

# GLOBAL DIALOGUE

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NEWSLETTER



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## > Editorial

One of sociology's important tasks is to combat popular stereotypes and political distortions, not least, those portraying the place of Islam in the world today. Thus, in this issue of *Global Dialogue* Catherine Delcroix analyzes how Muslims in Europe respond to Islamophobia, while Vedi Hadiz examines how Islamic Populism mobilizes Muslims in Indonesia and Egypt behind market ideologies, following the model of the Justice and Development Party now ruling Turkey.

Herbert Docena shows how markets and morality are also intertwined in climate change negotiations as the North denies guilt for centuries of emissions, and the South refuses to make sacrifices to counter conditions they didn't create. Here the market enters as a supposedly neutral arbiter, whereas in other cases its destructiveness is transparent. Thus, Rob Lambert writes about the possibilities of contesting neoliberalism through international labor solidarity based in the Global South, while Devorah Kalekin describes last summer's anti-austerity protests in Israel.

Market fundamentalism was also the focus of two major addresses, published here, to the September meetings of the European Sociological Association and the Latin American Sociological Association. They contribute to sociology in an unequal world – the theme of the 2014 World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama – as does, from another perspective, Piotr Sztompka, whose ten theses have prompted four divergent responses. The debate is not new but is invigorated by heightened consciousness of global inequalities.

Our human rights column describes the horrors of pax-Russiana in Chechnya, while our history column pays tribute to Devorah Kalekin, dedicated editor of the *International Sociology Review of Books*, which she began in 2006. Finally, I'd like to welcome the team of sociologists from Warsaw who will produce *Global Dialogue* in Polish, our 12th language, and the team from Bogotá who will take over the Spanish translation.

*Global Dialogue* can be found on [Facebook](#), and at the [ISA website](#). Submissions should be sent to Michael Burawoy: [burawoy@berkeley.edu](mailto:burawoy@berkeley.edu)



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
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# > Negotiating Islamophobia: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty

by Catherine Delcroix, University of Strasbourg, France



Street art showing Muslim women, both wearing the burqa and committed French citizens.

**I**slamophobia has been on the rise in Europe for some time. Just recently I was in Brussels participating in a scientific workshop of sociologists coming from various European countries, all working on citizenship in Europe. An eminent member of the European Parliament, who had helped draft the European Constitution, declared: “We Europeans cannot accept that Islam, which is a *violent* religion, call into question our European identity, which is *Christian*. Muslim migrants and their children must abandon their value systems and religious beliefs if they want to stay in Europe and be rec-

ognized as Europeans.” Most of us were very shocked! A colleague from the same country as this politician asked him: “Do you think your position is compatible with respect for minority rights, which is crucial to democracy?” This man answered: “Maintaining *European order* is the most important *priority*. It is more important than respect for minority rights, and even more important than democracy.”

Islamophobia is actually very old. In the French colony of Algeria a pre-conceived negative image was used to deprive the colonized of their prop-

erty rights and civil rights: according to the *décret Crémieux* (1870) they could become French citizens and recover their rights as citizens insofar as they rejected their Muslim faith – which of course very few did. If they did not, they lost their rights and liberties and, thus, became fair game for the colonizers.

Independence wars changed the game in North Africa and elsewhere. Just as Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians in Britain, or Indonesians, Moroccans and Turks in the Netherlands and Belgium, so Algerians, Moroccans and Tunisians in

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France were first defined as (temporary) labor power, 'guest workers' as they were called in neighboring countries. Then they got authorization to bring their wives and children; but the class dimension was always present, although it now took on an 'ethnic' (read 'skin colour') dimension. Nowadays their children and grandchildren claim full European citizenship, but they have to fight the stigma attached to their 'religion', or their 'origin'.

Confronted with pervasive racism and Islamophobia, how do European (French) Muslims react? Nobody knows the actual answer; only through a series of fieldwork studies could we get an approximate answer. For the last 20 years I have been undertaking in-depth case studies of Muslim immigrant families living in France, focusing, in particular, on how working-class families originating from the Maghreb educate their children to face discrimination. I have used a methodological approach based on the reconstruction of family histories, drawn from life-history interviews with several members of each family: parents as well as children. I have repeated these case studies in many different regions and cities of France.

To date, no one has offered a framework that provides a detailed account of the reactions of the discriminated to their discrimination to include both European Jews facing anti-Semitism in the 1920s and Muslims in the present period. To this end I have appropriated the famous typology of Albert Hirschman: 'exit', 'voice' and 'loyalty'. Hirschman, an economist, was considering the range of individual reactions of people confronting a dysfunctional state bureaucracy, for example a railroad State monopoly which is badly managed. Hirschman argued that all reactions to this situation fall into either one of three categories – exit, voice or loyalty. Users may either keep accepting the high cost of travelling by train (loyalty),

protest with complaints (voice), or go by car and forget about railroads (exit).

Now it happens that this typology works rather well when applied to reactions of people confronted with racism: they may either protest (voice), which relatively few Jews did in the 1930s, and few Muslims do today. They may remain passive and hope that the storm will recede, as did so many integrated Jews in Germany or France. This is 'loyalty', which in their case ended tragically. Or they may decide to leave the country, that is 'exit'.

### > Exit

Let us start with 'exit.' In France a growing number of young men who can't find a first job try their luck in Montreal. Canada still accepts new immigrants if they are skilled. Most of them experience the same epiphany, which one expressed as follows: "In France I could not find a job because of my Arab name, the name of my father who emigrated from Morocco. In Montreal, all of a sudden I stopped being seen as an Arab. To Canadians I was French, just French. Then they ask me about my skills... It was so pleasant. In France I had wanted that so much: to be like everybody else, a Frenchman. I tried so hard, I made many efforts, but people always came back with the same question about my 'origins' or my religion."

So to flee racism through emigration is one good solution. Such young French men do migrate to Australia or Arab Gulf countries. Not everybody however has access to such possibilities and there are other, less happy ways to 'exit'. It is well-known that racism may damage the self, self-perception, self-confidence, especially for individuals who are more isolated and less resilient. Some may resort to drugs or even suicide, which are also forms of 'exit'.

### > Voice

'Voice,' by contrast, goes in the opposite direction. 'Voice' is protest against the unfair social order which is discriminating against you. It may be voiced individually or collectively. 'Voice' demands recognition, it is a struggle for recognition: "Hey Society! I am one of your members. Do recognize me as such! And do also recognize my minority rights! Do live up to your proclaimed ideals!"

In France there are many examples of 'voice' by discriminated groups, some formal and organized, others informal and short-lived such as the riots in the *banlieues* in November 2005, triggered by the killing of a young man trying to escape the police. In contrast to 'exit', protesting against police violence, asking 'France' to live up to its ideals of 'Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité', does not mean rejecting French society, as so many people believe. Quite the contrary. It means that the discriminated still believe in society's capacity to reform itself.

Of the three main types of responses to racism, 'voice' is the one that opens the possibility of moving from individual to collective response – from micro-processes to the local, regional, or even national scales. But this road is not easy for the social order always fights back, and not always through repression. It is more clever than that; its most frequent weapons are discursive – clever ways of distorting the facts and the intentions of its opponents.

Let me take the example of the Muslim scarf. Why is it that girls and young French women, born of Muslim parents, decide to wear a scarf? Is it because of the pressure of fundamentalists? When sociologists interviewed high-school girls wearing the scarf, they discovered it was not that at all. Most of these girls declared they had decided by themselves to wear a scarf; often *against* the will of their parents. At first nobody believed them, everybody thought they were

lying. But eventually it became clear that they were, indeed, telling the truth. They also said it did not mean that they felt any less French for that; not at all.

The best interpretation of the 'scarf' phenomenon has been provided by Houria Boutelja, pointing to the *contradictory situation* of French Muslim women of the second generation. On the one hand, there is the weight of racism against Arabs, growing Islamophobia, and discrimination in labour markets. But the pressure is much stronger on their brothers than on these young women to whom 'white' society sends the message: "Leave the place where you grew up; escape the authority of your father and brothers; leave them behind. Turn your back on the past, come and join the open French society."

It is quite a temptation for these girls, says Houria Boutelja – the temptation of freedom. For, indeed, there are still traces of patriarchal culture, norms and prohibitions in many migrant families from the Maghreb. But it would amount to a betrayal of one's family and community. This is a trap, says Houria Boutelja, but to this trap they have found a solution which is the scarf. By wearing it these young women are speaking in a silent 'voice' to French society: "No, we will *not* betray our parents and our community. You have been mistreating them, first as guest workers, and now as Muslims; we will remain definitely on their side!"

But, *at the same time*, says Houria Boutelja, the scarf also sends a message to the men of their community: their father, brothers and cousins. And the message is: "Look, we have

not betrayed you, we are supporting you; we have turned down 'their' offer, yes? Now please leave us free to go our own way. We will not misbehave; but we *want* to be free to go on studying; we want to remain single rather than being married to somebody we do not know; we want to get ready for professional life." This is not 'exit'; this is not 'loyalty' (to French society) either; this is a clear case of 'voice', but a sophisticated one.

### > Loyalty

What then does 'loyalty' mean? It is hard to be loyal to a society which rejects you because you are seen as radically different. Nonetheless, this attitude of loyalty towards a racist society did prevail among the first generation of migrants, even in spite of the Algerian War of Independence. Thus, a national survey, conducted by Claudine Attias-Donfut in 2005 on elderly migrants in France of all origins, showed that more than 90% claim to feel at home in France.

