a movie theater in Colorado receives more news coverage than one island virtually experiencing monthly massacres.

Even with the often morbid attention to violence by global news networks, the pattern of events in Puerto Rico is not “breaking news.” Their focus is on one-off events and on the West – and not the rest. But another reason why this otherwise shocking string of massacres has not caught the attention of news organizations or of sociologists may have to do with numbers and naming. It only takes three fatal victims for a violent incident to be named a massacre by the Puerto Rican media.

At the local level, the practice of naming massacres after they reach the third victim seems to be unquestioned. It is allegedly the measure used by the police for categorizing these incidents, and yet, when the Police Superintendent qualified one of them as an “incident where there are multiple victims” without using the word massacre, local...
criminologists chided him. One criminal justice professor justified using the word because “be it due to custom or norm, this type of terminology is applied for cases with three or more victims.”

But within a global comparative framework, or when Puerto Rican news media report on massacres elsewhere, the local use of the word can be problematic. For example, Puerto Rican newspapers have used the front page capital letter headline “MASACRE” for two qualitatively different incidents: the local one was the killing of four persons in a car-to-car shooting and the international one was Anders Breivik’s shooting of 69 persons in Norway. Clearly, the conflation of different types of violence under the same name precludes our understanding of both incidents and of violence in general.

Writing on massacres, Jacques Semelin maintained that “sociology has neglected this field of study for far too long, leaving it to the historians.” Indeed, historians, and also social psychologists, have contributed greatly to our understanding of collective violence, but with the focus on genocides. The sociological literature includes Charles Tilly who examined varieties of collective violence, but without conceptualizing the massacre. Wolfgang Sofsky and Semelin have both outlined specific ingredients for a massacre to have taken place, and the latter has defined it as “a form of action that is most often collective and aimed at destroying non-combatants.” Yet, no one establishes how many victims constitute a massacre. The one definition that refers to “three or more people” is that of the Guatemalan Human Rights Commission, but only if other characteristics have been met (namely, the intention of eliminating the opposition, create terror, cruel and degrading treatment of victims, and systematic perpetration).

We are back to square one, without being able to ascertain whether the Puerto Rican killings-of-three are in fact massacres. Elements in the definitions above, and also the fact that Semelin seems to conceive of the massacre as an act that is part of – or happens en route to – the genocide (which then includes the element of total elimination), raise the question of intention in our analytical approach to massacres and their perpetrators – be it the killing of three in Puerto Rico or that of dozens elsewhere. Does a car-to-car quick execution with a machine gun between opposite drug-trafficking gangs meet the degrading criteria? Was Breivik’s main intention the total elimination of members of the Norwegian Labour Party? Did Adam Lanza target a specific group (ethnic or otherwise) in Sandy Hook Elementary School in Connecticut?

As sociologists we certainly need to make a more profound analysis of the large middle terrain that exists between individual acts of violence and genocides, for here is where the massacre as social phenomenon exists. Some may argue that once we know what happened in any given deadly incident of collective violence (say, the 2012 killings in Houla villages in Syria), it doesn’t matter whether we name it a massacre or not. Well, we may know what happened, but we will not understand why and how it happened. Naming something after the first word in the catalogue of unthinkable acts of violence should not be an easy way out from the process of understanding.

Moreover, if we take from Pierre Bourdieu the idea that by naming things we create them, we may in fact end up – at least in Puerto Rico – with massacres defined only on the basis of numbers (as three or more victims) without regard to other important sociological criteria. This is not irrelevant. In recent years, Puerto Rico has been immersed in a profound debate about the death penalty, most recently triggered by a Federal Court trial against the perpetrator of a massacre in 2009. Among those making public statements, one local politician favored capital punishment for the “authors of massacres,” presumably defined in Puerto Rican style. It may not be long before the island witnesses another trial for a massacre, one in which the very definition of the word might be on trial. “Legal discourse,” Bourdieu states, “is a creative speech which brings into existence that which it utters.” If massacres can legally become any killing of three victims through the definition by the media or some politicians, and if the death penalty becomes the punishment for its perpetrators, it may be time for sociologists to engage in a more elaborate conceptualization of mass killings and massacres.
Imagine you are a human rights activist from a small town in South America who is trying to stop a European mining company from continuing to pollute your community’s drinking water. You recently heard that a human rights activist in Africa was able to stop the same company from polluting her town’s water source. Ideally you could connect with this person, call them, email them or better yet, meet them in person. There is nothing like a personal connection to facilitate information sharing.
You would think that if two activists want to get together to have an in-depth and personal exchange they can just hop on a plane, meet their counterpart and brainstorm ideas. That may be true if they’re from North America and Europe, but it is not so true for persons from the Global South.