Moreover, I have myself witnessed many migrant parents trying to convince their children not to retaliate when confronted with derogatory remarks. It was a strategy of teaching patience to their children so as to increase their chances of success. Second-generation youth, however, have a more transnational conception of loyalty: they believe in the values of the French Republic and define themselves as European citizens. Their feeling of belonging is often connected to the fact that they have family members in other European countries. They believe in European democracy and the protection of minority rights.

To belong or not to belong, that is the question but it takes two to belong. Islamophobia is the opposite of the recognition that is necessary to belong and to feel one belongs. Let me conclude with what Floya Anthias says about belonging: "Belonging is about both formal and informal *experiences*. Belonging is not just about membership, rights and duties, as in the case of citizenship, or just about forms of identification with groups or others, but it is also about the social places constructed by such identifications and memberships and [about] the ways in which social place affects the stability of the self, feelings of being part of a larger whole, and the emotional and social bonds tied to such places."

This is the heart of the matter. I believe that as sociologists we have the means – for instance, by collecting case studies, by finding vivid examples through life histories – to modify the European common sense, ceasing to treat European Muslims as scapegoats; and, instead, considering them as part of us. ■

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# > The New Islamic Populism

by Vedi R. Hadiz, Murdoch University, Australia



Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey's charismatic Prime Minister, secures popular support for his amalgam of Islam and neoliberalism.

One of the most conspicuous features of the recent Arab Uprisings is that Islamic oppositional movements have not been at their forefront. That they did not take a leadership role is interesting given that Islamic groups, ever since the demise of most of the Left in Muslim societies during the Cold War, have been the most prominent source of dissent against a number of authoritarian regimes, especially in North Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt, vehicles like An Nahda and the Muslim Brotherhood, respectively, are likely to do well in new post-authoritarian environments. This has led to a degree of alarmism and Islamophobic hyperbole in sections of the Western media.

Digging deeper, we see that Is-

lamic politics have frequently been transformed by what may be described as a New Islamic Populism. If the older form was premised on the interests of a long declining traditional petty bourgeoisie made up of urban traders, petty commodity producers and rural elites, the newer Islamic populism is more likely to be constituted by an alliance of highly disparate elements: marginalised sections of the bourgeoisie, ambitious and educated members of new urban middle classes still stuck in the lower rungs of the social hierarchy, as well as the swelling masses of urban poor that have descended upon sprawling and chaotic megacities like Cairo, Istanbul, and Jakarta over recent decades – seeking education, employment, and the promise of a better life. In both these forms, however, the *um-*

*mah* is conceived as a sort of stand-in for the ‘people’ – a concept which is an integral part of all populist imaginings that juxtapose the morally virtuous but marginalised masses to the rapacious and predatory elite.

The effect of this transformation on organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood – which in spite of its internal contradictions is still the best organized force in Egyptian civil society – has been profound. In fact, the ramifications of the New Populism were already evident in the rise to power in Turkey of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in 2002, and to which the leaders of the Egyptian Freedom and Justice Party – the newly spawned electoral vehicle of the Muslim Brotherhood – appear to be looking for a model. Even as far away as Southeast Asia, Indonesia's >>

Justice and Prosperity Party (PKS) – the most successful of a slew of Islamic-oriented parties – has for many years also found inspiration in the AKP's successes, which recently won its third straight general election in convincing fashion. Besides embracing democracy, it is well known that the AKP ingenuously grafted neoliberal economic reform onto traditional social justice concerns of Islamic populism.

The AKP experience cannot be accounted for by the inherently moderating effect of participation in electoral democracy as some have suggested. More important is the realization that the objective of promoting the social, economic and political position of the *ummah* does not necessarily require an Islamic state or one that is rigidly governed by Sharia. It can be achieved by the favorable repositioning of the *ummah* and its political and organizational vehicles in relation to the existing state and the market.

In spite of grassroots support among the urban poor and a leadership heavily derived from ambitious members of the educated urban middle class, one of the most important reasons for the success of the AKP has been support from the so-called Anatolian bourgeoisie. The latter is made up of culturally Muslim businesspeople that had been

relatively marginalized by a Kemalist secular bureaucratic and political establishment that favored an Istanbul-based big bourgeoisie. Importantly, the more provincially-rooted Anatolian bourgeoisie had been growing in wealth and strength since Turkey moved into a more export-oriented, global market-based economic strategy in the 1980s. In the Turkish case, of course, it remains unconstitutional to be agitating toward an Islamic state and the AKP cannot even identify openly as an Islamic party in spite of having grown out of long established Islamic-oriented groups and networks. However, this has not proven to be an obstacle to developing cross-class alliances that have successfully won and retained control of government in pursuit of policies that enhance the position of the *ummah*, defined in opposition to secular elites accused of economic mismanagement, authoritarian practices as well as cultural aloofness.


The situation in Egypt is, of course, too fluid to suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood will be as successful – in fact it has had to tone down considerably its role in the Egyptian post-authoritarian environment so that it would not be perceived as having hijacked the Egyptian uprising. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood has been internally transformed since the days of Hasan Al Banna or Sayyid Qutb. It, too, can count on a strong

base of support from sections of the young urban middle class and certainly large portions of the urban poor given the relative disorganisation of Leftist and Liberal forces. Moreover, a major pillar of the Muslim Brotherhood has been businesses, large and small, that had supported its earlier semi-clandestine forays into electoral politics and, as a result, it was ostracised by the Mubarak regime. The Muslim Brotherhood, too, sees democracy as a useful tool to seize the positions of the Mubarak cronies at the commanding heights of the economy.

But the New Islamic Populism isn't always so close to success. If its major representative in Indonesia is the PKS, it is clear that the party is far from being in any position to obtain power. This in itself is interesting because one source of its weakness – compared to Turkish or Egyptian counterparts – is the absence of a strong culturally Muslim big bourgeoisie, due to the continuing dominance of the ethnic-Chinese element within the Indonesian bourgeoisie.

Whether successful or not, the rise of the New Islamic Populism has important implications for challenging stereotypes of the aims, strategies and vehicles of Islamic politics in the modern world. ■

Extreme risk ■  
 High risk ■  
 Medium risk ■  
 Low risk ■  
 No Data ■



**Climate Change Vulnerability.** Light green areas are the least vulnerable and dark blue areas the most vulnerable. Countries in the North have the greatest CO<sub>2</sub> per capita emissions but are the least affected by climate change while countries in the South, with the least CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, will be the most affected. Courtesy of Maplecroft.

## > Who's to Blame? Stormy Times in Climate Change Negotiations

by **Herbert Docena, Focus on the Global South, Philippines, and the University of California, Berkeley**

**T**his December, thousands of officials, activists, lobbyists, and maybe even some superstars will fly to Durban for the 17th conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Next June, many will again fly to Rio to mark two decades since the signing of the UNFCCC and other environmental agreements. Twenty years have now passed since what many now agree were the most complex – and perhaps most consequential – intergovernmental negotiations in history, but what has been achieved?

As I write, in Bulacan, Philippines, hundreds are spending another stormy night on their rooftops, hungry and waiting for rescue because of rising floodwaters unleashed by the latest super-typhoon; they wait because in a village of thousands, there are only two rescue boats to go from house to house. This, just a few days *after* the country paused to remember the anniversary of the worst typhoon in recent memory – and a day *before* yet another typhoon is set to hit shore.

Two decades since governments first agreed to reduce emissions, storms

are getting stronger and more frequent while droughts are getting more severe – just as climate science predicts. According to a report released last May by the International Energy Agency, carbon emissions last year have actually been the highest in history. Why, despite accords, are emissions that are blamed for what the philosopher Peter Singer calls “bizarre new ways of killing” still rising and rising?

I went to Bonn to observe the climate negotiations last June and was struck by what was being debated: a variant of ‘pledge-and-review,’ a proposal in which

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each country would essentially be left to itself to decide how it wants to act. No binding targets, no promises. In another hall, Bolivia was calling for a global tax to fund efforts to cope with climate change disasters. I was taken aback because, having just emerged from a crash course in the negotiations' early history, I knew that both proposals had been tabled – and junked – in the early 90s and yet, there they were, back on the table. I came to Bonn partly to get acquainted with recent developments in the negotiations, only to discover that they're back where they started. Why are the negotiations stuck?

After interviewing over 20 people who have been closely involved in the negotiations from around the world and after poring over hundreds of pages of negotiating documents, part of the answer may well be because the two main blocs – the North and the South – have still not satisfactorily resolved the most basic but also perhaps the most fundamental question in the negotiations: *Who's to blame?*

Indeed, beneath the increasingly arcane debates, it is still arguably this most mundane of moral questions that accounts for the most enduring standoffs: from the outset, most developing countries – from the most highly industrialized to the poorest – have accused the North of being guilty of causing climate change because of their emissions in the course of their industrialization. Most developed countries – for all the spats between Europeans and Americans – have remained united in rejecting this.

The US negotiating position has shifted over the years, but chief negotiator Todd Stern's sentiments – “We absolutely recognize our historic role in putting emissions in the atmosphere, up there, but the sense of guilt or culpability or reparations, I just categorically reject that” – are the one thing that all decision-makers, whether Republican or Democrat, a true believer or a climate skeptic, a business lobbyist or a Beltway environmentalist, can agree with. Without fail, every US negotiator I have spoken with has repeated the line: we should not be faulted for something we didn't know was (maybe) causing harm.