Surprisingly, in this era of globalization and infinite information sources, having two people from the Global South meet in person requires so much time, money, and effort spent on bureaucratic processes that they can become insurmountable obstacles. Even when the cost of their travel is covered, people of the Global South need visas to transit through the North, since most flight paths are through Europe and the US, as well as a visa to enter Colombia. For them, the sign on the information highway which says “visa required” might as well say “do not enter.”

As researchers at Dejusticia, a human rights think tank based in Bogotá, Colombia, we have learned this the hard way. Our Global Human Rights Leadership project seeks to open up more spaces for South-South exchanges, and while we have had some success, our efforts have at times been frustrated by the cruelty of visa processes that do not consider the time, money, and emotional cost of filling out forms, traveling, and spending hours waiting for permission to contribute to the global exchange of information. It is clear that when it comes to in person exchanges there is no level playing field between North-North and South-South exchanges.

A successful judicial exchange between Kenyan and Colombian constitutional court judges that took place in Bogotá in February 2013 showed us just how enriching South-South experiences can be. This exchange was fruitful because both of these Global South countries share similar histories of violence, ethnic and political turmoil, and entrenched poverty. Jurists from the United States and Colombia, for example, could not have the same conversation. Yet, an American judge can take a direct flight from Miami to Bogotá, and if, let’s say, on his way the plane stops in Panama he does not need transit visa. The Kenyan judges had to travel either through the European Union and/or the US and were required to have a transit pass through both places.

More recently, Dejusticia organized a weeklong workshop for young human rights activists from the Global South who work on extractive industries to come to Colombia and meet with sociologists to improve their research and communication skills. After an extensive and highly selective application process, sixteen participants from South America, Africa, and Asia were chosen to participate. But before they could come to our workshop, they had to pass through numerous visa mazes. We had the participant from Uganda who needed a Colombian visa and ended up applying in London because there is no Colombian Embassy in Uganda and she happened to already have a visa for the UK. Our participant from Papua New Guinea had to fly to his country’s capital city where he obtained an Australian visa, so he could fly to Sydney and apply for his Colombian visa and his US transit visa, to then fly for more than 24 hours to get to Colombia via New York. Clearly, governments and airlines have not fully understood the importance of South-South exchanges!

What happens when Global South organizations lack the time, money, or skills to navigate the minefields of visas and airline flight paths? What type of information sharing do these global processes impede? Both the North and the South need to begin seriously considering these questions. The North should begin by getting rid of transit visas to facilitate information sharing. The South needs to begin thinking collectively about how we can break down these barriers between us and the rest of the world to allow a free flow of information and people. A first step would be to stop requiring visas between countries of the Global South or at least make an exception for activists and researchers. Otherwise we all miss out on great opportunities to learn and share with people from around the world who may just have solutions to our national problems.
The Development of Sociology in Albania

by Lekë Sokoli, Albanian Institute of Sociology, Tirana, Albania and ISA Member of Research Committees on Comparative Sociology (RC20) and Sociology of Migration (RC31)

During the last two decades there have been extreme and multidimensional transformations in Albania. Economically, we have moved from a centralized economy, where the state was the only owner and the only employer, to a liberalized but chaotic economy; politically, we have moved from a Stalinist authoritarian regime to a problematic democracy; socially we have moved from the “equal distribution of the poverty” to the most extreme social disparities, more extreme than anywhere in Eastern Europe. Albania has become a laboratory for studying rapid change and its associated social problems as well as international migration, experienced by half the population (35% permanent, 15% temporary) in only two decades.