To be sure, parties have long agreed to

contribute according to their ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities,’ but this phrase has now become the most contested in the history of the negotiations: Southern negotiators tend to focus on the word ‘differentiation,’ convinced that its basis refers to the North's historical guilt. Northern negotiators seize on the word ‘common’ and – in contrast to Southern negotiators who often stop at ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ – make it a point to add ‘and respective capabilities,’ i.e. they will contribute because they are more capable, not because they are *obliged*.

This is not just semantic swordplay because each side's stance on the question of responsibility has oriented each side's answers to three concrete questions that have dogged the negotiations: Who's in charge? Who should do what? Who owes what?

Insisting that they're the aggrieved ones, the South has pushed for greater voice in decision-making, has tended to prefer punitive and compulsory measures, and has consistently demanded ‘compensation’ from the North. Hence, the insistence on mandatory measures such as global taxes or fines for excess emissions. Rejecting guilt and insisting that they're open to contributing more only because they *can* not because they *should*, the North has sought to restrict decision-making, demanded ‘flexibility’ or ‘cost-effectiveness’ at all times, through voluntary rather than compulsory measures if possible, and with rewards if necessary. Hence, the insistence on proposals such as ‘pledge-and-review,’ or mechanisms like carbon trading.

These diverging starting-points – linked to broader historical developments having to do with enduring North-South inequalities and the dynamics of global capitalism – help explain the failure to arrive at a common ground on many issues.

Efforts by the North to effectively confine the negotiations to only the big emitters instead of all 193 parties seem eminently reasonable to people like Berkeley economics professor Brad DeLong (who, in the same talk acknowledged that “many San Franciscans really won't mind having the climate of

Los Angeles”), since they believe that only those who will lead should decide. But this is unacceptable to those who care how justice is to be served: aggressors, after all, are not usually allowed to decide the terms of their punishment.

Demands for rewarding – rather than punitive – solutions may sound reasonable to those who see themselves as magnanimous leaders, but jarring to those who see them as guilty offenders: sinners, after all, are not usually allowed to ask for the most lenient form of punishment. Similarly, the North's refusal to subject climate funds to democratic control by all parties (on grounds that the South could not be trusted) sounds eminently justifiable to those who see themselves as benevolent leaders, but absurd to those who hold them to be culpable transgressors: the guilty typically cannot avoid paying indemnity by assailing the moral integrity of their victims.

Even in the rarefied field of climate diplomacy, quotidian questions of guilt and innocence seem inescapable because our answers to them can define the terms of our social relationships with others, even or especially in situations of inequality. For two decades, the North and South have been struggling over those terms at every step: what each can justifiably demand from the other, what others can justifiably demand from oneself, what one is entitled to, what one is obliged to do, and so on.

To date, the North, with the support of some in the South, has succeeded in institutionalizing its claims of innocence, through the Kyoto Protocol's guarantee of ‘flexibility’ and its resort to carbon trading, a mechanism that trumped the South's earlier proposals for punitive fines and compulsory compensation.

But that doesn't mean the question has been settled once and for all, as continuing demands for restitution, for an international climate court, or for ‘climate justice’ show. And as long as it is not satisfactorily resolved, the negotiations may remain stuck where they are for another 20 years. That may be fine for those perched in the Berkeley hills, but not for those stranded on the roofs of Bulacan. ■

# > What Possibilities for Global Labor?

by Robert Lambert, University of Western Australia, former President of the ISA Research Committee on Labor Movements



Australia-Venezuela Solidarity Network, May Day March in Caracas, 2008.

Even in the darkest of times we have the right to expect some illumination, and that such illumination may well come less from theories and concepts than from the uncertain, flickering, and often weak light that some men and women, in their lives and in their works, will kindle under almost all circumstances and shed over the time span that was given to them on earth.

Hannah Arendt, *Men in Dark Times*.

Given the multiple crises we are living through (climate, finance, work), the interventions of Edward Webster, Pun Ngai and Enrique de la Garza (*Global Dialogue*, 1.5, July 2011) on ‘global labor’ stimulate reflection on a critical issue: can society resist the synchronized power of global corporations, global finance, global institutions and nation-states and impose an alternative logic to resolve a looming human catastrophe? Might global labor play a role in activating societies across the globe to build a new relationship with nature, reshape the architecture of finance, radically regulate global corporations, trade and investment so as to reconstitute secure work and stabilize society on a socially just foundation? Might such a movement challenge the absurdity of neoliberalism, wherein the cause of these de-

structive crises is viewed as the solution? Even imagining such a prospect appears absurd, given the might of these institutions.

Each contribution highlights issues pertinent to this predicament. Drawing on a lifetime of researching labor in South Africa, Webster considers the ‘idea of solidarity’ – the ways in which such a culture and strategy can, in certain instances, be fractured but also strengthened in a manner which empowers. If transforming individualism at the local level is challenging, how much more its global construction? Webster contends that the latter might evolve through three types of solidarity: human rights (defence of victims); production (linking work places); and regulation (developing the law to protect rights and standards).

Pun Ngai’s compact account of China ‘as the world’s factory’ concludes that it has proven to be ‘a global nightmare for the new working class’. The *hukou* system permits rural workers ‘to work in the city but not stay in the city’, hence they exist as ‘half workers’, forced ‘wanderers’ across China’s transformed landscapes. She summarizes how this non-status and these exploitative conditions have triggered a significant increase in collective resistance.

Finally, Enrique de la Garza drawing on the Latin American experience, responds to Webster by arguing that the globalization of capital might lead to ‘a globalization of labor as a social movement’. Such a movement could be realized through new worker identities, exploiting the links in value chains and harnessing workers

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in the informal sector, which ranges between 40 to 70 per cent of the workforce in Latin America. As to the prospects of such a movement arising, he asks: will unions oppose neoliberalism, broaden the definition of their role and reignite utopian visions of society?

However, these ideas will remain pure ideas in the absence of an analysis of the uneven development of global labor based on an assessment of agency, politics, movement and action. This brief rejoinder simply poses questions for debate in these areas, for debate that transcends the academy is a small step towards constructing Webster's solidarities.

### > Agency

Here there is a need to distinguish between established and new labor internationalism (NLI), for, while the former produces career bureaucrats, the latter produces struggle-oriented activists. Change will be driven by activists, inspired by notions of human liberation, even at great personal cost, in contrast to those for whom global labor is a job opportunity, a career and middle-class comfort. Whilst the Global South has continued to produce activists, the anger generated by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) could create a similar dynamic in the North. Gramsci's famous statement on 'optimism of the will' challenges academics to move with this potential, not solely as recorders of events, but as engaged public intellectuals, moving between office and street mobilizations. Might we too be driven by an inner anger at the theft and dispossession the GFC represents? How determined are we to break the destructive cycle of a pure market logic? Reflecting on our own choices provides insights into agency as the critical variable, which can reshape politics.

### > Politics

Despite certain notable exceptions, the institutionalization of global labor in the North (International Trade Union Confederation and the Global Union Federations) is for the most part limited by a separation of politics and

economy and at best, a critique of the effects of neoliberalism, without challenging its destructive essence. This is a pro-free trade global labor movement, which contends that labor rights and social programs can assuage the adjustment costs of globalization. For these global labor institutions, action equals lobbying the power elites, even though little has been achieved through such tactics over the past half century.

To a degree and not without its contradictions, hope for a political revitalization resides in the Global South, where nationally based labor movements such as CUT in Brazil, CTA in Argentina, COSATU in South Africa, CITU in India and KCTU in Korea draw on traditions of resistance. Each has waged determined battles against neoliberal restructuring over the past two decades. As these forces unite through SIGTUR (Southern Initiative on Globalization and Trade Union Rights) there have been new initiatives to formulate a vision of what is being fought for, not just what is being fought against. SIGTUR is at an early stage of debating the concrete characteristics of the alternative to neoliberalism grounded in demands for short, medium and long-term transformation. The contention is that this struggle is a new, global liberation struggle demanding a politics of liberation at all levels. The substance of such a politics derives from Marx's theory of accumulation and exploitation and complemented by Polanyi's analysis of markets, society and commodification. If global labor in the South evolves a new politics, this might inspire forces in the North, given the severity of the current crisis. Activism and a new politics lay the foundations for a new kind of movement.

### > Towards a New Global Movement (a New Idea of Solidarity)?

David Harvey's conception of a new kind of global social movement, one 'constituted out of a broad alliance of the discontented, the alienated, the deprived and the dispossessed' is an intriguing prospect. At an international conference of the Global Union, UNI, in Paris in June 2011, a leader

of the French General Confederation of Labor (CGT) regretted that the labor movement had failed to make contact with the young *indignados* of Spain, the *aganaktismenoi* (outraged) of Greece, or the youth of the Arab Spring to show that their struggles are linked and that the Spring fight for democracy needs to be extended and transformed into a widening struggle against neoliberal capitalist development. The opportunities for a new movement are there, but whilst established global labor has created some links, it has failed to seize the moment and forge such a movement. Indeed, the institutionalized global labor movement is so grooved into lobbying in five-star hotels across the globe that they show no desire to mobilize and organize in the streets. Thus there is no coordinated global collective action and so the South will have to trigger such action.

### > Global Collective Action

The labor politics of elite lobbying needs to give way to long-prepared-for radical action, disrupting the logistics of the global economy – shipping, transportation in general – as well as disrupting global production networks from within. During the 1990s, SIGTUR organized several highly successful shipping boycotts. In Korea, a labor leader has been in and out of jail over the past decade for applying pressure through the slowing down of container trucks, which gridlocked city transportation. These disciplined, collectively organized actions demonstrate the latent power of global labor.