Albania’s post-communist transformation also brought with it the first wave of sociology. In most Eastern European countries, there was always some tradition of sociology, even under the harshest communist rule. In Albania, on the other hand, sociology was completely banned from university curricula. There was never a department of sociology at the University of Tirana and not one institute of sociology among the approximately 40 institutes of the Albanian Academy of Sciences. Marxism-Leninism was the ultimate truth, the monopoly of the Labor [Communist] Party which was immune to any kind of criticism. It did not draw on empirical evidence when considering social problems. The traditional schools of thought, including existentialism, Freudian psychology, structuralism, and phenomenology were altogether forbidden as were the works of Plato, Aristotle, Hegel, Dostoevsky, Sartre, etc. Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Pareto, Popper, Mill, Parsons, Merton, and other famous Western social thinkers meant nothing to us.

The fight against sociology was also considered part of the so-called class struggle as we can see from Currents of Political and Social Thought in Al—
bania, a “prestigious” book published in 1985 by the Albanian Academy of Sciences, only four years before the collapse of the Berlin Wall:

“The French sociologist Auguste Comte is known as the first creator of bourgeois sociology. Comte’s positivist sociology emerged as a reaction against Marxism, to reconcile the contradictions between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, to sabotage class warfare that was intensifying…”

In this book, and others of the time, sociology is considered bourgeois, reactionary, racist, anti-human, and an imperialist science. Until 1990, all sociologists of the world were considered dangerous and every school of social thought was prohibited, except the local “Albanian version” of Marxism.

A “new course” on sociology was only adopted after the death of Enver Hoxha, the Albanian dictator, in 1986. In his speech to the 9th Congress of the Communist Party of Banania, known as “the congress of continuity”, the new Albanian leader R. Alia referred to sociology among other social sciences, for the first time in an official document, saying:

“The priority of the technical and natural sciences should not eliminate the role of the economic, philosophical, sociological, legal, and educational sciences – in other words, the social sciences – when considering the current major problems of the socialist construction and ideological war.”

So, the official road for the development of sociology was opened, but with some strict conditions: (1) refer only to the Albanian original experience; (2) be a militant sociology, related to the construction of socialism and ideological war; (3) be a Marxist-Leninist science, based only in Marxist-Leninist texts.

From all this, it is clear that sociology could develop, only with many difficulties, and only after the collapse of communism. The first step to institutionalize sociology was the creation of the Albanian Sociological Association (ALSA) on the eve of the “great transformation,” in November 1990. But this organization failed very quickly, first of all because its founding members were a mixed lot – philosophers, demographers, lawyers, historians, physicians, novelists, natural scientists, journalists, artists, and even architects. Secondly, ALSA failed because of outside political interferences.

The second attempt to institutionalize sociology in Albania came with the founding, in September 1991, of a separate Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Tirana. But within one year, the Faculty was suspended, at the behest of the first democratic government, which swept into power in the elections of March 1992, reflecting clearly the political nature of its “democratic” opposition to sociology.

In 1998, two of the first Albanian sociologists (Tarifa and myself), while in the USA, founded the first international journal of the Albanian sociologists Sociological Analysis. It was a very critical period in Albania’s modern history, characterized by social unrest, political turmoil, and economic collapse – a time of complete breakdown in the social fabric.

After many ups and downs and through many hardships, the Sociological Association of Albania was founded in November 2006, with the new name of the Albanian Institute of Sociology (AIS). Since April 16, 2007 AIS is a regular collective member of ISA and since October 10, 2008 a member of the European Sociological Association. On the initiative of AIS and with the support of ISA, the Balkan Sociological Forum was founded in Tirana in November 2011.

With the foundation of the Albanian Institute of Sociology, sociology began to take off: the first department of sociology was founded, and then others followed. Now many Albanian universities are graduating specialists of sociology at the Bachelor’s, Master’s, and even PhD level. Since 2009 the Albanian government has included sociology in the national list of professions. It is also taught in all high schools and universities and a considerable number of think tanks now undertake sociological research.

Since its first meeting the AIS has grown from the original 35 founding members, to 7-8 times that number today; participation in our congresses has grown from twelve papers at our first Conference in 2007 to 410 papers presented by 587 authors and coauthors, coming from 22 different countries at the seventh Conference of Vlora in 2012. We now have an expanding bibliography of sociological works in Albanian as well as several journals: Social Studies, Sociological Analysis, and Sociological Lens.