Have we the imagination and political will to contribute, as engaged public intellectuals, to building anew in these spheres? Public sociologists have a role in the ensuing battle for ideas, reinforcing new politics, movement and action, thereby sustaining hope in the power of movement. The venture may or may not come to fruition in the coming decades, but there will be those who chose the street not the hotel as this drama unfolds, and in so doing they might provide that illumination for the 21st century to which Hannah Arendt referred in her reflections on the dark times of the 20th century. ■

# > Self-Discovery: A Grass Roots Civil Society in Israel

by Devorah Kalekin-Fishman, University of Haifa, Israel, former ISA Vice-President for Publications and editor of *International Sociology Review of Books*



Summer Protests in Israel against Marketization.

**T**he year of the Arab Spring was also the year of the Israeli summer. A gigantic two-month demonstration disturbed the complacency of the self-satisfied right-wing coalition that includes about two thirds of the Knesset.

In this summer civilians opened their hearts and admitted to one another that it is difficult simply to get along;

they found a camaraderie famously reserved for soldiers in fighting units. Until September, both the national government and the municipalities were pleased to encourage the protesters. What better sign that Israel is a democracy? Streets reverberated with the cries of men and women, Arabs and Jews, middle class and lower class, demanding a fair redistribution of resources and a renewal of government as a service to the people. Protest marches included

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citizens of all ages in growing numbers on succeeding Saturday nights. The fourth of these, on September 3, encompassed a previously unimaginable number of 430,000 participants (7% of the population): over 300,000 in Tel Aviv, 50,000 Arabs and Jews in Haifa, with scattered thousands in cities across the country, among them hundreds of protesters in the villages of Arab citizens. The organizers of the marches kept the numbers of protesters high by refusing to commit to any political party. They set up committees with academics who formulated demands for changes in priorities of government spending with a universalistic call for decent jobs, decent places to live, and decent health and educational services. The government set up its own committee to examine the possibilities within the limits of the given budget. After the peak of the gigantic march, the protest moved on to assembling people at 'a thousand' round tables, analyzing problems and working out further proposals for the government to act on. The surge of energy that swept the protest was transformed into on-going grass roots activism.

With the approach of the Jewish High Holidays, municipal authorities decided to clean up the streets. Tent-dwelling protesters were given notice, and the luxury of the 'middle-class' protest which swept through the entire population devolved into a demonstration by the truly homeless, those with a right to public housing because they meet the 'criteria', and have their names on a kind of virtual 'waiting list'. For them, the tents had not been a demonstration but a respectable alternative to living in doorways and sponging off family members.

Their plight was the logical outcome of three decades of right-wing governments which, since 1977, deliberately and systematically dismantled the welfare state and imposed a thorough-going neoliberal regime. Sustained by threats to security, real and fabricated, succeeding coalitions

showed that civil discipline and submissiveness were the only ways to promote the national good. The concerns of informal associations that consistently struggle to advance human rights within Israel and the Occupied Territories have been systematically ignored except for inconsistent redress in the courts, and then only unless they are not over-ridden by right-wing legislation.

The jelling of the hundreds of associations in Israel into an activist civil society was startling. It all began when a guy named Itzik discovered that the price of cottage cheese, an Israeli staple, was far higher than the price of similar products in Europe or the USA. Through his page in Facebook, he organized a consumer boycott which not only brought down prices, but served as the dress rehearsal for the 'middle-class' protest. The protest itself started at the beginning of July when Dafna Leef moved into a tent because she could not afford to go on paying rent – and hundreds joined her.

Suddenly '*Kiturim*' – the sport of sitting-in-living-rooms-with-friends-and-refreshments-to-air-complaints, a traditional Friday night pursuit for Jews in Israel – became the basis for a rational list of demands that specify the right to have a life. This development recalls the participatory democracy of kibbutz movement 'town meetings'. Like the organizers of civil society in Poland and Mexico, those heading the Israeli protest aim to influence those who wield power by giving voice to the people. A few insist on a 'revolution' in the concept of government. In the meantime, government spokespersons say that 'the message of the protest has been noted'; committees will provide appropriate responses. But there is still more than a year till elections, and it is doubtful if the current government can go beyond the well-known ploy of instituting a short-term regime of election economics. ■



# > Ten Theses on the Status of Sociology in an Unequal World

by Piotr Sztompka, University of Krakow, Poland, former ISA President

**A**lmost ten years ago at the ISA World Congress of Sociology at Brisbane 2002 I won the Presidency of ISA running on a very 'politically incorrect' slogan, 'Excellence rather than balance'. Now the slogan seems relevant again, especially after the 2010 World Congress in Gothenburg and the sweeping victory of Michael Burawoy who again injected revolutionary fervor into the ISA: the claim of some 'alternative', 'indigenous' sociologies, the oppressive nature of Western methods and theories, and the 'imperialism' of the English language. We have stated our opposite points of view on the pages of *Contemporary Sociology* (July 2011, pp.388-404) but because this has led to a fundamental misunderstanding of my position, and earning me such undeserved labels as 'the last positivist', and a blind fan of the US, I want to state my case again as concisely and precisely as possible, in ten points. Michael has generously accepted my statement for *Global Dialogue* for which he deserves thanks.

First, *one should not draw epistemological conclusions from the actual conditions of the world, or from the concrete differences in the institutional status of our discipline in various parts of the world.* Most sociologists, myself included, due to their professional sensitiveness are strongly aware of the unjust inequalities among, as well as within contemporary societies, which also include different research opportunities. But this does not imply that there must be a different sociology for the privileged and underprivileged. Good sociology is equally able to understand riches and poverty.

Second, in a reversal of a famous adage, *if one really wants to change the unequal world, the first duty is to understand it.* Again, most sociologists, myself included, are reform-oriented, but our activist aspirations cannot be realized by moralizing, preaching, or ideological manifestoes, but only by the discovery of the mechanisms and regularities of social life, including those creating and petrifying inequalities and injustices.

Karl Marx spent most of his life in the library, and not on the barricades, and is a giant of social science not because of the *Communist Manifesto*, but because of *Das Kapital*.

Third, *there is one sociology for many social worlds*<sup>1</sup>. The mechanisms and regularities of social life are universal for human race, although, of course, their manifestations differ across civilizations, cultures, societies, or segments of societies. Even the latter, though, are slowly becoming more uniform due to globalization, except those which refer to unjust inequalities (North versus South, core versus peripheries, race, gender and class divisions within societies), as well as religious fundamentalisms (believers versus infidels).

Fourth, *the standards of sociological research and good theory are universal*, and included in the cumulatively developing toolbox of methods and the pluralistic archive of sociological theories. This has nothing to do with any 'positivism', because the qualitative methodologies as well as the

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interpretive theories dominant today, recognizing the peculiarity of their social subject matter, also require universal standards, even though the standards are different from those of 'positivistic' sociology attempting to imitate the natural sciences.

Fifth, *the sin of origins does not disqualify the result*. The historical fact that the standard toolbox and pluralistic archive of theories has been initiated by bearded old men, mostly Jewish, living in Germany, France and Britain, and then developed mostly in Western Europe and the US, has nothing to do with their intrinsic quality. The latter has always been and should be subjected to sceptical scrutiny, corrections and improvements. But rejecting this methodological and theoretical tradition as 'imperialist' is a mark of obscurantism. Instead I would recommend, with Newton and Merton, 'to stand on the shoulders of giants'.

Sixth, *the futile attempt to create 'alternative' or 'indigenous' sociologies is pernicious for the discipline*. Science, including social science, does not know borders. It develops as a common pool of knowledge to which all national, continental, regional or even local sociologies are more than welcome to contribute. They may have unique research opportunities, unique research agendas, particular problem-emphases or orientations, but they do not require any alternative methodologies, or indigenous theories. Instead of arguing for the need for indigenous sociologies, my advice is: just do it. There is

a lot of important sociological work done in the non-Western world. But it is usually based on standard methodologies and contributes to universal pool of theories. Nothing alternative or indigenous there, but simply good sociology.

## **“The future is not with national sociologies but with research groups”**

Seventh, *the claims for national sociologies do not make much sense in this globalizing and more and more cosmopolitan social world of today*. The fact that countries or nation-states differ does not mean that their sociologies are, or should be, different. The only meaning of 'national' in this area has to do with some remaining institutional differences, different founding fathers, different research foci. But the results, if they deserve the name of 'sociology' and not just area studies or local statistics, must be abstract enough to enrich the universal pool of sociological knowledge. The future, also in ISA, is not with national sociologies but with research groups or networks (today's RCs, TGs, or WGs).

Eighth, the historical fact that a natural language, *English*, rather than

some artificial, specially devised language (say Esperanto), has become the most used communication tool in the airlines, tourism, computers, Internet and science, including sociology, *is not a disaster but a great opportunity*. This is particularly so for sociologists from limited language-areas (like my own) who now have at their disposal most of the universal sociological heritage (through translations into English) and acquire visibility and opportunity to contribute to the universal pool (by publishing in English).

Ninth, *it is an error to believe that the existential situation of the researcher provides epistemological benefit*. The disclosure of the mechanisms and regularities of injustices and inequalities has not been the exclusive achievement of underdogs or insiders. Numerous examples point to the opposite. The only valid legitimacy in science can be provided by the quality of results and not the social status of the scholar.

Tenth, *value judgments and ideological biases are unavoidable, and even admissible in sociology at the heuristic stage of selecting a problem, or research theme, but should have no place in the final results and their justification*. And all values, as Gunnar Myrdal has advised<sup>2</sup>, should be openly disclosed for debate. This is what I have been attempting in my ten theses. ■

<sup>1</sup> See my article in *The ISA Handbook of Diverse Sociological Traditions* (Sage, 2010), ed. by Sujata Patel.

<sup>2</sup> *Objectivity in Social Research* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).

# > Excellence and Balance: Producing Sociology that Matters

by **Tina Uys, University of Johannesburg, South Africa, ISA Vice-President for National Associations**

**T**he piece written by Piotr Sztompka follows his review of a three-volume set of conference papers presented at a meeting of the International Sociological Association (ISA) Council of National Associations in Taiwan in 2009. Sztompka's review was published in *Contemporary Sociology* along with a response by Michael Burawoy, the organizer of that meeting and the former ISA Vice-President for National Associations. The theme of the Taiwan meeting was *Facing an Unequal World: Challenges for a Global Sociology*, which is also the theme of the next ISA World Congress of Sociology in Yokohama, Japan, in 2014.

Contrary to Sztompka I do not see the volumes as developed with 'revolutionary fervor', but rather as an attempt to advance an understanding of the unequal organization of knowledge production and exchange between core and periphery.

It might be useful at this point to provide some historical notes about

the ISA and its relationship with the national associations. When the ISA was founded in 1948 on the initiative of UNESCO, its membership was restricted to national associations and, therefore, collective in nature. In 1970, individual membership was introduced, which broadened international involvement in the ISA and strengthened the development of research committees, but it also gradually led to a decline in the importance of national associations in the decision-making structures of the ISA. When the ISA introduced portfolios for its vice-presidents for the 1974-1978 term (Research Council, Programme, and Membership and Finance), national associations were conspicuously absent. During the 1994 World Congress in Bielefeld, the Council of National Associations was replaced as the main decision-making body of the ISA by an Assembly of Councils consisting of the Research Council and the Council of National Associations<sup>1</sup>.

Since the ISA's inception, the election of Presidents was predominantly the domain of Europe (10) and the USA (5), with Fernando Cardoso from

Brazil (1982-1986) and T.K. Oommen from India (1990-1994) being the only exceptions. Presidents of Research Committees for the present term (2010-2014) are also overwhelmingly from the Global North. Sztompka might argue that this is an indication of the importance of 'excellence' over 'balance'. Raewyn Connell<sup>2</sup> might take a different view. It could be seen as a demonstration of the general tendency to consider theorizing in social science to be the domain of the Global North, while the Global South is relegated to data-collection and application, resulting in 'metropolitan dominance and peripheral marginality in social science' (2007: 219). Other factors also might come into play, such as work from the Global North being more widely shared because of the widespread distribution of its published materials, popular centers of graduate study and/or language accessibility.

According to the ISA Statutes, the goal of the organization is 'to represent sociologists everywhere, regardless of their school of thought, scientific approaches or ideological opinion, and to advance sociological

knowledge throughout the world'. It could be argued that this statement contradicts Sztompka's context-independent 'one sociology for many social worlds' and 'universal standards of sociological research and good theory'. Understandings developed in particular contexts cannot be assumed to be universally applicable, especially if those contexts are restricted to the Global North.

Over the years the ISA has actively tried to make its goal a reality. One example is the ten regional conferences initiated by Immanuel Wallerstein, then President of the ISA, prior to the 14th ISA World Congress of Sociology in 1998, which focused on the state of world sociology from a regional perspective. A major achievement in restoring balance to the ISA decision-making structure was the election of Sujata Patel from India as the first Vice-President for National Associations in 2002. This also led to the introduction of the requirement in the ISA Statutes that, similar to the Research Council, a meeting of the Council of National Associations should take place once every four years between World Con-

## “in our ‘one science’, is there room for differences?”

gresses. The first such meeting was held in Miami, USA, in 2005 and the outcome of the deliberations of the meeting was published in a volume edited by Sujata Patel<sup>3</sup> (2010) with the title *ISA Handbook of Diverse Sociological Traditions*.

Just as there are theories and methods that compete for our attention, there are also world views (which might be the same theories and methods). In some cases that lens might be, for instance, indigenous sociology, a gender perspective or a humanist-libertarian perspective. Indigenous sociology might mean the context of a local area within a country, a region (such as the Global South) that crosses over national borders, or how you see things from where you are based (standpoint theory), for instance, in the catego-

ries of gender, class, ethnicity and/or age. The challenge for sociology will be to keep all these differences under one roof (sociology and the ISA), because if people do not feel that they have room to be heard, they move on. So, in our 'one science', is there room for the differences and can they all be heard?

The next meeting of the ISA Council of National Associations in 2013 is one ideal opportunity to provide such a space. We will make it possible to have real discussion and debate – among equals – around the topics and approaches that matter to sociologists in all the countries and regions. In this way we can ensure that we have excellence AND balance in producing a sociology that matters, locally as well as globally. ■

<sup>1</sup> For a fascinating account of the history of the ISA see: Platt, J. (1998) *A Brief History of the International Sociological Association: 1948-1997*. Montreal: ISA. <http://www.isa-sociology.org/history-of-isa.htm>

<sup>2</sup> Connell, R. (2007) *Southern Theory*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

<sup>3</sup> Patel, S. (ed.) (2010) *ISA Handbook of Diverse Sociological Traditions*. London: Sage.

# > ‘Patient Denied Hospitalization’ or ‘In Defence of Sociology’

by **Nikita Pokrovsky, State University-Higher School of Economics, Moscow, President of the Society of Professional Sociologists, Russia, Member of the ISA Executive Committee**

**A**fter spending many years in the field of professional and international sociology I have a strong feeling that in today’s world the future of sociology is seriously endangered. Its destiny is more uncertain and our professional ranks more dispersed than ever before. I will try to rationalize my inner feelings and intuitions. “Do we really need to defend sociology? From whom? Why now?” I often ask myself these questions regarding both Russia, my home country, and the international scene. I hate to sound pessimistic but I have to. There are, in my opinion, critical external risks to sociology as well as threats coming from within our own professional group.

## > The menace from outside

The external dangers consist of one main threat. To put it straightforwardly, in today’s world sociology is fast losing its influence and authority. Neither power structures (above all the state and business) nor the populace are very interested in what we would call ‘rational diagnosis’ of the clinical condition of the social. Instead, various irrational forces take the lead. Old and newly invented forms of religion, social mythology, ideology and mass blindness prevail almost everywhere. These forces have pushed aside rationality without difficulty, even in the social sciences. Under such conditions the sphere of rationalistic and scholarly sociology is greatly diminishing. In my opinion, the light of reason is the only foundation upon which the power and capacity of sociology rest. We sociologists can provide societies with a diagnosis. But increasingly it seems that the ‘clients’ or ‘patients’, i.e. our societies, choose to refuse hospitalization. Our societies feel rather good without sociological diagnosis despite the fact that the condition of

the ‘patient’ is really critical in many cases. In other words, sociology’s external danger stems from society’s denial of rational and scientifically-based analysis of the present situation. Indeed, this is a case of ‘patient denied hospitalization’.

## > The menace from within

No wonder that internal threats to sociology also exist, and these are related to the external one. Since many sociologists and sociological communities see that their social role and public significance are increasingly declining, they have decided to turn sociology into a ‘social force’, a sort of broad social movement for a better society. From the perspective of this concept of sociology, issues of scholarship and higher learning are moved into the remote background and the agenda of sociology as a public service is emphasized. ‘Sociologists have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.’ This well-known slogan of Marx, slightly re-worded, is, in fact, the motto of those who try today to change the world long before we are able to understand and interpret it in a scholarly way. For such sociologists action precedes knowledge. Can we agree with this? I cannot. Simply because in this country, Russia, we know well, from the previous history beginning in 1917, what it means to radically reconstruct society before undertaking an analysis.

## > What we should (and should not) do

I am convinced that the place of the sociologist is not on the public/political barricades whilst he or she wears the white robe of a scientist. Of course, a sociologist may at any time become a social and political

worrier for any public goal. However, that would immediately deprive them of the right to represent the science of sociology. We are not supposed to take part in the treatment (as distinct from the analysis) of society. There are many social institutions whose main task is to carry out that treatment: the state, political sphere, public organizations and movements, the press, public opinion, etc. Anyone familiar with the clinical process knows very well that the role of diagnosis is immense, and the final success of the treatment depends utterly on its accuracy and correctness. But diagnosis cannot and should not be mixed up with treatment. They belong to different spheres of expertise. Yes, we can and should contribute to changing the world by maintaining our professional scholarly objectives and also by increasing sociological culture and awareness within our societies through education and mass media. This alone is the ‘public mission of sociology’. Otherwise we would be inclined to become blind guides leading the blind.

**“diagnosis cannot and should not be mixed up with treatment”**

By saying this I am strongly supporting the ten theses of Piotr Sztopka in defense of sociology. The science of sociology for him as for myself is primarily and predominantly scholarship and professional excellence. Everything else is much more questionable. ■



# > Academic Dependency

by **Fernanda Beigel, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas, Universidad Nacional de Cuyo, Mendoza, Argentina**

**I**n his attempt to reduce the sociology of sociology to an ideological exercise, Piotr Sztompka builds a cocktail of academic dependency, intellectual imperialism, and colonialism within sociology, which are lumped together, uncritically naturalized and peremptorily discarded by reducing them to 'a reflection of those more fundamental external divisions in our globalized society' (2011: 389). Leaving aside Sztompka's disrespectful language used to describe peripheral scholars and their writings, my first argument is that critical studies of science have a long history, emerging in the North and in the South by the mid-20th century, when science (and especially social sciences) became embroiled in the Cold War. Academic dependency today has different dimensions and is its own paradigm within current sociology – a 'multi-paradigmatic discipline' according to Sztompka (2010: 22) himself.