If there has been a successful “sociological transition,” there are new challenges ahead, namely to create a new democratic and effective Albanian Sociological Association (AlbSA) that will embrace all Albanian sociologists, to continue to organize annual conferences and forums, to increase cooperation with “sociologists without borders,” and slowly increase sociology’s impact on Albanian and Balkan societies. One thing is clear, we have an important role to play in the challenges facing our great little country.
The Third ISA Conference of National Associations

by Ayse Idil Aybars, Middle East Technical University, Turkey

The Third ISA Conference of the Council of National Associations was held at the Middle East Technical University (METU) in Ankara, Turkey on May 12-17, 2013. The conference was jointly organized by the ISA with the Department of Sociology of METU, the Turkish Social Sciences Association and the Sociological Association of Turkey. The theme of the conference was “Sociology in Times of Turmoil: Comparative Approaches,” and the participants were representatives of National (Sociology) Associations from all over the world.

As the coordinator of the Local Organizing Committee, I was proud to host a major meeting of the ISA for the first time in Ankara. I can truly say that the organization of the conference proved to be a very exciting and instructive experience,
which took more than one year and involved a fruitful collaboration with invaluable and wise members of the ISA, as well as connections with countless experts, administrators, representatives of funding organizations, and wonderful colleagues in Turkey and beyond. Needless to say, we also did our best to ensure that everyone had the opportunity to experience the specificities of the Turkish culture, history, food, music, and dancing – all (of course!) from a sociological perspective.

The theme of the conference has shown itself to be very timely and appropriate, as the Turkish events that followed in the aftermath of the conference have confirmed. Here, in Turkey, the “turmoil” was triggered by the determination of youth to protect the trees in a park at the center of Istanbul. It turned into a nationwide protest against the current government attempts to regulate people’s lifestyles – a collision that has been keeping us, the Turkish sociologists and social scientists at large, very busy trying to figure out the implications of the events for society, for social and political participation, for the future of democracy and fundamental freedoms, for the role of the media in society, and so the list goes on. (See also the two articles by Zeynep Baykal and Nezihe Başak Ergin, and by Polat Alpman in this issue of Global Dialogue.)

Fortuitously, the conference provided us with a sociological analysis of a similar experience in the US, the “Occupy Wall Street” movement, illustrating how sociologists can deepen the understanding of such protests and their impact on the social, cultural, economic, and political terrain. The conference program brought together the unique experiences of sociologists from all the continents, undergoing significant global transformations and crises over the last two to three decades. It was an informative and challenging exercise to draw comparative lessons from transformations that, to different degrees, have been affecting the economic, political, and social spheres of individual countries, calling for innovative approaches to make sense of the new social landscape.

The Conference proved once again how sociology that had itself emerged from the social turmoil of two centuries ago – turmoil that changed the world forever by paving the way for the so-called “modern society” – continues to respond to a wide range of social and societal challenges. The papers of distinguished sociologists from different national contexts demonstrated that the critical and creative stance of sociology today is in an excellent position to draw lessons from these times of turmoil.

On behalf of the Local Organization Committee, let me express our gratitude to all the participants for their valuable academic contributions and to the ISA Executive Committee for their support and guidance that helped ensure the smooth organization of the conference.
> Junior and Senior Scholars Meet in Yokohama

by Mari Shiba, Nagoya University and ISA Member of Research Committee on Sociology of Migration (RC31), Kyoko Tominaga, University of Tokyo, Keisuke Mori, Hitotsubashi University, and Norie Fukui, Kyushu University, Japan

Professors Koichi Hasegawa, Shujiro Yazawa, Yoshimichi Sato, and Sawaka Shirihase – key members of the Local Organizing Committee for next year’s World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama (July 13-19) – put on an enticing pre-Congress conference, exactly one year ahead. The idea was to bring leading scholars from around the world – Professors Margaret Abraham from the US, Emma Porio from the Philippines and Han Sang-Jin from South Korea – into dialogue with young Japanese sociologists. This is what we young sociologists have to say:

> Mari Shiba:

I presented a paper on “Mutual Respect, Responsibility and Dialogue with Others within Us: A Case Study of Intercountry Adopted Children’s Past, Present and Future.” My presentation raised the question of cultural essentialism under multi-cultural policies. I am especially interested in the role of “mediators” between majority and minority...
communities who can build what could be called “con-
vivial” relations beyond mere multi-cultural coexistence. As
a graduate student who attended the previous Congress in
Gothenburg and also participated in the Second Forum in
Buenos Aires, let me say that these experiences gave me
a whole new network of friends and colleagues, and so I
encourage young sociologists, wherever you are, to come
to the beautiful Yokohama next year to share your research
and chart a common pathway toward a brighter future for
the world!