As a research field, academic dependency is nourished on the social studies of science, critical epistemology and comparative studies of higher education. It encompasses the unequal structure of *production and circulation* of knowledge that has emerged historically along with the international scientific system. This structure is composed of institutional, material and symbolic processes,

mutually related, which have produced different paths of academia-building. In the periphery, these combinations are the historical result of national and regional responses to internationalization – particularly given the diverse roles played by the state in scientific development and higher education.

There is no shortage of studies on the relation between scientific research and foreign aid, between publishing and scant material resources, about the uneven distribution of academic prestige among disciplines and institutions, or between dissimilar research capacities and heteronomous academic mobility. Within this research field we find the analysis of intellectual dependence, Euro-centrism and colonialism within knowledge production. These studies critically converge with dependency analysis and Latin American structuralism – two traditions mainly concerned with economics and politics. In the second half of the 1970s, pioneer works by Edward Shils, Joseph Ben David and Philip Altbach attested to specific factors shaping subordination within the academic field. In 1988, Frederick Gareau published an important paper in *International Sociology* arguing that Western-forged social sciences built their 'truths' with only marginal input from the Third World, a fact that raised serious questions about their objectivity. His analysis of the *Inter-*

*national Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* showed that 98.1% of the authors were affiliated to North American or European universities – the latter being mainly in the UK, France and Germany.

Recent studies show that 'universal standards' for sociological research and 'good theory' have been constituted and legitimized by the 'international' publishing system started by Eugene Garfield in the 1950s. For many decades, the *Social Science Citation Index's* rankings have been dominated by US and European journals. Academic prestige was progressively concentrated and a set of international hierarchies was established – separating research completed in more prestigious academic centers from marginal knowledge produced and published outside these centers. Despite the growth in scientific production in many peripheral countries, Latin America, Asia and Africa currently contribute less than 20% of the articles published in SSCI (Beigel, 2011)<sup>1</sup>. As a result, striving for academic autonomy has been a complex and uphill task for peripheral sociologies, while it is simply taken for granted in American or French Sociology.

The World Social Science Report (UNESCO, 2010) showed that unevenness in institutional settings, translation capacities and material resources are powerful determinants in

academic life. Collaborative research is still dominated by North-North partnerships, with a minute share of joint South-South articles (2010: 146). Heilbron has shown that symbolic goods produced by central academies – and written in English – have a dramatically broader international circulation than those produced in dominated languages (Spanish, Portuguese, Arab, Russian). The latter's 'export' rates are very low or even zero, as they have minimum access to the more prestigious journals published by the established research centers. It has also been demonstrated that a peripheral circuit can, eventually, reduce foreign imports and increase endogenous production of concepts or theories, but it is far more difficult to increase their international circulation. Especially in the social sciences, these 'peripheral centers' have reached dominant positions within Southern regions, but remain subordinate within 'Global Sociology' (Beigel, 2010).

There is no consensus on the possibilities and paths to overcome academic dependency. From the standpoint of the individual scholar,

**“In fact, we do have many sociologies in the West and ‘in the Rest’ ”**

career-building through international graduate education and publishing in English undoubtedly have provided successful passages to academic recognition – although it has been most generally effective for natural sciences. However, this individual path of accumulating scientific capital does not necessarily lead to broader scientific development in peripheral societies.

A final word on the opposition between Western sociology and Indigenous sociology – two position-takings that have been reduced by Sztompka to homogeneous stereotypes. Sociology in the peripheries is not a new phenomenon, it has its own history, and its own oppositions – one big debate being precisely around the sta-

tus of indigenous knowledge. Equally, the dichotomy also fails to recognize critical perspectives that have been circulating within 'Western Sociology' for at least fifty years. In fact, we do have many sociologies in the West and 'in the Rest'. ■

<sup>1</sup> I have studied the increasing challenge of the open access movement to the SSCI and other mainstream citation indices, along with opposition to the very discussion of international publishing standards within these alternative journals and data bases (Beigel, 2011).

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# > Producing Sociology in Today's Unequal World

by Helga Nowotny, President of the European Research Council, Chair of the Scientific Advisory Board, University of Vienna, Austria, ISA Life Member

**T**wenty-first century sociology finds itself in an unequal world. But it has many more intellectual and scientific resources than I was led to believe after reading the otherwise stimulating debate between Piotr Sztopka and Michael Burawoy. Let me enumerate just three.

## 1. Global science and its unequal opportunities

With the intricate assemblage of frontier research, technologies, and their potential and actual use, science has become a global enterprise. Seen by most governments as the motor of economic growth, national prestige and/or military clout, the transformation of our world through science and technology proceeds at an unprecedented rate. The results of such human intervention are new levels of complexity, accompanied by new uncertainties and the emergence of well-known global and local problems.

The social sciences and humanities and, in particular, sociology, are chal-

lenged to re-think their own foundations in view of what it means to be human, how to cope with our techno-human condition, and under which communal forms of life. Following the claims of Science and Technology Studies about co-production of the social and natural order, questions of unequal access to information, knowledge, education and democratic participation are crucial in view of the – perhaps utopian – vision of a future global scientific citizenship.

The unequal distribution of resources is mirrored in the unequal access to higher education, research funding and optimal research organizations. The overwhelming majority of scientific publications are still being produced in the North, home to the most productive and prestigious universities and research institutions. Meanwhile, with the so-called STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine) disciplines as the main beneficiaries, the picture is rapidly changing as China, India, Brazil and others impressively increase their share. Faced with a host of new societal problems, from climate change to fundamentalism, the importance of social science is

not lost on policymakers. While the pervasive rhetoric of innovation is nothing more than a collective bet on a fragile future, more scientific-technological innovation will inevitably entail more social innovation.

## 2. Sociology's emancipation from the confinements of disciplinary and national boundaries

Compared to sociology's beginnings the importance and salience of disciplinary and national identities have declined markedly. Once constitutive for the founding of the discipline, they risk becoming a liability. Science, in the sense of the inclusive German *Wissenschaft*, is characterized by a dynamic internal plurality. New knowledge often emerges at the interface of established disciplines. Methods, instruments and techniques move creatively across boundaries. Although department-based disciplinary structures remain a powerful disincentive, the expansion of interdisciplinary collaboration is irreversible.

This is not to say that disciplinary boundaries have become completely

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irrelevant. Establishing a disciplinary identity into which students are socialized still matters for learning what constitutes an interesting sociological problem. A widespread feeling persists that a 'sociological core' exists, worthy of being safeguarded against a new academic management intent on subjecting it to norms of efficiency and accountability. This is not only a problem of the West. Given the rapid expansion of the business model of the successful, mostly Anglo-American, university and its eager imitation in the rest of the world, disciplinary boundaries are up for managerial grabs everywhere.

Sociology has proven to be most productive and subversive when spilling over into the territory of other disciplines, insisting on human agency and bringing back society in its bewildering plurality. Although sociology grew up in the shadow of the nation-state, equating the problem of social order with territorial claims, from today's perspective each national sociology reveals itself as part of an ecosystem of plural knowledges, inevitably shaped by different institutional arrangements and by political, economic and cultural contexts.

Working against its self-provincialization, sociology must continue its emancipation from the confines of disciplinary and national boundaries. It remains to be seen whether it is ready to become a 'postdiscipline' by pluralizing and globalizing its practices. Historically, this would follow the shift from a hierarchical order (with the *Leviathan* as its ancestor) to the heterogeneous flow of social movements and networks with their own ambivalent challenges in the absence of still-to-be-invented institutions.

### 3. The imaginary real utopia of alternative knowledge

A knowledge utopia must articulate the epistemic assumptions on which it wants to build as well as the criteria for validating its own knowledge pro-

duction. It must find its place in the very real knowledge hierarchy which it challenges. Among the enduring legacies of the Enlightenment are the strong opposition to all religious and political authorities, its deeply rooted skepticism and the belief that all knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is only temporary, to be succeeded by an evolving expansion of the human understanding of the world. Truth itself – and allowing for plural truths – is in constant evolution. This is the main reason why Enlightenment thought has persisted and why any attempt to devise alternative modes of knowledge production will be up against this powerful, because self-renewing, process.

## “The Enlightenment needs re-thinking or even re-inventing”

In many other respects, the Enlightenment needs re-thinking or even re-inventing (Aboagora). It has to come to terms with its own, in-built contradiction between sentiments (including moral sentiments), reason and reasonableness; between the fiction of the autonomous individual and its ties to a changing plurality of collectivities. It must revisit the untenable dichotomy between the natural and the artificial. It must admit the falsity of its universalism, embracing instead the idea of global contextualism.

This is why projects like 'Provincializing Europe' (Dipesh Chakrabarty) or 'Another Knowledge is Possible' (De Sousa Santos, 2007) are rallying cries to transcend Northern epistemologies and to recognize an epistemic diversity. Such real knowledge utopias are possible because their imaginary is infused with alternative criteria such

as human dignity, collective justice, and the capacity to aspire (Arjun Appadurai) or because they include subaltern movements, while resisting the temptation to anchor their utopia in the quicksand of relativism. They will have to engage with existing hierarchies of knowledge production even as these are undergoing rapid transformation through the enormous global educational opportunities offered by the use of new technologies that open up knowledge monopolies, and through access to the co-production of knowledge. Yet I can only agree with the sober conclusion of the Royal Society: 'English looks set to continue to be the dominant language for research, and the global research community is, by and large, prepared to adapt to this'. ■

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# > When the End of War Doesn't Mean Peace

by Alice Szczepanikova, Alexander von Humboldt Post-doctoral Research Fellow, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany



| Violence continues in devastated Chechnya.

**L**uba Vladovskaja invited me to her dark, cold apartment in a Viennese suburb. After spending many long days and nights in the cellars and bomb shelters of Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, she asked her sons to find her an apartment with big windows. She got her big windows but they face a dirty courtyard and have cracked frames that cause draught and make the flat even colder. She shares this grossly

over-priced two-room apartment with her son and husband. The couple was forced to leave Chechnya in 2008 and they were granted asylum in Austria. Their two sons had to flee earlier after falling victims to unlawful detention and torture. Their story shows that the end of war in Chechnya has not brought peace and stability to its civilians and that having asylum in a European country does not guarantee security and life without fear.

It is 17 years since the first Russo-Chechen war began and 12 years since the start of the second campaign. In 2002, the war was proclaimed over by the then president Vladimir Putin. Throughout the following two years, Russian citizens – mostly coming from Chechnya – constituted the largest group of asylum seekers in Europe. Austria accepted a large share of these applications. Russia continues to be among the top three

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source countries of asylum seekers in the European Union. Despite increasing rejection rates for people from the North Caucasus all over Europe, they still struggle to come.

In the 2000s, the administration of the country was handed to pro-Moscow Chechens in what was dubbed as Chechenization of the conflict. They were to conduct the 'anti-terrorist' campaign themselves. Receiving strong support from Moscow, the Chechens were gradually given substantial leeway to run the country. Thus, although Chechnya is part of the Russian Federation, it has its own parallel system of criminal code proceedings with unwritten rules that condone falsification of evidence and torture. Hundreds of people are becoming its victims. The local authorities have a distinctive way of investigating crimes. They first identify potential perpetrators and only later pick evidence which implicates them in the criminal act. This evidence is often flimsy and based on testimonies extracted through torture. But in the environment where most of the representatives of the criminal justice system are loyal to the pro-Moscow regime, it is an efficient way to deal with the backlog of cases and to secure one's personal career advancement; all in the name of the fight against 'Islamist terrorism'.

Luba's son Mikhail Vladovskij was acquitted in 2005 after two years in jail.

He was imprisoned for allegedly blowing up cars occupied by members of the armed forces. He was supposed to have committed these crimes together with another man whom he, in fact, first met in the temporary detention of the district police department in Grozny where they were both tortured. Given how typical the case was, the acquittal came as a surprise. Anna Politkovskaya and Natalia Estemirova, prominent human rights defenders (both later killed), wrote articles about the uniqueness of this Supreme Court decision. The judge simply decided to look more closely at the evidence and the case fell apart. As Mikhail was recovering from his many injuries, it was clear that he and his brother, who was also tortured to give evidence against Mikhail, would have to leave the country to avoid another imprisonment. Indeed, the Prosecutor's office successfully appealed against the acquittal. After their departure, Luba kept trying to prove Mikhail's innocence and to bring his torturers to justice. This soon became dangerous. She had to endure numerous visits by the armed forces to her house and was shot at from a passing car. She understood it was time for her to leave too. After surviving the two wars in Chechnya, it was the process of 'normalization' under the Chechen authorities that made her leave for good.

After Luba had settled into her new home, her many illnesses started

coming out. Back in Chechnya, she simply could not afford to deal with them. She spent a long time in hospitals. But fear can hardly be cured. She says it is so deeply inside her that she cannot get rid of it. Luba shivers even when her phone rings. Does she have a reason to be afraid? In 2009, Umar Israilov, a young Chechen man, who was also granted refugee status in Austria, was shot dead on a street in broad daylight in Vienna. He formally accused Russia's government of allowing executions and torture of illegally detained people in Chechnya and pointed to direct involvement of the current Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov in these practices. By killing Israilov in such a way, not only a court witness was eliminated but a very effective lesson was given to Chechen refugees. Mistrust pervades Chechen communities as numerous informants of Kadyrov's regime are believed to operate in Europe. Those who carried out the killing were handed harsh sentences in Austria this year. The link to those who were suspected of ordering it remains unproven. As Kadyrov's patron, Vladimir Putin, is bracing himself for another term as Russia's president, the impunity in Chechnya is likely to continue. ■

# > Congress of the Latin American Sociological Association: Final Declaration

by Raquel Sosa Elízaga, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, ISA Vice-President for the Program of the Yokohama Congress, 2014



Chilean students making their protests felt at the Congress of the Association of Latin American Sociology, September, 2011.

**T**he XXVIIIth Congress of the Latin American Sociological Association took place from September 6 to 10 in Recife, Brazil 2011, attracting 4,578 participants and 9,716 registered students, professionals, researchers and teachers. Dozens of professors, students and fellows of the University of Recife and other Brazilian universities carried out an extraordinary collective effort to organize seven keynote lectures, nine integrative sessions, 25 thematic sessions, 52 roundtable sessions and 30 working groups. It was a vigorous, active,

critical and engaging community, made up mostly of youth, that gave meaning to our debates and common quests, to the questions we formulated and the research results we presented in one of the most intense Congresses ever experienced by our Association.

Our region is one of contrasts. On the one hand, we have Mexico's tragic loss of 50,000 victims and the urgent demand for justice and a stop to what can now be termed genocide; the constant pain arising from the destruction



and snail-pace reconstruction of Haiti; the threat of having old genocide perpetrators re-establish themselves in Guatemala; new tyrants replacing the will of thousands of citizens in Honduras; the continuation of the infamous economic blockade that has threatened the freedom of the Cuban people for the last 50 years; the existence of foreign military bases in Cuba, Colombia and Puerto Rico. On the other hand, we have examples of how our people have constructed alternatives that demonstrate that we have the memory and strength to overcome the difficulties we face: Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Cuba of course and Peru more recently, have opened a compass of hope among our people, aware of the grave problems stalking the future of millions of human beings in our great region.



Paulo Henriques Martins, elected President of the Latin American Sociological Association at the Recife Congress, September, 2011.

Latin America is the most unequal region in the world. Violence takes the lives of over 140,000 human beings a year; more than 30% of the population is struck by poverty; over 8% is illiterate. We have not done enough to prevent our universities and higher education institutions from settling into privileged positions, while thousands of human beings are unable to meet their basic needs of survival. Moreover, we have not been able to prevent our universities from becoming – whether gradually or

abruptly – centers for specialization and professionalism where students and faculty are estranged from their surrounding cultural, social and political life, not to mention the context of great economic frailty.

Yet it is encouraging to see that it was in Chile, the starting point of neoliberal policies in our universities, that a libertarian movement erupted in defense of public education. As in Chile, student and faculty movements have also taken off in Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil, Puerto Rico in defense of the public university. Many professionals and social scientists are raising their voices to demand our sovereignty, our right to decide the affairs of our public life, starting with education. In this struggle we commit ourselves to critical thinking, our best legacy to present and future generations. We thus salute the formation of the Institute of Latin American Inquiries (*Instituto de Pesquisas Latinoamericanas*) at the Federal University of Recife, which will undoubtedly make important contributions to regional social science debates.

Those of us present affirm our commitment to continuing the path set out by our colleagues who founded this association: Ruy Mauro Marini, Octavio Ianni, Florestán Fernandes, Agustín Cueva, René Zavaleta, Eduardo Ruiz Contardo, Lucía Sala. Among many others, we honor their memory as well as that of thousands of courageous individuals who have defeated terror, who confront femicide, racism, intolerance and genocide in our America. Our people confront all kinds of adversity threatening their dignity to survive with strength and creativity. It is our role to contribute with all of our imagination and unfaltering will, to conquer the space dreamt of by Toussaint Louverture, Hidalgo and Morelos, Bolívar, Artigas, O'Higgins and San Martín, José Martí, Benito Juárez, Sandino, Farabundo Martí, Che Guevara, Salvador Allende. "Long Live Latin American Sociology! Long live ALAS!"

*Professor Elízaga's "Final Declaration" to the ALAS Congress in Recife, was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly. ■*



# > Sociology for Turbulent Times: Address to the European Sociological Association

by Anália Torres, Universidade Técnica de Lisboa, President of the European Sociological Association, 2009-2011



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Jennifer or the Rotation of the Flight Attendants – a dramatic performance by Carré Rouge Cie at the Congress of the European Sociological Association in Geneva, September 9, 2011. Photo by Sandro Cattacin.

**S**ocial Relations in Turbulent Times, the theme of the European Sociological Association's 10th Conference, held in Geneva, September 7-10, 2011, seems to have been on target. Turbulence is indeed an everyday reality, especially since the beginning of 2011.

In Europe, at the economic level we are facing what I dare term a financial war. In the 20th century we had two devastating world wars and then a 'cold' one; in the 21st

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century we are facing a financial and economic war. The pressure from financial markets and rating agencies looks and feels like a military invasion, touching country after country, beginning, of course, with the most fragile economies and attacking the euro. Neoliberal global dominance tends to invade all spheres – from markets to states and universities – subjecting them to its logic. At the same time the effect of the crisis at the social level has led to counter-reactions and violent protests. All this is compounded by an incredible ideological mystification. Private interests are saved with public money while public expenditure is blamed for the crisis!