> Kyoko Tominaga:

I gave a paper on “How Activists Connect Their Weak Ties? What is Their ‘Sense of Community’?: Anti-G8 protest as an Opportunity to Build Networks among Activists.” I am analyzing global justice movements/anti-globalization movements in Japan. I recognize that such movements exist in different countries but with distinctive tactics, contents, and organizing styles, making them not only global but also national and local. The conference discussions helped me grasp more sharply the strengths and weaknesses of the Japanese version of global justice movements as well as the limits of my own research framework.

> Keisuke Mori:

I was pleased to have the opportunity to present my work on “Connecting to the Third World Project: Genealogy of Anti-Military Base Movements in Okinawa Island from a Worldwide Perspective.” I am trying to connect the post-
WWII history of Okinawa in Japan to the people’s histories of the world, by examining the common struggles against military bases. The presence of distinguished visitors with varied backgrounds helped me locate my study in a global perspective.

> Norie Fukui:

I presented my research on “Memory and Representation in Post-conflict Northern Ireland Society.” My research focuses on the wall murals in Northern Ireland, which show how two neighboring urban communities express hostility and empathy toward each other. Although I study Northern Ireland, I found I have common ground with other scholars who helped me apply my ideas to the Asian context. That’s what I hope the Yokohama Congress will be all about.

We would like to end with a few words from Margaret Abraham, ISA Vice-President for Research. She writes: “The invited guests were most impressed by the range of topics addressed by these young sociologists, and how globally conscious they were. It was also gratifying to see how the Japanese LOC has expanded the ISA initiative for conversations between senior and junior sociologists held at the Buenos Aires Forum of 2012. Finally, let me say that Yokohama is, indeed, a beautiful place, and everyone was going about their lives in normal fashion, and the hospital-
ity, cuisine, and the sushi were truly special. It is going to be very exciting to have thousands of sociologists from all over the world come to Yokohama next year to participate in the XVIII ISA World Congress of Sociology!”
María José Álvarez Rivadulla, ISA Member of Research Committee on Regional and Urban Development (RC21).

Majo is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the Rosario University, Colombia. Originally from Montevideo, Uruguay, she has a PhD in Sociology from the University of Pittsburgh and has lived in Colombia for the last five years. She is interested in urban inequality focusing on privilege as well as marginality and their spatial configurations. Specifically, she has studied squatter settlements, their organization, and their clientelistic networks in Montevideo. She has also written about gated communities, residential segregation, and on the beautification of slums through megaprojects such as fancy cable cars. She is now working on a new project to compare subjective inequality in different Latin American countries. She’s been involved with the Spanish edition of GD since Michael Burawoy first came to Colombia in 2011 and convinced her to do so. "You can’t say no to Michael!", she jokes.

Andrés Castro Araújo.

Andrés currently studies sociology at the Rosario University. He has broad interests in economic sociology (more concretely: work, organizations, and the professions) and cultural sociology – especially the role of expert knowledge in society. His current research focuses on the intersection of markets, class, and moral categories. He also has been in the GD Spanish translating team since it moved to Colombia, back in 2011.

Katherine Gaitán Santamaria.

Kathy has just graduated in sociology at the Rosario University in Bogotá, Colombia. Her main research topics are social movements, gender, and its intersection with class and ethnicity. Currently she is part of a collective in Bogotá, promoting social mobilization and activism among the youth, defending them against the arbitrary violence of the local state, especially in the poorest communities. She is also engaged in a project of social intervention with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Cazuca, Soacha, a very poor municipality next to Bogotá, to tackle some of the main social problems. She intends to continue with graduate studies (she has already started an interdisciplinary MA program in social studies at the Rosario University) and to continue working on social intervention in Colombia.