How did we get here? The crisis we are living through seems the logical outcome of a trend foreseeable since the beginning of the 1980s. European sociologists have been insisting for long on the negative impact of the main political, economical and financial developments that led us here. Three parallel trends can be identified, sometimes intertwining, sometimes coexisting in contradiction and conflict.

The first trend is the financial and economic one. Global finance and its extraordinary mobility combine to dictate politics to regions and nation-states. In the last 20 years the power of multinational corporations with their access to new reservoirs of cheap labor puts ever greater strain on European countries. These pressures led to processes of fission and disintegration all through the 1990s. At the same time the mobility of financial capital makes states helpless in controlling and regulating it. Economic recession and the crisis of the welfare state are among the consequences of these processes. For sociologists it was not difficult to predict that clashes would arise under conditions of exclusion and economic deprivation. That is exactly what we are witnessing: serious conflicts, spontaneous protest and even violent riots.

A second trend takes place at the political level. The creation of the European Union was already a sign of the contradictory forces of disintegration referred to above. The

EU represented a significant effort to build a body of norms and institutions defending human rights, fighting against nationalisms, or any other 'ism', and disparaging ideas of national supremacy. Moreover, these political norms and efforts were not nourished by ancient traditions – religious or other – but were lessons learned in World War II and the Holocaust. However, since the creation of the EU the tendency that seems to be winning is the neoliberal recipe of deregulation that has become the commanding force over the European Commission. The coalition of interests and political ideas that inspired the founders of the European Union and its social conception no longer prevail.

A third trend is the connection between civil society and the social and political agendas in Europe and at the global level. We are only too aware of the civic and political action against cuts and unemployment, against precarious jobs and prevailing immigration policies, and against the degradation of the planet. Yet it is obvious that there is a massive imbalance of power between civic players and multinational corporations. Not surprisingly, protests are often more explosions of rage against striking inequalities than organized actions with clear goals. They remind us of the period of early industrialisation and the insurgency of the 'dangerous classes'.

Sociologists and social scientists have had an important role contributing to public policies and building the European social model. But we need much more than that now. It is urgent that we refine our analysis of the present crisis, mapping our domains of ignorance, and, to give only one example, opening the black box of the financial markets. It is urgent that we disseminate our results and discuss them publically, denouncing the negative impact of neoliberal choices and recipes. It is urgent that we connect our European efforts with our colleagues around the world, developing the diagnoses of Global Sociology and utilizing the strategies of Public Sociology as Michael Burawoy and others in the International Sociological Association have been doing. ■



# > Goodbye, Devorah Hello, Mohammed

**Devorah Kalekin finishes her term as the founding editor of the *International Sociology Review of Books (ISRB)*, and hands over to her successor Mohammed Bamyeh, at the end of 2011. Her important contributions are celebrated in an e-mail interview with Jennifer Platt, ISA Vice-President for Publications.**



Mohammed Bamyeh, the new editor of *International Sociology Review of Books*.

## Goodbye Devorah...

### **JP: How did you come to develop the idea of ISRB?**

**DK:** The idea of an ISA publication dedicated to book reviews was initiated by Susan McDaniel, VP for Publications just before me. She was inspired to make the suggestion by the ASA's *Contemporary Sociology*, one of the most popular of the ASA journals. At the time *International Sociology* was published only four times a year, and expanding the book review section (which you [JP] edited) to fill another two issues per year was justified only if those could provide information not easily found elsewhere. I was then a member of the Publications Committee, and since I was interested, Susan asked me to write a proposal.

I wrote then that "the initiation of an ISA journal dedicated to reviewing publications in the field is no less than a bid to rekindle the sociological imagination. [...] Despite doubts about the benefits of the advance of economic globalization, sociology as a science must 'go global'. How social processes can be explicated under widely different political, economic, and historical conditions is understandably

a burning theoretical and practical issue in a world where the free movement of people, goods, and techniques has become a cliché. The proposed journal will [...] implicitly represent an appreciation of the fact that today the discipline is being enriched by the accruing insights of colleagues whose professional expertise is modulated by distinctive experiences of society. [...] It] will be providing an essential service by offering a platform for collecting, ordering, and managing, if not systematizing, varieties of sociological points of view that would ordinarily not be accessible."

Planning started with the name. I hoped that calling it *Review of Books* would suggest suitable *gravitas*. What emerged – review essays, interviews, headings of book review sections that change more or less from issue to issue – had to do with my obsession about combining the spice of variety with a secure disciplinary framework. My understanding is that the editor's task is to ensure that publications reviewed would relate, insofar as possible, to places outside the Anglo-Saxon world; and would review publications in languages other than English. The review essays were envisioned as opportunities to summarize important trends in sociology from different points of view. My plan was for each issue to have three review essays: on classical works, on publications in methodology, and on works in one of the subfields of sociology. I was delighted to find an excuse to include interviews because I love reading them. Reasoning that people who read sociology are probably curious about how the works came to be written, I introduced the section on 'Words from writers'. Another editorial decision was to allow for rather thorough reviews, of about 1,500 words, with 'glances' at important publications which could not be reviewed fully in time for a specific issue.

### **JP: Can you summarise what ISRB has achieved so far?**

**DK:** Although the plans aspired to more than has been accomplished to date, *ISRB's* most important contribution is, to my mind, that it has sensitized readers to the wide scope of disciplinary themes and valid approaches that characterize sociology around the world today. It has also

provided a platform for different generations of sociologists; books reviewed include tomes by young sociologists, as well as by veterans who write contemporary classics. I'm also gratified that reviewers and writers of review essays come from all the continents and, as a matter of fact, from all levels of the academic hierarchy. To some extent *ISRB* has contributed to breaking down the language barrier. There have indeed been reviews of books written in many languages apart from English and, over time, I was able to accept reviews in languages other than English.

**JP: What do you see as special highlights?**

**DK:** There are several, to my mind. Above all, I am grateful to all those who collaborated with *ISRB*, and made it possible to fill each issue with a rich collection of sociological reflections. The interviews are another highlight. Because of space limitations, I had to ask rather schematic questions. But each of the sociologists I have had the pleasure of talking to has disclosed aspects of the discipline that could not be deduced only from reading their work. Their ardor and worldviews often add surprising insights into their publications. I also think it's important that *ISRB* has published reviews of books in relatively new subfields, but has also given place to older works that are relevant.

**JP: How has it been received?**

**DK:** In the current climate of accountability, the professional answer would be to quote an impact factor. Fortunately, or unfortunately, depending on your point of view, the impact factor is not calculated for reviews. Most are solicited; where necessary, revisions are often negotiated by editor-reviewer consultation; and refereeing, except for review essays, is meaningless. So perhaps we can judge by the standing of *International Sociology*. According to SAGE statistics, its impact factor has risen steadily within the last five or six years. One would hope that *ISRB* has made some contribution, albeit hidden, to that record. Beyond that, colleagues have commented favorably; and I'd like to assume that they are sincere.

**JP: Where have you found the most problems?**

**DK:** In a recent e-mail exchange, Alan Sica, the editor of *Contemporary Sociology*, wrote that everybody likes to read reviews and nobody wants to write them. Hopefully the first part of his statement applies to *ISRB*, but undoubtedly, the second part does. The problem besetting an editor of a publication of reviews is soliciting contributions. There is a steady stream of books to the office, and an even more persistent stream of notices about books soon to be published. Reviewing lists of books and descriptions in order to choose the ones most relevant to our enterprise is the fun part; then one has to find reviewers. In an organization like the ISA, with its almost 60 research groups, it is not difficult to find the names of people whose expert opinion

is worth having. But convincing experts that it is in their interest not only to read a newly published work, but also to share their conclusions with colleagues by writing a review, is quite another matter. Obviously, this is a problem that gets solved, but it is troubling.

Another problem that I've encountered refers to the content, and this was not solved to my satisfaction. My plan was regularly to include reviews of visual materials of sociological import. If anything, the range of these materials and their quantity are steadily increasing. Yet, throughout the years of my editorship, I was able to solicit only a handful of articles on socially significant documentary films and video records of encounters with important sociologists.

**JP: Do you have any special message for your successor?**

**DK:** Apart from noting that for me, the years since *ISRB* made its debut have been at once an adventure and a fascinating learning experience, I wouldn't dare! I feel honoured to be handing over the editorship to a distinguished scholar, and wish Mohammed Bamyeh success in furthering the reach of *ISRB* in every sense of the word.

**... Hello Mohammed**

Mohammed Bamyeh, the new editor of *ISRB*, is professor of sociology at the University of Pittsburgh, USA. He has devoted much of his career to teaching and research in Islamic studies, political and cultural globalization, civil society and social movements, and comparative social and political theory. For more detail, see his web site: [www.sociology.pitt.edu/faculty/index.php?q=mohammed-bamyeh/view](http://www.sociology.pitt.edu/faculty/index.php?q=mohammed-bamyeh/view)

He very much looks forward to continuing in the footsteps of Devorah Kalekin, and contributing further to fostering *ISRB*'s unique profile. He invites prospective reviewers who would address lesser known but promising dimensions of sociological inquiry in a variety of world traditions, and places a special emphasis on materials not available in English, or otherwise difficult to access internationally. For e-mail contact: [mab205@pitt.edu](mailto:mab205@pitt.edu) ■